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Editorial Note

The special form assumed by this particular issue may require a word of explanation. Normally the Journal appears twice a year, in May and November; in 1958, however, there will be three issues because of the introduction of a special number devoted in the main to the Political Studies Conference held in Canberra in 1957. This issue therefore becomes Volume IV, Number I, in the sequence.

The importance of the Conference at this particular stage of the development of political science within the Australian universities warranted wide circulation of its findings; this Journal provided the logical means of doing so. Special features associated with the regular numbers have been omitted, though they will appear again in November, and space has been devoted to articles which might be said to supplement the Conference; this is especially true of the article by S. R. Davis and Colin A. Hughes, which provides an analysis of trends in recent Australian research and writing in the field of government.

One personal word. I should like to express my appreciation of the editorial work carried out by Professor Spann. He was responsible for handling the Conference papers and this particular issue is very much his work.

GORDON GREENWOOD.

Foreword

THE AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL STUDIES CONFERENCE CANBERRA 1957

The 1957 Australian Political Studies Conference took place at an appropriate moment. Seven Australian universities are now offering political science courses, and the total number of undergraduates taking subjects in political science or public administration is nearly 1,300.¹ Five universities now offer a three-year pass course, with accompanying honours courses, though the number of honours students is still regrettably small. The number of full-time lecturing appointments is about thirty, and there are also several part-time lecturers and tutors. The largest full-time staff is at the University of Melbourne. At most universities, the typical staff is three or four, and it is rare to find two teachers in the same place with interests in the same field of the subject.

Most of these developments have taken place since the war. In the 1930's, political science courses existed in a number of places, but mainly taught incidentally to the work of other departments. In 1945 there was no full Chair of Political Science in Australia, though the University of Sydney had a Professor of Public Administration (F. A. Bland) and Adelaide a Professor of History and Political Science (G. V. Portus). By 1957 there were seven, including the research Chair at the Australian National University, and a joint Chair of History and Political Science at the University of Queensland. In these post-war years political science has established its position as a university subject.

An Australian Political Studies Association was formed in 1952, to bring together university teachers in political science and allied subjects. It is affiliated to the International Political Science Association. It has held one or two business meetings at the periodical conferences of ANZAAS (the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science). In 1956 it began publication of *A.P.S.A. News*, a bulletin containing short articles and notes of interest to political teachers.

The Conference of University Teachers of Political Science, held at Canberra University College on 28-30 August 1957, was its second major enterprise. It provided the first opportunity for political scientists in Australia to meet for an extended period and discuss the major problems of teaching (and, to a lesser extent, research) in this field. It represented a sort of stocktaking, at which we could consider where our post-war work has got to and where it is and should be heading. A two-day programme of six sessions was planned, to which were invited full-time political science and public administration teachers, and one or two other persons who were thought to have an especially valuable contribution to make.² It was decided not to let the attendance exceed thirty, in order to keep the atmosphere as intimate and informal as possible. An approach was made to the Social Science Research Council of Australia for financial assistance, and a grant of £320 was made. A similar sum was contributed by the various universities.

¹See Appendix A, "Student Enrolments in Political Science".

²A list of conference members is contained in Appendix B.

The programme of the conference was as follows:

Thursday, 29 August
9.30 a.m. to 12.30 p.m.

Politics as a University Subject

Professor P. H. Partridge

Chairman—Professor R. N. Spann

The discussion was opened by B. D. Beddie and Dr. S. R. Davis.

2³⁰ p.m. to 5 p.m.

Three- and Four-Year Courses in Political Science

Professor L. F. Crisp

Chairman—Professor W. Macmahon Ball

The discussion was opened by Professor W. G. K. Duncan and Ruth Atkins.

7.30 p.m. to 10 p.m.

The Teaching of Comparative Government

H. A. Wolfsohn

Chairman—Professor P. H. Partridge

The discussion was opened by D. M. McCallum and S. Encel.

Friday, 30 August
9.15 a.m. to 10.45 a.m.

The Teaching of Public Administration

Dr. B. B. Schaffer

Chairman—Professor W. Macmahon Ball

The discussion was opened by R. S. Parker and T. H. Kewley.

11 a.m. to 12.30 p.m.

The Study of International Relations

Professor G. Greenwood

Chairman—Professor W. Macmahon Ball

The discussion was opened by Lord Lindsay of Birker and C. L. Burns.

2.30 p.m. to 3.30 p.m.

Summary and Conclusions

Professor R. N. Spann and Professor W. Macmahon Ball

Chairman—Professor P. H. Partridge.

The main papers are reprinted below, with a report summarizing the discussions.

Various individuals and bodies co-operated to make the conference possible. It was financed jointly by the Social Science Research Council of Australia and by the participating universities. It met in the Council Room of Canberra University College and its members were accommodated in University House. Our indebtedness for this is to many persons, in particular to Professors W. D. Borrie, H. Burton and A. D. Trendall. The brunt of the amazingly efficient work of organization was borne by Professor L. F. Crisp and Mr. S. Encel, to whom we owe immense gratitude. Mr. H. Mayer first had the idea, though he was unfortunately overseas when it came to fruition. Professor C. B. Hagan, of the University of Illinois, gave the conference an international flavour, and reminded us of the important American work in our field. A number of political scientists kindly contributed supplementary papers, of which we have only been able to print one or two; I have tried to deal faithfully with the others in my general commentary. Mrs. Joyce Hodgson and Mrs. Marcia Daniel acted as reporters, and their excellent summaries of the discussions have considerably lightened the editorial task. The cost of printing this report is being borne jointly by the Social Science Research Council of Australia and by the University of Queensland, whom Professor Greenwood has successfully interested in our endeavours.

R. N. SPANN

Political Studies: A Conference Report

By R. N. SPANN

It might be useful to begin by mentioning a number of things the members of the conference largely took for granted. The first relates to the objectives of political science as taught in the Australian universities. Professor Partridge indicated various possibilities in his opening paper, and it might have been expected that his view of the relative importance of these would have aroused some discussion. In particular, the conference might have debated the question of how far we are content with the notion of political science as a broad "cultural" subject, "essential for an educated understanding of the working of the society in which we live" (in Partridge's words); or whether we should devote more effort than we do to specialized kinds of training, as the psychologists, and to a lesser extent the economists, have tended to do. Some possibilities in this direction were mentioned; the need for a supply of graduates with a considerable knowledge of the political institutions and problems of Asian countries; training in statistical or survey techniques; specialist courses in the administrative field. But by and large the conference gratefully accepted the Partridge view that "whatever other objectives we may find time to achieve", we must make sure that we "produce students with a good understanding of politics".

It should be noted that Partridge did not suggest that "specialist" objectives were unimportant. He implied, indeed, that some time might be left for them. He also recognized the vagueness of his first formulation of the major objective of "understanding". Much of the rest of his paper represents an attempt to come to closer grips with what this might involve. He did not minimize the degree to which such a formula leaves open the danger of woolliness and allusiveness. "The teaching of political institutions can easily become a matter of broad impressions pepped up with some rapid generalization in the manner, shall we say, of some of Laski's writing on political institutions."

A second thing which we took largely for granted is that political science had established its claim to be an independent subject, with its own department and honours school. It seemed to be widely agreed that, although political science has no distinctive "method" (as mathematics, philosophy and law may be said to have), it has a reasonably distinctive "subject-matter",¹ though Mr. Beddie had doubts about it. This has recently been defined as follows:

Political activities are those that connect with the phenomenon of government and all that that entails. . . . Government is what we find when we come across a ruler-ruled situation, a situation,

¹On this, see also W. A. Robson, *The University Teaching of Social Sciences: Political Science*, Paris, UNESCO, 1954, p. 17 and W. Harrison, "Understanding Politics", *Occidente* Vol. XI, No. 3, 1955.

that is to say, that is more permanent than a hold-up (and not, of course, necessarily of the same character); but a situation, also, that is not confined to states; a situation, moreover, involving policies, but one involving also rules and procedures and probably laws, and therefore one involving authority as well as power.²

If we think of political institutions and processes defined in some such way as an important object of study in their own right, we have part of the case for political science as a subject.

At the same time we were all ready to accept the implications of Partridge's view that "political science is not one of the primary colours in the social science spectrum". It must draw on many methods of approaching its subject-matter, some of which have been devised by historians, philosophers, lawyers, economists, sociologists. It remains heavily dependent on other forms of knowledge, especially history.³ We most of us took it for granted that plenty of room has to be left in a political science degree for some basic training in these other fields, especially in the early years. But no one maintained that the study of politics and government was best left carved-up between the philosophers, historians, lawyers, etc.; what Partridge had to say on this point seemed generally acceptable. An epitome of our view might be that only we "take politics seriously", and have the disposition to examine the phenomenon of government squarely, and not peripherally to some quite different focus of interest.

There was some discussion of the subjects most useful as a background to a political science course. The main stress, in more than one paper presented at the conference, was on history, or the lack of it. Professors Crisp and Duncan made a particular point of this in their papers. The former regretted "the virtual disappearance of the . . . old first-year university course in constitutional history from all Australian history departments". He indicated that this has driven many political science departments (*e.g.* Adelaide, Tasmania) into including a good deal of elementary historical material in their own courses; and there was some agreement that political scientists will need to continue to some point to be their own historians. There were suggestions that guided reading could be made more use of to fill this (and other) gaps; instances were cited of courses which at some early stage tested the students' knowledge of an elementary historical text. But, as Mr. Parker said, "History schools do exist"; and we should strive to get them interested in courses that meet our needs. Professor Greenwood returned to the subject in his paper on international relations. Professor Partridge thought all students should "do several courses in history".

A number of other background subjects were mentioned, *e.g.* philosophy, economics, psychology, constitutional law, and had their supporters. Perhaps it would not convey too wrong an impression to say that, given that a good background in history and one or two other social sciences was provided, the members of the

²Harrison, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-1.

³I would myself wish to dispute the view that history and economics had a distinctive "method" in some sense that political science has not; but it is all the same true that (as Partridge indicates) they have at present much more to teach us than we have them.

conference were not unduly worried about the precise mixture; and prepared to agree that useful work could be done in political science by students taking a variety of combinations of other subjects.

The question of what subjects are most useful to the specialist in political science is, of course, not quite the same as the broader one of the place of political science in the general university curriculum. If we took it for granted that we had earned our "independence", we all at the same time expected that our courses would continue to be offered in various forms as a "subject" in general Arts and Economics degrees; and some of us at least thought that it was useful for there to be at least one course which could be offered even more widely, as part of the general education of interested students in many faculties including Science faculties. Professor Duncan thought there would ultimately be a need for a separate first-year course for those who were not continuing with political science;⁴ but others thought such courses tended to be of a low standard, and made it hard for the student who changes his mind and wishes to continue; and that there were better ways of using limited teaching resources.

First and Second Year Courses

A great deal of the discussion which followed centred on the basic pass courses, and there was relatively little discussion of honours work. It was perhaps a healthy sign that the stress was on the needs of the generality of students. Honours schools in political science are small, and though we hope that numbers will increase, it is still true that few specialized jobs are open to them. We have less ground than most people for neglecting the competent pass student in favour of the select few, and for (as it was put) "giving all the interesting parts to the honours students".

On some general points a fair amount of agreement emerged. First, it was widely agreed that political science courses should be offered from the first university year onwards, as is now already the case in most Australian and overseas universities. It is reasonable that some pass students taking the normal three-year degree in Arts and social science faculties should be able to include three political science courses if they wish.

Second, most people thought that the main course offered in the first two years should form a "common core" for pass and honours students, on which more specialized studies could be built. This should have some regard to the many students who do only two years political science. There was some healthy dissent on this point from Queensland, whose representatives stoutly resisted the notion that there was some virtue in uniformity as between different universities in this, as in other matters. Professor Crisp's case for more uniformity in his paper below was (in my opinion correctly) treated as really a case for mutual regard and reciprocity, not bothering too much about the precise content of courses. Professor Greenwood thought it might be necessary to begin options in the second year *e.g.* for students interested in public administration.

⁴The statistics show a heavy drop in numbers as years go on (see Appendix A). In Melbourne, for example, many law students do one year of political science.

Nor would everyone accept Crisp's notion that these courses were primarily to be regarded as "stocking-up", with the student primed "to accumulate in genial confidence" (as Wordsworth put it). Some wanted the emphasis even at this stage to be more on problems than Crisp's account might suggest.

Third, there was a good deal of emphasis on the need for selection, for not trying to cram too much into courses but covering what is covered thoroughly; and, closely connected with this, that we should deal with the various parts of the subject "squarely", keeping allusiveness in check.

Finally, there seemed to be a considerable agreement that the core subjects should have an "institutions" and a "theory" component in both years. The nature of these is discussed below.

Political Institutions Courses

It was agreed that in the first two years we should aim at giving a good working knowledge of the politics and government of four countries—Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R.—with enough general discussion of political institutions and processes to give students some idea of what a political system is. Anything else we do, from including some history and some reference to political ideas to referring to other countries or making comparative studies in selected fields, should be marginal to this central concern.

There was wide agreement that in the first year the important thing was to give a fairly wide coverage of British and Australian government, coming back perhaps in a later year for the more intensive treatment of Australian problems. For Crisp, as for others, the dominant problems of this first-year course were three:

- (a) to preserve sufficient time for introducing students to some of the basic concepts and principles underlying the British-Australian system;
- (b) to cull the British section of the course to leave only those aspects most significant for the business in hand (*i.e.* an introductory course); and
- (c) to eschew overloading and over-sophistication in the Australian section by a discriminating selection and treatment of topics.

In the discussion, a number of people also emphasised that a programme of guided reading, accompanied by some tutorials and tests, could do a good deal to fill gaps, and leave the lecturer freer to select topics for extended treatment.

One of the main difficulties in the first-year course is the relative weight to be given to British as compared with Australian government. It was once solved for us by the scantiness of the Australian materials, but this situation is rapidly changing. Various views were expressed. Some thought that British government could best be introduced historically, in terms of the political and constitutional conceptions that Australia had inherited *e.g.* parliamentary supremacy, Cabinet government, the rule of law; and after this, only referred to selectively and in a comparative fashion, in the course of dealing primarily with Australian government. Others wanted to give the two roughly equal weight as separate studies; Mr. Jupp pointed out that in some fields, *e.g.* electoral sociology, the British material was still much better than the Australian.

Mr. Encel thought that we should leave time not merely for simple comparisons between Australia and the United Kingdom, but for some discussion of "problems" that arise in the two countries. He thought the biggest difficulty in a first-year institutions course was to get students interested, and to see the significance of what they were doing. He thought it possible at this stage to take up one or two quite practical issues, *e.g.* arbitration, and to make students see the issues involved.

As the chairman of this discussion summarized it:

The course which emerges is one which gives people a simple framework at the beginning; treats fair and square some combination of British and Australian institutions, including a certain amount of history of the main developments; does a bit of exploration in the course of this, of some of the theoretical implications; and leaves quite a lot of that exploration to some other place.

Second Year

There was almost universal agreement that the second-year basic institutions course should be mainly concerned with America and Russia. This is in fact already true at a number of Australian universities, and most of the points made by Professor Crisp on this subject aroused little controversy. Most people agreed with him that, though in principle it was also desirable to deal with a Western European country (France or Germany) and an Asian country, this over-crowded the course. One of these should be sacrificed; Mr. McCallum and others argued that we should go further and omit both. If we are to give an adequate survey of how a political system works, with some historical background, and some attempt to relate political principles and practice, a self-denying ordinance is certainly indicated.

The amount of sacrifice involved seems partly to depend on one's attitude to "comparative government". A common view was that America and Russia needed at least a term each; if (as Professor Crisp thought) the final term should be mainly devoted to comparative problems, there is little or no time for anything else. Unfortunately the discussion on Mr. Wolfsohn's paper on comparative government was somewhat confused—it came at the end of a hard day.

Wolfsohn himself (see his paper printed below) was sceptical about comparative study as often conceived, and thought much of it futile or misleading; a medium for superficial comparisons; or based on some illusory hope that out of compared instances some general theory would emerge. Experience up to now shows that only a few institutions can be "more or less safely" lifted out of their environment. The comparative method should be thought of rather in terms of "experimental transfer", *i.e.* a way of showing up the character of the particular society in which we are interested.

Interestingly enough, Wolfsohn did not think the society-by-society method applicable to Asia, apparently because change is so rapid that it is not intelligible to think of Asian societies as "political systems" *i.e.* in terms of some more or less static set of interdependencies. There the most promising line of attack is "analysis

by problems" *i.e.* in terms of ways of meeting basic social and economic needs of a more or less common character. But this type of study was not in his view suited to a second-year course.

McCallum thought that this was unduly pessimistic. Provided one confined oneself to societies (and/or institutions) that looked comparable, it could be enlightening to discuss *e.g.* Cabinets, systems of judicial review, and so on, in Western-type democracies; some of the comparative work in K. C. Wheare's *Modern Constitutions* is of this type. He thought that Wolfsohn was inclined to confuse the problem of transferability of institutions with that of having a general theory about institutions.

If our interest is the generalizing or theoretical one we should often work from a limited field to a more extended one (from judicial review as it operates in Australia or the United States to judicial review in general), though we shall also make discoveries very often by our attempts to test or debunk large-scale views about *the* state, like the Marxist one.

Encel went even further in his criticism of the opening paper.⁵ Wolfsohn's "experimental transfer" should, in fact, continually take place when we taught by the country-by-country method, in the shape of "functional comparisons", as S. H. Beer had called them. As Professor Beer had said, the teacher "will be able, as such comparisons accumulate, to present a more or less systematic view of the probable consequences of various elements when they appear in different political and social contexts", *e.g.* the power of dissolution, proportional representation, legislative committees, constitutional emergency powers. Political science does in fact already possess a fair amount of systematic knowledge. Encel thought we often missed these opportunities, by failing to treat British and Australian government in part comparatively, and failing to use the honours and advanced courses for comparative study.

One reason for the superficiality of much of this work in the past was precisely the failure to theorize enough, *i.e.* to develop a proper framework in the light of which comparisons can be made. There is scope for a true "comparative government" course of this kind, probably at third- or fourth-year level. S. E. Finer and R. C. Macridis have outlined some possibilities.⁶ Comparative government has been too much concerned with institutions, not enough with "processes"—it has often assumed that the same institution has the same function in different countries. If we concentrated, for example, on the "decision-making process", a comparative study of the important decision-making groups in countries—who they are, recruitment, tenure, social images of them—could fill a large part of a year's course. It might also be profitable to examine the theories implicit in the comparative work of Bryce, Weber, Laski, etc.; and to examine in detail one or two "problems", *e.g.* the probable consequences of the introduction of proportional representation into a particular political system.

⁵He has since outlined some of his views in "Some Reflections on Comparative Government", *A.P.S.A. News*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1957, pp. 4-6.

⁶See S. E. Finer, "On the Teaching of Politics", *Universities Quarterly*, Vol. VIII, No. 1, Nov. 1953, and R. C. Macridis, *The Study of Comparative Government*, New York, 1955.

Wolfsohn did not dispute that there was a subject called political sociology, to which comparative government could be regarded as introductory. Its function, he thought, was to discuss and generalize about those institutions and processes which can to a considerable extent be understood without reference to other institutions; and to examine causal factors which seem to be common. For example, in advanced countries, one could do real comparative work by examining how the process of industrialization has affected the political life of different countries. This is quite different from *e.g.* comparing constitutions, or federations, in a way that can lead to no theory of constitutions or of federalism. It is also different from the sort of methodological framework suggested *e.g.* by Macridis, which is "only a more learned way of saying that societies should be analysed in more detail"; with which he did not disagree. This was what was being done in some second-year courses on America and Russia already.

Partridge said he was still unclear about the (theoretical or non-theoretical) objective of "comparing" elements in the political systems of two or more countries. One kind of comparison might serve the same logical function as the natural scientist's experiment. It might, that is, consist of testing a hypothesis concerning the conditions of a particular political phenomenon by studying another case of it where some of the conditions are different. This should be distinguished from "comparing", say, the different methods used to ensure legislative control over supply.

Jupp thought that it was very difficult to undertake the business of comparison (with whatever result) without some kind of theoretical framework. Most of the work done, for example, on parties and elections has been done by people steeped in sociology. Partridge thought that what Macridis and Encel were after was to lay some groundwork for comparing, a basis for hypotheses for the testing or development of which the comparison is undertaken.

It is hard to summarize the result of the discussion. It seemed to be agreed that (a) comparative government is worth undertaking, indeed in some sense inevitably involved in giving a clear picture of a political system; (b) it involves some preliminary identification of the main elements of such a system. Thereafter the conference could be roughly divided into (i) (at the theoretical level) those who hoped to approach some general theory of political phenomena; and those who saw comparison mainly as a means of bringing out the "uniqueness" of each society; (ii) (at the practical level) those who liked the sort of comparison that might lead to suggestions for "institutional transfer" between political systems; and those who thought that the scope for this kind of thing was very limited, or impossible, because you can't reform political systems that way, if at all.

It is even more difficult to say what this amounts to in terms of teaching; perhaps

(a) that it is valuable, in the course of discussing particular political systems, to show by reference to other countries how differences in the structure of a particular institution, *e.g.* the Cabinet, are connected with other important differences in the structure of the systems;

(b) that a few topics may be suited to the testing of general hypotheses about politics or alternatively to the simple indication that there are different ways of doing things in different countries. This seems a case where the proof of the pudding is quite peculiarly in the eating; it may be suggested that our experiments be reported to one another;

(c) that, as the export of institutions is currently happening in certain fields, it would do no harm to discuss one or two cases of this kind, as they affect "emergent states";

(d) that the discussion reinforced the need for giving students some account of the main elements of a political system, as a framework for comparison and a basis for hypotheses. My own view, as stated earlier, is that *some* of this should be done at the beginning of first year; and that perhaps a second-year institutions course could usefully include, before any systematic comparisons are attempted, two or three lectures on the main structural elements of a political system (as evidenced by British-Australian-U.S.A.-U.S.S.R.) and on problems of comparison, at a more sophisticated level.

Political Theory Courses

There was less agreement about what these should consist of, though we were all conscious of a gap to be filled and felt that most of us were not filling it adequately. A common practice in Australian and some English universities is for the main "theory" course to be a course in the history of political ideas, what has been called by an unfriendly critic "a ramble through archaic opinions", looked after in their spare time by the philosophers. Such a course has something to be said for it, not least that it can be firmly anchored to a number of "classical" texts.⁷

Partridge gave some reasons why it would not do the job needed in a "core" course for the generality of students, and the reader will find these below. Perhaps they are summarized in his assertion that "problems have to be defined in the form in which they present themselves to us, concerned as we are with the institutions and conditions of our own time"; (or, as he put it later in discussion: "Mill did not contemplate the contexts in which liberty is now discussed"). They raise empirical as well as philosophical issues; and so can most profitably be taught by someone who has a living interest in contemporary political and social institutions, and in a way that arises naturally out of the problems with which those institutions present us. (Mr. Beddie pointed out that this was true of the classical political philosophers themselves.)

All this was fairly readily assented to by many of us. The discussion concerned itself with two main issues. First, there were those who thought that Partridge had dismissed the history of political ideas too lightly. Crisp went furthest perhaps, in asking for a first-year course which should be "a broad survey of the problems and issues of politics which have been faced by the Greeks, the Romans, the people

⁷The arguments for the study of such texts are discussed in W. Harrison, "Texts in Political Theory", *Political Studies*, Feb. 1955 (*pro*) and A. Hacker, "Capital and Caribuncles: the Great Books Reappraised", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3, Sept. 1954 (*con*).

of Medieval Christendom, etc., and of the ways and styles in which they thought about them". It should "*not* be given by the philosophy department". Mr. Parker indicated that at Victoria University College, the "theory content" of the first-year course included the basic political ideas of Plato and Aristotle, as well as some discussion of liberal-democratic theories in their institutional setting.⁸ Others argued in favour of courses, usually at second-year level, which could at least be anchored to a few "classical" texts (see below). My impression of the discussion that followed was that most people thought that Partridge's was the *ideal* solution; but that some of us doubted our capacity to organize such a course. Many who doubted whether the history of political ideas should be a "core course" were still hopeful that it might be squeezed in somewhere.

Second, a promising dispute looked as though it might develop between Partridge and Beddie about how far political theory so defined should be taught in a separate course, and how far as part of institutional courses, as "the clarification of our insights into the facts".⁹ But this dispute petered out at an early stage. It became clear that most people agreed that some theoretical framework must form part of institutional courses; as Beddie put it, "unless a student has some background of theory, he doesn't see the reason for penetrating to the significant detail" of political institutions and processes; perhaps we should say, enough theory, but only enough, to make possible the significant discussion of how political institutions work. Partridge thought that some courses, for example a course on the Soviet Union, might include a good deal of theory. He also accepted Dr. Davis's formula that even the separate theory course, at least in the early stages, would consist of "suggestive exercises" within a select list of topics that emerge fairly naturally from the institutional studies that are concurrently being made. Mr. Truman thought it would be a pretty drab life for other lecturers if there were a special "theory" man, leaving the rest with the "hard yakker". He thought that each of us should develop the theory that arises out of his own subject in his own way. Parker sympathized with these worries. But "the only way to get theory done is to specialize", though some interchange of staff on different courses would be desirable. Dr. Dowling thought it might be dangerous to think, as Partridge did, of theory at the undergraduate level as an "integrating" subject. "Should students have their heads battered against the problem of integration? Why should we worry unduly about it? The historians don't seem to."

One was left with some doubts about where all this led, especially in the case of the first-year pass student. There is clearly room for a good deal of experiment.

Partridge sketched in his paper some possible topics: (a) the purposes and nature of a political system, with some discussion of terms like "state", "sovereignty", "law", "power", "consent", and so on; (b) the values and principles that operate in political and social life, e.g. "freedom", "equality", "democracy"—both to be

⁸In *A.P.S.A. News*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1957, pp. 4-5, Mr. Encel has outlined a short course in the "Political Facts of Life for Students", which includes a survey of early democratic thought, some developments since then (Marxism, anti-democratic theories, the arrival of the mass-state), and then reviews the democratic presuppositions in the light of these changes.

⁹See also B. D. Beddie, "Political Theory and Political Science", *A.P.S.A. News*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1956, p. 9.

discussed in relation to the "empirical social conditions" that influence their interpretation. He leaves largely open the question at what stage in the course these topics should be discussed, though in discussion he said that the serious study of concepts such as freedom and equality was advanced work. Perhaps some personal comment on this practical point would be in place—comment which I believe fairly faithfully represents the bent of such discussion as took place on the matter.

First, it is clear that there are some strict limits to what can be done in the first year, even if we consider the possibility of, say, a one-hour a week theory course running concurrently with an introductory course on institutions for a part or whole of the year. If we have a large body of students with a poor background of history, no political philosophy, only just embarked on the study of British and Australian government, we are selling our wares in a highly unsophisticated market; and they had better be reasonably straightforward. Second, some of Partridge's topics can (as he himself says) appropriately be part of the institutions course. We should discuss there what political science is about, say something about the nation-state and its relation to other social groups, discuss notions like "sovereignty", "constitution" and so on, probably in the first few weeks. Parker made an impressive plea for "covering the framework" in a concentrated way in the first few weeks. His experience was that students were faced with "a feeling of absolute desolation" when they came to politics. They must be taught what it is about, and survey the vocabulary it uses. This has to be done shortly for reasons of time in the institutions course; I would myself be doubtful whether it can profitably be done more fully at the first-year level, especially as we have no well-accepted model of a political system to present, as the economists have in their field.

Third, we have to bear in mind the suggestion that such a course should deal in an analytical fashion with issues that arise fairly naturally out of the first-year institutions course. (Some might want to challenge this.) Fourth, the principle already stated, that it is better to do one or two things thoroughly than a good many sketchily.

Partridge did not go far in discussion into the practical details.

The opening theory course would be one that just talks about what politics is, the conflict of policies in society. This creates the problem of a mechanism, ways in which decisions can be given effect. We can discuss the main conceptions associated with this.

Professor Macmahon Ball thought that this sounded too much like discussing conflicts without clarifying what they are about, *e.g.* equality. Parker agreed, and reminded us of the student who did only a single course in political science.

There seemed at this point to be a certain convergence on the notion that we should also discuss (in an elementary course) some of the conceptions associated with liberal-democratic theory—rights, consent, majority rule, problems of franchise and representation, political "equality", monistic *v.* pluralistic notions of the state and society. Some wished to add an issue or two raised in Anglo-Saxon socialist thought; and Mr. Creighton Burns thought that a difficulty with questions of

political equality was that they had ceased to be "problems" in the British-Australian context, whereas social and economic equality were lively issues. Encel also thought it important to discuss issues in which students were interested, and he thought they could perhaps be raised best in the institutions course *e.g.* in treating a few topics such as arbitration.

There was also some difference of opinion between those who wanted it all to be taught historically, as a study of the development of democratic ideas, followed by a re-examination of some of these in the light of later criticism and social change (in the "Anglo-Saxon" context);¹⁰ and others who wished to start with some simple analysis of concepts, bringing in the history by the way.

There were a few suggestions for a second-year theory course, some of which were a modified and selective history of political ideas, at least to the extent of being partly related to texts. Suggestions included:

(a) Nineteenth century political thought and after (Mr. Beddie):

Beddie discusses this briefly in his paper below. It would start with a few definite texts, deal especially with Marxism, apparently move on to the kind of discussion of issues that Partridge advocated. (It, or some other theory course, would include a term in which one writer is considered in detailed relation to his background and influence.)

(b) The study of texts (*Federalist* to Marx, Lenin) bearing on United States and Soviet political theory:

McCallum made this proposal in discussion, pointing out that it was partly embodied in the existing Government II course in Sydney. The University of Melbourne has since introduced an honours course of this character—Paine, *Federalist*, Tocqueville, through to Trotsky's *Revolution Betrayed*.

Advanced Courses

We did not have so concentrated a discussion on this topic, which was in many ways a pity. But a number of comments were made by the way, which may be worth summarizing.

A number of people were attracted by Miss Atkins's view that, after a "common core" in the first two years, we could appropriately bi- tri- or quadrifurcate in later courses, as staff allowed. Creighton Burns thought variety was good for the tired teacher, as well as for other reasons; and a number of people supported Crisp in arguing that, in the case of honours students in later years, we should try to escape from "the strait jacket of the subject in political science", and be prepared to offer a student the possibility of doing a number of shorter courses *e.g.* in the final year, one in comparative politics, one in political theory, one in Australian government or political sociology. Parker thought it quite possible for a final-year honours

¹⁰Jupp suggested that we might go further and give a short account of "contemporary ideologies" (liberal democracy, social democracy, Communism, Catholic social thought). See J. Jupp, "A Course in Contemporary Ideologies", *A.P.S.A. News*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1957, pp. 7-10. The criticism was made that this was getting a long way from the critical-analytical course that Partridge had in mind.

student to combine, say, the study of some selected modern state, some aspect of international relations, and of modern political theory, with further work on Australia.

Various alternative fields of study were proposed as advanced, including honours, courses:

- (a) "Advanced" Comparative Government
- (b) Area Studies *i.e.* of a particular country or closely related group of countries¹¹
- (c) International Relations
- (d) Public Administration
- (e) Political Theory and Sociology: and we also considered
- (f) the Honours thesis

Some of the problems of (a) and (b) are discussed above. (c) and (d) were the subject of separate papers, discussed below. The discussion of (e) and (f) was more fragmentary, but an attempt is made below to draw together the main points.

International Relations

There has been a good deal of discussion lately about how far international relations is a "subject", and some suspicion that what is often taught under this head is, as Creighton Burns put it, a "glorified news commentary". Professor Greenwood, in his opening paper, expressed a temperate view on this matter. He agreed that the recent growth in this field has utilitarian roots, and is not due to any sudden realization that it represents a field of enquiry or ground for mental training equal to or superior to that provided by more traditional subjects. He accepted the force of the argument that it had no special "method" and needed to be based on knowledge drawn from other subjects, history, economics, political institutions, law and so on. But he thought the same could be said of the study of politics itself; even of historians, who "have to control a multiplicity of forces and have not at their disposal a multiplicity of skills". Indeed, Greenwood's conclusion turns out to be not very different from that of Partridge in discussing political science as a subject, that there is a varied pattern of relationships between states, that it is important for someone to consider it as a whole; and unlikely that this will be done by the economist, the geographer, or the political scientist primarily concerned with the internal workings of states. He is also concerned to stress the peculiarly close alliance that must exist between international relations (as concerned with power-relations between governments) and political science (as concerned with political power in general); and the peculiar dependence of both on the historian.

What this came down to in immediate practical terms was that international relations is not a subject for beginners. It could appropriately be a third-year

¹¹The new Government III course at the University of Melbourne on China, India and Japan might fall into this category. Dr. Rigby has recently suggested that we should consider the possibility of playing a part in honours and diploma regional study programmes, which would involve concentration on a particular area, combined *e.g.* with language study. See *A.P.S.A. News*, Vol. 1, Nos. 2 and 3, 1956.

"alternative" course within a political science "major"; and with some prospects of it also being at least part of an honours course,¹² with the possibility of further work in a fourth year.

It seemed to be widely agreed that students must, before embarking on a separate subject of international relations, be required to take some courses in politics, and preferably also in history and economics. This was a point forcibly made by Crisp, Beddie, and others. There was a danger of teaching it as a "mystique", in terms of "sovereignty", "nationalism", and so on; of tying it too closely to treaties and international law and organizations. It should be based on the study of the foreign policies of states, which could not be understood except in relation to their internal character. Mr. Armstrong expressed the view that we were over-stressing the special dependence of international relations on other subjects—he was not convinced that it could not stand on its own feet.

I have the impression that Professor Greenwood made good his case for international relations. All the same, a good deal of concern was expressed in discussion at the diffuseness of much that passes for the subject, and there was criticism of some of Greenwood's emphases.

Lord Lindsay, for example, thought that a really satisfactory course in international relations would involve a good deal of theory—and needed students advanced enough to handle theoretical questions, and the kinds of simplified model that have been constructed by social anthropologists and political scientists. They would need to consider, for example, the kinds of political relations that arise between different cultures, and problems of the stability of different kinds of political systems.

Creighton Burns also believed that a high-level study of international relations would involve theoretical models, in which the approach of many kinds of social scientists would be involved. However, if the subject was to be taught to undergraduates at all, he thought that contemporary international politics was in fact the most difficult to deal with, as so much of the needed information was not available. He concluded that international relations at the undergraduate level is perhaps best taught as history and by historians. For the period 1870-1914 there is a considerable amount of primary and secondary material, enough to permit both source criticism and the interpretation of particular problems, as well as a basis for theory and generalization. A historian is a good "detective", and well-trained at sorting out reliable from unreliable evidence—one of the principal skills needed in this field. Greenwood had himself indicated that an international relations course need not be concerned exclusively with contemporary situations, and instanced the period of French ascendancy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as one suited to detailed examination in the course. Beddie disputed some of this, and thought the course should be contemporary in emphasis. "1919 is the right

¹²Professor Greenwood also expressed the view that the general political science courses should not ignore "international considerations". It is hardly intelligible to discuss the internal workings of states without reference to their external relations; or "democracy" without some mention of the problem of "democratising" foreign policy. Some others went so far as to say that this was the most appropriate way that international relations could be taught at the undergraduate level.

time to begin"; but broadly conceived, not tied to treaties and international organizations, but rooted in the study of the foreign policies of the great powers.

Arthur Burns argued the case for both theory and empirical-historical studies. The important thing in teaching was to make students "flexible, so that future developments won't catch them entirely by surprise". This involved introducing as many perspectives, and getting students thinking in as many different ways as possible.

Part of the discussion on Greenwood's paper was concerned with post-graduate work. Creighton Burns thought that the systematic study of international relations was probably best done at post-graduate level.

Because it is diffuse, centreless and comparatively primitive as a systematic study, it would probably be wise to pull in as many different representatives of the already established social sciences as possible. . . . A little academic imperialism may knock it into a more recognizable shape.

The political scientist, for example, might be mainly concerned with the analysis of decision-making—the sorts of policy-decisions made by statesmen, how they are made, in what circumstances and under what pressures. The study of international relations has been too long in the hands of lawyers and meta-historians.

The main point made by Lindsay was that a great deal more research into international relations ought to be undertaken. One of the obstacles was finance. Another was that much of the most valuable work would take longer than present regulations for post-graduate degrees allowed. "If you want work done, you have to choose something in which the man can get definite results with three years' work. This means that you rule out extremely important and interesting problems." There are also many problems in which teamwork is needed. It is hard to organize within the present university system the writing of books such as Laqueur's *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East* or Rostow's *Prospects for Communist China*, or the kind of research that an External Affairs Department would like to see done. Some kind of government-aided research institute associated with the universities might be the appropriate agency. Arthur Burns thought that the time had perhaps come for dividing research fields into "spheres of influence", and for concerting research policies in Australia. Creighton Burns doubted whether we were at the stage where we could usefully argue over the spoils of research, though he thought that the considerable community interest in international relations possibly encouraged us to concentrate on the text-book approach at the expense of more detailed studies of specific problems.

Public Administration

The discussion on this subject mainly concerned its place in the general political science curriculum. The special problems of universities that offer an undergraduate Diploma in Public Administration were rather left on one side. (Mr. Kewley thought that "there was no clarity about the objects of such diplomas".) Dr. Schaffer in his opening paper outlined an ambitious programme, in the belief that "specifically undergraduate education in public administration, with all its problems, is an exciting, difficult and wholly legitimate task that must be done".

He wished to see "at least two units in administration and the possibility of honours work not separate from but as part of the honours work in politics (and perhaps history and economics)".¹³ This would include such topics as (a) administrative history; (b) the comparative study of public services and types of bureaucracy, in their political setting; (c) the history of administrative ideas and movements (*e.g.* Benthamism, the American discussion regarding administrative reform); (d) administrative behaviour, making some use of case-studies.

Mr. Gardner supported the notion of extensive undergraduate teaching in this subject, though he expressed less interest in comparative study. He felt that there was still a good deal to be said for the Gulick-Urwick approach. The student can think more clearly about administrative problems after such a study, which should be followed up by the sociology of administrative behaviour, the examination of the various influences which are brought to bear upon administrators in making judgments.

Most other contributors to the discussion were content with the existing provision—normally one course in public administration which can be taken as part of a political science "major". However, a number of people were also concerned to stress that the administrative role of the state should be considered in the general politics courses, which, as Parker and Kewley both pointed out, are seriously incomplete if they leave out of account the "bureaucratic revolution", the role of the modern public service and changing notions of the social and economic functions of states. Public administration courses have in fact often been simply a way of dealing with certain important areas of modern government that tend to get squeezed out of the regular political science courses, *e.g.* public service organization, public finance, social services, the economic functions of the state, administrative law, local government.

Some of the lack of interest in developing this field at the undergraduate level stemmed from the view that there is a limit to what can be profitably done with a mixed bag of students, most of whom have little or no administrative experience and many of whom will never be administrators. But it is also apparent that most university teachers of political science are not particularly interested or competent in the administrative field, nor aware of the kinds of contribution they can profitably make in it.

The conference gave no great attention to the content of an undergraduate course on public administration. Parker's paper contains one set of proposals, somewhat on the lines suggested by Dr. Schaffer, though with some reservations on the subject of comparative study. Dr. Schaffer has since given some further details in the article cited above.

There is the special problem presented by the public servant who looks to the university for some training that will be helpful in his career. Dr. Schaffer made the point that the public services themselves have very varied, and sometimes

¹³See also B. B. Schaffer, "Designing a Course in Public Administration", *A.P.S.A. News*, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1958, pp. 1-4, where the present Queensland courses are described in more detail.

unclear, ideas of what they want from the universities—varying from “a liberal education” to the narrowest technical requirements. Where there are good in-service training schemes, the demand for the latter may be less. The varying situation in the Australian States is easily illustrated: the University of Sydney, for example, has abolished its undergraduate Diploma in Public Administration; the University of Queensland has recently introduced one. At Melbourne, ninety per cent. of students taking the courses in public administration are public servants; at Sydney, under half.

Some interest was also expressed in the development of post-graduate courses in administration; and Parker, in the short paper printed below, outlines some possible courses. He and Kewley agreed that there was a case especially at this level for thinking of “administration” rather than “public administration”. “At the level of organization and management, the distinction between public administration and non-governmental administration is largely artificial.” There may well be a growing demand for post-graduate work of this kind and the universities should be considering on what terms they will meet it.

Political Theory and Political Sociology

Partridge in his paper distinguishes between the kind (or kinds) of political theory with which we have mainly been concerned above—which sketch a map of a political system, or examine the values and principles that operate in politics—and “another type of political theory, the technical, political-sociological theory . . . of which studies of electoral behaviour, or of the factors affecting public opinion, are familiar examples”. Assuming that advanced work in the former should have a place in the political science curriculum, it is worth devoting a little attention to the place of the latter.

The topics dealt with by “sociological”, sometimes quantitative, techniques, include:

- (a) Voting behaviour, attitude and opinion measurement
- (b) Parties, groups, opinion-leaders, analyses of structure and ideologies
- (c) Studies of decision-making in politics and administration.¹⁴

A few advanced and honours courses bearing on these fields already exist. The University of Queensland has an advanced course in political theory and behaviour, which includes some discussion of current sociological and psychological theories of politics. There is now an advanced seminar at Melbourne which, among other things, discusses the theory of “groups” and political parties. The University of Sydney this year has a final-year honours course on public opinion, with special reference to the role of the press.

Partridge expressed the view that some of the *results* of this kind of work should be embodied in all our teaching. He also thought that some training in the techniques involved might find a place in advanced honours work. I do not

¹⁴For a fuller account, see “Political Sociology”, *Current Sociology*, Vol. VI, No. 2, 1957, UNESCO.

think it was disputed that we cannot hope to do much technical sociological training at the undergraduate level; not so much because it is too difficult, though Crisp appeared to incline to this view in his paper, but because there are more important things to do. (If separate courses in sociology or social anthropology exist, they can sometimes be useful "options" for the political scientist.) Some kinds of technique are easier to teach than others—"content-analysis" than sampling methods, the latter than mathematical model-building. Even if we cannot do much, it is hard to accept that we should not at some point give honours students a notion of what can be done by such methods, and some hint of the elementary rules for their proper use.

The Honours Thesis

The honours thesis has been for some years a requirement in a number of Australian university departments. Its most developed form is perhaps to be found in the University of Sydney, where all final-year honours students in the Department of Government are required to prepare a thesis of about 15,000 words, and it forms an important part of their final examination.¹⁵ This has resulted in some first-class work—Parker thought some of the theses he had seen better than much post-graduate work of the same kind—and has stimulated the interest of students, especially the "middle-graders", who often reveal qualities not brought out in ordinary teaching and examining.

This experience was discussed at some length. I was left with the impression that most people thought there was a place for the thesis, though there was criticism as well as praise; that it can easily take up too much time, or leads to a too-narrow concentration at a period when students should be reading widely, and tends to confine written work to Australian materials. It was agreed that its success depends very much on the enthusiasm and care of the supervisor. One view was that in practice it encourages a concentration on history at the expense of theory; however, most people seemed to doubt whether honours students could be expected to do an extended piece of original theoretical work. This left open the possibility of thesis-work which is essentially a survey of other people's work in some field, with some attempt to evaluate, though this is liable to become no more than a lengthy essay. Account must also be taken of the fact that the sense of handling primary materials, and of originating something, is an important element in the enthusiasm (hence the success) with which this work is done, a point which Mr. Westerway made with considerable force.

Essays and Examinations

Encel started a lively discussion on this subject. He detected little improvement in students' written work over the years, and was astonished at the incapacity even of final-year honours students to organize materials and express themselves. There appeared to be some feeling that we should not be so hide-bound by the occasional longish essay, and encourage some writing of shorter pieces (perhaps

¹⁵For an account of this, see H. Mayer, "The Final Year Honours Thesis", *A.P.S.A. News*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1957, pp. 5-7. In practice 15,000 words tends to be a minimum.

to be read by and discussed with the student); and that written work done during the year should certainly be taken account of in assessing the final examination, a point made by Professor Duncan. The University of Melbourne is already trying the experiment in certain courses of reducing formal lectures and replacing them by individual tutorials at the end of first and second terms, at which a short essay is read, discussed and marked.

There were very few references to examinations—they are unpleasantnesses we are only too ready to forget about till in sight of the final day for sending in papers. Here is one field where inertia seems to rule. It would almost be worth another conference to discuss examination methods, and whether “answer four (or five) questions” from a miscellaneous list is really the final word on the subject.

General Conclusions

It would not be appropriate to try to reduce the conference discussions to a neat set of conclusions, in the manner of a Royal Commission report. No doubt we shall all continue to do what we want to do, and on many important matters there was no consensus of opinion. But one or two general reflections which have occurred to the writer perhaps deserve a mention.

The first is that one thing we learned from the conference is the value of keeping more in touch about what we are doing, or intend doing, in political science teaching. There are various channels for this, including the possibility of further meetings. But we can also take the fairly elementary step of communicating ideas about courses to one another, or to *A.P.S.A. News*. In particular, tips about particular approaches or ways of organizing material or using texts that have turned out well (or badly) would be helpful. We could also do a little more, until the Crisp millenium of the freely-mobile student arrives, to improve the mobility of teachers; and perhaps extend an occasional invitation to one another to lecture or take a seminar in our respective institutions.

A second reflection is that the bent of the conference discussions confirms the view, as it has recently been expressed, that the average political scientist take his stand somewhere between the historian's refusal to systematize and the sociological impulse to systematize too thinly. It is an uneasy stance, and one sometimes hard to defend. But it is where we are, and where many of our great predecessors were.

My final impression is summed up in Professor Partridge's contention that “political science must be problematic”. He did not mean by this that it must necessarily deal with immediately and obviously burning issues; but that it is a dead thing unless it is to some point presented to us in the shape of problems to be solved, and problems in which we have a living interest. I wondered when I heard him say it, do we still carry about too much dead-weight? Do we often enough reflect on what interests us and concerns us in our own subject? Do we ask enough “what is living and what is dead” in political science?

University of Sydney

Politics as a University Subject

By P. H. PARTRIDGE

Since mine is the opening paper, I assume that my role is to discuss some of the most general questions concerning the teaching of political science. Consequently, I shall begin with a few remarks about the objectives we may have in mind in including political science in a university education. Then I shall say something about the kinds of political knowledge we should try to teach in order to achieve our objectives. And, finally, I shall discuss the teaching of political theory. I shall concentrate on political theory because it is one of the main recognized branches of the subject which is not dealt with in any of the papers that are to follow, and also because it is a branch of the subject which nowadays causes teachers of political science a great deal of perplexity.

I

In planning our courses we may have four main objectives in sight, and the courses we include, and the emphases we give, will vary according to the objectives we want to achieve.

(a) We may say that political science has a claim to inclusion in a university education because it is essential for an educated understanding of the working of the society in which we live. Politics is as important as any other aspect of culture and of social life; and no one has a liberal or educated understanding of society unless he understands what politics is about, and how it is related to other aspects of cultural and social life. The man who does not understand the role played in society by political institutions is, in a very important respect, an uneducated man.

(b) We may teach some politics courses for vocational reasons: to give students a training that will fit them for careers in central government, local government, trade unions, and so forth. In British and Australian universities, vocational considerations have not so far played a very important part in shaping the curriculum. I believe that courses on politics and public administration in many American universities are sometimes much more deliberately vocational.

But it is inevitable that, as time goes on, some courses will be taught in our universities mainly in order to produce certain sorts of specialists who are in demand in the community. In this country, it is already being argued that there is a need for a supply of graduates with a good knowledge of the political institutions and problems of Asian countries. We may expect that, as our departments of political science grow larger and become more highly diversified, this kind of motive will play a larger part.

(c) One of our objectives may be to produce some professional political scientists, graduates who go on to become teachers of the subject in the universities and to do original research. For this purpose, we may have to emphasise some courses which would not be important for students aiming simply at a general political

culture or understanding, such as a training in statistical techniques and other specialized techniques of research. Again, this sort of consideration has not been very prominent in the devising of courses in our universities; the subject is still too new in the universities, and the departments too small, to permit much to be done along these lines.

If these are the three most important objectives, it is obvious that it is difficult to achieve all of them. In our universities, time is usually too short and resources too limited for us to delude ourselves that we meet fully the requirements of all these objectives. So we have a problem of priorities. Which should we care about most, and which should we sacrifice, if we have to sacrifice something? This is one of the main issues of broad educational policy we have to face in present circumstances. I don't propose to discuss it, but merely to express dogmatically one view that I myself hold.

My view is, that whatever other objectives we may find time to achieve, we must at least achieve the first to the best of our ability. Our most important aim in claiming a place for political science in the university must be to produce students with a good understanding of politics. Whatever else is skimped, this must not be.

Having said this, I shall now concentrate on my first objective. "A good understanding of politics" is a very vague phrase. I shall try to make clearer what, in my view, a good understanding of politics would involve.

II

What sorts of things should we teach in order to give students an educated understanding of political life and institutions? In trying to list the *minimum* requirements, I am not speaking of separate courses, merely of the essential kinds of knowledge, no matter in what courses they may be taught.

First, a general understanding of the nature of politics: what politics is all about. Most students when they enter the university—for that matter, most adults—have the crudest notions concerning the function of politics in the life of a society. I suggest that a course on political science has failed unless students come out of it with reasonably clear, coherent, well-developed answers to this sort of question, fortified with a sufficient mass of historical and contemporary political knowledge. Questions concerning the functions of law and government, the role of the state in relation to other institutions and various spheres of social life; the significance of power or force in society; the issues at stake in political activity—these questions have been the subject of speculation by the great political thinkers throughout the history of Western civilization. Students of political science, I believe, should be thoroughly steeped in this tradition of political enquiry.

Second, a sound, accurate knowledge of the structure and the working of the chief political institutions of the modern period: the sort of material usually taught in courses on comparative government or modern political institutions. This will naturally include instruction in the political and constitutional ideas associated with political systems and institutions, and also a study of the permanently

important groupings and forces which are at work within a political system: classes, pressure groups, trade unions, churches, and so on.

One problem here is that of selection. We would include the institutions of our own country, no doubt, and also those of the countries which are most powerful in the modern world—the countries whose policies and influence are most likely to have the greatest effect on the development of political society throughout the world in the future. This means for us Australia, Britain, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. There may be time for others, but the four I have mentioned would be the irreducible core.

Third, a study of modern international relations. Usually international relations is not treated as being an essential part of the course but as an optional or extra. But I take the view that what is taught should be related throughout to the outstanding issues in the political life of the time, the problems and dilemmas which loom largest in the political thinking of the period. In our time, problems concerning the relations between states, the implications of national sovereignty, the issues concerned with international political authority and international law, and so on, are amongst the most pressing and pervasive political problems of the age. I maintain that a student cannot be said to have a good knowledge of modern politics unless he understands the fundamental general issues of international politics, and the forces which are affecting the relation of contemporary states to one another.

Fourth, a thorough study of "political theory". I shall expand this remark later in the paper. Political theory now refers to many different things, and, as I have said, teachers of political science are often very uncertain about what kind of theory should be taught. What I have just listed would obviously involve a great deal of political theory of one sort or another. But I prefer to deal with this problem separately and in more detail below.

III

In planning courses, we are all conscious of a difficult problem of integration: of working the different things we have to teach together, so that they form parts of a single subject. At present, there is a tendency for the subject to dissolve into a number of rather unrelated subjects or kinds of political knowledge; and it is very difficult to bind these different kinds or "levels" of political enquiry—philosophical, historical, sociological, descriptive, etc.—together sufficiently.

Criticism of political science made by practitioners of older disciplines often makes the point that the subject tends to lack continuity, integration or development. And it is true that the subject does contain a number of disparate elements which it is hard to link closely. These elements include: political philosophy; the history of political ideas; contemporary political ideologies; constitutional doctrines; a reasonably detailed knowledge of political institutions and systems; technical knowledge of issues of public policy, *e.g.* policies of economic control; the sociological theorizing about political behaviour which is becoming increasingly a preoccupation of political scientists. Now, these different aspects of political study do not run together naturally. They are centrifugal rather than centripetal. For example,

analysis of political conceptions of the more philosophical kind tends to lead us into the more remote logical or philosophical questions; the history of political ideas naturally links with the wider history of a society; "political sociology" tends to take one deeper into sociology and psychology. All of these things appear to be an essential part of the study of politics; but the *thorough* study of any one of them tends to take one away from the "political centre", if there is such a centre.

One can easily produce linkages if one is willing to teach each of these branches badly enough. It is easy to throw in some very sketchy remarks about the history of political ideas, or about standard arguments employed by philosophers, here and there in a course on modern political institutions. But, if we do it this way, we play into the hands of the critics who say that a university course on politics does not provide an intellectual discipline comparable to philosophy, economics or psychology, all of which demand some rather stiff and close analytical or theoretical thinking. This is a difficulty we should not burke. For the sake of intellectual discipline, we should demand that courses on political institutions produce well-trained students of the structure and working of institutions; but they won't do this unless they insist on the habit of pretty exact and fairly detailed knowledge. And it is hard to combine the getting of this exact knowledge with any adequate theorizing about institutions and processes. Similarly, an intellectually respectable study of theories of rights, or of political obligation, or of contemporary theoretical work on parties or public opinion, requires the same concentration. Thus, the more scrupulously we try to teach each of the main branches of the subject, the more we tend to be distracted from an equally careful study of the others. And, consequently, we have to face the question I am here raising in connection with the teaching of politics. Where do we fix our centre? Where do we draw the circumference? What should fall within and without the circle in an undergraduate course on politics?

IV

I assume that there would be agreement on one point: whatever else may be in the course, one quite central thing must be a solid study of the structure and function of the political institutions and systems I have already mentioned as being the least we can cover. This is one sort of knowledge which courses on political science alone can give in a systematic way; and part of the competence or expertness that may be expected of a student who has studied political science is a sound knowledge of the constitution of modern political systems. The teaching of the essential facts about the most important institutions and systems ought not to be made incidental to some other purpose, *e.g.* as illustrating some political generalization or some point in political ideology; the important thing is just to know what is the case, how the thing works.

I emphasise this because, in the attempt to avoid dry-as-dust "description", the piling up of mere facts which produces the "paralysis of thought" of which Whitehead somewhere speaks, there is always a strong temptation to under-estimate the importance of adequate and accurate knowledge about institutions. The teaching of political institutions can easily become a matter of broad impressions

pepped up with some rapid generalization in the manner, shall we say, of some of Laski's writing on political institutions. It is true that there is no point in studying political institutions or systems unless we are aiming at an explanation of their mode of working; therefore a course on British or American government will not produce an educated understanding unless it contains a great deal more than narration and "description", but has in it a lot of history, a good deal of discussion of the ideas or ideologies that have left their mark on the system or are still operative within it, and also the application of general theoretical conceptions and hypotheses to the particular facts being studied.

Nevertheless, as a practical pedagogical point, it is never easy to combine all these things satisfactorily; and just as some institutional courses contain too much dull description of institutions and procedures, so others under-emphasise the importance of exact and detailed knowledge of how things are for the sake of more superficially exciting theoretical speculation. Thus, although the teaching of the elementary, basic facts about modern political institutions and systems and of the elements of theory cannot and should not be separated from one another, the main purpose of "institutional" courses is exact knowledge of the character and working of institutions; and the problems of political theory can only be properly studied in courses exclusively devoted to them.

I want, then, to emphasise these points. In courses on political institutions, the primary purpose is to give students a full, accurate knowledge of what the institutions are and how they work; a fair bit of theoretical discussion is essential, if only to show students what are the problems concerning the different forms that comparable institutions take; these theoretical discussions are intended to throw light on the study of theory—at the most they illustrate the kinds of problems that are dealt with by one species of political theory; somewhere in a full three-year course on political science, political theory has to be taught as a branch of the subject in its own right.

V

This brings me to political theory. As I have said, we tend now to be worried about the teaching of theory. We are all a little uncertain as to what the subject is; the name covers so many different ways or levels of theorizing about politics, and it is not clear that they can be combined. Some of the traditional ways of speculating about politics now seem to be suspect; we all know, for example, that some of the philosophers of the positivist or linguistic school have been attacking the logical foundations of the traditional classical political philosophy; we suspect that the collapse of idealist and rationalist metaphysics cannot have left unimpaired the political philosophy those metaphysicians produced. And, of course, the rapid growth of the "empirical" study of politics during the last few decades, and of positive theory of the generalizing, explanatory or "scientific" type, has caused some political scientists to ask whether this is not what political theory really is, and whether the discussion of "ends", "principles" and so on hasn't as little relevance in political science as it is usually assumed to have in courses on economic theory.

In spite of those difficulties, I would argue (a) that an essential part of our minimum course in politics should be a course in political theory; (b) that it should be a single course, delivered by political scientists (it might be better if it were given by one man if a man with the necessary range of interests were available); (c) that it should try to link together the several different kinds of theoretical thinking about politics; and (d) that such a course could, better than any other, serve the function of connecting the several different bodies of material covered in the different sections of the politics course.

I shall now try to support these contentions with some remarks on the character of a course on political theory.

To begin with, political theory and the history of political thought are not the same thing: the development of theory in politics has long been retarded by the not uncommon assumption that study of theory is merely the study of the texts of Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Burke or Rousseau. I don't want to deprecate the study of the history of political thought; no one will deny that a knowledge of it is necessary for an "educated understanding of contemporary politics". And, if we are thinking of theory of the explanatory, generalizing kind, then of course the study of the classical texts introduces many of the central and permanent problems of social theory and supplies important theoretical suggestions. But it still seems obvious to me that political theory needs to be taught independently, and not merely by means of historical study.

The main reason is that we can most easily arouse an interest in theory by dealing with what students will readily see to be the real, important, difficult problems. In other words, problems have to be defined in the form in which they present themselves to us, concerned as we are with the institutions and conditions of our own time. Much of what Hobbes or Burke or Rousseau have to say has little or no application to contemporary social institutions and structure; inevitably, since political science deals with a very rapidly changing subject matter, much of the conceptions and generalizations of our great predecessors is very remote from the problems which strike us (and our students) as the interesting and tricky ones. A course on theory will take its departure from, and be about, contemporary phenomena.

There is another preliminary question: how should political philosophy be taught to students of politics? My own view is that a great deal at least of what traditionally is called political philosophy should be taught to all students of politics as being necessary for the "educated understanding"; and it should be taught by the political scientists as part of the single course on political theory I want to recommend.

On the first point: philosophical questions crop up unavoidably in connection with many of the commonest, most fundamental, terms of political discourse. The conception of "rights" is an obvious example, but there are many more; it is impossible to avoid a discussion of the logical character of the concept, of the different ways in which it is employed in political discussion, of the ways in which one can relevantly support claims to the possession of rights. Political scientists,

since they became aggressively "scientific", have tended to look down their noses at the close examination of terms or concepts that philosophers go in for; it is often suggested that this is just scholastic fiddling which merely impedes the down-to-earth theorizing of the robust scientist. But this is silly; the alternative to this fiddling is to be naively uncritical in the use of the fundamental categories of the subject; and students of politics remain theoretically untrained and unsophisticated unless they are taught to understand something of the philosophical issues connected with the use of the most general and fundamental notions of the language of politics.

I do not much like the arrangement that sometimes prevails whereby politics students are sent to the course of the philosophers for political philosophy while, in their own courses on political theory, political scientists avoid philosophical questions like the plague. This is a divorce which has nothing to be said for it. I see no reason why politics students should not be required to attend the lectures of the philosophers; but political theory should be an indispensable part of the politics curriculum, and in that course philosophical matters should be raised in their proper place. It is true that some philosophers in recent years have drawn very sharply indeed the distinction between "philosophical" and "empirical" questions and restrained themselves from discussing empirical matters. The consequence of this sharp separation in the field of politics is exemplified by the inanity of a book like Weldon's *Vocabulary of Politics*. The major problems of classical or traditional political philosophy do raise empirical issues, as well as logical or philosophical ones; and empirical evidence is relevant in discussing them. They should be dealt with in any comprehensive course in political theory, but they cannot be discussed very thoroughly apart from examination of the detail of political life. This is my main reason for arguing that it is not good enough for the political scientists to leave all discussion of the questions of political philosophy to the philosophers, more especially since so few philosophers now preserve the earlier tradition of historical and social learning.

But these points are preliminaries. We are speaking of a compulsory, elementary course in political theory, a necessary part of the education of all students of politics. What should such a course try to be?

Perhaps it should be a number of different things, linked with one another as well as may be. In the first place, it should be a broad introduction to the main features of a political system; the purposes, nature, structure, organization of a political system, the different types of processes and pressures which make up political activity. It should be, in other words, an elementary theoretical "map" or schema. We should try to make such a sketch as coherent and systematic as we can, and fill in as much detail and complication as possible; but, in the nature of the case, our course will largely be an introduction to problems, hypotheses, trends of enquiry and speculation, since the subject boasts little in the way of settled or digested theory. This, of course, is theory in the positive sense, descriptive, analytical, explanatory, and it cuts across conventional academic divisions. It will naturally include discussions of the meanings of the basic concepts of political study (terms like "state", "sovereignty", "law", "force", "consent", and so on); and

these will draw from the writings of political philosophers as well as from the work of political scientists, historians, or sociologists.

There will be no disagreement with the view that our course should aim at sketching a theoretical map of a political system, and at establishing the important relations of interaction. There may be more disagreement about the second thing I think the course should be. There is another sense of political theory: the examination of the values and principles that operate in political and social life. Some political scientists have argued that this does not concern them since it is philosophy, not science, that is concerned with values and principles. The theory of the political scientist, so it is said, explanatory or causal theory, belongs to a different logical world from the discussion of values about which science has nothing to say.

The raw scientism which inspired this self-denying ordinance is now happily somewhat out of fashion with teachers of political science. The political controversies of ordinary life are, of course, very often concerned with values and principles. Hence, in accord with my doctrine that the fundamental aim of political science as a university subject is to educate students to understand and participate in the political life they share, a training in the art of examining principles "at the stiffest level of intellectual debate that the student can stand" (as Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie puts it) is a necessary part of political education at the university level.

I believe, also, that as a matter of educational policy too much can be made of the argument about the logically different world of scientific statement and value-judgment. I shall emphasise rather the extent to which elucidation and testing of principles links up with questions of "empirical" description, analysis or explanation.

We can distinguish different levels in the discussion of the meaning and validity of principles. In dealing with such terms as "freedom", "equality", "consent", "power", "sovereignty", we can easily discriminate between different possible meanings or usages: this is, in part, a logical or semantic exercise. It is usually necessary if we are to guard against the confusions that creep into more concrete argument. But, on a different level, the questions are different when it is our job to specify what is or should be the application of such terms to concrete political and social arrangements; when, for example, we have to say what precisely the principles of "freedom of speech" or "equality of opportunity" or "government by the consent of the governed" are to include and what practices and arrangements they are to exclude. Obviously on this level discussion of the "meaning" of value-terms and principles demands a close consideration of social fact, of how institutions and social mechanisms work and might be made to work. One of the sorts of questions that arise is this: What are the empirical social conditions we must take account of (including the conditions which are outside human control) in deciding the interpretation to be given to any principle, *e.g.* "government by the consent of the governed"? This will often not be an easy question to answer; it will often open up a large field of "positive" political investigation and discussion.

Thus, we have to explore principles in the light of social conditions, of what we know or can find out about the mode of working of social processes. Dahl's

recent *Preface to Democratic Theory* contains some good examples of this kind of investigation of principles. One is his examination of the notion of majority rule. What can we make of the doctrine or principle, in the light of what we now know about the influence exerted by a multiplicity of distinct minorities upon the various elements in a government's policy? It is very clear now that simple formulas about majority-rule or majority-choice do not describe accurately the tremendous complexity of the electoral process in modern large-scale parliamentary states: what happens is nothing so simple as the choice of a government (and a line or trend of policy) by a majority of electors. This fact provides one of the conditions of our problem in examining the meaning and validity of the democratic principle of majority-rule. Do we reject the principle as being inapplicable to the necessary mode of operation of a contemporary state? Is there some way of defining it or formulating it so that it will be an effective principle, one that can regulate our conduct of affairs? In facing questions like this, we have to consider not only moral or "value" problems (political scientists too easily identify political philosophy as being purely a branch of moral philosophy); we need also a considerable grasp of the hard facts of political mechanisms and forces.

I have no space to develop this argument or supply more abundant examples. It will be seen that this range of theory makes heavy demands upon a teacher. He has to be alive to the logical and philosophical issues that are present; he will need to have had some philosophical training; but, if he is going to consider values or principles from the point of view of interpretation or application, he has to try to be alive to those features of modern social life illuminated by the work of political scientists, economists, lawyers, sociologists, etc., which may be relevant to his discussion. It is asking a lot, but it is unavoidable; for the examination of principles which proceeds throughout only a high level of abstraction or generality usually evades the interesting, the difficult and the practically important problems.

Would the kind of course on theory I have been discussing be too hard and require too much time? Such a course could not be very systematic or coherent. Every teacher has to weave his own pattern. He has to choose topics that seem suitable to him; decide how stiff he can afford to make his handling of them; how far he can carry them. He must reconcile himself to being inconclusive. His aim is to teach his students to do this kind of thinking better than they could have done it otherwise, with a clearer awareness of what it involves. Nor would I suggest that all this material should be covered in a single, continuous course. It might be carried on throughout the whole of a three- or four-year course. Some elementary theoretical material should be got across before the serious institutional courses are properly started (*e.g.* the beginnings of the theoretical sketch of which I spoke, an introduction to some of the fundamental concepts in the subject); but some kinds of theoretical material can best be introduced only after a good deal of the institutional ground has been thoroughly covered.

I have said nothing about another type of political theory, the technical, political-sociological theory that is becoming too prominent for me to ignore, of which studies of electoral behaviour, or of the factors affecting public opinion, are familiar examples. This theorizing usually requires knowledge of statistical

techniques; it runs more and more into the technicalities of sociology and social psychology; and it needs a lot of time and perhaps some practice in carrying out investigations if it is to be properly understood. Some will say that this is what political theory really is, that anything else belongs to the pre-history of political theory or political science. What should be done about it?

If we have the man-power to provide a variety of honours courses, we may devote one or more of such courses to training in this sort of theory and research. If one of our aims is to train some of our students to become professional political scientists, some training in these "newer" techniques and approaches to political research is desirable. And the teacher of the sort of course I have outlined will no doubt find many opportunities to *describe* important examples of this recent work; and, more importantly, he will no doubt take up into his discussion of a variety of problems any conclusions he may have come to as a result of reading the reports of such work himself. But, in an elementary or basic course to be given to all students, pass and honours, as an essential part of a university education in politics, I think we have done enough if we confine ourselves to a thorough introduction to the kind of material I have discussed. Its importance in a liberal education in politics cannot be diminished by the progress of specialized research, although, of course, the theoretical outline we construct and teach, and equally our estimation of the strength of particular values or principles, may be affected by what we are taught by the rigorous investigation of the different aspects of the political and social systems.

This is all I want to say about the content of a *minimum* course in political science. It is not my business to express views about the mode of teaching courses on political institutions, comparative government, international relations or public administration, since they are all to be dealt with in separate papers. I have already referred to the teaching of the history of political thought; but, since this is a matter which often causes some difficulty, perhaps I may amplify a little what I have said before.

I am not certain that a course on the history of thought, including perhaps the study of works of the classical writers, need necessarily be included as a separate part of our minimum course. Naturally, whatever we do, we shall find ourselves compelled to refer constantly to the views of earlier writers. And the analysis and criticism of principles will involve a great deal about the historical growth of ideas, the issues or circumstances to which they were a response, and so on. But the use we make of history should be guided by our present purpose. As I see it, the important thing is for us *to construct* a political theory to teach, one that never loses sight of contemporary political and social conditions and of what social scientists have to say about them; and which employs and weaves together with as much logical skill as we can command, several different levels or "orders" of political argument. The study of the history of ideas and of classical texts can be no substitute for this important contemporary work of critically reformulating political doctrines and ideas. It will help, of course, but only if we go back to earlier thinkers with the main problems involved in this work of critical reformulation already in mind.

VI

It may be worth-while in conclusion to comment on one other issue, whether political science is a subject which demands a separate honours school to itself; or whether it is better taught as one part of a more comprehensive course which gives equal place to other subjects, *e.g.* to philosophy and economics or to history. The question is perhaps no longer open here, since we seem to have come down on the side of the separate honours school. In England, I understand, with a much greater diversity in this matter among the different universities, it is still more alive. However, I shall say a few words about it, since doing so will help me to elucidate some of my arguments still further.

The arguments against extreme specialization (such as one finds in some American universities) are well-known. Political science is not only two-faced (I refer to the faces of scholarship and of theory which I have tried to distinguish), but also multi-parasitic: it sucks a great deal of its blood (but by no means all of it) from other subjects, especially history (including the history of political thought), philosophy, psychology, economics, sociology: these are the subjects usually thought of, but geography, human ecology, statistics, and still others could be emphasised. It is obvious that the sort of minimum course on comparative institutions I have outlined would require to be built on a foundation of Australian, British, European and American history, these including a history of political ideas. And the several "orders" of theoretical work I have been trying to distinguish would have a more secure foundation if accompanied by a study of history and the history of thought again, philosophy, and relevant parts of economics, sociology, statistics, and so on.

Another way of putting the argument would be to say that political science is not one of the primary colours in the social science spectrum in quite the same way as history, philosophy, economics and psychology are. It does not possess (at least not to the same extent as the other four) its own distinctive body of fundamental technical knowledge. Compared with them, it is secondary or derivative: it draws much more from them than they draw from it. That is some of the case against giving political science its own honours school.

Granting all that, I still have no doubt that the case for is much stronger. In another sense, political science is a primary subject. It tackles problems, which are of central importance for understanding a social system, which none of the other subjects does tackle; it tackles them in ways and for purposes the other subjects ignore or slur. No other subject teaches the careful, scholarly, comparative study of political institutions and processes; certainly no other subject studies as special problems the connection between the structure and functioning of institutions or other formations. And, turning to the other, the theoretical "face" of the subject, of course no other subject is concerned with any of the different sorts of theory I have distinguished. Actually, in trying to link together, and to operate with, the several different kinds and levels of social thinking, the political scientist is doing something that puts him in a distinctive position among the social scientists. This arises partly from the nature of political activity (or, more accurately, the nature of many of the issues that are characteristic of political activity); the result being

that you have in political science an activity of synthesizing to which there is nothing quite comparable in any of the other social sciences. In that sense, political science is more than parasitic: though it borrows material from many fields, it does so for the purpose of dealing with problems which are quite fundamental for the understanding of the working of modern social systems.

Therefore, I think that political science should possess its own independent honours school: the teaching of social science would be seriously defective in any university where this is not so. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the facts insisted upon by those who take the opposite view. *Everything* the political scientist teaches or thinks is heavily dependent on historical knowledge: his students must be taught a lot of history. *Some* of the things he teaches are heavily dependent on philosophical knowledge, others on sociological knowledge, and so on. The only thing I can say, therefore, is that the basic or minimum courses given in the department of political science itself should not be so multiplied or heavily loaded that it becomes impossible for *all* students to do several courses in history; and for many of them, at any rate, to do appropriate courses in philosophy, economics and psychology.

But—to conclude with a point I have perhaps already made *ad nauseam*—it would be a bad thing for the teachers of political science to transfer part of their responsibility to the historians, philosophers or psychologists. The latter can give material which is valuable or indispensable for politics students. But they cannot convert it into the currency of political science. Because political thinking—in any of its branches, though more in some than in others—is thinking of a peculiarly synthetic sort, the political science teacher has also to be his own historian, philosopher, economist or sociologist.

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A Comment on Professor Partridge's Paper

By B. D. BEDDIE

The main problem raised in Professor Partridge's paper, at least in its third and following sections, is how the disparate elements that enter into political courses can be so related to one another as to make political science a coherent academic subject. His contention is that integration can be achieved only if more, and more rigorous, political theory is introduced at all (or very nearly all) stages of the political science course. By this he does not primarily mean that the institutional or factual courses should be more theoretical; he rather means that strictly theoretical courses should be conducted along with, but separately from, the distinctively institutional courses.

Professor Partridge, of course, does not base this separation of institutional and theoretical courses on any final logical distinction between theory and practice or theory and fact. On the contrary, he insists that the main thing is to relate the content of the theory courses to the content of the others. He thinks, however, that neither the theoretical nor the institutional courses can be sufficiently rigorously or comprehensively taught unless they are treated separately. I believe that he has established his case that theoretical work requires a fairly rigorous discipline of its own and that there must therefore be some separate courses in "pure" theory.

As a matter of emphasis rather than of criticism, however, I would be inclined to argue that more theory could be effectively brought into institutional courses than he is ready to admit. He himself makes the point that institutional courses cannot be treated merely descriptively, that we cannot describe any institution and much less a complicated interacting set of institutions without making, implicitly or explicitly, general assumptions. It is, of course, for this reason that we find markedly different interpretations of the same institutions and especially disagreements about the importance or causal function of one institution as opposed to another. If these assumptions and the various interpretations connected with them are explicitly dealt with, it seems to me that a good deal of theory can be elicited in the primarily institutional courses.

I do not believe that the introduction of theory into institutional courses in the way I have suggested would in any way compromise the attaining by students of a systematic knowledge of the essential facts of institutional structure and functioning on which Professor Partridge insists. Indeed, unless a student approaches institutions in the light of the differing interpretations to which they give rise, he is never likely to develop exact interest in them; he will never see the point of looking beyond their general form to their significant detail. I am, for example, not convinced that the question of majority rule, discussed by Professor Partridge on page 27, could not be reasonably dealt with in a course on American,

British or Australian institutions. Could one, in fact, say that the institutions of those countries could be dealt with without fairly thorough discussion of majority rule?

I must stress, however, that, in the context of Professor Partridge's paper, I do not put much weight on this first point. Our disagreement is at most a matter of emphasis though it may be of some practical importance in the allocation of teaching duties. If, as Professor Partridge suggests, there should be one theory man in each political science department, he would hardly be able to cover pure theory courses extending throughout each year of a three- or four-year course. Hence, if the thorough theoretical coverage that he thinks necessary were to be sustained, some of it would have to be dealt with in the institutional courses.

I now turn to the central and most challenging part of Professor Partridge's paper—his outline of a proposed course in political theory. His advocacy of a new approach to the teaching of theory is connected with the present crisis in this field of study. Most, I imagine, would agree that if coherence is to be given to political science it can come only from theory: but the difficulty is, at the present time, that it is precisely in the sort of general theory that is relevant to politics that disintegration and fragmentation is most evident. Only political theory can provide the "centre" for political science, but it is precisely in political theory that "the centre cannot hold". According to the scheme Professor Partridge outlines, the teacher of political theory must, while in a sense recognizing the disintegration of the subject, create a centre for it by drawing its various elements together and by refusing to accept any one of its existing elements, for example political philosophy, as central.

Professor Partridge's conviction that a centre of the kind he suggests can be found or created is connected with certain positive, and even "positivist", beliefs that he has about the nature of political theory. For example, anyone who believes that political theory must be "metaphysical" or who subscribes to a "historicist" position would probably regard the search for the kind of centre he suggests as misguided. More important, even one who believes in the possibility of establishing a positive general theory in the field of social sciences, might deny the possibility of establishing such a theory in the field of politics. He might argue that politics is not an autonomous theoretical field, that *e.g.*, since political phenomena are simply one rather special kind of social phenomena, political theory should be regarded as a department of social theory or sociology.

Even if it were admitted that political theory cannot be absorbed into any one existing field, it might still be claimed that it can be absorbed, without significant remainder, into a number of other fields. This claim would have serious consequences for Professor Partridge's account of political theory as a synthesizing activity, for if it were true, it would mean that the position of the political scientist among social scientists would simply be that of a "Jack of all trades". If political theory is not to be merely a collection and application of borrowed doctrines, it must have its own distinctive subject-matter. While most political scientists are convinced that they do possess a distinctive subject-matter, it must be admitted, I think, that they have been unsuccessful in defining or indicating what it is. Some point

to governmental institutions, others to "power", others to the choice or allocation of particular kinds of values. Others, without pointing to any specific criterion, seem to think that an autonomous political science must be able to be created because there is no other discipline that can solve our practical political problems.

I do not, of course, think that these doubts about the autonomy or fundamental importance of political science as a theoretical subject have very much practical bearing on the kind of theoretical course that Professor Partridge advocates. The same doubts could, in fact, also be raised about any of the other social sciences. Even if one of them should eventually turn out to be more fundamental than the others, we do not know which it will be, and in the meantime there is great merit in following the synthesizing procedure and in investigating border-line problems.

Can we, however, realistically aspire to employ the synthesizing method advocated by Professor Partridge in the teaching of undergraduates? From this point of view, I think his scheme is certainly ambitious and so far as most available lecturers are concerned, optimistic. Teachers of the subject are not merely called upon to know political science and political philosophy, to be logically acute and, what is very difficult, be able, with sophistication, to draw on other fields like sociology, economics and social psychology. They have, in addition, in their teaching to anticipate research, and draw these various disciplines together to form coherent political theory. The question that arises then is: who shall educate the educators? Professor Partridge's reply presumably is that they must educate themselves. This, of course, is an admirable aim and, within limits, realistic enough. Nevertheless, it does seem to me that the attractiveness of his scheme might easily evoke from us an enthusiasm for it that would not be matched by our performance in executing it.

But let us suppose that the scheme is well taught. How will it be received by students? By good students I have no doubt that it will be received with profit, but about the less good students I am not so sure. The course that is presented is, without speaking derogatively, bound to have a virtuoso character; the writers and fields investigated or touched upon will be highly diverse and technicalities will arise at a great many points especially in the reading of students. Professor Partridge himself admits that the extent to which the course can be made systematic and coherent is limited, and I should therefore think that for students who were at all slow in perceiving the interconnections being aimed at and the general purpose of establishing them, the course may be confusing and might *appear* to lack integration. The effect of the course on quick but superficial students might also lead to over-confidence, to the notion that through the "master science" of politics they have succeeded in "sewing up" a whole number of disciplines.

By way of more positive criticism, I would suggest that, without in any way seriously compromising his basic position, Professor Partridge could, with advantage, allow rather more importance to political philosophy and to the study of classical texts.

In the first place it seems to me that the extent to which general political theory has ceased, or at this stage can cease, to be philosophical can easily be exaggerated. Admittedly, there are many today who think that the connection

between political science and philosophy has been virtually severed. Professor Robson, for example, argues that while a knowledge of economics, public law, history and sociology is essential to the study of political science, philosophy is only a "tool" subject in the same sense as statistics or languages are "tool" subjects.¹ This view, which I am *not* imputing to Professor Partridge, seems to me to be clearly false. However desirable we may think it would be if politics could be emancipated from philosophy, the fact is that most of the essential categories of political thinking do embody philosophical elements; they are semi-philosophical categories. One simply cannot theorize about values, ideologies, individuals or individuality or even about classes or economic determination without getting involved in philosophical questions. And it is no solution simply as an act of will to decide to disregard the philosophical questions and to proceed positively or realistically. This way simply leads to philosophical and political naivety. If politics is to be made a positive and independent subject, the various complicated threads that bind it to philosophy have to be unravelled; the attempt to sever them at one blow can only kill the new subject at birth.

Hence, I would say that any course in political theory at some stage, but preferably at the beginning, should systematically discuss the relation between politics and philosophy. This problem, I think, could be best discussed by considering the thought and some of the texts of the writers who have dealt with the difficulties of emancipating politics from philosophy. It was in the nineteenth century and especially with Marxism and its impact on social thought that the relation of philosophy to positive social and political theory was raised in a way which continues to be highly relevant to the present crisis in political theory. Put crudely and shortly, then, I am suggesting that a course in political theory still very much of the kind Professor Partridge advocates might begin with a consideration of trends, both philosophical and positive, in nineteenth century political thought.

This way of proceeding would, I think, have the following advantages:

(a) It would mean that the course could at least start with definite texts and with material that has been worked over in critical writings.

(b) It would put the present crisis in political thinking into perspective in a way that beginning at other points, for example with Plato or with Locke, does not do. In this way it would be made clear to students why the subsequent courses should deal with the widely different aspects that Professor Partridge outlines.

(c) It would mean that students had some general knowledge of certain theories, for example utilitarianism, idealism and especially Marxism, to which constant reference is bound to be made in later courses, both theoretical and institutional.

The other concession that I should be inclined to ask Professor Partridge to make to the more traditional teaching of political ideas is of a different kind and one that I would press rather less confidently. There is in Professor Partridge's paper considerable emphasis on the contemporary: the political theory he advocates

¹*Political Studies*, Vol. III, 1955: Robson quoted by Wheare on page 71.

is concerned to seek solutions to contemporary problems both of a theoretical and practical kind. His emphasis on the contemporary is, I believe, correct; the distinctive character of political science as opposed to other studies, especially history, is that it is moved by the desire to understand and solve contemporary problems. And, incidentally, concern with contemporary problems is not characteristic only of the new political theory. It is also characteristic of the main tradition of political philosophy. For this reason, it can be said that the scholastic and almost reverential approach to the history of ideas that has been evident in some English teaching of the subject has, despite the appearance to the contrary, been out of accord with the true tradition of that subject.

On the other hand, especially in England, concern with the history of ideas has produced fine and, I would think, for any enthusiastic student of politics, interesting results. I refer to the kind of scholarship that is not particularly interested in the truth of the ideas of which it treats but is rather interested in tracing their origin, their social setting, their transmission and their practical effects. It seems to me important that a student of politics should be interested not only, as Professor Partridge insists, in the general nature of political activity, and of its relation to other activities, but also in the nature of political thinking and of its relation to other forms of intellectual activity. He can, I think, develop this kind of interest only by going to fairly remote past thinkers who have been the subject of the kind of scholarship to which I have referred. I want to suggest, therefore, that the contemporary bias of Professor Partridge's political theory course should be redressed by, say, one course in which students would take the doctrine of a single classical writer or school and study it from the point of view of its intellectual antecedents, its institutional setting, its practical results and its subsequent fate.

Professor Partridge himself, of course, is keenly aware of the necessity of redressing the contemporary bias of the courses he advocates both in political institutions and in political theory. I confess, however, that I am not quite clear of his stand on this matter. On page 29 he seems to say that politics students should obtain their essential grounding in history from history departments. If, however, political science is, as Professor Partridge insists, more than contemporary history, then presumably past history (the sort of thing taught in history departments) will not be able to provide an entirely satisfactory historical background for political science. That political science is in a special sense a contemporary subject should not, I assume, be taken to mean that there can be no political science of past situations. It means only that political science is in a special degree motivated by contemporary problems. If there is such a thing as a general theory of politics, it must be able to account for all political situations or institutions, past as well as present. Even if our object is primarily to "sketch out a theoretical map of a modern political system" (page 26) this will only be able to be done if we know what is peculiar to the modern political system and what it shares in common with all political systems.

Hence, there is a case for showing that the political scientist, in addition to having the kind of historical background provided by history departments, should be prepared to extend his own studies through time, or at least to test the soundness

of his contemporary studies by referring to non-contemporary situations. On the side of theory, whether positive or evaluative, he must at least have given his political studies sufficient historical extension to ensure that he will not make the mistake of thinking his theory of modern institutions and values has universal application.

I do not want to make too much of this rather formal point. Political theory certainly is not and probably never will be in the position where it will range through space and time looking for crucial instances. There is some point in Lasswell's remark that:

We can dispense with the truistic statements that sometimes pass for the 'universal laws' (or hypotheses) of all cultures, classes, crises, and forms of personality. It is more important to know the interdependencies which characterize voting responses, for example, in contemporary American civilization.

Even so, one cannot help thinking that a good deal of the study currently devoted to public opinion and voting responses is vitiated by lack of historical perspective or by, what in this context comes to the same thing, a failure to distinguish factors of pervasive social importance from factors of a local and temporary kind. This concern with the contemporary is, of course, not merely accidental; in particular it is reinforced by the fascination which techniques derived from natural science have for the modern mind. It is doubtful whether anything else than a distinct treatment of earlier forms of political life and thought *within political science departments* can preserve the subject from the alien values and methods that now threaten it.

Canberra University College

Three and Four Year Courses In Political Science

By L. F. CRISP

The purposes of this paper are in general two. Officially, it is to open a discussion on what the contents and sequence of three- and four-year political science courses should be. Incidentally, however, I wish to argue for some measure of broad uniformity—though by no means for *identity* of content or treatment—in the Australian universities in the fields and in the sequence of fields to be covered in at any rate the first two years' political science courses.

Broad Uniformity

My arguments are primarily three:

(a) Some students have, for any of a number of fairly familiar reasons, to move from one State to another at some time during their undergraduate course. At present they frequently stand to lose by the move because their new university is unwilling to grant them full credit for the number of "subjects" completed in their old one. This is apparently, and perhaps justifiably, done on the ground of irrelevance (or comparative inadequacy) of the contents of the "subjects" taken to the corresponding "subjects" which would have been taken in the new university had the transferring student been there all along. Broad uniformity of field and sequence, especially in the first and second years, should wholly or largely obviate this.

(b) In Australia there has seemed to me to be an arguable case for encouraging the serious honours student in politics to attend a second university for one of the four years of his course. Only some broad uniformity of fields and sequences of "subjects" will afford the basis either for assured granting of credits or for a satisfactory overall course, without which this planned, limited mobility would be impracticable.

(c) Our personal backgrounds and the circumstances in which we work are pushing us some way, more or less unconsciously, towards a measure of uniformity. A closer examination of the possibilities might well enable us consciously to achieve a fruitful broad uniformity of fields and sequences, without any significant feeling of restriction upon what the late G. V. Portus used to talk about as "Professor's Freehold".

As regards (a), I am teaching in Canberra, where an atypically high percentage of our students are, or become during their courses, Commonwealth public servants or are the children of public servants. They are liable to be transferred or promoted out of—as others are liable to be promoted, or moved with their parents, into—Canberra in mid-course. Our total numbers and our class sizes are, moreover, as yet small and consequently our experience of transfer of students in or out tends

to bulk larger in our minds than would be the case elsewhere. Even discounting these freely admitted Canberra peculiarities, we will appreciate that no Australian university is immune to this problem and hence some of its students have experienced or are likely to experience either demonstrable injustice or at least a feeling of injustice in regard to the terms upon which they are received into their new university. This in itself is, in my contention, sufficient to warrant at least some consideration of measures to clear up the difficulty.

As regards (b) above, I have felt for some time that there is an arguable case for at least good honours students in political science spending the second or (preferably) the third of their four undergraduate years at a university other than their own. We cannot in our circumstances expect nor wish to achieve the degree of mobility of students noticeable in Germany. Nor do we perhaps want to develop the mechanical "hours-grades" credits system which appears to facilitate mobility in America. And we certainly do not want to (nor could we) make a migratory second or third year even semi-compulsory, if only for honours students. Reasons why it might be experimented with include:

- (i) Even in our larger Australian political science departments there are neither the numbers of teachers nor, with respect, the galaxy of stars or the variety of specialists always available in Oxford, London or the larger American universities. A year spent by the student of one Australian university at another would, however, on average double the number of contacts with political scientists which he would otherwise make on his way to a degree. This in itself should be some stimulus. Again, it might enable a student to take a year with some specialist in a subject which particularly interested him, would help him in his special final honours year work, or would further fortify his longer-range plans to pursue a particular post-graduate specialty. (If some such practice were established it might strengthen the case for carrying on one of the larger staffs here or there the occasional specialist in a field which would otherwise be rather hard to justify entirely for one self-contained department.)
- (ii) In a federation of large geographical proportions there is much to be said for the better student in political science experiencing at first hand another State, its government, its political "atmosphere" and "style" of politics. In a federation there is, alternatively or additionally, much to be said for some of the better political science students in a State capital experiencing at first hand for a year the "atmosphere" and "style" of bureaucracy, government, etc., in the Federal Capital—while Canberra students moved in the opposite direction. (Some American colleges, going one better, are nowadays even arranging for their students to take their third year in a university in Britain, France, Germany or Switzerland.)

I do not for a minute under-estimate the difficulties and obstacles to even such a modest scheme. But I do believe that the objective difficulties (subject-credits, accommodation, finance or adjustment of scholarship tenure) may on wholehearted

challenge prove easier to vanquish than some of the subjective resistances in the academic mind. In political science we find it hard enough to get even a handful of good honours people. When we do get them there will doubtless be a reluctance to see them float off to someone else, even for a year—particularly just when they are beginning to respond to and profit from our first couple of years of hard work on them.

I mentioned, regarding (c), that circumstances are tending to “impose” some measure of uniformity, or at least of common limitations, on us. It must serve here to instance four by way of illustration:

- (i) Children tend to come from school with insufficient stock and command of history and, from our political science viewpoint, perhaps especially of British and Australian constitutional and political history. A few years ago I circulated some statistics to call attention to the number of matriculants without history. Efforts to make good this short-coming, aggravated as it has been by the virtual disappearance of the potentially useful old first-year university course in constitutional history from all Australian history departments,¹ have even led two political science departments to offer a year of constitutional history as Political Science I or II. Other political science departments have somewhat uneasily sought to make running repairs to historical knowledge by sacrificing in part an analytical to an historical approach to the study of institutions in first- and second-year courses. Departments in all universities appear to have this problem in common.
- (ii) Historical accident, tradition and departmental imperialism have led to a difficulty over political philosophy. In some universities this was, of course, a preserve of the philosophers before political science made its debut, or at least asserted itself. In at least one (Melbourne) it was filched by the philosophers in broad daylight (and this was consequently decisive for Canberra, where we know what is expected of a satellite nowadays). Moreover, it is currently liable to fall into the hands of philosophers who have little knowledge of or sympathy with either practical politics or the political scientist's interests. And the rising tide of verbal analysis and desiccated logic-chopping bodes ill for the future of the “subject”. This is not to say that we do not need to tidy up our use and understanding of terms and concepts in political science. All I am arguing here is that this regrettable situation has placed departments of political science in something of a dilemma as to how far they can permit a treatment based to some extent on an artificial divorce of theory and institutional practice. All our political science departments seem to be busy smuggling theory back into their subjects. Again most departments seem to have this problem in common. Of the universities under consideration

¹Melbourne and Canberra currently offer “British Constitutional History for Law students” but it is not available to others; Sydney offers “Constitutional Law I” which is effectively a course in constitutional history by and for lawyers.

- (i.e. those with political science departments), Melbourne, Sydney, Tasmania and Canberra offer political philosophy and Adelaide moral and political philosophy courses controlled and conducted by their philosophers.
- (iii) Related in a practical way to this problem of accommodating and linking theory and practice is the problem of pass and honours courses as it presents itself in Australia. The facts that both must be offered, that the one must be designed as a three-year course and the other as a four-year course, and that both must be given by the same very small staffs, place, if not a strait jacket, at least pretty tight limitations on what we can do about each. The extent to which the two can be differentiated in nature, content, or even perhaps in emphasis and sophistication must be limited. Effectively only in "additional material for honours" in each of the first three years and in the whole of the fourth year can we really let ourselves go. In the marginal (honours) work, we can and clearly pretty generally do introduce a good deal of theory, methodology, etc.
- (iv) The common background (overwhelmingly Sydney-Melbourne-London-Oxford) and a certain amount of movement of staff within the Sydney-Melbourne-Adelaide-Canberra-Brisbane circuit have obviously been potent factors making for a good deal of common coverage—a sort of tacit consensus about what should be covered somewhere in the three or four years. To the outsider no doubt this all spells a somewhat inbred provincialism. This is doubtless true and almost as certainly inevitable. But it may make for a certain strength, too, as far as undergraduate teaching is concerned (what it makes for in the field of post-graduate studies may well be another matter altogether).

What Is and Ought to be Taught²

The First Year

While there is a good deal of diversity of content in present first-year political science courses there is, as regards what I shall call the east coast universities (i.e. Melbourne, Canberra, Sydney and Brisbane), a broad agreement.

At one extreme—let us call it the "pessimistic" or "realistic" end of the scale—Adelaide is apparently so impressed (or depressed) by the inadequacy of children's school training in British and Australian political and constitutional history³ that it has made its first year political science course in fact a course in constitutional history and practice—primarily, it would seem, history. At the other extreme—let us call it the "optimistic" end of the scale—Tasmania plunges the first-year political science student straight into a course which (besides a little theory) is a

²An outline of political science courses taught in 1956 is given in Appendix C.

³This seems to the outsider the more remarkable inasmuch as it would appear that a child who has been right through the S.A. secondary schools syllabuses in history would appear to be as well, if not better, prepared as other Australian children for a university course in political science (certainly far ahead of N.S.W. children).

study of the governments of three overseas countries—Britain, the United States and Russia—and of the United Nations.⁴ Somewhere between these extremes lie the east coast universities which in their first-year political science course all cleave to a broadly similar line. They assume some knowledge of history—sometimes, alas, a quite unwarranted assumption. They proceed on the basis that in the analytical study of institutions and politics they should start with the British-Australian tradition in these matters in which Australians grow up and about which they may be assumed to have absorbed something as they have grown up. This seems to be the soundest practicable principle for the first-year course—proceeding through the *more* familiar towards the *less* familiar in subsequent years. Similarly the theory dealt with in the first year is generally that of modern democracy and constitutionalism.

The principal problem regarding the first-year course nowadays seems to be where to leave off in matters of extent and intensity, *i.e.* where to take a stand against the temptations (a) to put more and more material and reading into it; and (b) to give a more and more advanced treatment of the material. It is, after all, an introductory first-year course for youngsters with no experience and little reading in the field. Yet, particularly on the Australian side, we have in the space of ten years come from a state of affairs where there was little accessible printed material—and that mostly very unsophisticated—to one where there is, relatively (though British and American visitors would not gain this impression) a quite considerable and rapidly growing supply. It is extremely uneven in quality and coverage but sophistication is, happily, beginning to peep through. This trend will doubtless continue and accelerate.

The obvious answer to the problem is to go so far in the first year (*i.e.* a general coverage in extent) and to come back in later years for more intensive, advanced treatment of particular aspects of the British and, even more, the Australian fields. This we are already doing, of course, in three directions: (a) coming back in third year (in the Melbourne-Canberra course) to an extensive consideration of government in Australia in relation to the economy; (b) passing over appropriate sections of the field to the separate subjects of public administration⁵ and international relations; and (c) bringing more Australian focus into the fourth (honours) year. This has the advantage not only of keeping the first-year situation manageable but of bringing the students to the more important and more complex Australian problems and material *after* they have read (*e.g.* in second year) enough of various other systems to enable them to take a more penetrating look at their own.

Number one problem of the first-year political science course (assuming it to deal with Britain and Australia) seems to me, then, to be a more conscious and

⁴Curiously, when it comes to the second year of political science, Tasmania turns about and offers a course in British and Australian constitutional history and practice apparently similar to the first-year Adelaide course. (It should, however, be noted that some of what the east coast universities teach in first-year political science is offered in Tasmania's first-year public administration.)

⁵The handing over of control of public administration courses to political science departments, which has been such a general trend in recent years, has opened up a major field for this sort of elimination of overlap.

constant facing of the fact that we are just now passing from the age of scarcity of Australian materials to the age of plenty and need to be carefully revising those courses:

- (a) to preserve sufficient time for introducing students to some of the basic concepts and principles underlying the British-Australian system;
- (b) to cull the British section of the course to leave only those aspects most significant for the business in hand (*i.e.* an introductory course);
- and (c) to eschew overloading and over-sophistication in the Australian section by a discriminating selection and treatment of topics.

There is another problem associated with the first-year course which is worth a little attention. It relates to the choice of other "subjects" to be taken in that year. A full-time pass student with us takes ten subjects in three years, and usually four in the first year. At present, as I see it, unnecessary waste and complications⁶ arise because of the requirement from pass students of one foreign language unit and one Science unit being included in the ten. At Canberra we have been exploring ways and means of getting rid of those two requirements for *pass* students in Arts. If we could it would mean a freer approach to the choice of satisfactory first-year subjects.

It seems to me that a political science student should in first year:

- (a) make a start on political science proper—hence Political Science A;
- (b) acquire or consolidate a broad background in British and Australian constitutional and political history;
- (c) take a broad run through the history of political ideas;
- (d) inevitably, take the first unit of his second "major" (*i.e.* his second three-year group).

Regarding constitutional and political history, ideally it should be a course especially designed for political science students—as Adelaide manages it. In most situations at present, however (in relation to the number of courses taught) the political science departments with existing staffs could rarely cope. Moreover, there would in some cases be jurisdictional difficulties with history departments (though they have almost all now abandoned the general constitutional history course). And there would also be strong arguments for economy, at least to the extent of providing (as in Tasmania) a course designed to serve both political science and law students.

⁶I say waste and complications because the average pass student is neither interested in nor likely to get anything worth-while from one university year of a foreign language, especially when it is taken at the lower level, *i.e.* in Melbourne terminology, French IA instead of French I—the former is a waste of teaching talent while the unwilling and ungifted but coerced student spends more than proportionate time slaving over the subject (and hating it) simply because it is a must. Unlike the honours student he is rarely if ever going to want to follow up his main interests in the language in question. The same applies to the Science subject. It usually means uneconomic and purposeless use of staff and laboratory space by unwilling or at least unenthusiastic Arts students. If a really good and imaginative one-year course in the history and method of science were really feasible for Arts students there might be rather more to be said for encouraging them to take it.

Regarding the history of political thought, I believe there is a very pressing need for a first-year course such as Oakeshott gives to the newcomers at London School of Economics. This should *not* be given by the philosophy department. It should be a broad survey of the problems and issues of politics which have been faced by the Greeks, the Romans, the people of Mediaeval Christendom, etc., and of the ways and styles in which they thought about them. It is a course which, as I see it, is as much needed by first-year history students and by those who are later going to read political philosophy with the philosophers as it is an essential for political science people.

The Second Year

Fundamentally the second-year political science student—if a serious student of the subject—is still largely “stocking up”. On the basis that he is moving from the more to the less familiar and that he has studied Britain and Australia in the first year, the broad aim of the second year seems clear. It is to study, under the general and perhaps loose heading of comparative foreign government, the most important or significant political systems outside our own immediate tradition, both for their own sake and to give the student proceeding to third- and fourth-year work the grasp of a sufficient number of political systems and traditions for meaningful probing into the deeper problems and analyses of political institutions and behaviour.

If this is agreed, the issues concerning the second-year course reduce themselves largely to details of which countries and which foci. The United States and Russia appear to select themselves. Queensland, indeed, leaves it at that. Melbourne and Canberra add Germany and Japan. France, to my own regret, appears to miss out all round.

With one reservation (to be mentioned below) I find the U.S.S.R.-U.S.-Germany-Japan selection a good and fruitful one. U.S.S.R.-U.S.-Germany give a nice contrast of one-, two- and multi-party systems (latterly the French system would be a more convincing multi-party case); they give a nice contrast in the realities behind apparent federalisms; they afford a useful study of variegated political executives; they offer a fascinating contrast in bureaucratic traditions, etc., etc. Japan adds an Asian contrast—a contrast all the more fascinating because of the German and American influences or would-be influences on Japanese institutions and practices and of the relatively very sudden overlaying of modern (and alien) features upon an ancient tradition. So far, so good.

My reservation is the belief that, as handled at present at least, treatment of four countries in the course makes it too crowded. In view of the ignorance of both the history and the governmental systems with which students enter this course, those teaching it have little option but to adopt the country-by-country approach and, in effect, to teach some history along the way in order to make the politics reasonably meaningful. In a four-years honours course perhaps time can be afforded for that. But the course itself suffers from not allowing within itself more actual comparative analytical work. If, say, Japan were dropped, the third term could be given over to comparative analysis and one would get what, in the

circumstances, is probably the best of both worlds—two terms country-by-country and a term of straight comparative analysis. But this would be done at the cost of dropping what appears to be the only study of an Asian government in any political science course in Australia. Moreover, inasmuch as we see second-year political science as a most necessary background (especially for ill-read pass students) to international relations and to public administration, it would be a pity to have to cut down the number of countries studied. Here then is a real dilemma. My own feeling, on balance, is for more comparative analysis even at the sacrifice of one country.

As regards other "subjects" to be taken during the second year, a decision would depend very much on what is available. If the student is really concentrating on politics then I should like to see public administration (if a one-year course) taken at this stage—again in accordance with the principle that as much material as possible should be "stocked-up" in the first two years as a basis for the more sophisticated analytical work in third and fourth years.

The Third Year

Prescription for the third year becomes really difficult—difficult, first, because the possible choice is so wide once students have become familiar with a number of political systems in some detail and, secondly, because for pass students this is their final year and there is so much we should like to give them before they move out.

At this stage, the Adelaide and Tasmanian departments are offering two distinct subjects each (Comparative Government and International Relations/History of Political Ideas and Public Administration III, respectively); Melbourne and Canberra departments are offering a maximum of three (Political Science C, International Relations and—if not taken in second year—Public Administration). This freedom to offer two or three subjects means some relief as regards pressure on the content of the subject officially known as Political Science C or III. Sydney sticks austere to a single course of Government III which is in fact a course in public administration available only to Economics degree students and not to Arts people. Queensland offers one subject but it is an amalgam of minor courses in ancient classical political thought, modern political sociology and methodology (this last related to comparative study of governmental systems).

Melbourne some years ago scrapped a Politics C course which was largely devoted to consideration of theories of political sociology and to methodology in favour of one which, at the pass level at least, has focussed on the state in economic life and the relations of major economic institutions and powers to the state and to each other. The first half of the year is given to an examination of the cycle of ideas about the role of the state in economic life from the end of mercantilism, through the classical political economists, etc., to Keynes, the Welfare State and the socialist planners, together with the changing nature and roles of capitalism, the private and public corporations, the trade unions and related institutions and pressure groups. (Up to a point this half has something in common no doubt with Sydney's second-year course, though the emphasis may be more on the

economic.) In the second half of the year the focus is turned on to Australia again and a closer examination is made of the relationship between governments and governmental machinery and the economy than is possible in Political Science A.

To my way of thinking this has proved to be a very useful course—especially for our Canberra students, most of whom come from or are destined for the bureaucracy. In the first place, it comes at a point in their total degree course when the students have a sufficient grasp of the political systems of several major powers to appreciate more adequately than would earlier be possible questions of politico-economic relationships. Secondly, in Canberra at least, much the most popular social science major is economics; consequently when our political science students reach their third year they have almost all read some economics (some are currently reading a third year of it) and they find the first half of the Political Science C course a useful and interesting attempt to link up in a primarily political context something of what they have picked up already in both economics and politics courses. If they have read some economic history as well they stand to get even more out of it. Thirdly, their studies of other federalisms and quasi-federalisms in the second-year course, together with some command by this stage of some six countries, should give them a much better equipment and perspective for the study of the economic aspects of Australian government than would have been possible if the Australian system had been dealt with once-for-all in the first-year course. Finally, the course does provide for some linking of theory and practice which becomes more imperative with each succeeding year of the political science course.

I am not for a moment suggesting that Political Science C as developed to date in Melbourne and Canberra is either a perfect "subject" or anything but one of many alternative "subjects" one might evolve for third-year students. But I would say that there is much to be said for evolving *some* course—especially for third-year pass students who are then winding up their university studies—which does something to bring together some of their separate studies in economics, history and politics by focussing on the common frontiers of political and economic activity in a dynamic or historical setting. If we had enough staff to make it possible to give wholly separate courses to pass and honours students in their third year there might be a case for postponing such work, as far as honours students are concerned, until the fourth year. The fact is that we have not been so generously provided and consequently the honours people can happily enough take in a common third-year course on these lines and then move on to advanced political topics in their final year.

Honours Work—First to Third Years

I have spoken only incidentally and inferentially of the content of the "additional work for honours" during the first three years of the political science course. It has been the subject of little or no uniformity from university to university or even, within some universities or individual subjects, from year to year. It has in some cases been the means of smuggling back political theory in the face of the philosophers and of treating it from angles most appropriate to a political science course.

My own feeling is that the honours work in the first two years should be aimed at two things: (a) enthusing the honours students with their discipline; (b) familiarizing them at first hand with a shelf of classics in the field of political theory and institutions relevant to the ground being covered in the pass subject-matters already discussed. (We can hardly avoid subjecting the pass student mostly to text-books but the honours man deserves something better.)

Regarding both these aims but with special reference to the second, we in Canberra have felt that the classics chosen (it might be Mill, Bagehot, J. F. Stephen, Green and Bryce, let us say, for the first year) should be supplemented and reinforced by carefully selected autobiographies, biographies and political novels of merit which would help youngsters to enter a little more into the spirit of the age and into the political attitudes and "style" of the authors of the classics under study. There seems to me every reason for suitable long-vacation reading lists of this sort of material being made available as well. Perhaps we are over-optimistic.

With the third-year honours work, as with the pass work, an almost limitless field seems to open up. The same formula might be applied as I have just suggested for the first two, or the break might be made at this point and a start made in the direction of political sociology and questions of methodology. My own inclination is in the former direction. I would leave the sterner sort of methodology, in particular, to the fourth (final honours) year—insofar as I would worry undergraduates with it at all.⁷ I have a feeling that most of those who have brought the best sociological and methodological work from London and elsewhere have been rather too apt to forget that they themselves first really made contact with it as *graduates* in their twenties, rather than as third- or even fourth-year undergraduates in the last year or two of their 'teens.

The Final Honours Year

Two issues seem to face us here. The first is whether a sub-thesis should be one of the requirements in this year. The second is how many and what "subjects" should be included, leading to examinations at the end of the year.

For the sub-thesis I have not hitherto been an enthusiast. It may well be that there should be an extensive piece of writing at this stage but I think that it should at least be closely geared into one of the "subjects" taken and not be chosen at large. I found in my final honours year enough and more than enough stimulating reading prescribed to fill prolonged waking hours. Revisiting Oxford after the war when the new B.Phil. degree was in its infancy I found a good deal of controversy as to whether even it (which is a post-graduate two-year course) should include a sub-thesis or be confined entirely to reading for examinations. In the end a typical Oxford compromise was effected—the option of a sub-thesis in lieu of one of the six examination papers (at least that was the formula in the

⁷ I never knew the blessings of the old Political Science C course in Melbourne either as undergraduate or teacher. That it had a considerable effect on some of those who did experience it as students is undeniable. That it had a profound or notably beneficial effect on any but a very few of the best is perhaps more questionable. Some who were plunged into its more exotic and esoteric sections were certainly not ready for them.

politics course for B.Phil.). My impression at that time was that the early B.Phil. students in politics fought shy of the sub-thesis. What the Oxford statistics are after a decade I do not know. Here in Australia the east coast universities at least seem to be unanimous in *requiring* a sub-thesis as part of the final honours year. Reporting in *A.P.S.A. News* on his Sydney experience, Henry Mayer has made out a persuasive case for this requirement. I maintain reservations⁸ but would be happy to hear further argument.

As regards fourth-year "subjects", in the absence of sub-theses, at any rate, I would argue for three: one in the field of comparative politics; one in the field of political theory or philosophy; one in the field of Australian politics or political sociology. If the course in political philosophy given by the philosophy department were suitable both as regards contents, orientation and standard it might be fitted in here to meet the second of these requirements (I notice that Sydney requires its final honours people to take one subject outside their own department). There seems no reason why the content of these three subjects should not change completely from year to year. It does to some extent in some universities already—if for no better reason than that staff members go on sabbatical leave in rotation.⁹

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⁸For my part I should even be happy to see the restoration of M.A. by examination (as an alternative to M.A. by thesis)—the course leading to examination being somewhat akin to the Oxford B.Phil. There seem to be some M.A. students whose focus of interest is such that they stand to get far more out of such a course than from writing a thesis.

⁹I should like to see rather more movement of staff members from university to university on one-, two- and three-week visits (as teaching commitments permit or actual exchange visits can be organized) to let fourth-year honours students in particular meet and hear from as many political scientists as possible on their specialties and current enthusiasms. This is complementary (or at least a lesser alternative) to my earlier suggestion for a year's visit by honours undergraduates to another Australian university. We have had reason to appreciate in some of our universities the stimulus to be gained from longer or shorter visits from the better "Fulbright" Americans and the occasional peripatetic Englishman. But we have made relatively little use of one another's resources. Professors are no doubt pretty much tied down but in any case much of the worth-while research and writing is coming from their under-paid colleagues. With small staffs it is not easy to arrange to cope with absences on such visits but most of us even so have been pretty unenterprising.

The Teaching of Comparative Government

By H. A. WOLFSOHN

A course in comparative government consists as a rule of the description and analysis of the institutions and political arrangements of a number of countries that happen to form part of the syllabus. Each country is investigated singly, contrasts and similarities are noted and where the desire exists to arrive at "significant" conclusions, a suitable summary will be produced at the end of the course. It is important to ask which countries have been chosen for study and why. But no general rule appears to be available by means of which the composition of the syllabus could be universally determined. A large number of motives, many of them of a personal character, are responsible for the drawing-up of the syllabus. Among these may be listed the personal interests of the staff available, the existence of up-to-date material, the "importance" of the countries chosen, the interest assumed to exist among undergraduates, and so on. Occasionally political considerations determine the choice of material.¹

On the whole, therefore, the choice of material is rather arbitrary, and one criterion is almost as good as any other. "Importance" is obviously a very sensible criterion. A syllabus that excluded the Soviet Union or the United States would almost be self-defeating and, what is worse, would probably prove unattractive to undergraduates. And it would be absurd not to make full use of the special knowledge members of staff may have acquired in relation to certain countries in which they are strongly interested. Furthermore university departments should not be entirely impervious to market considerations as topics of great interest increase enrolments and improve the level of students' performances. The size of the syllabus is likely to vary in accordance with the number of lectures available and the degree of detailed attention it is planned to devote to each society. However, the method and the purpose in the teaching of the subject will have an important bearing upon the choice of material and the size of the syllabus.

Text-books on comparative government follow the arbitrary methods established by university departments. Geographical proximity is a convenient method for Shotwell to include all the countries of Europe in one volume.² For Finer mixed criteria of importance and geography were responsible for his choice of the "Greater European Powers" only.³ Political systems owing their creation and/or character to identical political inspirations such as the nations of the British Commonwealth may be usefully discussed together.⁴ And the same, of course, applies to totalitarian

¹G. A. Almond, Taylor Cole, R. Macridis, "A Suggested Research Strategy in Western European Government and Politics", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLIX, No. 4, Dec. 1955, pp. 1042, ff.

²J. T. Shotwell, *Governments of Continental Europe*, Macmillan, 1940.

³H. Finer, *Governments of Greater European Powers*, Methuen, 1956.

⁴A. Brady, *Democracy in the Dominions*, Toronto, 1947.

societies. Books on Asian governments may later follow similar patterns, but for the time being a different approach is likely to establish itself.⁵ On the whole, however, no fixed patterns exist, and the value of text-books is largely determined by the volume of material offered.⁶

The freedom of choice in the composition of the syllabus and in the writing of text-books suggests some of the difficulties of the subject among which the greatest is connected with the meaning of "comparison". The type of comparison used will be strongly influenced by the method and purpose of the teaching employed. If the purpose be mainly to enlarge the students' acquaintance with as many foreign governments as possible, then what I will call the "panoramic" or "portmanteau" method is likely to be applied.⁷ In this case the comparison will be informative and simple but somewhat fortuitous. Its typical form will be, what is done in country A, is done differently in country B, and *quite* differently in country C. To some extent, of course, this sort of thing is inevitable in the teaching of the subject, but the panoramic method which because of the great volume of material covered is as a rule exceedingly monographic in its presentation brings certain dangers with it. The impressionistic use of comparisons and contrasts for purposes of illustration leads often to the establishment of superficial similarities and in extreme cases to academic dishonesty.⁸ J. Miller, for instance, in his book on Russia, identifies the position of the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with that of the British Prime Minister. In spite of these disadvantages, however, this approach is useful for the coverage of a large number of political systems provided that "cross-references" and hasty comparisons are kept down to a minimum.

I fully agree with Finer that "all knowledge issues from comparisons" which exhibit the "institutions of each country as articulated interdependent systems".⁹ This description of the historical method at least allows some definite meaning to be attached to the term "comparison" because it underlines its scope and limitations. In scientific procedure at its simplest, carefully selected comparisons are expected to lead to the emergence of uniformities which may form the basis of general propositions and fully-fledged theories. And, in comparative government, attracted by the idea of a general science of politics, we are often given to understand that the comparative study of political systems will provide the foundation on which a general theory of politics can be constructed.¹⁰ However, I don't think that these expectations have been fulfilled. Finer himself is somewhat undecided on this question. In his *Governments of Greater European Powers* he decided in favour of the historical method of presentation because he considered it more suitable

⁵G. McT. Kahin, G. J. Pauker, L. W. Pye, "Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries", *Am. Pol. Sci. R.*, Vol. XLIX, No. 4, Dec. 1955, pp. 1022, ff.

⁶W. B. Munro, *The Governments of Europe*, Macmillan, 1938. Here, for good measure, a "supplementary" chapter on Japan is added on the ground that "... the government of Japan is in a sense European" (p. 798).

⁷J. S. Roucek (ed.), *Governments and Politics Abroad*, New York, 1948. No fewer than nineteen countries are included in this relatively slim volume of 585 pages. Its redeeming feature is that some attention is given to the governments of South America which, owing to widespread ignorance on the subject, are rarely included in the average text-book.

⁸*Am. Pol. Sci. R.*, Vol. XLIX, No. 4, Dec. 1955, p. 1041.

⁹Finer, *op. cit.*, Preface, p. ix.

¹⁰C. J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy*, New York, 1950, pp. 576, ff.

for teaching purposes. In reality, however, he preferred the "analytical" approach by institutions as "scientifically better" which he then applied in his *Theory and Practice of Modern Government*. In this latter work a tremendous amount of material is in fact vertically analysed as a suitable background to the four chapters of Part I which are supposed to reveal the general categories of politics.

However, what was essentially an effort in political sociology turned out to be a long and diffuse discussion in which general political categories, political and constitutional principles, technical observations and emotive recommendations are scrambled up into a tasty dish of political philosophy.¹¹ The trouble was that Finer diluted the analytical approach by institutions with historical references of one kind or another, with discussions of political philosophy, with general speculations on the "purpose" of government, and so on. As a result the important question as to which institutions lend themselves at all to purposes of generalization remained obscure. As Finer himself pointed out repeatedly, the historical method of presentation serves to show the close interdependence of institutions, the interrelation between constitutional principles and political procedures and the general influence of moral and cultural values, all within *one* society, considered as a single "national configuration".¹² But when he adopted the "scientifically better" analytical approach by institutions,¹³ *i.e.* when he embarked upon the search for general laws in politics, he appears to have been unaware that the success of this scheme requires the full elimination of all historical detail. The work of Michels, Weber, Duverger and others has so far shown that only a few institutions can be more or less safely lifted out of their environment (I would put the emphasis on "less safely"), and once this lifting-out process has been completed, nothing can be deduced as to the nature of government or its purpose because essentially similar institutions can function in lots of different societies.¹⁴

References to *the* purpose of government, to constitutional principles as such and to political philosophy have no place among the possible generalizations of political sociology. And even in the less ambitious historical presentation of single societies references to questions of this sort should be avoided as far as possible.¹⁵ By blurring the distinction between the generalizations of political sociology and the historical or "monographical" presentation of single societies, Finer enormously enlarged the scope of comparative government, but at the expense of including institutions which by their very nature are not comparable. Constitutions, for instance, are not institutions in the same sense in which political parties are.

¹¹For instance, "Government is an adventure, not a text-book, because its end or purpose shares the dark or bright nebulousness of man's ultimate purpose" (p. 6).

¹²In his *Governments of Greater European Powers*, Preface, *passim*.

¹³In his *Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, London, 1932.

¹⁴This is, of course, not quite correct in relation to Michels, who used the "iron law of oligarchy" to prove the impossibility of democracy as such. For this inference, however, there is no justification. More interesting is the case of R. T. McKenzie who discovered that the British Labor Party fulfilled a purpose entirely different from what, for instance, Lord Attlee thought it did. He has stated, however, that "as a citizen" he preferred to ignore his own discoveries.

¹⁵The impression that political philosophers are the actual creators of political systems should be avoided. Otherwise a lot of time has to be spent on explaining why Hegel was not necessarily responsible for Hitler, or how far the present French Chamber is influenced by Rousseau, etc., etc.

General observations about constitutions are as a rule limited to two: "All constitutions require amendments"; "All constitutions are contracts". On the other hand constitutions can be *enumerated* and individually analysed, as in J. A. Hawgood, *Modern Constitutions since 1787*; or K. C. Wheare, *Modern Constitutions*. These books are useful as students can always be referred to single chapters. But as a general introduction to politics they are as useful a guide as the London telephone directory is to London. The same applies to Wheare's *Federal Government*.

And, after all, the final upshot of all this effort is not so novel. What we get is a return, admittedly on a "higher" level of abstraction, to the usual panorama of juxtapositions and enumerations of isolated procedures, constitutional principles and political philosophies which the student cannot be expected to remember.

In view of these difficulties we will have to reduce our ambitions and vote for the adoption of the restricted use of the historical method of presentation. In this way at least we can provide a useful if limited network of interrelated propositions about single societies. Comparisons should be employed in such a way as to return detailed explanations of the working of institutions. I suggest therefore that the teaching of comparative government should always include the experimental transfer of a set of practices or institutional arrangements from one national framework into another with which it is being contrasted. Such questions as, "what would it be like to introduce the American form of federalism into the Soviet Union", are instrumental in getting the student to state and, in a sense, to *discover* the remarkable position of the Communist Party in Soviet society. By rejecting the suggestion as absurd, the student has already moved more than half-way towards an understanding of the Soviet Union. The considerable difficulties of such transfers will not only force into prominence the "unique" features of each society but will also provide an excellent method of elimination by means of which a residue of actually transferable institutions and political procedures may be discovered.

This is especially important for public administration and political sociology. It appears that the scope for generalizations in public administration and political sociology depends upon how far certain institutions and procedures are divorced from political pressures and influences. What is left over at the end of the sifting-out process consists largely of administrative techniques such as committee procedures, criteria for public service recruitment, the administration of public utilities, etc. "Political" institutions such as parties and pressure groups, trade unions and bureaucracy should be reserved for treatment by the sociologist. This enumeration does not, of course, exhaust the field left to the political sociologist. I am mainly concerned here to stress the value of comparative government as a discipline for the later work in political sociology.

To many students, for instance, the lack of party discipline in the American Congress is something of a mystery and preferences for the British system are often emphasized. But an experimental transfer of British practices into the American environment serves to bring out forcibly the intimate relation between Congressional behaviour, American parties and party machines, the operation of the "locality rule", local pressures and the pluralistic features of American politics. In this way the stage is set for the formulation of a series of general propositions about the

American political system, and often in my experience the intelligent student will be able to do this without much help, even to the point of predicting fairly accurately the failures (and the arguments leading thereto) of frequent American attempts to "reform" the American system along British lines. The famous controversy between Laski and Price on the merits of the British and American systems of government is of great interest in this context as the protagonists tried to prove the superiority of their respective institutions and procedures. But the suggestions advanced in the course of the discussion showed convincingly how confined they were to the society in which they normally function.¹⁶ Students often express a strong preference for the greater "efficiency" of the British system, but transfers of the type suggested, which are at bottom negative testing procedures, serve to show that each political system determines and improves its efficiency by means peculiar to itself.

To sum up. The method of teaching comparative government which I have recommended has in my opinion three distinct advantages: (a) It enables the student to explain systematically a range of connected institutions and political procedures; (b) as a method of elimination it leaves a residue of comparable institutions and technical procedures which are of considerable importance to political sociology and public administration; (c) it prepares the student for the later work in the general theory of politics and public administration.

I have little to suggest as to when the subject should be taught at our universities except that the first year should be reserved for a detailed study of Australian and British institutions. I am convinced that our Melbourne first-year course in British and Australian government has been instrumental in permitting me a higher degree of sophistication at which to acquaint our students with the details of foreign governments. The second year appears very suitable, especially if it is intended to run a course in political sociology in the third or fourth (final) year. Knowledge derived from the study of comparative institutions will then prove invaluable.

Regarding research in this field I am pessimistic enough to suggest that its scope will remain very limited in this country for a long time to come. For one thing, our libraries do not possess the resources required, nor does the average Australian student command the linguistic qualifications for the study of material in foreign languages. But in cases where students do possess such qualifications¹⁷ they are likely to be frustrated by the depressing shortage of foreign books and periodicals in our libraries.¹⁸ It is therefore not surprising that Melbourne should not so far have conferred any higher degrees for research done in this field of study. Honours students in their final year have also avoided choosing comparative government topics for their final-year theses of about 10,000 words. This does not prove,

¹⁶cf. D. K. Price, "The Parliamentary and Presidential Systems", *Public Administration Review*, Autumn, 1943.

¹⁷There is an increasing number of Russian-speaking students available whose services cannot be utilized owing to the serious shortage of Russian sources.

¹⁸This may not apply to Canberra.

of course, that such theses cannot be written. At any rate, in such cases topics would have to be carefully chosen and adjusted to the material available.

A limited field for research, however, remains open to our students. British and American law reports and periodicals, the Hansards of Britain and the older Dominions, the Congressional Record and many though by no means all Congressional publications are available and research, mainly on administrative and parliamentary procedures in English-speaking countries, seems perfectly possible. For other types of research the conclusion is unavoidable that Australians should go overseas to gain access to facilities so far unobtainable in this country.

A few words should be said about Asian government owing to its increasing importance as a teaching subject in our universities. There are a number of reasons why Asian government should not be taught along the lines suggested for the study of Western societies. For one thing, the institutions in all Asian countries (even in Japan) are in a state of flux and their representation in systematic form would entail the considerable danger of distorting their character and functions. There is admittedly more than a superficial similarity between a large number of institutions common to Asian and Western societies, but the conscious transfer of many Western institutions into Asian societies has given rise to a long process of assimilation in the course of which new characteristics, modifications and adjustments are bound to arise.¹⁹ The present-day practice of Asian governments of experimenting with political forms and principles has highlighted basic needs of a social and economic character common to all countries of Asia.

These developments dictate the approach to the subject which may be defined as "vertical analysis by problems". The social, political and economic implications of previous colonial status form an excellent beginning. From there it is easy to proceed to a discussion of the policies of reconstruction. These should be broken up into the related issues of agricultural and industrial development, the question of exploitation and capital accumulation, the relation between the projected speed of development, the extent of national rates of saving and the democratic and/or authoritarian structure of the government, and the attitudes of peasant populations to agricultural reforms and industrialization. It will be found unavoidable to focus attention on questions of political leadership against the background of large-scale illiteracy, and on the implications of the absence of a graded bureaucracy.²⁰

Most text-books on Asian government deal more or less explicitly with the theory of economic growth and its practical application.²¹ This makes such a course considerably more difficult and unsuitable for presentation in the second year. It should therefore be taught in the third year as part of the general syllabus or reserved for the final year as a form of special study. Suggestions have been made on occasions that such a course should eventually be offered as an alternative to

¹⁹*cf.* Kahin, Pauker, Pye, *op. cit.* This article provides a full list of problems common to Asian countries.

²⁰This is important in relation to political parties which often appear to assume administrative functions in country districts (Indonesia, for instance).

²¹E. H. Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia*, New York, 1949; M. Zinkin, *Development for Free Asia*, Chicago, 1956; W. A. Lewis, *The Theory of Economic Growth*, London, 1955; W. Macmahon Ball, *Nationalism and Communism in East Asia*, Melbourne, 1956.

the second-year course on European and American government. This seems to me undesirable because students should study both European and Asian government and, as I have already argued, the greater intellectual demands made on the student by a course of Asian studies make it an unsuitable second-year subject.

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The Teaching of Public Administration

By B. B. SCHAFER

"Neither is it to be passed over in silence that this dedicating of colleges and societies only to the use of professorial learning hath not only been an enemy of the growth of sciences, but hath redounded likewise to the prejudice of states and governments: for hence it commonly falls out that princes, when they would make choice of ministers fit for the affairs of state, finde about them such a marvellous solitude of able men; because there is no education collegiate designed to this end."

Bacon, *Advancement of Learning*, Book I

I

There are apparently two groups of questions here: to whom (and when) should public administration be taught; and secondly, what is it that we should teach under this title? The debate occurs because of doubts about the status of formal knowledge in administration and the propriety of academic activity in this field. It is especially fierce in relation to undergraduate teaching and it is this that I intend to discuss. I think that we should grasp the nettle. In other words, the course of my argument is that right answers to these questions depend precisely on the public service's relations with the university, and especially on its attitudes to administrative recruitment and to administrative study. This suggests, in Australia at any rate, that there are no simple answers available. We should be prepared to deal with all sorts of students including undergraduates. If we are to provide undergraduate courses the present condition of administrative studies demands that we talk about many sorts of things: terminology, administrative history, case studies, the history of administrative ideas and of certain special movements, and particular situations and methods. Such an approach encounters many difficulties. We could avoid them only by avoiding undergraduate teaching altogether, and that I reject. Some of the difficulties will be mentioned in the course of the paper, which ends with a consideration of three of the most important: the discipline of the study; its relation to political studies in general; and certain questions about purpose or at any rate about results. This is not a proposal for the universities to provide training and it is independent of considerations of what else the universities should do in public administration and where other types of administrative courses should be given. It is concerned with one point, precisely that specifically undergraduate education in public administration, with all its problems, is an exciting, difficult and wholly legitimate task that must be done.

II

Whether you are studying or running a public service, there are two questions that you cannot escape. The first is what sort of recognition you are going to give to the administrative talent and its role in organization; and the second is

how you are to select, train, promote, and place people for this role. About the first question there probably is not nowadays much disagreement. Administrative talent is a matter of leadership and of special managerial skills. Its role is related to policy, organization and control. The bigger and more important the organization is—and this is peculiarly true in the public sphere—the more the work to be done at the top is administration rather than anything else. There is greater disagreement about the second question. Nor is this surprising: for the finding of good administrators and the placing of them as against the other people you need (who may be politicians or scientists or clerks) are difficult and delicate matters.

The difficulty is to find able men. . . . For look what it is that you demand in a man of business! Talents for the particular business, the art of bringing out those talents before the eyes of men, temper to deal with men, inventiveness together with prudence, and, in addition to many other moral qualities, that of moral courage, which I have remarked to be the rarest gift of all.¹

Different public services adopt different solutions in this matter. The United Kingdom civil service believes in the recruitment of academic all-rounders, the French in the recruitment and development of intellect, the Americans in the recruitment of good competitors. President Roosevelt had a consciously devised theory of administration by competition.

I think that there is something to be said for this. . . . There is something to be said too for having a little conflict between agencies. A little rivalry is stimulating, you know. It keeps everybody going to prove that he is a better fellow than the next man. It keeps them honest too. An awful lot of money is being handled. The fact that there is somebody else in the field who knows what you are doing is a strong incentive to strict honesty.²

This is a great contrast with the French system of rigorous training and academic examination in the old *Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques* or the new *Instituts des Etudes Politiques* and *Ecole Nationale d'Administration*. It is, equally, a great contrast with Sir Edward Bridges's expression of the British belief in a single but classified system of recruitment: "a common origin in entry by the same examination" (and therefore by the same education); transfer between departments (especially for the top administrative posts); and

recruiting first-class material from the universities: men who were determined to escape as quickly as possible from routine jobs by showing that they were fitted for better things; men who brought to their work a happy blend of scholarship and ebullience that one finds in a university.³

III

In this way public services differ. Now public administration may be looked on as a practical science. Administration will be studied partly in response to demands. The demands made will be dependent on the attitude of the public

¹Sir Arthur Helps, *Friends in Council*, London, 1869, First Series, Vol. II, p. 64.

²Frances Perkins, quoting Roosevelt in *The Roosevelt I Knew*, London, 1948, p. 288.

³Sir Edward Bridges, *Portrait of a Profession*, Cambridge, 1953, p. 15.

service to administration and, especially, to its recruitment. Public services vary in these matters. Their relations with university education and, in particular, with university studies in public administration, will, accordingly, vary too. I am not arguing that relations between university education and the public service are simple. Let us take one instance of the matter. The United States is the country where there has been the greatest possible development of university study of public administration; but that has not meant a flow of graduates into the federal service. In particular, in recent years attempts at recruiting potential career administrators from the universities had met with declining success.⁴

Let us take another instance of the complexity of the matter. The problem of the relations between the structure and recruitment of a public service and the educational system has probably only once been fully solved, and that was in Great Britain for the relatively short period in the nineteenth century when the Trevelyan-Northcote Report was first being implemented. Then a rigorously classified civil service harmonized with a still highly stratified educational system. But public administration was not yet being taught in the universities at all (save for what hints could be picked up here and there in Aristotle). The administrative class was recruited exclusively from university men on the basis of a stiff competitive examination in the subjects in which they were taught simply because they were the subjects that they had taken, and not because the subjects had anything to do with the public service. As Macaulay explained in advocating these requirements:

Whether the English system of education be good or bad is not now the question. Perhaps I may think that too much time is given to the ancient languages and to the abstract sciences. But what then? Whatever be the languages, whatever be the sciences, which it is, in any age or country, the fashion to teach, the persons who become the greatest proficient in those languages and those sciences will generally be the flower of the youth; the most acute, the most industrious, the most ambitious of honourable distinctions.⁵

Relations between university education and the public service are complex. They are not for that reason the less important. One could categorize the services according to their attitudes to administrative recruitment and one would be entitled to expect a significant correlation with their attitudes to university education.

In the particular matter of relations between university studies of public administration and the public service, one finds similar degrees of paradox, complexity and significance. In general public administration studies must be related to demand and the public service must have some sort of attitude to the studies. This cannot be the whole *raison d'être* of university work. Equally (to cover familiar ground) public service recruitment from the universities will not be of administrators alone; its recruitment of administrators is not (even in the United Kingdom) only from the universities; its university recruitment of administrators is not only (or even mainly, save now in France) from those who

⁴cf. Philip Young, "The Federal Service Entrance Examination", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1956, p. 3.

⁵G. Trevelyan, *The Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay*, London, 1881, pp. 585-6.

have studied administration (even where as in the United States there is much study); and its recruitment of those who have studied administration is not necessarily restricted to those who are mainly going to be employed in that sort of work. But the public service's use of university public administration is not limited to the point of entry; and it is still true for the teachers of the subject that their relations with the public service will be decisive for them. In the first place there is the matter of demands made or unmade, answered or neglected. In the second place, what the university teacher of public administration puts into his subject is, at the best, a result of direct contact with the public service; at the least a result of what he thinks about it; at the worst a result of what it thinks about him. He may, according to the situation, nurture young talent for the public service or encourage the mature. Administration like politics is nearer to cookery than science. The public service can flatter the teacher with a sudden demand to brew a scheme of reform or reorganization. It can also leave him to stew in his own juice. Obvious examples from the past spring to mind: the growth of a certain content and premise in American teaching in response to public service reform, the bureau movement and local and state government reorganization; the emphasis on law in central European university courses in administration; the English provincial universities' concentration on local government. In the third place the whole subject of public service attitudes to administration, to the university and to administrative studies is a vital matter for the study itself. All this will be reflected in what the university teacher tells his students.

IV

What has been said comes down to this: you can approach the questions of whom and what should be taught in university public administration at least by recognizing that the answers to both questions will be a reply among other things to a varying situation. Different public services, different views of administration; different views, different demands on universities; different demands, different relations and responses; such a situation cannot but include, one way or another, a determining influence on our subject. The answers would always be difficult to arrive at. In Australia, the objective situation would seem to suggest mixed, eclectic answers to both questions: whom (and when); what (and how).

The first of these questions is certainly one source of the difficulty of knowing what universities can do in public administration. The simple answer that they should train those who are to be administrators is obviously not available anywhere and certainly not here. We are, therefore, subject to a strong temptation to avoid the question altogether by concentrating on the things we can do other than undergraduate teaching. Now, of course, a university teacher can go along to an *école nationale d'administration* and give a lecture on social services; it would be very nice for us if the public service released some intelligent young men who would make good research students; and we should enjoy the opportunity of turning ourselves into supernumerary research and planning officers from time to time. But it must be a very odd university discipline that cannot make a peculiar contribution at an undergraduate level: no undergraduates, no discipline.

Even if we face the provision of undergraduate courses, we tend to hide from another thing: what sort of public servants are going to take the courses? Do we not ignore the problem that where there is no specific and early selection of an administrative class it is very difficult to guarantee that young public servants taking the courses are those who should? Furthermore, where administrative talent is often recruited from technical personnel, may it not be necessary for us to think of teaching our subject as much to young scientists as to young clerical officers or to Arts students?

We may be encouraged to avoid the problem of undergraduate teaching. Certainly we can see some of the difficulties. Experience elsewhere has varied; it offers few successes. But all this does not justify a surrendering to temptation, particularly at this stage of public service history. For we know that while the simple answer is unavailable it is also true that we would not want to employ it: after all, we do not, I suppose, wish to say that potential entrants to the public service must pass through our hands first as a necessary (still less as a sufficient) condition of their entry. If we reject the simple answer and refuse to surrender a claim to contribute at this level we are driven to a combination of hopes: that some people after entry will find an undergraduate course in public administration useful; that some undergraduates will find this an attractive adjunct to other studies and will take their chance as to its utility. If, as I have argued, the public service situation is a decisive factor, an eclectic answer is in Australia the likely one in any case. The Commonwealth, at any rate, seems willing to try its hand at a number of different relations with the universities in recruitment and selection of administrators. We had best respond in like fashion.

Three things should be emphasised. First, I do not think that public administration departments should seek to turn themselves exclusively into Henleys, *écoles nationales*, short course summer schools or research institutions. This does not mean that one might not prefer a fitting of public administration into normal degree studies rather than specific diploma courses. Secondly, it is still true that the edge in graduate recruitment and promotion favours the technical graduate. This might tempt us to dress up our subject as a similar specialism. We would (despite some things I shall say below) be unwise to try this on. For that very reason we can claim a place in the sunshine of general education. The technical or science recruit to the public service will not be the worse for having thought about it beforehand. No student of our subject will be the worse off if it is, in any case, a useful one. Thirdly, if we adopt this position I think we are in a way committed to an interest in such public service recruitment and promotion policies as would at least not hinder those who studied public administration.

V

In the end it is clear that one's answer to questions about students depends on one's answers to questions about what should be taught. Here again I think one gets an eclectic answer; the public service situation has been a determining influence; and experience elsewhere has been interesting rather than conclusive. Look at the history of the subject in the United Kingdom and in the United States.

The local government service in England inspired the development first of the provincial Diplomas in Public Administration, and more recently the Diploma in Municipal Administration. The traditions of the United Kingdom administrative class meant that in Oxford (and in London) public administration would be studied and taught as part of political science in a degree course for general education, not for vocational training. If the graduate wished to enter the public service, he would have to take his chance with the rest. In both cases the development of special courses in public administration was very limited. As Professor Mackenzie said of Oxford:

P.P.E. once had a paper called Public Administration, but the conventions of the constitution soon dealt with *that*. Almost from the outset it was understood that all the questions were dummies except those on the history of English Local Government, and law was brought into line with practice when the regulations were last revised.⁶

The diploma courses consisted of, in Professor Mackenzie's words (page 3), "a smattering of history . . . a little law . . . and what I can only call current affairs". (This summary was not meant by Professor Mackenzie and is not meant here to be entirely pejorative.) How different the American situation! Independent of urgent pleas from harassed local government clerical officers, free from the anti-vocational sneers of philosophers and political scientists, inspired by the gospel of scientific management and the wealth and success of university schools of business, public administration in the universities there went to the farthest reaches of principle and science beneath the banners of research, reform and reorganization. Of course, the principles were not always very useful precepts and the science was often rather doubtful. It did not seem to get many students good jobs in the federal service, though the teachers often did very well. In the end it retreated but the movement had been splendid to behold. What a moment it was when the university teacher Merriam could join with the bureau researcher, Gulick, and the city manager, Brownlow, to say:

The foundations of effective management in public affairs no less than in private, are well known. They have emerged universally wherever men have worked together for some common purpose, whether through the state, the church, the private association, or the commercial enterprise. They have been written into constitutions, churches and articles of incorporation, and exist as habits of work in the daily life of all organized peoples.⁷

Here was something you could teach and it was worth teaching, for "the forward march of American democracy at this point of our history depends more upon effective management than upon any other single factor".

In Australia there has been a fuller recognition of public administration as a separately provided study than there was in, say, the Oxford or London tradition. We have been unclear about whom this was intended for and about what the study should be. British and American experience would until recently have shown us only

⁶W. J. M. Mackenzie, *Public Administration in the Universities*, 1951, p. 1.

⁷*U.S. Senate, 75th Congress, First Session, Document 8, "The President's Committee on Administrative Management"*, Washington, 1937, p. 16.

what not to do (and no one would argue, presumably, that we should convert our subject in the continental tradition into a mere branch of law). Up to a point the thing is made more hopeful by recent changes. On the one hand it would now be recognized in the United Kingdom that there is such a subject as administration. Some of it can be taught; even Sir Edward Bridges has recently said as much. There may be an argument about how much can be taught and where different bits of the teaching should go on. There would be general agreement: (a) that the university can make an indispensable contribution, and (b) that a great deal has been learnt about organization. Presumably what has been learnt can also be taught. Great strides have been made under Professor Robson and Professor Mackenzie.

Meanwhile (this is now a platitude) the public administration movement in the United States has undergone radical change. This has been developing since, say, 1937—a convenient date to take with the President's Committee and the Gulick-Urwick book. What have the criticisms and changes amounted to? Study and experience showed that one could no longer say as Willoughby said in the 1920's that "in administration there are certain fundamental principles of general application analogous to those characterizing any sciences".⁸ The awareness of informal organization; the decline of the bureau movement; the transfer of interest to national government; the heightened appreciation of language; the Brookings' criticisms of bureau shuffling and of the 1937 report; the personal experience of university teachers in the new deal and wartime administrations; the culminating corrective of the 1952 experience of party political change: all this has come to mean that seventy years after Woodrow Wilson's article it has been rediscovered that public administration has something to do with the past, with policy and with programmes. This does not prevent teaching; it simply makes the teaching much better and much more important than ever before. Politics and history are respectable interests again. One may quote from Bacon, Bentham and Henry Taylor (and even from Cornford's *Microscosmographia Academica*. Consider how the young administrator could improve his grasp of the whole Dickensian science of government—the knowledge of how not to do it—by a study of *that* masterpiece.) The United States may be ahead of the United Kingdom here, for in the United Kingdom the Urwickian stream still bubbles on. In the United Kingdom there is sometimes a tendency either to sit back and claim that one was right all along or to busy oneself with criticism or with adoption of the American position of a generation ago.

Now I take it that to know what we wish to teach is even more important than to know to whom we wish to teach it, and to seek an answer to this question is more legitimate than to ask what we think our teaching is for. I have argued that the public service situation indicates that we should be prepared to teach all conditions of men. I would also argue that that answer and this present condition of administrative studies indicate that we should be prepared to teach many sorts of things. Some of our students will be public servants; we must have something to do with the teaching of techniques. But the nature of the students and the

⁸*Principles of Public Administration*, Washington, 1927.

condition of the study must prevent that from being taken too far. To some extent we are participating in a sort of general education; again, the students and the subject prescribe an engagement in the cultivation of political sense and of critical appetite. What, more specifically, does this amount to?

Presumably we would wish to exempt ourselves from Professor Mackenzie's aspersions on teaching in the United Kingdom and from American aspersions on teaching in America. What then should we do? I do not think that we have to surrender Woodrow Wilson's dictum about administration's being a practical science; this remains the slogan of Herbert Simon. It follows that one must free oneself from the criticisms that Sir Henry Taylor directed at most writers on government.

Authors in abundance, from Aristotle to Hobbes, have written out theories of civil society; and it is not to be questioned that their writings must have had momentous political consequences, if it were only through the exercise and direction which they gave to men's thoughts. But these consequences, whatever they may have been, were so indirectly brought about that he who would examine wherein they have been injurious and wherein beneficial, seems to lose himself amidst the general materials and results of the intellectual universe. And whilst the structure of communities and the nature of political powers and institutions were thus extensively investigated, the art of *exercising* political functions, which might seem to be no unimportant part of political science, has occupied hardly any place in the speculations of its professors.⁹

We must study decisions and their consequences. Here we must move towards the old diploma approach. The problem will be mainly one of standards. The history to be done, for example, will be administrative history; it must also be very much improved administrative history. It must not be summary. It must dispense with the mundane in favour of the distinctive, the individual and the material. If I may speak from United Kingdom experience I should say that our administrative history used to be limited, second-hand and sentimental: it was restricted to local government and civil service reform; it was a re-rolling of the fag-ends of other work; and it was designed on Whig assumptions about progress (Northcote-Trevelyan), good things (the Haldane Report) and bad things (eighteenth century boards). It was more suited to the Crystal Palace than to the groves of Academe. Outstanding work in administrative biography (S. E. Finer's *Chadwick*), the past example of the Webbs and the contemporary example in America of L. D. White (*The Federalists*, *The Jeffersonians*, *The Jacksonians*), the impact of work like Mr. Keith-Lucas's on the local government franchise and, above all, the ripe fruit of the civil war history series harvested by Sir Keith Hancock and his team, have recently shown what research into administrative history can produce for teaching. I have found that nineteenth century history in central government organization is as possible as in local government; and that, having done it, what I want to say to students about the ministerial department and the tenacious life

⁹*The Works of Sir Henry Taylor*, Vol. IV, London, 1883, Preface to "The Statesman", pp. 211-12.

of institutions seems much more urgent than it could otherwise have been. I would give a first place in teaching to this sort of work, after I had come to some understanding with students about the content and terminology of the subject.

A similar contribution from the old diploma approach would be "current affairs". Take bundles of official reports and papers; reveal their major premises; discuss, criticise and prophesy; abstract them and make your judgments and your recommendations. Is not this a training in the field and matter of administration and in its prime method: argument? Nor is it original to suppose that the administrator will learn more from the Clarendon state papers than from his Gibbon.

This is a sort of work in administrative engineering or diagnosis. How, for example, should one set up a public assistance scheme? Here are blueprints of ways in which it has been done elsewhere. What is the secret of this knot? Here are ways in which similar knots have been unravelled or severed. One will hasten the development of that administrative sense of recognizing, in Bridges's words, the old wolf in its new look sheepskin.

The teaching will make immediate demands on research. Is there yet, for instance, any apparent move to the establishment of a programme of case study and publication? There is a second problem. It is one thing to present to students the results of research in administrative history or fully prepared case studies. It is another thing to put them into case study themselves. If history should come early in the course, one feels that case work in its more elaborate sense should come relatively late. A third difficulty is that if we are prepared to use something of the old diploma approach, we must remember that part of its practice was, we have seen, the teaching of "a little law". We still have to solve the urgent question of what sort of law administrators need to know, and what sort of law should be taught alongside politics and public administration.

The old English provincial diplomas provide one approach. A second approach is to ask what may now be got from the Oxford and London and from the American attitudes, remembering that these seem to be opposed and that each has been subject to criticism and change. Three or four things may be said. The first is that either attitude would now allow one to draw upon a medley of old and new writings: Guicciardini, Clarendon, Swift, Bentham, Helps, and so on. There really is no clash here. If we want to direct students to Bacon and Henry Taylor, we also want to direct them to the whole corpus of American writing from Hamilton and Wilson through to Barnard, White and Appleby. John M. Gaus wrote of Burke that his writings generally "are an important part of the accumulated insights into government we students of public administration should draw upon".¹⁰ And this is what one would say of Gaus himself and the best of his predecessors and contemporaries.

This is attractive material. It is characterized by its insight; by its concern with the exercise of functions; by its acceptance of the merely primary elements of politics and its concentration on judgment of the incidental and the immediate. It is a precise reflection of the interests of the sort of administrative person described

¹⁰*Reflections on Public Administration*, Alabama, 1948, p. 34.

by Bagehot in his superb essay on Peel: not distant speculation, but pressing consultations; not fixed opinions, but "the details of the day, the passing dust". We can allow ourselves a different sort of choice than that employed in courses on the history of political ideas. We need no longer pretend that public administration is a new discovery or even desist from encouraging the reading of Dickens, Trollope, Balzac, Gogol or Kafka. But there are important limitations. One recalls Henry Taylor's saddened words about what could be done in this way. Bacon, Machiavelli and Burke—Henry Taylor noted—had said something about the administration as well as the constitution of governments. But these three writers left unattempted "the formation of any coherent body of administrative doctrine. . . . And even as to what was applicable in the seventeenth century, the greatest of these authorities (*viz.* Bacon) sets down a large note of deficiency."

There is another difficulty: how is this material to be disciplined? One can suggest a possible answer. It would now seem that it is best to look at American public administration writings themselves as a movement in the history of administrative ideas (and, of course, of practice, especially in reform and reorganization). That should certainly be worth-while at some stage of the course. It must be a good thing for a student to know about Buck's standards of reorganization; much better if he sees them within the experience of the state reorganization movement. This is today the best way to approach the corpus of the American movement: to dismiss it would be foolish and to isolate excerpts would be unwise. If this is how you approach some, is it not the way for other writings too? Read Taylor and Helps; but read them in the light of knowledge of the early Victorian ministerial office. Read Burke in the light of economical reform. This does not remove all the difficulty: the American movement is so important as to deserve attention beyond what it would get as an appendage to administrative history; one would not, whenever one quoted a notion, accept a commitment to deal with its history. But it is a partial solution: treat writings as debates (refer to Meriam and Schmeckebier's critique as well as to the Brownlow report itself); describe the practice with which they were surrounded; devote to some such instances special attention in the course.

What else can we now get from the Americans? The criticism of the American public administration movement, of its past confusion about universality, principle, description and prescript—none of this means that its contribution is over. For one thing, the American movement has at least contributed a language and a check list. We cannot, for example, any longer assume that we know what the optimum span of control must be, but neither can we ignore the problems imposed on the administrator by the necessary limitations of his powers of attention. This sort of phrase is useful in check lists (especially in comparative study) and in practice (especially in Organization and Methods). The explosive sense in the social sciences of the analytical approach to language has been felt here. It is very important that we be more careful in our terminology. We use key words like executive, administrative and control, very loosely. Our language can be made much more consistent. This is no reason for surrendering such summary words as are available. Much of what was said about things like the span of control was mere proverbs.

We need not, therefore, reject the phrase. We need not, indeed, necessarily surrender all that was said as long as we remember the status of the propositions. If this sort of public administration was but a false heir of science we need not now expose it on the mountain side; let it keep its station and it may still have duties to fulfil.

Let us acknowledge once for all that if the best and the worst of American public administration theory were open to criticism, the criticisms have been made. Had there been no such movement we would not even be able to make jokes about span of control and line and staff; and the Americans are making the best of them. Professor Latham, scanning the literature of the subject of organization, detected a theology of administration. In this literature, he wrote:

One can learn that bureaux should be organized by function or clientele when they are not organized by accident or malice. When circumstances and accident beget bureaux, a light touch of co-ordination here and there is said to be important. Very nice things are also said about integration. Staff services almost always get favourable notices and a central place in the discussion, although the line may be mentioned sympathetically, as lords and ladies might refer with gracious pity to the 'working classes', useful but dirty.¹¹

The criticism is not the end of the matter; the movement itself is a fascinating field of study (being tilled from one end by L. D. White and from another by Stene and by Waldo). Its language remains to be used. Its present condition is healthy.

The whole movement has certainly made it possible to set out on a course of something more than mere institutional chat. It has also, with its terms, its successes (for there were some) and its resolution made it much easier to get inside the problems of administrative practice. Is there any reason to suppose either that we should not be concerned with developments in practice or that we cannot make a contribution of some sort? Take as an instance *Organization and Methods*. We can act (as I have argued elsewhere) as assessors of claims. We can make other contributions too (as Professor Mackenzie has argued). O. and M. is a matter of judgment; it is, essentially, objective. This, one hopes, is what the university study of public administration is also sometimes like. This is primarily a matter of research, not of teaching; but why should we not be prepared to talk with students about such practical questions as the types of papers employed in organization or the design of forms? Proper analysis here is complex and it is rigorous in its demands. It provides excellent training in any case; the training will be none the worse if the student is now, or is to become, a public servant, junior or not.

This might take one to precepts: if it does we should be prepared to mention them. What it certainly will do is to take one to the internal discussion of administrative behaviour and problems. At this point one must be prepared to see what the sociologists have to say. I need merely refer to Mr. R. S. Parker's discussion of what public administration may gain by combining the study of administrative history (and the burden of what I have been arguing for so far is

¹¹"Hierarchy and Hieratics", *Employment Forum*, Vol. II, Ap. 1947, pp. 1-6.

just that) with the study of the sociology of administration as bureaucracy.¹² Is not Max Weber a perfectly respectable academic figure? Weber leads us not to a contemplation of the ideal but to questions about status, specialization, authority, procedure, and in his words "the basic importance of written records—the files". Take files: here the practical administrator and the sociologist will immediately agree about the importance of the matter. Will the university teacher step back in horror? Let him ask himself merely why files—the grouping of series of papers in particular ways—are so peculiarly significant in organization and outstandingly in public organization; let him consider the question of the different ways in which papers may be grouped and the factors that enter into a decision about the best way in specific circumstances. The administrator needs to know the answer to these questions. The sociologist and many others may contribute to it. The teacher of public administration must see that it has to do with size, organizational memory, responsibility, principles of justice, the division of labour, the political evaluation of decisions and statutory interpretation. Will he then not see administrative behaviour more nearly and more clearly? If he finds nothing worthy of his attention here he had best go off and teach some other subject, and one that has nothing to do with politics or human relations.

VI

The sort of course that is suggested by this eclectic approach is necessarily built up from the history of particular organizations, services and so forth; ideas from Henry Taylor or from F. W. Taylor; check lists for organizational analysis; sociology; the comparison of different situations and operations; and detailed studies of administrative practice. It would discuss language, history and behaviour. If there were a major emphasis it would be historical; but that would be largely supplemented by the sort of conclusive or editorial frameworks used by W. A. Robson in his various studies. The burden would be comparative rather than local; the leading point of concern would be the administrator rather than any one public service. One envisages a gradual movement during the course towards a use of case studies by the students themselves: I have indicated that I can think of no better administrative training than that.

Can this sort of material provide a coherent course? Is it a discipline? What dependence will it have on politics teaching in general? Can it be said to be a course in administration as well as about administration, for administrators and so forth?

The problem of cohesion is that one is trying to deal with several types of administrative knowledge and that it would all be much clearer if we were not dealing with groups of students of differing experience and uncertain needs. But these are the necessary conditions. Students vary. The subject's significance and its attractiveness have many faces. Administration has more than one meaning. There are different sorts of knowledge about it. Its study must be a hotchpotch. Such a course would not be unusual in politics. Such a course would be open

¹²R. S. Parker, "Public Administration as the Study of Bureaucracy", *Public Administration*, Vol. XV, No. 1, March 1956.

to the winds of argument. It would, like the best practice in Australian public service, be an attempt to get something out of experience so far here and elsewhere. One could expect something of it in, say, two years. By the end of his first year one would hope that the student would know what an administrator was and something of the situations in which administration has occurred. By the end of the second year he should know all that more fully; and, in addition, something of the growth of administrative ideas, the problem of bureaucracy, public service practice here and elsewhere and the tools available to the administrator. He will have amongst other things some blue-prints, so to speak, of how things may be done. If he is a public servant he should have something more: a heightened zest, an improved sense of profession, a sharpened dialectic. If he is not he will know more about men and government.

It would no doubt be simple to build teaching around one institution (for example the Commonwealth public service) or a series of institutions (for example departments and statutory authorities). But if this were all that were done it would not really be a clearer piece of work; it would neglect functions, procedures and management; as institutional study it would be very confined and accidental. It would largely ignore one whole meaning of administration; it would either sink into a tributary of political institutions or broaden into the approaches I have suggested.

What must provide the discipline of the study is, it seems, not any such institutional restriction but a steady sense of administration itself both as public service and as that peculiarly tense position of delegation and leadership occupied by officials as managers in government: this is what one will continuously be studying with many reasons for such a study and hence from many sources. The discipline will be increased by an awareness of the assumptions hidden in such phases as Wilson and the American movement, Justi and the cameralists, Trevelyan and civil service reform and so forth. It will be increased by the development of an ordered sense of what questions are relevant in a consideration of administrative behaviour.

The second problem is about the right relation of undergraduate teaching in public administration to other work and in particular to other political studies. This is a difficult matter to discuss partly because it is a problem at many levels: at the levels of discipline, of university organization and indeed of university politics. It is certainly true that the whole burden of the study cannot be borne by students with no other relevant knowledge of politics and history. Public administration is not an independent subject, and both Woodrow Wilson and W. A. Robson have, in fact, said as much. It makes at least three demands. The student should see something of the historical matter in which particular notions or situations in administration are encrusted. He should know something of the political ecology of, at least, two or three public services. He should have the corrective awareness given by political education that (in E. M. Forster's words) programmes mean pogroms. Administration is about programmes: let it, then, beware; move for order in organization but for *laissez-faire* in spirit. Administration is also a matter

of arguing about decisions to be made; let the student of its practice remember that the choices are generally between the less bad and the worse and the decisions made a little delayed and more or less unreasonable; let him, at the same time, flex his dialectical muscles in political theory.

This is the sort of thing that politics can contribute to administrative studies. The contribution, I would argue, is not only of institutional or historical knowledge. For example, the student of administration will encounter the problem of the imposition of responsibility on discretion and its relation to the concept of the public interest. His examination of this matter will be the more sensitive as he is aware of Bentley and Truman, and of Rousseau and Hegel too. But public administration comes as a dependant not as a mere mendicant. It is concerned with a study of the small things that help, the collateral not the essential, with judgment rather than general speculation. This is a vital contribution and, granted the time, this study will itself include some politics and history: administrative history and some history of ideas; specific policies and services; administrative politics; the line between administrative and political levels; comparative study; and the distinction between administration inside and outside government, in the familiar phrase, between the business of government and the government of business (here it may be the exemplar for the rest of politics). It would be wrong to submerge such a study into political studies in general. It has its own gifts to make, as in an appreciation of the complexity, proscriptions and prejudice of the life of institutions. Furthermore it would presumably be foolish to surrender such extra facilities as have been granted to political studies under the heading of public administration. And these studies (granted the facilities and proper organization) need to branch out more not less: recession is not the right word for the day.

The nub of the matter is the organization of relations between this and the general body of political studies. There appear to be two main alternatives used at present. The first is the provision of two or three units in public administration alongside politics units, and presumably with the hope that students of one will be students of the other. This seems to be too separate a development even if in practice the hopes for joint study were occasionally fulfilled. The other way now used is to tack on a year's work in public administration as an alternative second or third unit. This restricts public administration to one unit; it allows public administration students to miss much of the other work in politics; it may put public administration into a distant situation where few arrive. I want to see at least two units in administration and the possibility of honours work not separate from but as part of the honours work in politics (and perhaps history and economics). Perhaps this can only be done (with a proper meeting between this subject and the rest of politics) if at least five units altogether are provided, spread over three or four years, allowing the student some choice in the arrangement of his set of units. It would, among other things, mean a careful design of the first unit in politics as an introduction to the various branches of political studies rather than as a self-contained and more or less specialised section. It would mean a full participation by teachers of administration in first year and in honours politics teaching; and, in general, an intermingling of teachers.

It is in the end the heart of my argument in favour of undergraduate teaching in public administration that a meeting place between this and the rest of political studies can be arranged and that such an arrangement would make politics (including administration) a more fruitful course. The end of the long Wilsonian debate, then, is simply that public administration is an essential part, and essentially a part of political education. This is not an argument in favour of undergraduate diplomas. Such argument would have to be based on certain assumptions: that administration can be taught in one way for a diploma and in another for a degree; that the standard of enrolment for a diploma can be different from that for a degree; that fewer units may be taken; that one can enforce a different choice of subjects in a diploma; that the university may (while always doing only what it is right for it to do) more specifically ensure that it is here doing what it is useful to do for the public service. There may be something to be said for these assumptions: but I am not concerned to argue them. There is, however, an associated matter which may not be so easy to leave aside: I have tried to indicate what I think public administration is about; but what is it for?

I have said something of whom public administration is for and what may be expected of its results. Should one go farther than that? On the whole I think not, with this any more than with any other discipline. But some confusion can be cleared away. First, something like a sense of purpose has always been influential in the teaching of this "practical science" (to repeat Wilson's words), and it would be so with the sort of undergraduate teaching I have been proposing here. That does not mean that I expect to be teaching potential leaders; nor does it mean that I expect to improve the office methods of my students. It does mean that there is nothing in the academic discipline of public administration which limits its relevance to administrative practice. We may as well admit, then, that there will be much that is useful: check lists, thinking about O. and M. and about files and so forth. But such education as is obtained in the actual subject matter of public functions will be incidental and such precepts as appear will be offshoots of talk about the sense and practices of administration. Thirdly, the course will certainly be about administration. But "it is one thing to instruct the spectator, and another to coach the rider".¹³ Even if one has things to say to the rider, these may not amount to coaching; and the difficulties, we have seen, are obvious here—can anyone give such coaching, should we do so, how do we know who the riders are going to be? We are faced, that is to say, with problems of the nature of administrative knowledge, the role of the university and administrative selection: the inescapable difficulties of this subject at this level. Necessarily we are engaged in education not in training. The significance of the conflict between the two can be exaggerated, but it should be remembered both to prevent our making false claims to the public service (and so stultifying what we can do for them in other ways) but also to incite us to a much more pugnacious presumption of our academic role. We might remember Henry III and Henry IV lying assassinated with copies of the *Prince* in their pockets: administrative study may provide an uncertain

¹³George A. Graham, *Education for Public Administration*, Chicago, 1941, p. 17.

harvest, but its cultivation has been long and most respectably attempted. Now above all we should continue the pursuit.

We do have things to say about administration (though, unlike Colonel Urwick, we do not hope to say everything) and to the administrator (even if many of our students will never be administrators). Some of what we say will approach precepts (even if the precepts may be more concerned with the importance of keeping two hats in the office than with not having too great a span of control). There are several types of administrative knowledge; we can contribute to some but not to all. The public service should not be too satisfied with the pain and grief of self-education and its stagnant results. We should not be too frightened of being useful. We can do something; it will not all be done with undergraduate public administration; it will not be too much; it will not be the sole point of undergraduate courses; but if we can do something, let it be done. In the end if I am asked if university undergraduate study is in administration and for it as well as about it I would say that it has at least something to offer the public service; and that this can be offered with no compromise at all with university standards. I would be the very last to suppose that this declaration of faith solves all the problems. I am not going to claim that it is only through this study of administration that the university student can prepare himself for an administrative career, or a public servant for promotion (though I would certainly think it is very good for both); or that it is only such pursuits as justify the study (though I see nothing dishonourable in vocation); that it is only at this level that the study should be done; or (though Bacon, Taylor and Arthur Helps all give advice on the arts of rising) that it will always be easy to carry impatient careerists hungry for practical titbits through historical and sociological digression from the more immediate discussion of classification or office management.

Whatever we say to the public service, we do not need to apologise to our colleagues. Some things in administration are a practical science. Administration is also a fine art. In both senses some teaching can be done. Public service attitudes are a key; you cannot simply ignore the students you have, the material of your study and the evidence to hand. None of this removes the subject from the broad highway of university tradition, for it is an ancient, difficult and supremely important subject and it can be a highly disciplined one. "The due arrangement of men in the action part of the state, far from being foreign to the purposes of a wise government, ought to be among its very first and dearest objects." Should we not be excited by the prospect of making proper provision for its study? But we should be modest too. Sir Henry Taylor had to reduce his original intentions to more limited dimensions. We should be satisfied if we can help students according to the time at our disposal as Sir Henry Taylor helps the reader according to the time required to peruse *The Statesman*.

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A Comment on Dr. Schaffer's Paper

By R. S. PARKER

We now come to that pedestrian and unexciting subject which nevertheless comes in handy as a trash bin into which to shovel the unwanted leavings of rationalized politics courses. It is merely concerned with the causes and nature of a revolution in social organization without which the success of the industrial revolution is both inconceivable and incomprehensible. The bureaucratic revolution has made possible the system of capitalistic production and the effective development and control of large states, altered the structure and character of social classes, changed the whole nature and balance of political power, and produced the neuroses on which the whole new science and profession of psychoanalysis have largely been built up. This is the miserable and insignificant concern of Dr. Schaffer and our three or four other scavengers of the political science Augean stable.

Dr. Schaffer's paper is itself such a delightful pipe-opener for a discussion that I almost feel he has reversed our roles. He has asked so many of the pertinent questions and outlined so many of the problems of framing the teaching of public administration, without offering dogmatic solutions, that I am left only two possible ways in which to provoke you further. I can add a few more questions, and I can be dogmatic myself with definite proposals about whom to teach, what to teach and how to teach it. I shall try to do these things together, and will comment in passing on some of the things Dr. Schaffer does say definitely.

Dr. Schaffer, deliberately I think, has confined himself to a plea and a plan for undergraduate teaching. I know that this is most relevant to the Australian university situation at the present moment. But I cannot feel that even the university's contribution to public administration teaching can be adequately discussed within these limits. The demands of the public services, to which Dr. Schaffer refers, will not be confined to this sphere, and in any case I do not believe that the subject can be wholly encompassed at the undergraduate level. I imagine that Schaffer himself agrees with this, but from his paper I get the impression that it might have different implications for him than for me. To make my first dogmatic assertion, I will suggest that there is not much point in thinking of public administration at the undergraduate level as in any direct sense "training in the techniques of administration". It can only be in a very indirect sense "training of future administrators". There are two basic reasons for this.

The first, which Schaffer appreciates, is that our undergraduate students are such a mixed bag that attempts to train administrators are for many of them beside the mark. Though some of them at present are actual or would-be public servants, Schaffer's own proposal—with which I cordially agree—that public administration teaching should be closely linked with general politics courses, ought

to result in an increasing proportion of ordinary Arts, Economics or other students taking this subject.

My second reason for questioning the idea of undergraduate training for administration is the belief, obliquely confessed to at one point in the paper, that a proper appreciation of the techniques of administrative practice is only possible for people who have had more than routine experience in an office. Hence I believe that real value can be obtained from the detailed study of administrative practice—whether this be the framing of forms, organization and methods, or how to beat fellow permanent heads to the ears of Ministers—only if this be deferred either to in-service training courses or to advanced post-graduate work.

Thus I would picture the undergraduate course as being essentially a contribution to general education, extending those insights into the nature of government, of human relations in general and of political relations in particular, which Schaffer so eloquently outlines. This view has obvious implications for the content of undergraduate courses. They would do those things in which Schaffer is most interested: show the historical growth, *à la* Weber, of the bureaucratic element in Western government and private administration; survey the “movements” in the literature of administration; show the links between the administrative and the political elements in government; introduce students to administrative biography; describe some of the reform movements; say something about the political significance of administrative law; in the course of some of these show the nature of the contributions of administrators to policy-making; and suggest that—*pace* the sceptics about American “principles”—there is such a thing as theory of organization.

May I here in passing make one or two dissents from specific propositions in the paper? Firstly, the approach that Schaffer and I have outlined seems logically to point to the kind of comparative treatment—leaping across the world and all time—that Schaffer advocates. But I have found that this has the gravest dangers in teaching. Agreed, historical and geographical perspective is essential, but work that is not at some point given shape by being related to the structure and history of some particular government—preferably the one nearest home—can all too easily be confusing to the student and slither into vague generalities. Keep the subject vertebrate.

A second point, which I have already implied, is that at the level of organization and management, the distinction between public administration and non-governmental administration is largely artificial. I know it is awkward, if we are to teach public administration as a branch of politics, to launch out into discussions of business and social administration. Nevertheless I believe that the stock list of distinctions between public and private administration is often most superficially conceived, and no student—and certainly no teacher—can afford to neglect the contributions that both government and business have made to the theory of organization and the art of management. If this connection is respected in teaching, it can also help to suggest that work in this field is intimately related with the other sciences of social behaviour.

What I have said about undergraduate teaching implies that I would like to hear discussion on other ways in which the university can contribute to administrative education. My own experience as student and teacher has been that undergraduate work, so often done part-time and by students at the bottom of the administrative hierarchy, becomes not only dull and boring, but (and this is perhaps the reason for the boredom) largely incomprehensible when it attempts to deal with administrative techniques and tactics that can have meaning only for people with some experience.

As a basis for discussion I would suggest there are at least three useful forms of post-graduate work in public administration.

The first is at the immediate post-B.A. level—in work for Masters' or Doctors' degrees. Here it must still be true that students should not concern themselves in technical detail with the administrative process. (Indeed, I would comment, on one surely unintended suggestion of Schaffer's, that university education should never be concerned with detailed form design or the organization of registries.) The Master's course, I would think, offers the opportunity of more detailed study of particular issues selected from the undergraduate syllabus—the social significance of bureaucracy, administrative tribunals, the public corporation. As an example, here is one tested course on the administrative state: (a) social background and significance of bureaucracy; (b) study of civil service in relation to particular countries; (c) study of people in bureaucracy; (d) organization of bureaucracy; (e) pathology of bureaucracy (*e.g.* Peck, *Our Wonderland of Bureaucracy*); (f) bureaucracy as a power group (control of bureaucracy). The Ph.D. course could accommodate thesis work on administrative history and biography, recruitment practices, or studies of specific institutions.

The second field for post-graduate work, still a Utopia in Australia (though the Commonwealth Public Service Board is nibbling at the idea) but a reality in New Zealand for nearly twenty years, is the advanced post-graduate diploma for practising administrators from government and business. Its features: full-time for one or two years; inter-departmental co-operation within the university to give specially designed courses in public economics, administrative law, social history, industrial relations, etc.; the seminar method that makes these courses truly educational for both staff and their well informed students in a mutual exchange of learning and experience; research projects, preferably joint enterprises among two or three students; and participation by senior and articulate administrators in the teaching process. It is possible to draw in such people with invaluable results to themselves as well as to the academics, and also for good relations between the university and its potential patrons. It may be that this participation by the practising administrator is possible as well as desirable at the undergraduate level, but naturally it is much more interesting and attractive for him to take part in advanced discussions with people who already have some real insight into the problems he is talking about. I can say that post-graduate work of this kind is a rewarding academic experience, and is more fruitful than anything I know in the academic world in stimulating practical ideas for the improvement of administrative practice. I have seen it exercise an influence on the whole pattern of thinking and practice in a public service.

The third way in which I think the university can become usefully involved in post-graduate work in this subject is in developing close relations with in-service administrative training in government and business, and with the summer school or staff college for mature administrators. Of course, everything depends in these activities on the universities insisting on certain limitations and standards which I need not detail at the moment.

Finally and frivolously, I should love to get some assurances from this conference on ways in which the case study can be made to contribute to administrative education. In its highest form, in the book edited by Harold Stein, I find it hard to get beyond thinking of this effort as a rather sophisticated kind of bedside book for the budding bureaucrat—perhaps because the best case studies are largely records of and stimuli to administrative nightmares.

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The Study of International Relations

By GORDON GREENWOOD

What is striking about the study of international relations, especially since the second world war, is the extensive growth in demand for the subject, the wide-ranging attempts to make some provision to meet that demand, and the developing belief that existing international conditions require a body of university graduates with knowledge and understanding of the whole complex of international political and social relations. The demand may be traced back to the first world war; the impulses which have carried the movement forward at an accelerating pace have been both utopian and hardheaded. In the inter-war period the stimulus was largely idealistic, the objective being to assist indirectly in the creation of a more regulated and orderly system of international conduct. Considerable importance was attached to the application of a higher standard of morality to international dealing, to creating effective machinery for ensuring that the rule of law was more widely operative, and to the responsibility of the individual to assist in this process. There was nothing inherently disastrous about this approach. In practice, however, many who became responsible for the teaching of international relations were excessively utopian in outlook and therefore predisposed to ignore many of the more uncomfortable facts about international behaviour. It was the damage done by this kind of approach in the United States which George Kennan had in mind when he recently criticised

teaching that portrays incorrectly the nature of our world environment and our relations to it and encourages students to disregard the urgent real requirements of international life in favour of the cultivation of artificial and impractical visions of world betterment.¹

There were two interesting things about the approach in the inter-war years which might be noted. The first was that in most countries the need to meet the demand for instruction, and indeed for investigation, was met by and through the traditional disciplines rather than by the development of international relations as an independently conceived subject. In history, law, politics, economics, geography, and in lesser degree sociology and social psychology, increasing attention was paid to a study of particular international problems which had obvious affiliations with the subject concerned. Additional international material was incorporated into existing courses given in these departments, and on occasion new and separate courses dealing with international material were introduced. The second point was the curious, yet not unnatural, relationship which existed between the dominant moods of the various national societies and the kind of international instruction

¹George F. Kennan, "Training for Statesmanship", *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 191, No. 5, pp. 40-3.

which was offered. The clearest instance was provided by the United States, where the strength of isolationist sentiment led to an emphasis upon fields of study with an obvious domestic relevance and to a comparative neglect of wider international issues.² The American experience was by no means unique. Indeed an interesting parallel could be worked out with the Australian situation where, in the inter-war period, what little teaching there was emphasised either international machinery or the evolving structure of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Interest was mainly confined to the departments of history and law, and to some extent economics; but it was again essentially the development of some measure of international emphasis within the framework of well-recognized subjects.

As a study international relations has been thought to be essentially concerned with contemporary developments. In 1935 Zimmern could report,³ following a conference upon the teaching of international relations, that there was an overwhelming conviction among those who attended that the concentration should be upon the contemporary scene. There has not, I feel, been any significant change of opinion on this count since the war. The emphasis upon what is contemporary has undoubtedly meant that the study of international relations has been closely related to what seemed to be dominant national needs. Indeed, it could be demonstrated that the willingness of universities to provide special facilities, as well as the willingness of governments and other interested groups to provide finance, has been not unrelated to a belief that it was in the national interest to assemble information as well as to produce a trained body of experts.

In emphasising that the study of international relations has utilitarian roots, we must be careful to recognize that it is utility of a different order from that which produces the engineer or the accountant. The 1950 International Studies Conference⁴ on the University Teaching of International Relations was emphatic in its conclusion "that contemporary conditions present in this regard a challenge to which the University should respond". If human society has reached a pass where civilization itself may be in jeopardy, then it might be argued that there are compelling reasons why many of the best brains within the universities should be concentrated upon an endeavour to mitigate the danger by discovering feasible ways in which national societies may pursue their own well-being without irreparable disaster.

In this task a measure of idealism is called for, if by that is meant a belief in the necessity of building towards more effective forms of inter-governmental or international co-operation. Idealism should not be confused with an attitude of refusal to examine critically the shortcomings of existing procedures, for as Myrdal

²Professors Furniss and Morgenthau have both commented on this point. See H. J. Morgenthau, "Area Studies and the Study of International Relations", *International Social Science Bulletin*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1952, p. 647, and Edgar S. Furniss in G. L. Goodwin, *The University Teaching of International Relations*, Oxford, 1951, pp. 94-109.

³Sir Alfred Zimmern, "Introductory Report to the Discussions in 1935 on University Teaching of International Relations", in H. J. Morgenthau and K. W. Thompson, *Principles and Problems of International Politics*, New York, 1952, pp. 20-1.

⁴See C. A. W. Manning, *International Relations (the University Teaching of Social Sciences): a report*, Geneva, UNESCO, 1954.

recently implied, it is for those who genuinely believe in the logic of a developing internationalism to shoulder the responsibility for calling attention to existing defects.

For some, like Professor Manning, who believe in the superiority of international relations conceived as a separate and distinct discipline, the implications of the challenge issued by the 1950 conference are unmistakable. They interpret the challenge to have only one meaning: go thou and do likewise; organize the teaching of international relations as a distinct discipline with courses so contrived that the essence of the student's preoccupation will be with the whole complex of relationships, which add up to something more than the several constituent parts. For others, who indeed represent a majority, the implications are less certain.⁵ The challenge is recognized, but they are by no means convinced that the only way to meet it is to treat international relations as a subject in its own right. What is agreed, in Professor Wheare's words, is that "international relations is a field of study interesting enough and complicated enough and varied enough and important enough to be studied on its own".⁶ What is not agreed is how this can best be done.

Those who have doubts and hesitations about the validity of its academic claims arraign the subject on a number of counts. There is a body of criticism which suggests that treatment of any subject called "international relations" is likely to be superficial and unscholarly and lacking in the discipline provided by the existence of well-recognized methods of attack. They point to the very nature of the subject itself, to the sheer impossibility of compressing the field in such a way that the teacher, let alone the student, could possess the kind of mastery of the material which might legitimately be expected in more traditional subjects. It is easy to demonstrate the immense range and complexity of the field: that those who enter upon it will need to be concerned across innumerable regions with history, culture, religion, economic interests, strategic and geographical considerations, institutional forms, patterns of thought, questions of law, and a host of other matters. How then can such a subject be taught to students who in most instances will lack the necessary tools to build towards an understanding of the culture, the history, the outlook of the nations concerned? Is there not the possibility that what purports to be a serious academic study will degenerate into contemporary commentating or into political indoctrination or into a vehicle for those with some utopian message to deliver? There is certainly the danger that the student will be attempting to use many tools before he is master of any. In a subject where the factual information is abundant there is the likelihood that this may be amassed without any corresponding enlightenment. Above all, the subject suffers from the fact that it has no essential coherence, no easily defined boundaries which permit a reasonable definition of its scope, and no separate methodology to distinguish it from other subjects. Many would agree with Professor Keilhau, that international relations could not be looked upon as a discipline in its own right

⁵Considerable confusion and disagreement have been evident at every international discussion of the subject. See Goodwin, *op. cit.*, *passim*, but especially Appendix B, pp. 37-9 and Appendix C, pp. 42-4.

⁶K. C. Wheare, "The Teaching of International Relations", *Political Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1954, p. 275.

because I do not think it will be possible for it to develop any special method of international relations. In looking at international relations, they are either economic, political, legal, cultural, institutional, ideological, and I am sorry to say, strategic.⁷

These objections are not negligible and, indeed, some may well be fatal to the teaching of international relations at the undergraduate level, at least as a separately conceived subject. But they can, I feel, be exaggerated, especially when a comparison is made with the other social sciences, many of which are beset by not markedly dissimilar problems. Politics, while it has important roots and is often treated historically or philosophically, is also concerned with contemporary problems and issues. Equally it is a subject where the dangers of contention, of indoctrination, and of emotional involvement exist. It is not easy to define the frontiers of many social science subjects. What are the boundaries of sociology, or indeed if it comes to that, of history? Do not both have to control a multiplicity of forces and have at their disposal a multiplicity of skills? The historian no less than the teacher of international relations has to weigh, assess, and make part of his pattern of interpretation things which belong to economics, to law, to politics, to religion, to philosophical speculation, to technical change and so on. It is true that the historian has certain advantages through perspective, through relative immunity from the prejudices which were felt by contemporaries of the period, and through the presence of more extensive documentary material. On the other hand there are denied to him many of the more recent techniques which have been evolved for the observation and testing of contemporary situations. But in the end we cannot, I believe, escape from the fact that the attraction of the international problem in our time is so great that both individuals and governments will demand that attention be given to it. The subject material of international relations will be taught in one form or another. We have therefore to recognize, and be constantly on our guard against, the kind of difficulties which beset its teaching and investigation. We cannot simply throw up our hands and say nothing can be done because of the immense difficulty of controlling the material or because those who do the teaching will inevitably be susceptible in some degree to the weaknesses of human nature.

If this be assumed, what procedure should we adopt? Should the emphasis be thrown upon approaching international relations through subjects which are already well established, and which have developed their own effective techniques? Or should we rather adventure, as Professor Manning would have us do,⁸ into the creation of new departments whose special business it is to make an understanding of the international scene the central question for those students who elect international relations as their major interest? Professor Manning himself emphasises the importance to the student of some acquaintance with history, economics, law, geography, and other subjects which have an obvious relationship to segments of the international scene. He welcomes the contribution which can be made by

⁷Goodwin, *op. cit.*, Appendix C, pp. 42-4.

⁸Manning, *op. cit.* The argument runs through the booklet, but see especially Chapters 2 and 5.

specialist studies within these disciplines and denies that the practitioner in international relations wishes to establish any monopoly in the field. At the same time, Manning does not regard the teacher⁹ of international relations as being simply a co-ordinator or synthesizer of the material which can be brought to bear on the field from a variety of subjects. Believing as he does that it is a distinct discipline, he finds the *raison d'être* for international relations in the existence of the pattern of relationships itself, in the organic whole which is something more than the sum total of its parts. He speaks in semi-mystical language of this as "an aspect of reality, existing so to say 'out there', in the social cosmos". It is then this *complexe relationnel international*, to use Professor Chevallier's phrase, which is the essence of the subject for those who believe in a holistic view of the field.

It seems to me that there is one great strength and several rather damaging weaknesses in the position adopted by Manning and his supporters. The strength lies in the fact that there is obviously something over and above what the economist or the political scientist or the geographer or perhaps even the historian may have to say about international relations—a pattern of relationships existing at every given period, an aspect of social reality, a *complexe*, call it what you will. Somebody presumably has to address himself to the nature of the total relationships, whether this is done by the co-ordination and integration of the contributions from several distinct disciplines, or whether it is done by a general practitioner regarding this as his special subject material. I do not suggest that it is impossible for a teacher from one of the more traditional social sciences to attempt something of this kind, but I think it unlikely that the economist or the geographer or the political scientist will regard this as his main concern simply because both the problems with which he is likely to be concerned and the questions which he will want to ask will have been largely defined for him by his own discipline. The historian is in a somewhat different position, but I will come to that in a moment.

The weaknesses are more obvious. First, there is the absence of any method which can be specifically defined as belonging to international relations in the Manning sense. There is no approach known, at any rate to me, toward the field other than that provided by one or more of the existing social science subjects. Or, as Professor Wheare put it in his soft retort to Professor Manning:

Can it be studied? It seems to me that it can be studied by the historian, by the economist, by the lawyer, by the student of political institutions, by the sociologist, by the social psychologist, by the statistician, and so on. There is a field for social studies, and it may be studied by different methods or techniques; different aspects may be selected for study. In this respect the international social structure is not different from the national social structures. I would not despise any one of these different approaches to the study of international relations nor would I say that I would reject any one of them unless I could have some or all of them.¹⁰

⁹The teacher would require quite remarkable qualities: immense knowledge, outstanding analytical ability, considerable insight and more than a passing acquaintance with a wide range of subjects bearing upon international relations. He would also require a synoptic vision of the field and a balanced judgment when assessing it. He would need to be an international relations specialist in the sense of a general practitioner.

¹⁰Wheare, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

This is simply to emphasise that the study of international relations must, if it is to be meaningful, have both a focus and a method of approach, and this cannot be contrived simply by applying the term "international" either to the relational complex or to a particular social science. Morgenthau writes:

To establish an academic discipline with the adjective 'international' as its focus is obviously no more possible than to centre one on the adjective 'national'. Such attempts, on the national or international level, will either lead to the restoration, by dint of their own logic, of the traditional academic disciplines and consequently to the frustration of inter-disciplinary integration, or else to the drowning of all discipline in a chaotic mass of unrelated data which will at best receive from the ever-changing whims of public opinion a semblance of order and direction.¹¹

I also find myself in agreement with him when he goes on to argue that the focus for international relations cannot be discovered in law, politics, economics, geography and whatnot, applied at the same time.

International relations requires no less than area studies a hierarchy of intellectual interests, one of which is predominant, providing the principle of integration, while the others are subsidiary, supplying the knowledge necessary for the satisfaction of the predominant interest.¹²

If this be so, then the answer is clearly that the approach is best made through an inter-disciplinary technique but with a firm recognition that the majority of subjects must be subordinated to the central subject which is providing both focus and a method of attack. In short, the approach to international relations can best be decided by the individual teacher or researcher and by the nature of the subject which is his dominant interest. The problems which he poses and the questions which he asks will be determined by the needs of his own study and the range of his own interests.

The second objection, which is closely related to teaching, is the almost insuperable difficulty of ensuring that the student who centres his activities in international relations in the Manning sense has the opportunity to become master of any one subject. I would myself much prefer a student to be trained in depth in history or politics or economics with such supplementary and supporting help as the structure of his course would allow from literature, languages, psychology, or indeed any subject whose content enlarged the range of insights into international relations as approached from a dominant discipline.

If then at the undergraduate level the approach is best made through one of the older established social science subjects, what could be said of their relative claims? We would all recognize that law, economics, and geography have their own legitimate point of approach and their own genuine contribution to make and that each might well represent an effective point of departure for a later and more rounded study of international relations. Some would advance claims for social psychology and, more readily perhaps, for sociology or social anthropology. I cannot here examine the claims which those subjects might advance to the teaching

¹¹Morgenthau, "Area Studies and the Study of International Relations", p. 653.

¹²*ibid.*, p. 654.

of significant aspects of international subject material, but I would like to say a word or two about the position of both political science and history.

Political science has itself a legitimate claim to active and large-scale enterprise in this field, and the circumstances of our time give to the subject a special importance and enable it to make a contribution which perhaps no other subject can make with equal effectiveness. The main reason is that the question of power and its exercise lies at the heart of any organized society, that power is normally exercised in one way or another through political instruments, and that, in the relations between one national society and another, of all the various kinds of relationships that of politics is dominant.

For all those at least whose general philosophy of man and society suggests the paramount importance of politics, conceived as a struggle for power among individuals and groups, the answer must be in favour of international politics. And this is indeed the answer which the most authoritative discussions of the subject give.¹³

If this view were accepted it would mean that for many purposes an approach could be made either through some inter-disciplinary organization, in which politics played the dominant role, or more directly through existing departments of political science. But if the answer be given in favour of the department of political science we would be wise to bear in mind Morgenthau's own qualified impeachment:

The advisability of this solution will depend upon whether a department of political science actually puts the study of politics in the centre of its endeavours or whether—as most of them do—it merely offers a disparate collection of courses whose common denominator is a vague and general relation to the activities of the State.¹⁴

The case for history would be stronger than for any other subject but for one consideration. The interest of the historian is perforce predominantly in the past. Nonetheless, the study of history remains of basic importance to any meaningful approach to the subject matter of international relations. We would do well to heed Burke's warning that "our little stock of reason is small"; we cannot afford to ignore what he called "the deposit of experience". History is indeed the one subject which the student cannot do without, and you will find testimony to this again and again in the writings of the more eminent international scholars of our time. It would, I think, be impossible in any worth-while sense to teach, let us say, the international relations of the inter-war period in Europe to students who were ignorant of the course of European development before 1919. It would be well-nigh meaningless to analyse the international behaviour of the United States or the Soviet Union with students who were wholly or largely unaware of past developments in those two countries.

History indicates what is habitual and what is innovatory, what is permanent against what may be ephemeral. Professor Duroselle of France says:

History affords the only means of distinguishing between what is permanent and what is accidental in the international life of any

¹³*ibid.*, p. 655.

¹⁴*idem.*

country. It is the key explaining the inter-relationship of facts and, though it is neither all explanatory nor self-sufficient, it clearly reveals the difference between recurring factors and those that are radically new.¹⁵

Not less important is the relevance of historical training to the needs of students of international relations. Both in approach and technique the methods of the historian come closer to those actually required for the study of international relations than do those employed by other social sciences. The historian acquires experience in developing a synoptic approach; he has an immense and varied range of material to control; it is his business to marshal, analyse, and weigh a multiplicity of forces; and he is concerned above all with the evaluation of a complex and composite situation. This is something which the economist or the geographer or the political scientist has only to attempt in a much more marginal sense. It might be objected that sociology is the exception, but, like the separately conceived study of international relations, sociology tends to suffer at this stage of its development from a lack of internal discipline and from the lack of an agreed methodology.

A further and not unimportant advantage which history enjoys as a subject from which to develop the study of international relations is that it is at one and the same time a social science and a humanistic study. It employs methods of scientific exactitude where these are possible, but recognizes that its essential concern is with people, with the thoughts, emotions and actions of the individual and the group. And this is the kind of combination of emphasis and interest which is required in any approach to international relations.

International relations should be humanistic as well as scientific. Indeed, this is true of all social sciences as the terminology implies. Here again I find myself in sympathy with two American scholars, George Kennan and H. J. Morgenthau. Morgenthau has the root of the matter when he argues that a non-directive objective social science is a contradiction in terms, that social science is science from a certain point of view, that the point of view will be determined by the outlook of the scholar and the nature of the interest with which he approaches what he intends to investigate. Nor, as Kennan observes, can an understanding of foreign affairs be effectively acquired simply by understanding the intricacies of tariffs or the classifications of treaties or the machinery of international organization or the techniques of sampling mass opinion.

International affairs are primarily a matter of the behaviour of governments. But the behaviour of governments is in turn a matter of the behaviour of individual man in the political context and of the working of all those basic emotional impulses which are the stuff of his behaviour in the community of other men.

Whoever does not understand these things will never understand what is taking place in the inter-relationships of nations. And he will not learn them from courses that purport to deal with International Relations alone. He will learn them, rather, from those things which have been recognized for thousands of years

¹⁵J. B. Duroselle, "Area Studies: Problems of Method", *International Social Science Bulletin*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1952, p. 644.

as the essentials of humanistic study: from history and from the more subtle and revealing expressions of man's nature that go by the names of art and literature.¹⁶

I wish now to turn briefly to an examination of some of the practical problems involved in the teaching and organization of international studies at the undergraduate level. How you teach this material, and how you organize the teaching of it, will depend, of course, on the view you take of the nature of the subject. It will depend also on the subject from within which it is taught, and, not least importantly, by whom it is taught. Law, economics, history, politics, and other relevant subjects, each has its own particular starting point; each has its own peculiar range of problems; and each its own systematic method of dealing with them. It cannot therefore be expected that international relations, as taught from within each of these subjects, will be the same. For my own part I do not think this objectionable. Indeed, it is almost certainly a gain that men like Laski, Webster, Barraclough, Keynes, Fairbank, Stone, Morgenthau, should both rub shoulders with one another in the international field and bring to bear upon it the insights of their own special training and their own particular experience.

The organizational problem will depend fundamentally on whether or not the decision is in favour of the establishment of an independent department, or at least an independent discipline, with a set of related but underpinning subjects. Since in the Australian context the social sciences have for the most part been embedded in faculties of Arts whose regulations were originally designed for humanistic studies, it would require in most Australian universities some alteration in faculty regulations to enable a concentration of satellite subjects around international relations as a central discipline. But even if taught from within politics, it would be necessary to ensure that there was effective scope for an adequate grouping of at least some of the other relevant social science disciplines. In my own University this might necessitate some modification of the Arts regulations to lessen the compulsory spread and intensify the opportunity for selection from the social sciences. Beyond the formal modifications which might be required in regulations, there are a range of possibilities all relating to the objective of ensuring closer co-ordination of related subjects. I have pointed out elsewhere in relation to history that one of the more significant disadvantages under which we labour is the failure to develop effective interrelationships between departmentally separated subjects. This is not simply a matter of ensuring that the student can take an adequate number of related subjects; it is also a question of the willingness of departmental heads to pool their resources for particular objectives and so design what they have to offer that what is done in, say, history or geography, can be made relevant at the appropriate point in time to the needs of the student in, say, economics. The problem is more acute in the case of international relations, and it may well be that the answer is best provided if not by area studies, which do have certain points of objection, at least by the establishment of an inter-disciplinary committee which can devise an integrated pattern of study for the student who finds his central interest in international relations.

¹⁶Kennan, *op. cit.*

If we confine ourselves to the teaching of international relations within an Australian department of political science I would think that the overall structure might be something like this: a basic first-year course, alternative courses in the second year, one of which might well be in the field of political philosophy and the other in institutions, and a third-year course devoted to international relations, with an alternative course perhaps with a strong sociological emphasis if the facilities of the department can afford this degree of diversification. I would add to this that I would think it reasonable that some at least of the honours courses might well be devoted to the theory and practice of international relations.

It would also be essential that international relations, when approached not as isolated subject material but as an organic whole, should come relatively late in the undergraduate course. There are those who believe that "the introduction of international relations, in an appropriate form, can be made at an early stage in the student's career",¹⁷ but for my own part there seem to be two basic objections to this. The first is that time has not been allowed for the student to acquire even a smattering of those subjects which will become the tools which he will have to employ. The second is that I believe international relations to be such an extraordinarily complex field that it can only be handled by those who have reached at least some degree of maturity. Sir Alfred Zimmern writes:

The greatest danger which confronts our subject is to regard it as a subject for beginners. . . . International Relations are not simple; they are very complex. To simplify them is to destroy their essence, to eliminate the whole substance of their problems. . . .¹⁸

The advantages of a special course inserted at a late stage in the structure of a political science department provide answers to some of the questions which I have already raised. By this time it should be possible to assume that the student has received a firm grounding in one of the traditional social sciences, namely politics, which has its own established methods of procedure. He has been given the opportunity not only to acquire some mastery over this particular discipline, but to obtain some grounding in the related subjects which he will need. For my own part I would insist that the student should have undertaken at least one, and preferably two, courses in history. His course in international relations should be a natural culmination of his previous concern with the central questions of politics, which can now be applied by him in their international aspect. Finally, a separately organized course with its own coherence will provide for the student at least something of what Manning and others seek, either by way of synthesis or by a concentration upon the complex pattern.

I do not propose to define what I would regard as the proper content for a third-year course in international relations within political science. This is essentially the business of the man selected to give the course. If it is to be worth-while, it must mirror the interests which he has acquired and the skills which he can command. Stimulating teaching can only come about where a man is vitally concerned with what he has to say and speaks from the confidence

¹⁷Goodwin, *op. cit.*, Appendix B.

¹⁸Zimmern, *op. cit.*

conferred by a mastery of the techniques which he possesses. Finally, there is the question of the qualifications which should be expected from anyone selected to teach in this field, and it is here that I feel some slight qualms in arguing that international relations should loom large in the structure of a political science department. It is commonly found that the majority of political scientists in any given department have little interest in and, perhaps for that reason, no great aptitude for international relations. Their concern both personally and professionally is more likely to be with institutional patterns in local and national government—with party organization, electoral issues, bureaucratic functions or parliamentary procedure. Such emphases do not seem to assist greatly when called upon to master the multiplicity of diverse forces encountered at the international level. I do not imply, of course, that an interest in international relations cannot develop, or indeed has not developed in some cases, but I think it more likely to come from those who have made their entry into politics by way of history or law or perhaps some other discipline. Again I do not believe that a separately organized department of international relations would provide the ideal undergraduate background. I have already pointed out the rather special qualities demanded of the teacher in international relations, and will only add in passing that in the brief recent controversy between Professor Wheare and Professor Manning, which centred to some extent about the person of Sir Alfred Zimmern as an example of the consummate general practitioner, neither referred explicitly to what I would have thought was the central question. The more successful teachers of international relations have not in fact been the products of separately established undergraduate schools in the subject. Zimmern was certainly not; neither was Manning. I doubt whether the skills, which Manning himself so much admires, could be acquired with equal facility by those who have not been forced to master one or more of the traditional, and I would argue, humanistic disciplines.

There is one thing to be added if political science is to play an important part in the approach to the subject material of the international field. It has long seemed to me that the teaching of political science has become out of focus because it has adhered too strictly to what were once looked upon as the natural boundaries of the subject. Almost all political science is taught within a national framework or a series of national frameworks and most issues are discussed either at the level of local or central government. I feel that today many of the more important issues in political science can only be fully dealt with if the discussion at the national level is also expanded by including international material. Treatment of a question like the nature of the state could well lead naturally to an examination of the place of the nation state in the context of international affairs. Enquiry into democratic theory and practice should certainly not ignore the crucial questions raised by the democratization of foreign policy. Again, the liberty of the individual can no longer be conceived in exclusively national terms. The pressures upon him, even when translated through those who exercise power in the national community, are to a not inconsiderable extent pressures which stem from international forces. If one may take an extreme example, I do not think it could be said that the liberty of the individual Hungarian was exclusively a matter between himself and the Hungarian Government. To teach this aspect of political science as though

this were so, as though the pressure of the Soviet Union were an irrelevancy, would be to misconceive the actuality of the situation. What is true in an extreme form of the Hungarian national is to a lesser degree true of virtually every citizen of every country in the world. Or, to multiply examples, if one is talking again of the area of individual freedom and the relevancy of formal declarations, like the Declaration of the Rights of Man, or formal constitutional guarantees, like those incorporated in the Constitution of the United States, I would think it essential that one should take full cognisance of the Declaration of Human Rights. Similarly, in dealing with questions relating to the civil service, I do not see why the teacher of political science should not address himself to the problems associated with the creation of an international civil service. Examples could be multiplied endlessly.

My plea therefore is that those who teach political science should address themselves to the relevant international material in two distinct ways. First, they should be continuously aware of the extent to which the traditional problems of political science are no longer exclusively contained, if they ever were, within the boundaries of the national state. They should be sensitive to the changing *milieu* in which these problems have to be discussed, and ready where appropriate to deal with them in an enlarged context. This is to introduce some at least of the subject material of international relations, though it falls short, of course, of any systematic treatment of the subject. Secondly, a political science department should introduce one or more courses, at a relatively late stage, designed to treat the subject material of international relations in a more systematic way. The first procedure would have the great advantage that when students undertook the more systematic course some at least of their earlier work would possess an immediate relevance.

I am tempted to add what is almost a third method of approach. I do not quarrel with the view that international relations should be predominantly a contemporary study, but see no reason why it should be exclusively so. Possibly this approach falls more legitimately to the historian than to the political scientist but there is no reason why it should be the historian's preserve alone. After all, the political scientist does not confine his interest in political ideas or political institutions to the present. Let me take an example of what I have in mind. It would be both interesting and illuminating to examine European relationships in the period of French ascendancy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This would provide an excellent case study for the political scientist. It would illustrate the pervasive influence of a dominant power upon the habits and actions of other states in the cultural and intellectual as well as in the political and military fields. It would involve consideration of methods of diplomacy, the conventions governing international conduct, and the respect accorded to treaty obligations. It would, in the case of England and France, exemplify the kind of problems which emerge when countries with different systems of government based upon widely divergent political philosophies have to deal with one another. It would entail an examination not only of the impact of a semi-autarchic system upon the economic well-being of other states, but of imperial rivalry in many strategically and economically important parts of the world. It would include such questions as the balance of

power, the importance of strategic frontiers, the formation and structure of military alliances, the use of financial subsidy as an instrument of policy, the problems associated with refugees, and the significance of religion in moulding state policies.

There are, naturally, points of differentiation, such as the significance of dynastic considerations and the absence of formal international machinery, between this period and the contemporary scene. Nevertheless, the crucial issues of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries do read surprisingly like a catalogue of the problems with which a student of contemporary international relations would be concerned. A refusal to confine the study of international relations exclusively to the present would have a number of advantages, to some of which I have already pointed when referring to the value of an approach from history. The case study would be more self-contained and more manageable; there would be the advantage not only of hindsight but also of the existence of an authoritative body of scholarly material; for the student there would be a diminution of contemporary prejudice and an easier path to objective analysis; and there would be a standard by which to measure the extent to which the issues of contemporary relationships are peculiar to our age.

Hitherto I have said nothing about either teaching or research at the post-graduate level, and my comment can at this stage be little more than a footnote. The emphasis of the paper partly stems from the fact that it was the undergraduate level that I was asked to deal with but it is also due to my belief that most of the problems drop away when one moves into the post-graduate field. By that stage one ought to be able to assume that a student with any enterprise is likely to know where he wants to work and with whom, and even indeed the special field to which he wishes to devote his energies. Beyond this one should also be able to assume that he comes to his post-graduate work with the undeniable advantage of a reasonable mastery of a particular subject; that he has been trained as an historian, an economist, a political scientist or whatnot. He will no doubt become aware of certain deficiencies either because they have been pointed out to him by his supervisor or because he has discerned them for himself, and in most universities there will be an effective opportunity for him to apply his own remedies. He may, if he so wishes, include in his post-graduate work appropriate undergraduate courses in the subjects which he requires. He will also have available to him a range of post-graduate seminars which bear a relationship to his own particular field of enquiry. His maturity will be greater because of the understanding gained from his own experience of life; he can widen his horizons, acquire new points of view, master new techniques. In addition, the post-graduate field does fulfil most of the criteria which I mentioned before as being desirable. The student is in possession of a training which gives him at least a sound competence in a specific field, and permits him when engaging in acquiring multi-disciplinary equipment to do so in relation to one dominant subject and one dominant point of approach.

Those who teach at the post-graduate level will also no doubt have certain advantages. Their time will not be consumed to the same extent by the demands of a large body of undergraduate students; they are likely to be less self-satisfied about their own particular methods, and more aware of the contribution which

can be made by alternative approaches. They have the stimulus of other specialists about them, and they, as well as the students whom they supervise, have more opportunity to experiment in their own research and in co-operative team enterprises. Yet in the end, whether it be a case of student or teacher, what development takes place is not so much a matter of contrivance as of the personal qualities of the man himself, the extent to which he is still engaged in an intellectual quest, the degree to which he is still sensitive to a range of new ideas.

Finally, there is the question of research, and here I wish to make brief reference to certain remarks of Lord Lindsay in a lecture entitled "Australia, the U.S.A., and Asia", which he delivered in Canberra early in 1957.¹⁹ I hope I do him no injustice by condensing his remarks. Essentially his attitude was that Australia needed to devote greatly expanded resources to research which had a direct relevance to the conduct of foreign policy. He argued that, while some research was no doubt being done in government departments, those concerned were too busy to spare much time for fundamental thinking. He took a pessimistic, though he would say a realistic, view of research activities in the Australian universities, and in special associations such as the Australian Institute of International Affairs. He came to the conclusion that any serious contribution to the study of international affairs was virtually confined to the Australian National University, though he did make reference to minor activity by the Institute, and to spasmodic part-time efforts within the State universities. He believed that worth-while results could only be achieved by placing less emphasis upon historical and descriptive methods, and more upon the scientific analysis of contemporary material. His plea was that the government, either through the universities or by the establishment of special research institutes, should foster work of this kind. But he indicated that the money should be made available to people who were prepared to do the right kind of work.

With much of what Lord Lindsay had to say I am in agreement; but on a number of fronts I do not share his pessimism, and on others I can only dissent. In particular I think he grossly under-estimates the actual and potential contribution which is being made and can be made by the State universities. I would suggest that what is being done within the State universities, both in weight and volume, exceeds anything else in the country. And I would add that very often its quality is high. There is to my knowledge work of a serious kind, which in many cases has achieved international recognition, being undertaken in such departments as law, history, politics, and economics, in Melbourne, Sydney, Perth and Brisbane. There is the developing interest in special areas which extends to the regular despatch of members of university staff to South-East Asia and elsewhere. One could point to the establishment of departments concerned with Indonesian studies, to the work upon United States Far Eastern policy or upon the Indian sub-continent, or again upon the contemporary Commonwealth. But my optimism is not based exclusively upon what has already been achieved, with inadequate time, inadequate facilities, and even less adequate finance. Without being

¹⁹A slightly amended version of this lecture was published in *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 111, No. 1, Nov. 1957, pp. 33-45.

excessively utopian about the recommendations of the Murray Committee, I think it clear that the position is bound to improve, that there will be an expansion of staff which will permit more time for research, an increase in research allocations, and the development of improved facilities for travel and communication. In addition, and this I believe to be not unimportant, I think it certain that the larger State universities, and perhaps almost all of them, have reached the point where they are planning to enter the post-graduate field in a much more extensive way. It is important that fundamental research should continue to proceed within a university framework.

No one would dispute the contribution made to a study of international relations in the United Kingdom by Chatham House or by comparable organizations in the United States. There would be both a stimulus to teaching and investigation, and a genuine service to the Australian government and community if the Australian Institute of International Affairs or one or more kindred organizations could command the resources and staff to make a similar contribution. Nor is there any reason why university staff interested in international questions should not devote part of their energies to participation in the work of special institutes. I would myself go further. I see no objection to the university specialist from time to time either undertaking specific assignments for the government or the United Nations or indeed concentrating his attention upon research projects directly oriented to issues of basic importance to his own society. Indeed, during my visit to the United States in 1956 I was repeatedly impressed by the real gain to the universities which had come about from the widespread practice of employing university personnel on government international assignments. At Columbia, for instance, many, perhaps most, of those engaged in post-graduate teaching in some segment of the international field, possessed extensive practical experience. What was impressive was the way in which realistic experience was combined with the retention of scholarly instincts. It is a formidable combination.

The deployment of time on projects designed to assist in the shaping of foreign policy can be justified provided that absorption with this kind of activity is for a specific and limited period. Beyond that it is likely to do disservice to the primary purposes of the university scholar and teacher. Similarly, those who work exclusively within research institutes may well discover that their initiative is circumscribed by the specific objectives for which the money has been provided. It is both instructive and encouraging to discover how many of the ablest of the American international specialists have after service outside returned to the universities because of their belief that their most scholarly and significant work could best be done within them. Fundamental speculation requires the freedom which a university can best provide, and I think it no accident that a university like Harvard has wherever possible set its face against the acceptance of government contracts.

I see no objection to pressing the view upon governments or anybody else that fundamental thinking and scientific exploration of international problems are urgently required in the Australian situation. But there should be an equal

insistence that the best way to achieve worth-while results is to allow the university and its individual members to decide for themselves the problems they will approach and the methods they will employ.

I end by repeating that whatever be done, either in the way of teaching or research, whether at the undergraduate or the post-graduate level, it will be best achieved through an approach which represents a genuine combination of humanistic and social science studies.

University of Queensland

APPENDIX A

STUDENT ENROLMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

(Figures are as at the end of the first academic term, 1957)

Universities represented

Sydney	Adelaide
Melbourne	Tasmania
Queensland	N.S.W. University of Technology
	Canberra University College

Totals

The total number of undergraduates taking subjects in political science and/or public administration is 1,276. External students comprise 94 at Queensland, seven at Adelaide, and an unstated number at Tasmania. Honours students in all years total 128.

Numbers at the various universities (all subjects)

Melbourne	419
Queensland	292
Tasmania	203
Sydney	141
Adelaide	104
University of Technology	93
Canberra University College	59

Numbers by year of course

Total	First	Second	Third	Fourth
933	549	245	119	20

(In Sydney, fourth-year students include both pass and honours.)

These figures exclude about 350 students taking specialized subjects which cannot be fitted easily into the above sequence. Details are as follows:

Melbourne	International Relations	93
	Public Administration	33
Tasmania	Public Administration	70
	(first year 45; second year 13; third year 12)	
Queensland	Public Administration	32
	(plus 25 external students)	
Canberra University College	Public Administration	12

The situation at the University of Technology is not strictly comparable, as there is nothing in the nature of a degree course. Here, there are 93 students taking four specially constructed courses.

The Decline in Numbers

Taking the above figure of 933, the percentages of students at various stages of the course are as follows:—

	%
In first year	60
In second year	27
In third year	11
In fourth year	2
	—
	100
	—

It must be remembered that at Sydney, Government I is taught in the *second*-year of a degree course, so that there is nothing strictly comparable with the first year courses at other universities. If we eliminate the Sydney figures, we get the following results:

Total	First year	Second year	Third year	Fourth year
792	549	164	77	2
100%	69%	21%	10%	—
(The Sydney figures are:			Government I	= 81
			Government II	= 42
			Government III	= 18)

APPENDIX B

LIST OF CONFERENCE MEMBERS

K. G. Armstrong (Melbourne)
 Ruth Atkins (N.S.W. University of Technology)
 Professor W. Macmahon Ball (Melbourne)
 B. D. Beddie (Canberra University College)
 C. L. Burns (Melbourne)
 Professor L. F. Crisp (Canberra University College)
 Dr. S. R. Davis (Queensland)
 Dr. R. E. Dowling (Queensland)
 Professor W. G. K. Duncan (Adelaide)
 S. Encel (Canberra University College)
 A. J. A. Gardner (Melbourne)
 Professor G. Greenwood (Queensland)
 Dr. C. A. Hughes (Queensland)
 J. Jupp (Melbourne)
 T. H. Kewley (Sydney)
 Lord Lindsay of Birker (Australian National University)
 D. M. McCallum (Sydney)
 A. A. Morrison (Queensland)
 R. S. Parker (Australian National University)
 Professor P. H. Partridge (Australian National University)
 Dr. R. L. Reid (Adelaide)
 Professor G. Sawyer (Australian National University)
 Dr. B. B. Schaffer (Queensland)
 Professor R. N. Spann (Sydney)
 T. C. Truman (Queensland)
 P. B. Westerway (Sydney)
 H. A. Wolfsohn (Melbourne)

Observers at individual sessions

A. L. Burns (Research Fellow in International Relations, Australian National University)
 J. C. Conway (Inspector, Recruitment and Research Branch, Commonwealth Public Service Board)

Overseas visitor

Professor C. B. Hagan (University of Illinois)

APPENDIX C

THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE COURSES, 1956
(Based on Calendars and *A.P.S.A. News Summaries*)

Year	Adelaide	Melbourne and Canberra	Sydney*	Queensland	Tasmania	Technology
Pol. Science I	British and British Commonwealth con- stitutional history	Concepts and demo- cratic theory British institutions Australian institu- tions (Hons.: Democratic theory and practice)	Concepts Australian and some British institutions (Hons.: American government)	Concepts and demo- cratic theory British institutions Australian institu- tions	Concepts British, U.S. and Russian institutions, international institu- tions	Australian government
Other I				Public Admin. I	Public Admin. I	
Pol. Science II	Theory British, Australian and American institu- tions	U.S., U.S.S.R., Germany and Japan (Hons.: Theory)	Liberal, socialist and communist theory: the U.S.S.R. (Hons.: Parties; public law)	Theory U.S. and U.S.S.R. (Hons.: Individual and state and economy; parties)	British and Australian constitutional history and Australian gov- ernment	U.S. government
Other II		Public administration		Public Admin. II	Public Admin. II	
Pol. Science III	Comparative govern- ment and public administration	The state and economic life (Hons.: Further theory and analysis)	Public administration (Hons.: Imperialism and colonial self- government; thesis on Australian govern- ment)	Classical political theory Political sociology Methodology (Hons.: Rationalism in politics; political behaviour)	History of political ideas	
Other III	International relations	International/Public relations/Admin.			Public Admin. III	

*Note that for Sydney Arts students Government I and II are second- and third-year subjects respectively.

Under-Representation and Electoral Prediction

By C. S. SOPER AND JOAN RYDON

It is reasonably well-known that the distribution of seats in a two-party single-member electorate system is rarely, if ever, in the same ratio as that of the overall votes gained by the parties. The tendency for the winning party's majority to be exaggerated is now accepted as an essential ingredient of such an electoral system, so that a party which loses an election is not regarded as "under-represented" simply because its opponent's majority has been exaggerated.

The simple exaggeration of majorities, however, should operate in the same way for both parties: for any given proportion of the overall vote, the same proportion of seats should be won, whichever party is concerned. In practice, though, it has been noticed that this frequently does not appear to occur. The electoral system seems at times to discriminate against one of the parties, which is "under-represented"—the other being, of course, "over-represented". A party is "under-represented" in this sense when it would appear that, if it polls a certain proportion of the overall votes, it wins fewer seats than would its opponents had they instead polled that proportion. It follows that the "under-represented" party would need more than fifty per cent. of the overall votes in order to win fifty per cent. of the seats, so that it would be possible for that party to win a majority of votes and yet lose the election. It is in such an event that "under-representation" becomes quite apparent.¹

Apart from occasional eccentricities in particular electorates or localities,² there seem to be two reasons for "under-representation":

- (a) variations in size of electorates³ which may be correlated with the party's votes in those electorates;
- (b) the differential concentration of the party's voters as between electorates.⁴

This paper is an attempt to isolate these two factors of "under-representation" and measure them. We should then be able to adjust for them and find an *effective*

¹In the statistical appendices to the Nuffield studies of British elections D. E. Butler has shown that the Conservative Party was "under-represented" in 1945, while in subsequent elections the Labor Party has been "under-represented" and this has become apparent when Labor has won more votes than the Conservatives who, nevertheless, have controlled the House of Commons.

²For example, in the 1955 elections for the Australian House of Representatives disagreements in the Labor Party became an open split in the State of Victoria, where rival Labor groups disrupted the two-party system.

³"Size of electorate" has been taken to mean the number of formal votes recorded in an electorate. In Australia this represents a fairly constant proportion of the electors enrolled, since, under compulsory voting, neither the proportion of electors who vote nor the proportion of informal votes varies greatly from electorate to electorate. This, of course, facilitates the use of election statistics. In countries where voting is not compulsory it would probably be desirable to distinguish between the two factors of variation here—namely, variations in the number of eligible voters in each electorate and variations in the proportions of eligible voters who actually vote.

⁴Known sometimes as "concentration of majorities" or the "gerrymander effect".

vote which, on some standard of exaggeration of majorities, will produce the observed division of seats.

Once we have measured "under-representation", we shall consider the possibilities:

- (a) of adjusting predictions of election results so as to make them predictions of the *effective vote*; or
- (b) of making direct predictions of the *effective vote*.

Examples throughout the paper have been drawn from elections for the Australian House of Representatives in 1949, 1951 and 1954. These three elections were all held under the same electoral boundaries within a fairly short time of one another, and the changes in voting were not very great. All three elections were won by the non-Labor parties and in each the Labor Party appears to have been "under-represented"—though this was readily apparent only in 1954, when Labor polled a majority of the total votes but won a minority of the seats.

The percentage of votes polled overall by each party in each election, together with the number of seats (from a total of 121) which each party gained is given below:⁵

	1949		1951		1954	
	Vote %	Seats	Vote %	Seats	Vote %	Seats
Labor	48.60	47	49.16	52	50.82	57
Non-Labor	51.40	74	50.84	69	49.18	64
	100.00	121	100.00	121	100.00	121

The Law of Cubic Proportions⁶ (the Cube Law in brief) has been chosen as the

⁵We have excluded the seats for the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory because they are smaller than other electorates and their members do not have full voting rights in the House of Representatives. The voting figures used are the official *final* figures (that is, after the counting of preferences) adjusted in the following ways: (i) allowances have been made for all seats uncontested or contested by only one of the major parties on the basis of previous voting in the electorate concerned and changes in voting in contested electorates of similar type in the same State; (ii) all votes for minor candidates—Independents, Communists, etc.—have been distributed between the candidates for the major parties so that the figures for each electorate (and for the country as a whole) are all divided between Labor (Australian Labor Party) and non-Labor (the coalition of Liberal and Country Parties). The elections have thus been treated on the basis of a clear two-party system. For some justification of this method of handling the figures see Joan Rydon, "The Relation of Votes to Seats in Elections for the Australian House of Representatives 1949-1954", *Political Science* (New Zealand), Sept. 1957, which provides a more detailed consideration of the voting figures in these three elections. The slight differences in the overall votes used in that article and here are due to some "rounding off" of figures.

⁶The cube law is an attempt to provide a formula which reproduces the exaggeration of the winning party's majority mentioned earlier. It states that the ratio between the percentages of seats won by the two parties is roughly the same as the ratio between the *cubes* of the percentage of votes cast for the two parties. If V and v are the percentages of votes cast and S and s the percentages of seats won by the two parties then the cube rule may be written as an equation


$$\frac{S}{s} = \frac{V^3}{v^3}$$

It has been claimed that the results of a number of elections in Britain and New Zealand roughly conform to this formula. There has been considerable discussion of the rule in recent years in journals such as the *Economist* and in numerous articles and books—in particular see M. G. Kendall and A. Stuart, "The Law of the Cubic Proportion in Election Results", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. I, No. 3, Sept. 1950, pp. 183-96 and D. E. Butler's statistical appendices to the Nuffield studies of British elections: R. B. McCallum and A. Readman, *The British General Election of 1945*; H. G. Nicholas, *The British General Election of 1950*; D. E. Butler, *The British General Election of 1951 and The British General Election of 1955*.

standard of exaggeration of majorities, mainly because it appears to fit the case—on the average—reasonably well over the central third of the seats in the actual elections when these seats are arranged in descending (or ascending) order of the vote⁷ gained by one of the parties.

This may be illustrated in Figure 1, where a “representative”⁸ curve of the distribution of seats for the House of Representatives for the period 1949 to 1954 has been drawn in conjunction with the distribution which would be required for the cube law to apply exactly. It may be seen that, to all intents and purposes, the cube law distribution coincides with the representative distribution over the central section of the diagram, thus covering all the seats which, under normal circumstances, could change hands.⁹

Figure 1



Cube Law Distribution

The cube law distribution of seats, as may be seen from Figure 1:

- (a) is symmetrical, in the sense that one half is an inverted mirror image of the other;
- (b) has been drawn so that differences in size of electorates are eliminated, each electorate being considered merely as 100 per cent.

These are, of course, not independent, the first being conditional on the second.

⁷Throughout the remainder of this paper “vote” will always mean “percentage of the formal vote polled” and, unless otherwise stated, it will refer to the Labor vote.

⁸The “representative” curve is a pure freehand construction based on the three distributions of votes. It is intended to formalise the particular asymmetry which occurs in each of the three.

⁹This is the same kind of diagram as appears in Kendall and Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 188, figure 1.

If the actual distribution of seats corresponded with that required for the cube law to apply exactly, then the overall votes for the parties would be in the same ratio as the votes shown by the curve for the median seat (indicated at M). Thus one could use either of these ratios in the application of the cube law.

If we take the median vote as the *effective vote*, we may find the cube law division of seats between the parties by sliding the cube law distribution vertically until it passes through the point M—the median vote—and reading off the division of seats at the point where the cube law curve cuts the horizontal fifty per cent. line. If the median vote is less than fifty per cent., the party will lose the election—winning less than half the seats. This is obvious when the point is made, but, because of the reasonably good “fit” of the cube law curve to the actual distribution curve over the central third of the seats, the same division of seats may be obtained from the actual distribution.

Thus, taking the median vote to represent the *effective vote* for a party, one may fairly confidently apply the cube law to these elections to obtain the actual division of seats between the parties. We would obtain the following division of seats:

	1949	1951	1954
Labor	48	49	58
Non-Labor	<u>73</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>63</u>
	121	121	121

A comparison with the actual division given earlier shows that the error here in the Labor seats is: 1949, + 1; 1951, -3; 1954, + 1.

Measures of Under-Representation

Taking the median vote as the best representation of the effective vote for a party, it is fairly clear that total under-representation will be measured by

$$\text{Overall Vote—Median Vote.}$$

The problem now is to divide this amount between the two causes of under-representation mentioned above.

(a) Variation in the Size of Electorates

If all electorates *were* the same size, and if the percentage votes actually polled still applied to these equalized electorates, then one party's overall percentage vote would equal the simple average of that party's individual electorate votes. Thus the deviation between the overall and the simple average vote represents the effect of differences in the size of electorates.¹⁰ Since each electorate counts only as one unit for the purpose of electing candidates, a party is favoured by a distribution of electorate sizes which, from a given overall percentage vote actually produces a somewhat greater average percentage vote per electorate. For the three elections used here the differences between the overall vote and the simple average vote (for Labor) are:

¹⁰The overall vote can be considered as a weighted average, where the percentage vote cast for a party in each electorate is weighted by the size of that electorate. The simple average is also a weighted average but, in this case, the weight is *one*. Hence the difference between the overall vote and the simple average vote is purely a matter of the different weights used—a matter of varying weights as against equal weights.

	Overall Vote	Simple Average Vote	Difference
	%	%	%
1949	48.60	48.61	-0.01
1951	49.16	49.18	-0.02
1954	50.82	51.06	-0.24

In each case the simple average exceeded the overall vote, hence Labor was favoured slightly in each election by variations in the size of electorates. Since this article is dealing with measures of *under*-representation, it is appropriate that the above differences, which indicate *over*-representation in each election, should be negative.

(b) *Differential Concentration of Majorities*

Given the measure of total under-representation (Overall Vote—Median Vote) and the measure of the effect of variation in the size of electorates (Overall Vote—Simple Average Vote) we presume that the remainder of the total under-representation, namely Simple Average Vote—Median Vote, would measure the effect of differential concentration of majorities. This, however, needs justification.

It will be recalled that Figure 1 was drawn on the assumption that electorates were all of the same size or that size differences had been eliminated. Hence any under-representation shown there cannot come from differences in the size of electorates.

In this Figure both ends of the actual distribution deviate upwards from the cube law "ideal". This means that safe seats are won by Labor with votes in excess of those required by the "ideal" and, conversely, by non-Labor with less than required by the "ideal". There appears to be overconcentration of Labor voters at *both ends* of the distribution.¹¹

A measure of this concentration may be obtained in the following way. Imagine that the distribution curve is divided at the median seat, M, and one half rotated through a semi-circle until it lies alongside the other half. The two sections of the cube law distribution will now coincide. This has been done in Figure 2 for each of the elections of 1949, 1951 and 1954.

The divergences between the two halves of the actual distribution now indicate the combined surplus Labor vote in pairs of electorates in corresponding places at opposite ends of the distribution. These divergences, when averaged over the whole 121 seats, represent the average surplus (ineffective) vote per electorate. These average surplus votes are:

	%
1949	2.06
1951	2.51
1954	1.57


Since differences in sizes of electorates have been eliminated, these average surplus votes are due solely to the differential concentration of Labor votes—mainly in safe seats at both ends of the distribution where they have no chance of influencing the division of seats.

¹¹Which is the reason we prefer to talk about "differential concentration of voters" rather than "concentration of majorities".

Figure 2

Australian House of Representatives Elections

Comparison of the Two Halves of the Distribution of Electorates



Electorate pairs (in corresponding places at opposite ends of the distribution)

If all the electorates *were* of equal size, the overall vote for Labor would be the simple average of the Labor votes in each electorate given earlier. If we reduce these by the average surplus (ineffective) votes previously calculated, we would get the overall vote which would have been recorded with the "ideal" distribution, namely:

	%
1949	46.55
1951	46.67
1954	49.49

These are, of course, the votes recorded in the median seats of the actual distributions, since the average surplus vote which was deducted was, in fact, the average deviation of recorded votes from the median vote, *and this is identical with the deviation of the simple average from the median vote.*¹²

So the measure of differential concentration of majorities together with the measure for the effect of variation in the size of electorates does exhaust the measure of total under-representation.

Summarising, we have:

Adjustment for Differential Concentration of Majorities:

The simple average of votes for the party in each electorate less its median vote.

Adjustments for Variations in Size of Electorates:

The party's overall vote less its simple average vote.

In both cases, positive differences operate against the party—they indicate "under-representation"—negative differences operate in favour of the party.

It must be stressed that *these results are quite independent of the use of the cube law* as the "ideal" standard of exaggeration of majorities. We have seen that any standard for this exaggeration should not discriminate between the parties; it should require the distribution of each party's votes about the median to be symmetrical. Since our measure of the ineffective concentration of voters is an independent measure of the actual distribution's asymmetry, it follows that it will always be a measure of "unfairness" in a two-party system, irrespective of the standard of symmetry chosen. To put it another way, whatever standard for a symmetrical distribution we choose, the average of the deviations of the actual distribution from the standard will be identical with our measure, *i.e.* with the average deviation from the median, provided in each case that the median votes according to the standard and the actual distributions coincide.

¹²In his article "Seats and Votes in New Zealand", *Political Science* (New Zealand), Vol. V, No. 2, Sept. 1953, pp. 37-44, R. H. Brookes has attempted to indicate ineffective concentrations of Labor voters (his "gerrymander effect") by comparing a party's mean and median votes (see his Table 7, p. 43). He finds that, for all the elections he studies, the National Party's median vote exceeds its mean vote, and he considers that the mean must have been pulled down by a few disproportionately low votes in electorates where Labor polled unnecessarily large majorities. This would be demonstrated by his Table only if his electorates were all the same size, *since the mean vote that he uses appears to be identical with the overall vote* that he quotes at various places in the article. If his electorates were uneven in size, he could get the same effect if the National Party's victories were in small electorates and its losses in large electorates, without any suggestion of ineffective concentration of voters. In fact, his Table 7 indicates the combined effects of both factors of "under-representation", even though his method is designed to isolate an indicator of ineffective concentration. As shown above, the indicator is actually a measure, a point which he does not appear to have noted.

The independence of the measure for variation in size of electorates should be even more obvious.

Although examples have been drawn only from three Australian elections, the measures devised should be applicable to any two-party system, and should provide a means of calculating "under-representation" in any election, even if the *effective vote* so derived does not come as close to satisfying the requirements of the cube law as do those of the elections used here.

Effective Vote

So far we have considered the median vote as probably the best measure of the effective vote—as it would be if the actual distribution was "smooth". In practice, however, there are problems. The median is a notably unreliable representative measure—slight unevenness in the centre of a distribution can move the median quite considerably in relation to the mean without having any significant effect upon the distribution as a whole.

The actual distributions of votes in our three elections show such unevenness. For example, if we list the number of seats falling in one per cent. intervals (Labor vote) we get the following results:¹³

Labor Vote %	Number of Seats in the one per cent. Intervals		
	1949	1951	1954
45-45.99	2	5	4
46-46.99	3	7	4
47-47.99	4	1	3
48-48.99	5	4	2
49-49.99	4	0	4
50-50.99	5	6	3
51-51.99	2	4	2
52-52.99	2	1	4
53-53.99	3	3	3
54-54.99	2	3	4
	—	—	—
	32	34	33

Some unevenness must occur from the indivisible nature of the seats. If the average slope of the distribution curve is such that say 3.3 seats should be included in each one per cent. interval, some intervals will, under the best of conditions, contain three seats and some four.

The most obvious unevenness, however, occurs in 1951 and 1951 is the distribution which gives the worst result with the cube law when the median is used as the *effective vote*. In fact, of course, the use of the median vote is an expression of confidence in the *evenness* of the central part of the distribution. When the distribution is uneven, we need to find some other method of approach.

As a guide, we may find values for the *effective vote* which will produce the actual distribution of seats observed. Referring back to Figure 1, we could arrange

¹³Incidentally the cube law would, over this range, produce a change in seats of approximately 3.49 per one per cent. change in votes. The above table indicates that the average changes would be 3.2, 3.4 and 3.3 respectively.

for the cube law distribution to pass through the horizontal fifty per cent. line at the point which represents the actual distribution of seats observed, and read off the *effective vote* from the vertical line at the median seat. This would be the vote recorded in the median seat *if* the actual distribution was even and followed the ideal exactly. Such values deduced for the *effective vote* compare with the actual median votes as follows:

	"Required" Effective Vote		Recorded Median Vote
	%	%	%
1949	46.1 to 46.4		46.55
1951	47.5 to 47.8		46.67
1954	48.9 to 49.3		49.49

In each case the actual median vote is outside the "required" range, but that for 1951 diverges from it by more than the other two. The errors in seats may be estimated on the basis of about 0.3 per cent., representing one seat showing the previously calculated errors of +1, -3 and +1 respectively in Labor seats when the recorded median votes are used.

The problem now is to adjust for the unevenness of the centre of the distribution, to find an *effective vote* of about the required size—using the cube law to set the requirements.

The method adopted is a matter of opinion. We have tried the following. We omitted a group of eleven seats evenly spaced about the median, and considered the five votes on either side of this median group of eleven. Then we averaged the ten votes. The result gave a "constructed median" which would have been recorded if the distribution had actually been along the straight line fitted to these ten votes by the least squares method. The "constructed medians" and Labor seats by the cube law based on them are:

	Constructed Median	Labor Seats	Error
	%		
1949	46.39	47	0
1951	47.25	51	-1
1954	48.60	56	-1

These "constructed medians" appear to have a slight bias downward,¹⁴ but it is notable that 1951 has been brought fairly well into line.

We might now reconsider the adjustment for differential or ineffective concentrations on the basis of these "constructed medians" on the grounds that the previous adjustments were influenced by the accidental position of the recorded median. The adjustments to the Labor vote would be obtained thus:

	Simple Average Vote	Constructed Median	Adjustment
	%	%	%
1949	48.61	46.39	2.22
1951	49.18	47.25	1.93
1954	51.06	48.86	2.20

¹⁴The bias can be associated with the slight difference between the average slope of the cube law distribution over the range 45 per cent. to 55 per cent.—namely 3.49 seats per one per cent. interval—and the observed average slopes of the actual distributions—3.2, 3.4 and 3.3 seats per one per cent. interval respectively.

On this basis there has not been much change in the “under-representation” of Labor from differential concentration of majorities. If we include the adjustments for variations in the size of electorates—which have not been influenced by the use of the constructed median—we get overall adjustments of:

	%
1949	2.21
1951	1.91
1954	1.96

It should be clear that the definition previously given for “Adjustment for Ineffective Concentration” is strictly applicable only where the central part of the distribution of votes is smooth. In the case of actual and, therefore, almost inevitably uneven, distributions the definition needs to be amended—“constructed median” replacing “median”.

Prediction

If we wish to forecast the outcome of an election it appears from the foregoing that the vote which it is worth-while to predict is the constructed median or *effective vote*.¹⁵

If this had been correctly predicted for each of the three elections considered, we could, by the cube law, have estimated the division of seats between the parties within one seat of the actual results. Instead of using the cube law, we could have based forecasts on the “predicted” *effective vote*, and the actual distribution of seats in an earlier election. Taking the change in the *effective vote* as the “swing”, this could have been done, either by the method developed by D. E. Butler in the Nuffield studies,¹⁶ or, alternatively, by assuming that the central part of each distribution was even and that, over this range, an equal number of seats would change hands for every swing of one per cent.¹⁷

Our forecasts would have been as follows:

	Swing	Change in Labor Seats (errors in brackets) Butler Method	Smoothed Distribution
1951			
(based on 1949)	+0.86	+ 4 (−1)	+3 (−2)
1954			
(based on 1951)	+1.61	+ 3 (−2)	+5 (0)
1954			
(based on 1949)	+2.47	+12 (+2)	+8 (−2)

¹⁵In the remainder of this paper “effective vote” will be considered as equivalent to the “constructed median” rather than the actual median.

¹⁶Butler assumes that when there is a change in the overall vote one may impute the same change to the vote in each electorate (*i.e.* that divergences tend to cancel out so that the effect would be the same as if an equal change occurred in each vote). Thus, with a one per cent. increase in its overall vote, Labor should win seats equal in number to those in which it previously polled 49 per cent. or more. From any election result it is thus possible to calculate how many seats should change hands for any “swing” in the overall figures.

In this paper “Butler method” is taken to mean a “prediction” based on a previous distribution of votes and a “swing”. However, by “swing” we mean a change in whichever vote we are considering as the *effective vote* and not necessarily the change in the overall vote.

¹⁷The actual numbers in each of the elections we have used would be the averages calculated in the previous section: 1949, 3.2; 1951, 3.4; and 1954, 3.3. See footnote 13.

Neither of these methods appears quite as accurate as the cube law, but it is clear that any of the three methods would have given a fairly satisfactory forecast *if the effective vote had been correctly predicted*. The problem then is to find a method of predicting the *effective vote*.

Adjusting the Overall Vote

Generally it is the overall vote (or change therein) which is predicted. We will, therefore, first consider whether, if the overall vote had been correctly predicted, we could calculate from it an *estimated effective vote*. There seems no direct method of predicting the actual adjustments necessary to convert the overall into the *effective vote* and these adjustments change somewhat between elections. Nevertheless, we could consider using the actual adjustments from one election combined with the "predicted" overall vote for the next to obtain an *estimated effective vote*. But this is equivalent to assuming that the swing in the *effective vote* equals that in the overall vote. If we had correctly predicted the overall vote in the second election, we would know this swing and could thus obtain our *estimated effective vote* without using the adjustments. We would get the following results:

	Effective Vote in "Base" Year %	Swing in Overall Vote %	Estimated Effective Vote %	Seats by Cube Law (errors in brackets)	Change in Seats Butler Method Smoothed Distribu- tion
1951 (based on 1949)	46.39	+ 0.56	= 46.95	50 (-3)	+ 2 (-3) +2 (-3)
1954 (based on 1951)	47.25	+ 1.66	= 48.91	57 (0)	+ 3 (-2) +6 (+1)
1954 (based on 1949)	46.39	+ 2.22	= 48.61	56 (-1)	+10 (0) +7 (-3)

These results do not appear much less accurate than those obtained by using the actual *effective vote*. But it must be emphasised that the three elections here considered all took place under the same electoral boundaries and within a short period of time. It is probable that between most consecutive elections the changes in the adjustments necessary to convert the overall vote into the *effective vote* would be greater and therefore the advantages in calculating the division of seats from the actual *effective vote* rather than from the adjusted overall or *estimated effective vote* would be greater than here. A more promising approach would, therefore, appear to be to consider the possibility of predicting the *effective vote* directly.

Direct Prediction of Effective Vote

If for 1949 we take the ten electorates used to obtain the "constructed median" and follow their fortunes in 1951, imagining that their actual results in 1951 have been predicted, an average of these "predicted" results may give a reasonable prediction of the 1951 *effective vote*. The following is the outcome of such constructions:

	Predicted Effective Vote	Vote Required by Cube Law		Error in Seats
1951	%	%	%	
(based on 1949)	47.89	47.5	47.8	+1
1954				
(based on 1951)	49.14	48.9	49.2	0
1954				
(based on 1949)	49.42	„	„	+1

In each case the division of seats would have been predicted by the cube law within one seat of the actual result. It must be remembered that this does not involve predicting the new distribution; it merely requires the old distribution to be known and used to represent the new for the purpose of prediction, and, even then, only as far as the central section of the distribution is concerned.

We could apply our other methods of forecasting the division of seats using as the “swing” the difference between the actual *effective vote* in one election and the *predicted effective vote* in the next. Thus:

	Swing	Change in Seats (errors in brackets)	
		Butler Method	Smoothed Distribution
1951			
(based on 1949)	+1.50	+ 5 (0)	+ 5 (0)
1954			
(based on 1951)	+1.89	+ 4 (−1)	+ 6 (+1)
1954			
(based on 1949)	+3.03	+13 (+3)	+10 (0)

Conclusion

Since any standard of exaggeration of majorities must produce a smooth symmetrical distribution of votes when these are arranged in ascending or descending order, the obvious measure of the *effective vote* is the median vote for this distribution. In an actual distribution of votes, however, there will inevitably be some unevenness; thus the *effective vote* needs to be estimated by calculating the median vote which would be recorded if the actual distribution—particularly around the centre—was replaced by an appropriately “smoothed” distribution. This eliminates the accidental nature of the actual median vote recorded.

Thus there appears to be a strong claim for our assertion that the *effective vote* is best represented by a “constructed” median, based on an appropriate “smoothing” process applied to the centre of the actual distribution. Of course, the nature of the smoothing process is a matter of opinion—we do not claim any more for our process than that it gives reasonable results with the material we are using.

An *effective vote* calculated from a past election enables one to isolate those factors of under-representation which are associated with differential concentrations of votes and significant variations in the sizes of electorates. This can be done

without having to calculate that overall vote for a party which would just enable it to secure half the seats—perhaps the normal method of ascertaining the existence of under- and over-representation.

Similarly, since the *effective vote* is the one which—in association with the appropriate standard of exaggeration of majorities—determines the division of seats between the parties, it is the vote which appears most worth-while predicting. We can see no way of predicting the changes in the adjustments for under-representation from one election to the next, so it would appear necessary to attempt a direct prediction of the *effective vote*.

Our suggestion in this connection consists of using the electorates we employed in calculating our “constructed median”, in “predicting” their results in the forthcoming election and considering that the average of these predictions is itself a prediction of the likely *effective vote* in this election. Again, this method seems to have worked reasonably well in the elections we have studied.

This method could be applied even if there was a revision of electoral boundaries between the two elections concerned—since one could work on the electoral boundaries of the first election, ignoring the new boundaries. In this way, the intentions of (roughly) the same group of people will be subjected to investigation.

However, if the revision of boundaries is sufficiently thoroughgoing, it may be that the new set of electorates so formed will not function in accordance with the same standard of exaggeration of majorities as the old set. Presumably no method of prediction could overcome changes of this nature.

Cape Town

The Literature of Australian Government and Politics

By S. R. DAVIS AND COLIN A. HUGHES

Introduction

It is now the common rhetoric of most Australian bibliographers that for nigh on forty years Australian political scholarship has wandered in the wilderness and has come within sight of the Promised Land only in the last decade. Something of this is true. Until very recently there was not more than one text on the government of Australia; none on its political parties; none on its Cabinet system; none on its electoral systems; none on its voting behaviour; none on its foreign policy; and even now, pleasing as is the vision from Pisgah, few have explored Canaan.

Yet there has been, of course, a literature in these lean years, albeit a literature narrow in its preoccupation and highly opinionated in style. The talk and the writing about political institutions in these years is almost exclusively about two things; about the Federal Constitution and about the New Australia and the New World born from the events of 1914-18. In the main, even when it has been dignified within the hard covers of a symposium, it is a single-article literature. In the main, the literature is polemical and hortatory. The concern with other things is slight. Aside from the studies on constitutional law and the impressive mass of Bland's writing across the 'twenties and 'thirties about Cabinets, Parliaments, bureaucrats and local institutions—an almost unique Australian Odyssey—there is little else, and even Bland's work is almost entirely a missionary literature, full of earnest diagnoses, alarums and calls to action.

Why this has been so can never be easy to answer. Possibly too much was new in a climate dominated by the triple themes of nationhood, federalism and welfare to talk about other things and in another way. Possibly there were too few to claim attention to a different manner of writing about politics and government. Possibly too much was pressing in a society notoriously impatient of any but utilitarian questions and pragmatic answers to encourage withdrawal. Whatever the reason, however, such was the dominant preoccupation and such the dominant strain of the writing almost up to the present time. The new professionalism which has arisen is almost a complete break with these years. First the enquiry is now more intensive, cast over a much broader field and the manner of writing is so different. Unlike its more colourful pioneers it is very much more self-conscious, academically prim, and extremely anxious to join the ranks of the respectable and atone for the sins of its forebears. It is less vehement, less hortatory and less polemic. The promise of this new movement is considerable and already there is evidence of some fulfilment. Yet it is a pity that there should be so much guilt feeling for the past; for if Australian writing has emerged from the era of platform advocacy into an era of judgment; if one is now only exhorted to understand the Australian society before one seeks to change it, there is nevertheless much in this tradition which is worthwhile.

The purpose of this article is to survey the shape of this literature, to give a sense of its content and to map the extent of exploration. Two preliminary comments, however, regarding the scope and the manner of this review. First we have taken our brief to embrace the "literature" of Australian politics and by literature we have understood not all but only some of what is written. Further, the literature of Australian political studies has been taken to mean both works written by persons normally resident in Australia, and works written primarily about Australian problems by anyone else. The second comment is on the order of our material. For this we have found it most convenient to follow a somewhat modified version of the list employed in the UNESCO symposium, *Contemporary Political Science* (1950), thus: Constitutional and Administrative Law; Federalism;

Parliamentary Government; Parties and Pressure Groups; Elections; Public Administration; Local Government; International Relations; Comparative Government; Political Theory. Whilst deciding to include constitutional and administrative law, we have omitted three legal topics in which Australian writers have made substantial contributions. One, international law, is an omission which we especially regret, partly because it occurs in the *Contemporary Political Science* list as an integral part of international relations, but more because the contributions to its development made by Julius Stone are quite possibly the most important work undertaken by a single Australian scholar in any field of political studies. Another, the law of arbitration, is peculiarly an Australian development, and finds its great exposition in H. B. Higgins's *A New Province for Law and Order* (1922, reprinting articles which first appeared in the *Harvard Law Review*). The third, jurisprudence, has never had an Australian school as such, but individual contributions by Jethro Brown, Paton and Stone, amongst others, would warrant recognition in any survey. The first topic we have omitted because we doubted our qualifications to appraise the work which has been done, the others for this reason and because they would have opened the definition of political studies too widely.

Constitutional and Administrative Law

The study of Australian constitutional law can be said to start with one of its crowning glories, Quick and Garran's *The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth* (1901). Quick and Garran opened in the nineteenth century style with an historical introduction of 250 pages, first tracing the development of colonization from classical Greece to the modern era, and then providing for about two-thirds of the introduction an excellent history of the federal movement in Australasia. There followed another 700 pages of annotations on the Federal Constitution. The wealth of scholarship lavished on the notations, the comparisons with British, American and Canadian provisions, and the relation of particular provisions to the pre-federal debates, performed an admirable service. When the work is prophetic it is sometimes wrong, as in the discussion of the Senate, but then it represents the majority view at the time of its writing. Whilst unfortunately there was no attempt to convert the work subsequently into a standard reference by new editions which could have annexed judicial and legislative exposition of the Constitution, together with the few minor changes to the Constitution itself, in 1904 Sir John Quick, together with Littleton Groom, produced *The Judicial Power of the Commonwealth* (which included a section on the practice and procedure of the High Court), an essay of some forty pages on the definition and limits of the Federal judicial power and the two statutes which made it operative. Unlike *The Annotated Constitution* the work contains some case law, whilst following its arrangement of commentaries on the relevant passages of the Constitution, the two Acts in question and the Rules and Orders of the High Court. Rather more important for our purposes was Quick's *The Legislative Powers of the Commonwealth and the States of Australia* (1919) which was intended as "a natural sequence" of *The Annotated Constitution*. At times the prolixity which made *The Annotated Constitution* a depository of comparative constitutional knowledge gets out of hand, as when the discussion of the defence power produces a brief military history and some purple passages on the new nationalism (pp. 422-7), but then its record of naval development is a very useful study of early legislation. Shortly after the publication of Quick and Garran, there appeared Sir W. Harrison Moore's *The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia* (1902, 2nd ed. 1910) which shares its eminence as a classic. Lacking the sweep of the first study, it covered all aspects of the Constitution under broad subject headings. Confined more closely to the terms of the Constitution it lacked the comparative information; it opened with only a brief history of the federal movement and the comparative material on federation and confederation was confined to a brief appendix. However more use was made of American and Canadian judicial decisions—and some pre-federal Australian cases, and some useful accounts of the origins of certain sections of the Constitution were provided. It was followed in turn by a work of modest size, Kerr's *The Law of the Australian Constitution* (1925). Whilst it was divided into four parts, dealing with the federal nature of the Constitution and its legal consequences and the three types of federal power, it did not take the form of a commentary on the Constitution section by section, but examines certain broad topics, which only incidentally are attached to particular passages of the

Constitution. Kerr was succeeded by W. Anstey Wynes's *Legislative and Executive Powers in Australia* (1936) and the second edition of Wynes's *Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia* (1956). Here there is none of the broad sweep of Quick, the reflections on what is more narrowly comparative government than constitutional law, but had there been the book's weight and length would have been unmanageable except in two or more volumes. Indeed only in the field of constitutional law within the wider area of political studies has Australian scholarship spread itself out to the point where, to quote a recent reviewer, the book's high price should include the wheelbarrow required to shift it.

Whilst Quick and Garran were speculating as to what the Commonwealth would be, and Quick boasted in 1919 that after eighteen years of practical legislation and judicial interpretation the Constitution in all its essential features was now an open book, Wynes in 1936 required fourteen pages to list the cases cited, and in 1956 the table had grown to 35 tightly printed pages. By this time the study of politics, of political institutions and comparative government, had clearly separated from the courses in constitutional law taught at universities by and for lawyers. Whilst earlier authors had expounded the American and Canadian Constitutions at length, not to mention those of Imperial Germany or Switzerland, Wynes is able to dismiss them with a few pages at the start no more than referring to the appropriate sections of the American and Canadian Constitutions, and then citing their experience at appropriate points in his treatment of Australian development.

The emphasis in the works cited above has fallen on the legislative powers of the Commonwealth. The role of the Crown stems in large part from considerations outside the terms of the Constitution to which they have clung, and the judicial power, although vital, is a relatively small and esoteric topic. As Sawyer points out in his chapter in *The Commonwealth of Australia* (ed. Paton), the more detailed grant of powers under the Australian Constitution has restricted the growth of a great body of interpretation comparable to the American development since 1789. Stress falls on legislative powers and the validity of laws, and these are highly technical when compared with the broad issues of civil rights. The absence of separation of powers, which has proved troublesome only in respect of the judiciary in Australia, removes another fruitful subject for legal argument and record. A hasty glance at the pages of the *Index of Legal Publications* under the heads "Constitutional Law: Australia" and "Constitutional Law: United States" indicates the relative poverty of Australian publication extending to the periodical field as well. In part it may be attributed to the small number of academic lawyers in Australia, but there are other causes, whilst the debate about Australian federalism has shifted the focus of attention from the primarily legalistic description of a system in equilibrium to the economic and political origins of a dynamic process.

However, these works, whilst invaluable to the teacher and researcher, are forbiddingly large and detailed for the average undergraduate. The gap was filled for a time by a special students' edition of Harrison Moore's *The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia* (1910), and more recently the provision of a text suitable for teaching at the undergraduate level has been well met by Mr. Justice Nicholas's *The Australian Constitution* (1948, 2nd ed. 1952). Much more than the works previously mentioned it goes beyond strict legalism to examine financial relations, co-operative federalism, and briefly such topics as the working of Parliament as affected by the Constitution and international obligations undertaken by the Commonwealth. With it, or other larger texts, may be used Sawyer's *Australian Constitutional Cases* (1948, 2nd ed. 1957) which provides lengthy extracts from leading constitutional decisions together with brief head and foot notes. The cases are by no means pabulumised for undergraduates, and are designed primarily for law students.

Apart from the general survey volumes, specialized monographs have been few. Mitchell in *What Every Australian Ought to Know* (1931) discusses the Financial Agreements and Section 105A of the Constitution, and Brennan in *Interpreting the Constitution* (1935) disagrees with the judgment in the Engineers' Case in an essay admittedly polemic. Brennan's book should be placed in the anti-unification debate of the 1930's with works such as Canaway, not in the main stream of constitutional law, which has been descriptive rather than argumentative. The chapters in *The Cambridge History of the British Empire*, Vol. VII, Part I, "Australia" (1933)

by K. H. Bailey, Garran and Moore provide a good constitutional history of the first decades preceding and following Federation. No sector of Australian political studies would be complete without its symposium, and here the volume is *Essays on the Australian Constitution* (1952) edited by Else-Mitchell. The contributors are academic and practising lawyers in roughly equal numbers, and the field is broadly covered; the essays deal with ten topics, interpretation—in an important paper by Sir John Latham after his retirement from the High Court bench, Parliament, the judicial power, Federal-State relations, the defence power, the compulsory acquisition powers, industrial relations, trade, commerce and intercourse, finance and taxation, and international relations. The essays exhibit a greater readiness to go beyond strict legalism in constitutional exposition; for one thing they are prepared to argue for change in the Constitution which the dust cover notes is “primarily the province of the political scientist”. In the volume *Australia* (1952), edited by Paton in the series *The British Commonwealth: The Development of its Laws and Constitutions* (edited by Keeton), Sawyer and Friedmann have chapters on constitutional and administrative law respectively, the first a general statement of the form of government with general observations on the development of Australian constitutional law, the second showing the derivative nature of Australian administrative law. Friedmann provides a useful classification of administrative tribunals, which is repeated in his *Principles of Australian Administrative Law*.

Despite the importance of administration in the political scene, recognized to a considerable degree in the periodical field, there has been only one text on Australian administrative law, Friedmann's *Principles of Australian Administrative Law* (1950), which is, as he states, a preliminary study to rich but largely uncharted material. The derivative nature of the law itself allows considerable use of standard English texts such as Robson or Allen. Fry prepared a volume, *Australian Courts and Administrative Tribunals*, which was mimeographed for students' use at Brisbane in 1946, but it was never printed; it was primarily a study of the judicial power of the Commonwealth and of the State courts of Queensland, but dealt with certain administrative tribunals of that State in some detail, the Industrial Magistrates' Courts, the Land Courts and Tribunals, Mining Wardens' Courts, Sugar-Cane Price Tribunals, Public Service Appeal Boards and Railway Appeals Boards.

If it is possible to characterize the broad outlines of the study of Australian constitutional law over the last six decades, it would be to record a close alliance between exposition of statutes and judicial decisions and description of political and economic factors influencing but technically outside the legal system. A federal form of government forces the process, but the majority of writers of constitutional law texts have been men of affairs as well as lawyers, and they have written for a small but influential profession with an interest in politics and current affairs. One gap which we would record, but not hazard an explanation for, is the complete absence of the judicial biographies which have popularized American jurisprudence, and particularly constitutional law. Barton, Griffiths and Higgins have biographies, but their judicial careers are regarded as epilogues to political careers. The lack of biographies of Isaacs and O'Connor, to list only the first five members of the Court, is regrettable.

When we turn to the periodical literature, sources are somewhat poorer, but still extensive when compared with other fields of political studies. The first law journal was *The Commonwealth Law Review* (1903-09) which gave far greater emphasis to constitutional law than any subsequent periodical. Its articles were short, but contributors included regularly Harrison Moore and Higgins (before his elevation to the High Court), and it provides invaluable coverage of the early working of the Constitution. Until the post-war period when a number of university journals were begun, the only other Australian publications were the *Australian Law Journal* (from 1927) and *Res Judicatae* (irregularly from 1935). The *A.L.J.* has been designed primarily for practitioners, and its pages are given over to reports and notes; few articles have exceeded two or three pages, and thus the opportunity for argument has been severely limited. *Res Judicatae*, perhaps because of its closer connection with academic lawyers, has published a number of articles of normal length on constitutional and administrative law. Rather more promising has been the appearance of journals produced by or under the supervision of the law faculties at the various universities, beginning with the *University of Queensland Law Journal*

and the University of Western Australia *Annual Law Review* in 1948, and followed by the *Sydney Law Review* in 1953, the *Melbourne University Law Review* replacing *Res Judicatae* in 1957, and the University of Tasmania's law review to commence in 1958. Articles by Australian writers have appeared in journals published in the United Kingdom and the United States. The *Law Quarterly Review* in particular has a long record of Australian contributors from Harrison Moore, Jethro Brown, Garran and Holman to Dixon and Sawer.

Historical and comparative articles have been few. Cowen's "A Historical Survey of the Victorian Constitution, 1856 to 1956", *Melbourne University Law Review* (1957) and Bailey's important "Fifty Years of the Australian Constitution", *A.L.J.* (1951) are rare instances of the first. In the field of comparative constitutional law Cowen's "Comparison of the Constitutions of Australia and the United States", *Buffalo Law Review* (1955), Sawer's stimulating "The Supreme Court and the High Court", *Journal of Public Law* (1957), and a comparison of the distribution of legislative powers in the Australian and West Indian Constitutions by Hughes, *U.Q.L.J.* (1957), suggest the limited range. As might be expected the practitioner's delight, Section 92, has attracted a number of articles including one by Lord Wright accompanied by a partial bibliography of the literature of Section 92 by Stone, *Sydney Law Review* (1953). Otherwise coverage of constitutional topics has been haphazard. Two articles by Cowen and Derham on the position of judges in Victoria in the *A.L.J.* (1953, 1956) and a paper by Beasley on the Western Australian Legislative Council mentioned elsewhere are rare instances of the study of State constitutional law. Federal-State relationships have attracted far more attention under such topics as the reference of powers by the States to the Commonwealth treated by Anderson, *Annual Law Review* (1951), the conflict of Federal and State jurisdictions, the Commonwealth Grants Commission and the Federal jurisdiction of State courts. Most articles have dealt with the Federal Constitution, and in particular the judicial and legislative powers. Sawer in "Injunction, Parliamentary Process, and the Restriction of Parliamentary Competence", *Law Quarterly Review* (1944), and Cowen in "Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Limits of Legal Change" (dealing with South African cases), *A.L.J.* (1952) explore parliamentary sovereignty, and Nicholas's brief "Appropriation and the Senate", *A.L.J.* (1953) looks at another parliamentary topic. Sir John Latham in "Changing the Constitution", *Sydney Law Review* (1953), discusses how unification might be achieved with the existing machinery for change contained in the Constitution. Administrative law has been neglected by comparison; administrative tribunals in Victoria, the liability of statutory corporations for *ultra vires* torts, and the liability of the Crown for tort and executive discretion, statutory discretions, injunctions in public law, legislative attempts to restrict judicial control over administrative tribunals, and "the shield of the Crown", such would represent an almost complete list of topics dealt with by the journals.

Federalism

The obsession of so much of Australian writing for so long with the novelty of federalism is scarcely surprising. Indeed, if its political literature is distinguished at all in these years, its claims must rest almost entirely on the value of this material. In extent it is not small. In subject, scope and ideas, however, it has been singularly limited. The writing falls into two parts, the literature of debate about federalism, and the literature of description. The first predominates, and its character is virtually decided in the first decade of federalism in Australia. The problems laid bare then have scarcely altered, and though the circumstances of the debate have changed over time, the discussion in the next forty years has shown a remarkably small capacity for adaptation and growth. In essence, two experiences condition this debate—the first discovery of want of power in Commonwealth legislation, and the first intimation of State financial inferiority. With few exceptions, this first, and each subsequent encounter with the cost of federalism, releases moods of frustration, regret, exhortation, diagnosis, counsel and reform. The great bulk of this writing is confined to the 'thirties and 'forties. Little of what had been written prior to the 'thirties, and little in the more reflective mood of the present, suggests the impatience, urgency, and restlessness which characterized the writing of these two decades.

Possibly the first notable contribution to this debate is Canaway's *The Failure of Federalism in Australia* (1930). Written a little after the *Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution* (1929) it owes very little to the extensive evidence submitted to the Royal Commission. It is, in many ways, an odd, difficult and distracting work. Its prolix and paraphrastic style does not win friends easily; it is irritatingly formalistic, redolent of a nineteenth century lawyer's commentary. It is repetitive, lacking in theoretical rigour and occasionally fantastically unreal. Yet with all this, there is a recurrent fascination in this work—whether in its attempt to house the market-place exchanges in a more coherent case against the federal experiment, or in its scattering of half-explored ideas about the mating of alien constitutional systems.

Canaway's main argument is that federalism and responsible government are inherently incompatible. Where power is divided responsibility is divided, and where responsibility is divided there is the source of all evil—governments pursue self-regarding policies; it is difficult to formulate and harder still to achieve a concert of purpose and action; there is inevitable collision and duplication; the lines of responsibility can never be perfectly clear, it is impossible for the public to apportion praise and blame and in the certain confusion accountability must suffer. In one way or another, of course, most of these arguments—though certainly in a less terrifying apparel—have been employed in the front lines of the anti-federalist attack before and after Canaway. But one of the most tantalising of his hypotheses which has been barely explored is the condition of public opinion under a federal system. What does the public know of federalism? Is it as perplexed as Canaway believed? Is it conscious of any constitutional burden, or is it like any public aware only of its own physical burdens and little else? Not until 1948 was a serious attempt made to answer this question.

Canaway's book was published on the eve of the 'thirties, and though the debate over the Constitution responds directly to the issues of the time, the Australian writing unlike the literary ferment in the United States is still relatively well-mannered and only mildly reformist. There is yet no literature of "Defend the Constitution". The Premiers' Plan is only a pale shadow of the New Deal. The judiciary provokes no "Storm over the Constitution". The worst it is called upon to do is to frustrate the efforts of a singularly strong-willed fruit grower to "flog his crop across the border".

The debate about the chronic imbalance of fiscal power between the Commonwealth and the States, the constitutional validity of marketing schemes, and the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Constitution, is mainly scattered through three symposia of the Australian Institute of Political Science, a small collection of documents, Copland and Janes, *Cross Currents in Australian Public Finance* (1936), a dozen or so articles in the *Australian Quarterly* and the *Economic Record*, and a few slender tracts such as Mitchell's *exposé* of the pitfalls in the Financial Agreement of 1927, *What Every Australian Ought to Know* (1930). The publication, however, which best represents the dominant themes of the time is the collection of papers read to the first conference of the A.I.P.S., *Studies in the Constitution*, edited by Portus (1933).

The prestige of this slender volume of *Studies* is undiminished, and in the literary debate over the Constitution it is probably rivalled only by the discussions published in the *Federalism: a Jubilee Study* twenty years later. In a sense the *Studies* is a natural companion to the *Report on the Constitution*. What distinguishes this collection of papers, however, is not so much its simplicity and the authority of its contributors, but its remarkable freshness, even now. Then as now the talk was predominantly concerned with the two crucial issues—the apportionment of public money between Federal Government and the States (three of the nine papers are given to this), and the power to control industry, trade and commerce. The common mood in these essays is constitutional reform. Most are constrained to moderate counsels. The views are—the federal system has worked, but at a price (Bailey); a general power to control industry, trade and commerce should be granted to the Commonwealth (Menzies); and tax centralization combined with selective grants should be used to cure the fiscal instability of the States (Mills). There is yet no wholesale clamour for a radical transformation of the Constitution. Only one of the contributors is a tartar—all power to the centre. Here in the *Studies* as in the periodical literature of the period the concern is as much for the welfare of the States (indeed,

if anything, more so) as for the Commonwealth. The talk in the *Australian Quarterly*, for example, is about "The Difficulties of the Small States" (Hyttén, 1930); "Smaller States" (Hutchin, 1933); and "Towards Federal Equilibrium" (Hawker, 1937).

War and federal Labor policy, however, transformed the mild revisionism of the 'thirties. On four different occasions in five years a Labor government made an unprecedented bid for larger constitutional power. Yet were it not for the Labor policy, war alone would have stimulated a fervour for the nation. Isaacs's successive pleas for unification in two pamphlets—*Australian Democracy and Our Constitutional System* (1939) and *An Appeal for a Greater Australia* (1943)—owed nothing to Labor theory and everything to a belief in constitutional simplicity and unified national progress. However, in the juncture of war and welfare the talk about constitutional reform becomes inextricably mixed with talk about socialism and welfare politics. The result is a literary flurry of an unusual intensity and fecundity. Almost the entire record of this debate is again contained in three symposia of the A.I.P.S., half a dozen articles in the *Australian Quarterly*, and a few influential pamphlets. The dominant themes of these years are, however, best reflected in the writing of three people: Greenwood's *Future of Australian Federalism* (1946); two papers contributed to the A.I.P.S. discussion in *Constitutional Revision in Australia* (edited by Maughan, 1944) by Bland and Drummond; and Bland's introduction to the symposium of the New South Wales Constitutional League *Changing the Constitution* (1950).

Greenwood's book *Future of Australian Federalism* may be usefully subtitled "The failure of Australian federalism" and "The case for extended Commonwealth powers", and it owes a great deal of its inspiration to Harold Laski's influential thesis of the 'thirties that federalism is obsolescent in a world of large-scale capitalism. His argument is this: the dual intent of the founding fathers was to devise a means of building a nation, and to preserve the identity of its parts. Neither hope has been fulfilled. The growth of the nation has been impaired by irrational restraints on the Commonwealth, and the independence of the States has been progressively worn away. The assumptions on which the Constitution of 1901 was built have changed. The new age is one of large power politics and national economies. The people are no longer divided in manner or belief. A new constitution must be built on the foundation that security and welfare are indivisible.

This book is scarcely the federalist's manual. For the arguments that comfort the federalist one must go to Bland and Drummond's essays in the collection *Constitutional Revision in Australia*, *Australia's Changing Constitution* (1946) and the A.I.P.S. symposium, *Decentralization* (1948). As one of the most impassioned champions of the Constitution Bland's case is a peppered mixture of the basic federalist beliefs with some of his own crusading arguments against the "New Despotism": the political concentration of power is a threat to the democratic way of life; popular sovereignty is best limited by the judicial process; federalism has worked and the preconditions for federalism still exist in Australia; bureaucracy is best controlled by devolution to local institutions, by the deconcentration of federal administration, by greater delegation to the States, and by the restoration of real parliamentary control. Drummond adds only one other argument to these ideas—a plea for the creation of new states. This esoteric limb of a few Australian federalists is essentially a rural anti-capital city movement centred in northern New South Wales and northern Queensland. Its literature is, in the main, the literature of a crusading movement which lives in a twilight world of reality and unreality, hope and desperation. Caught in the established contest between the Commonwealth and the capital cities it offers aid to neither and hence is shunned by both. Except for Ellis's *Early History of the New States Movement* (1933), a number of papers by Neale in the *Australian Quarterly* (1950 and 1955) and *Historical Studies* (1950), and the symposium of the A.I.P.S. *New States for Australia* (1955), it is almost entirely a pamphleteering literature.

How long will this incessant hue and cry over the Constitution—long stilled in the United States and Canada—continue in Australia? Clearly for some time yet. With all its other beliefs in an agony of reappraisal, the constitutional ideas of the intellectual "Left" are still unreformed and unrequited. Federalism as it is in Australia is an impediment to socialism and Sawyer in the Fabian essays *Policies for Progress* (1955) explains how it frustrates democratic

socialism and what the unchanging remedy is. Even now every new text on Australian government still feels the need to discuss the purpose and the fate of federalism in Australia. However, whether from boredom, resignation, or stalemate, for a time at least, the volume and heat of the literature in the 'forties has now subsided. The prevalent concern and temper of the 'fifties is reflected with surer fidelity in the papers read to the Australian jubilee conference on *Federalism* (1950) edited by Sawyer. In this scholarly collection of papers one is back to the more contemplative mood of the 1933 *Studies*. Even the weight of interest is the same. Four of the eight papers are concerned with the intractable issue of federal finance—how to distribute the public money so that neither the centre nor the parts have too much or too little. The others are of varied pursuits on law and administration. Of the whole, however, the essay most likely to rival Hancock's early thoughts on Australian federalism as a source of quotation is the essay by Partridge "The Politics of Federalism". The pivotal question in this speculative essay is—if the working of the Constitution contents neither the federalists nor the unificationists, what then sustains it? There is little, if any, popular affection or understanding of it, he argues. People neither identify themselves with the Commonwealth nor the States; they have no sensitivity to the implications of constitutional referenda, nor care for the precise disposition of power. Their attitude to the Constitution is wholly opportunistic and empirical. What perpetuates the federal system is the force of its own momentum and institutional inertia. But will Partridge's answer serve? There is some agreement now that if the debate is to continue it cannot rely solely on impressionistic answers, however informed or experienced, to such questions. The current restiveness in Australia with a discussion that has been so little informed with the hard currency of fact and investigation is not without cause.

Little stands outside the debate, and what does is, after we exclude the large body of legal commentary on the Constitution, only a small scattered miscellany of three or four texts, and a dozen or more articles which may be quickly charted. The field of inter-governmental relations in Australia is slightly cultivated, though even here almost the entire preoccupation has been with one matter—the financial relations of the Commonwealth and State governments. What is valuable in Australian federal experience, however, may well lie in the thought given to this problem. No single work has been devoted to this theme. The writing is almost exclusively in the pages of the *Economic Record*, a few papers in such symposia as the jubilee essays in federalism, and in the few comparative studies as Birch's *Federalism, Finance and Social Legislation*. The central issue is—how to apportion the public revenue justly between the needs of the central and regional governments. Giblin and Mills best characterize the work of a profession which has contributed extensively to Australian public affairs—the political economists. Their early essays in the *Economic Record* lay much of the foundations which underlay the thinking of the Commonwealth Grants Commission and the successive moves to centralize direct taxation. With the exception of Brown's important paper in *Federalism* (1950), it is doubtful whether the ideas on this chronic problem have been advanced beyond their diagnosis of the Australian experience. Outside these single papers on federal fiscal theory and policy, the institutions and administrative procedures have attracted little attention. The two organizations which best typify the Australian response to the problem of federal finance—the Australian Loan Council and the Commonwealth Grants Commission—have barely been touched. There is no account of the Commonwealth Grants Commission, and an institution of such central importance as the Loan Council has only attracted a few scattered individual papers by Maxwell in the *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* (1940), Davis in the *Annual Law Review* (1952) and Headford in *Public Administration* (1954).

Once the card-index to constitutional law and federal finance is exhausted the activity in other sectors of inter-governmental relations thins out quickly. There is, for instance, little published or unpublished work which can support a work such as Jane Clark's study of Federal-State co-operation in the United States. The compass of this field is, of course, extensive, and demands a great deal of analytical and descriptive work over a complicated field of policy and administrative contacts between the two levels of government. An early study by Warner, *An Introduction to Some Problems of Australian Federalism* (1933) is a very useful though limited survey of some aspects of this field. Such theses as Davis's

Federal-State Co-operation (1950), Provost's *Inter-Governmental Co-operation in Australia* (1954), or Goldsmith's *Administration of Tuberculosis Control* (1957) have made a few inroads into a small group of activities in which Federal-State interaction can be more easily traced—for example, health, marketing, development, taxation. But none of these studies is readily available, though a summary of Davis's thesis appeared as an article, "Co-operative Federalism in Retrospect" in *Historical Studies* (1950). The extensive consultative agencies which form the clearing house for national policy decisions in Australia such as the Premiers' Conference and the Australian Agricultural Council have become important conventional instruments of federal politics, but only two, possibly three, short articles by Bernie (1947) and Grogan (1958) in *Public Administration*, and single chapters in Copland's *Australia in the World Crisis* (1934) and MacLaurin's *Economic Planning in Australia* (1937), have examined their organization and work. The operation of a dual administrative system—the extent to which they overlap and duplicate each other, the comparative efficiency of Commonwealth and State services—has always been in the forefront of the debate about federalism in Australia. But it was not until 1931 that Westhoven's article in *Public Administration* (Victoria Regional Group) made the first essay into the administrative interaction of Commonwealth and State public services to establish that the Commonwealth and States were not engaged in duplicating each other's activities. Other articles in *Public Administration* by Foxcroft (1946), Mauldon (1949), Davis (1951), Curtin (1953), and Copland's paper in *Federalism* (1950) have added a little to Westhoven's account. No full-scale study yet exists, however, though a more substantial contribution is foreshadowed in the symposium which Spann has edited, *Public Administration in Australia* (1958).

What remains outside this is still scattered, discontinuous, and exploratory. Federal theory, for example, has not attracted any special school of devotees. Constitutional lawyers have probably shown the greatest curiosity in this field but with few distinguished exceptions such as Stone's chapter on sovereignty in *The Province and Function of Law* (1947), it has been almost entirely a practitioner's writing on constitutional interpretation, and this has taken federal theory little beyond the condition in which Dicey and Haldane's obiter in the Colonial Sugar Refinery case left it. Elsewhere there is little taste for theoretical talk. Such studies as Wheare's *Federal Government*, or Partridge's "Politics of Federalism", or the concluding chapters of Barcan's thesis, *Trends Towards National Unification: A Study of Nationalism and Regionalism in Australia* (1955), or Davis's "The Federal Principle Reconsidered" in the *Australian Journal of Politics and History* (1955) are very partial exceptions. The preferred manner of discussion about theory is more faithfully reflected in a miscellany of places—for example, in the talk of political economists such as Giblin and Mills about fiscal authority and political responsibility, or Colin Clark's short discussion of the principles of fiscal decentralization in Australia, or in Bland's ideas about joint Commonwealth-State administrative action, or indeed in the whole pharmacopoeia of the unificationist and federalist arguments. In the main, principles are not at the forefront of these discussions. More commonly talk about theory is concealed in talk about the working of political institutions; and even in the debate about federalism, principles are more often stated rather than examined.

Again, a field of such rich potential as public attitudes to the Constitution has drawn only one valuable research paper—Parker's "People and the Constitution" in *Federalism in Australia* (1949). What he infers about the thinking of the public on constitutional issues is primarily based on careful sifting of referendum statistics and the referenda polls of the Australian Institute of Public Opinion. This is certainly an agreeable advance on the intuitive writing of the pure impressionists. However, referendum statistics are so hopelessly equivocal and single question opinion polls so treacherous that they can never be called upon to mirror the whole complex public mind. It has become quite clear now that until some attempt has been made to employ the developed apparatus of scientific attitude surveys on a small or large sample of the public, Parker's depressing image of the Australian public which feels little, cares little, and knows even less about the way it is federally governed must be treated with great reserve.

Cabinets and Parliaments

The central institutions of State and national government, the Governors and Governor-General, Cabinets and legislatures of Australia, have received their fair share of attention, but no more than a fair share. A major portion of the short introductory texts on the Federal government by Crisp, Miller and Davies, the forthcoming text *The Government of the Australian States* (edited by Davis), and Sawyer's pamphlet, *Australian Government Today* (1948, 5th ed. 1957) is straightforward description of these institutions, and in addition a small number of other works deal with particular aspects. Such are Childe's *How Labour Governs* (1923) examining the record of the Australian Labor Party in office in New South Wales and Queensland, and Denning's *Caucus Crisis* (1937), a study of the Scullin Government. They point the principal trend whereby interest has focussed on the differences between the operation of parliamentary government in Australia and Britain, and in particular on those differences which can be attributed to the policy of the A.L.P. and its machinery of Caucus and extra-parliamentary control. Typical are the two essays by Bland and Miller in *Parliamentary Government in the Commonwealth* (1951), edited by Bailey. But even Bland found it necessary to refer to other differences than those attributable to Labor heresies. The smaller size of Australian legislatures, the absence of a socially distant ruling class, and the centralization of government all are contributing factors listed by Bland, and Miller adds the impact of the federal system and the referendum, the more strongly partisan sentiments of politicians, and the prevalence of coalitions in the anti-Labor front. Miller, in his *Australian Government and Politics* (1954, 2nd ed. 1958) specifically sets out the Australian style of parliamentary government, and makes the acute observation that much of the discussion of politics centres around the personal problems of party leaders. As a result it is a pathological literature of crisis, rather than of day-to-day administration, particularly in its discussion of conflicts between Cabinet, Caucus and party.

The weakness of detail in studies of Cabinet government in Australia is due more to the poverty of sources rather than to lack of interest or appreciation of the importance or interest of the subject for comparative purposes. Thus, of two of the best attempts, Sawyer in his article, "Councils, Ministers and Cabinets", *Public Law* (1956), is forced to rely on statutory provisions and general observation, whilst Crisp in his *Parliamentary Government* sets out the propositions of Jennings with irregular citations of Australian practice based on such sources as Scott. At this point we might examine briefly one of the greatest weaknesses of Australian political studies which affects not merely the study of parliamentary government, but pervades the whole field of politics, the poverty of biographical sources. The first sources which might be expected to provide such material, the *Dictionary of Australian Biography* (1949), and the *Australian Encyclopaedia* (1958), lack critical approach and a similar weakness is shown in such historical survey works as *A Century of Responsible Government in Tasmania, 1856-1956* (1957) edited by Green, or *Responsible Government in South Australia* (1957) by Combe, where potted biographies of Premiers and Ministers and even briefer notes on private members for the century since the grant of responsible government have been discreetly edited and reduced to the austerity of a Who Was Who written by the subjects. The few distinguished biographies there have been have often been peripheral to the main events. Thus Sir Frederic Eggleston's portion of *George Swinburne, A Biography* (1931) by Sugden and Eggleston is a model of balance between detail and broad survey of the contemporary setting—and incidentally the best account of the abortive Interstate Commerce Commission. Similarly the political biography by Fitzhardinge in *Nation Building in Australia: The Life and Work of Sir Littleton Ernest Groom* (1941), edited by Groom, Palmer's *Henry Bourne Higgins: A Memoir* (1931), and Lloyd Ross's *John Curtin* (1958), keep their protagonists in the centre of a properly balanced story. By comparison such works as Browne's *They Called Him Billy* (1946) on William Morris Hughes, Catts's biography of J. H. Catts (1953) and King O'Malley (1957) are personal hagiography rather than political biography. Murdoch's *Alfred Deakin: A Sketch* (1923) and Whyte's *William Morris Hughes* (1957) share a common defect in that they carry their story only part of the way at a time when it should have been possible to give a truer estimate of the man's significance in his entire political career. To date the classic of Australian political biography remains Evatt's *Australian Labour Leader* (1940, 3rd ed. 1945, 4th and reduced ed. 1954)

on W. A. Holman which is unique in that it is a major work devoted to a man whose political career was almost entirely in a State office. Earlier political figures were better served, but their battles are somewhat remote to be infallible guides to recent practice in Cabinet or party. Autobiographies are even rarer: Hughes in *Crusts and Crusades* (1947) and *Policies and Potentates* (1950), and Lang in *I Remember* (1956) provided scattered though very quotable reminiscences, and others such as Sir George Foster Pearce in *Carpenter to Cabinet* (1951) and Gordon Brown in *My Descent from Soapbox to Senate* (1953) have produced similar volumes, although of lesser quality; the best samples remain Sir George Reid's *My Reminiscences* (1917) and Sir Randolph Garran's *Prosper the Commonwealth* (1958). At present there are reported to be anything up to half a dozen biographies or autobiographies of Federal leaders of the past generation under way, and when these are completed the picture should be somewhat altered; at present the poverty of biographical writing of the last half century of Australian history when compared with the first fifty years shows an extraordinary lack of balance. The recognition of the plebiscitary character of Australian elections, both State and Federal, may compel attention for the party leaders at both levels.

Amongst the political journalists, only two have attempted any book length studies based on their inside knowledge of the working of the central government. The first, Denning, in *Caucus Crisis* (1937), *Capital City* (1938) and *Inside Parliament* (1946) captured much of the air of Canberra with some solid description of institutions and the way in which they were worked. His successor, Whittington, in *The House Will Divide* (1954) and *Ring the Bells* (1956) gives a number of anecdotal sketches, the reliability of many of which has been disputed. One other experiment, the collection of a number of articles from the *Sydney Morning Herald* under the title *Men, Parties and Politics* (1943) was ephemeral journalism with little value for later readers. Official party histories have been infrequent; Black's *A History of the N.S.W. Political Labor Party from its Conception until 1917* (1933) is an above-average example.

One topic that has been regularly noted has been the "federalization" of the Cabinet; the fullest treatment is to be found in an article by MacKirdy in the *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* (1957). The most regularly discussed point, Caucus control, is extensively dealt with by Crisp, Childe, McHenry in *University Studies* (Perth, 1955) and *Historical Studies* (1955) and Miller in *Political Science* (1953), whilst its corollary, extra-parliamentary control, has been less often raised, probably because it is less common; the debate on its recent exercise in Queensland was reported by Colin Hughes in *Parliamentary Affairs* (1957). Occasionally certain aspects of parliamentary government have been of topical interest and led to articles on some narrow point, such as Edwards's "The Powers of the Australian Senate in Relation to Money Bills" in *Australian Quarterly* (1944).

The impact of the two world wars on parliamentary government, and to a limited degree on administration, has been ably handled by the official war histories, Scott's *Australia During the War* (1936), Volume XI of the "Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18", and Hasluck's first volume of *The Government and the People, 1939-1941* (1952), Volume I of the Series 4 of "Australia in the War of 1939-1945". The second volume for 1942-5 has never appeared. With them might be noted an article by Walker and Foxcroft in *Public Administration Review* (1943) and the volumes by Butlin on *War Economy* (1955) and Walker on *The Australian Economy in War and Reconstruction* (1947). The volumes by Scott and Hasluck are unusually good examples of writing political history, and whilst neither gives the attention to the machinery of government which the volumes of the Civil Histories of the United Kingdom in either war provided, at the level of Parliament and Cabinet they are invaluable.

The role of the head of state, whether he be Governor or Governor-General, has been completely ignored except by the lawyers. Whilst the constitutional lawyers such as Keith have explained the growth of convention as to their powers, and Evatt in *The King and His Dominion Governors* (1936) has made an Australian contribution of considerable importance, generalizations about the role of the Governor, comparisons with the monarch in the United Kingdom, all have to be guesswork of a very unsubstantial sort. Every text will refer to the somewhat different views of the two major parties on Australian or British-born Governors, but

no one can hazard an estimate of the extent to which the rights to be consulted, to encourage and to warn are exercised. Legislative upper chambers have been similarly slighted. The Senate is mentioned in the standard texts, if only to be ridiculed, but the State second chambers were ignored, except for one historical monograph, Currey's *The Legislative Council of New South Wales, 1843-1943* (which appeared in the *Journal and Proceedings of the Royal Australian Historical Society*, 1943), Manning's pamphlet *The Upper House: The People's Safeguard*, 1856-1953 (1953), published for the Constitutional League, and Beasley's article on the Legislative Council of Western Australia in *Res Judicatae* (1947). This omission is serious, for the Legislative Councils, where they continue to be directly elected, are more influential than students conditioned by the British Parliament Acts suspect; the deficiency has been partly remedied in *The Government of the Australian States*.

Parties and Pressure Groups

Surprisingly this must be one of the shorter sections of this survey, partly because of the poverty of material on Australian pressure groups, and primarily because Mayer has recently and ably surveyed the literature on Australian parties in "Some Conceptions of the Australian Party System, 1910-1950" in *Historical Studies* (1956). A bibliography on Australian parties and pressure groups by Milburn and Cole was published in the *American Political Science Review* in 1957. The literature on parties is dominated in bulk and coverage by Overacker's *The Australian Party System* (1952) now slightly dated and regrettably out of print, which gives the historical background of the four main Australian parties (before the appearance of the Democratic Labor Party), and extended discussions of their formal structure, with some account of the power structure within each, their prime objectives and the groups whence they draw their principal support. Crisp, Miller and Davies devote about one-fifth of their space to the major parties. Crisp gives a slightly idealized picture of the Labor Party, but reports the activities of the three main groups within it, Communists, Catholics and unionists; sections on organization deal exclusively with Caucus and Conference, and on the problem of the periodic splits which occur in the A.L.P. His discussion of the anti-Labor parties looks mainly at the interest groups supporting the parties, and to a limited extent the organizational structure through which pressure is applied. Miller looks at the "syndicates" supporting the different parties, and secondarily at organization. Davies pursuing his theme of the bureaucratization of Australian society regards the parties—very briefly—solely as organizers and transmitters of opinions formulated by the basic groups of society for the direction of the machinery of government. In Grattan's *Australia* (1947) Gollan contributed the chapter on party politics with a straight history of party fortunes at the Federal level, but the most important contribution from the survey volumes comes from Hancock's *Australia* (1930, 1945) where the movement-resistance theory was eloquently expounded—although, as Mayer points out, it had been in the air previously.

Other occasional papers are unsatisfactory: McMahon and Calwell in *The Australian Political Party System* (1954) deal primarily with party policy at a fairly general level, and what they have to say about organization certainly falls short of a peep behind the scenes. Earlier in *Trends in Australian Politics* (1935) a similar task was undertaken by Blackburn, Hall and McCallum, the first telling the story of the rise of the A.L.P., the second explaining the composite nature of the anti-Labor party by its fusion of old Liberals and ex-Labor, and McCallum analysing the bases of support of the two parties.

Whilst not nearly as much attention has been paid to discovering an Australian style of politics as to the Australian style of parliamentary government, some useful discussions have started. Miller in "Aspects of the Party System in Australia" in *Parliamentary Affairs* (1953) compares the British and Australian party systems, and points to the absence of a governing élite and the emphasis on "bread and butter politics", leading to three major differences—the absence of a continuing Right-wing party, the existence of a permanent sectional party in the Country Party, and the undoctinaire quality of the Labor Party. Davis and Webb in *The Australian Political Party System* discuss the relevance of the Duverger hypothesis to Australia.

One phenomenon of writing about parties has been the general hostility to the Country Party, usually over the contradiction of its being "against the *idea* of socialism . . . but . . . in favour of the *fact* of socialism", to quote Miller, thereby antagonizing supporters of both Liberals and Labor. The most severe criticism comes in Eggleston's *Reflections of an Australian Liberal* (1953) in a chapter entitled "The Cost of the Country Party", although as has been pointed out the work might well have been entitled "Reflections of a Victorian Liberal" and many of his strictures are more applicable to the Victorian Country Party than to its half-sisters in other States and at the Federal level. Another characteristic of writings about Australian parties particularly pronounced in the case of the Country Party, has been an air of disapproval in writing about the pressure groups, interest groups or syndicates associated with or controlling the parties. In part this may be a reflection of English views of the proprieties of parliamentary government which are only now being affected by study of the operation of pressure groups on the parliamentary and administrative process in Britain. The dominance of interest groups is agreed as the characteristic of the Australian party system. The "syndicate" theme has been well analysed by Mayer and we would only add that many of the authors cited by him appear not merely to report the facts of interest group control, but to express regret at the facts. The field of pressure groups as such remains unexplored except in brief passages of Crisp and Miller, and for the peculiar relationships of the various interests closely associated to the major parties. Studies of economic history such as Hitchins's *Tangled Skeins: A Historic Survey of Australian Wool Marketing* (1956) may explain the activities of interests in securing certain government policies, but they are usually confined to the Federal level, and provide such information incidentally to their analysis of economic policy.

Another characteristic has been the emphasis and concentration on the A.L.P. Overacker gives far more space to the A.L.P. than to the two anti-Labor parties combined, and only the A.L.P. has had a full-scale history—and that of the Federal party only, in Crisp's *The Australian Federal Labour Party, 1901-1951* (1954). Healey's *A.L.P.* (1955) attempts a more popular history of the party, but falls very short of the mark. Two theses, Rawson's *The Organization of the A.L.P., 1916-1941* (1954) and Truman's *The Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups of the Australian Labour Movement* (1954), provide the most detailed studies of factionalism within the A.L.P. The reasons for this concentration are fairly simple; there has been a general acceptance of the movement-resistance theory which makes study of the Labor Party far more useful; the A.L.P. carries on its internal struggles for control of machinery or policy determination far more openly than the anti-Labor parties, and therefore research into its history is easier; there has been a continuity of policy and organization which allows a treatment other than the episodic form compelled by the broken history of the anti-Labor movement. It could not be argued that in recent years supporters of the A.L.P., whether academics or not, have been any more vocal or literate than its opponents, and it may be that the Liberal Party having established itself more firmly than its predecessors will attract a better literature in due course. At present interest seems to have turned rather to its junior partner, the Country Party, with the impending publication of Ellis's study of the New South Wales Country Party, and the appearance of a study of an allied pressure group, Bayley's *History of the Farmers and Settlers' Association of N.S.W.* (1957).

One aspect of party activity which has been sadly neglected has been policy content. Eggleston contributed a paper entitled "Political Parties and Their Economic Policies" to *An Economic Survey of Australia*, edited by Copland (1931, an issue of *The Annals of the American Academy of Politics and Social Science*), but it did no more than the standard job of recognizing the interest groups behind the parties. Whilst the pragmatic approach of the A.L.P. and the mixed nature of the anti-Labor programme make characterization difficult, it is surprising that—apart from the chapters by Hancock and Alexander in *The Cambridge History of the British Empire*, and the collective study *Australia: A Social and Political History* (1955), edited by Greenwood, which dealt in broad outlines—until the publication of Sawyer's *Australian Federal Law and Politics* (1956) there was no satisfactory survey of legislation and party legislative policy—so necessary for the check on the "movement-resistance" hypothesis suggested by Mayer. The appearance of the second volume of Sawyer's work, as well as comparable studies for at least some of the States, will be necessary before such a task can be undertaken

properly. The party compilations of legislative records and occasional articles summarizing recent political history which used to appear in *Australian Quarterly* and elsewhere are inadequate for such a purpose; the "Political Chronicle" of the *A.J.P.H.* by allowing more space is doing a far better job.

The tiny Australian Communist Party has received proportionately more attention than its membership or voting support would warrant, but this no doubt reflects the general view of its influence on the Labor scene. Overacker devoted a descriptive chapter, and Miller a concluding note, to it, and Webb's *Communism and Democracy in Australia* provides probably the best account of the party. The party's general secretary, Sharkey, has written an official history, *Outline History of the Australian Communist Party* (1944), and its pamphlet literature setting out policy is extensive; a broader account of its role is to be found in Campbell's *History of the Australian Labour Movement* (1945). Ellis in *The Garden Path* (1949) provides an unusually detailed, but strongly partisan, account of Communist infiltration of the Labor movement. Other minor parties have been served ill, apart from Hall's essay in *Trends in Australian Politics* (1935) written when they were most significant, and the Lang Labor Party is usually treated as a topic under the general discussion of the A.L.P. The new Democratic Labor Party and the corresponding Queensland Labor Party are perhaps too new to have been studied; sections of the forthcoming *The Government of the Australian States* deal with them, and much of the background to the split which produced the D.L.P. is given in two articles by Langdon, "The Catholic Anti-Communist Role Within Australian Labor" in *Western Political Quarterly* (1956), and Rawson, "The A.L.P. Industrial Groups" in *Australian Quarterly* (1954).

Elections

The muse of psephology descended on the Australian scene only recently, some seven years after the appearance of the first Nuffield study, and a considerable time after the early American studies. Australian election studies have been of two types, those which survey the operation of the electoral system, or systems, as a whole, and individual constituency studies. The first begin with the chapters by Webb and Davis in *Australian Political Parties* (1954), examining Duverger's views of the electoral system-party system relationship in an Australian context, and include two articles by Rydon, "Electoral Methods and the Australian Party System: 1910-1951" in the *A.J.P.H.* (1956), and "The Relation of Votes to Seats in Elections for the Australian House of Representatives, 1949-1954" in *Political Science* (1957). Truman in "The Press and the 1951 Federal Elections", *Australian Quarterly* (1951) examined the coverage of election issues provided by the metropolitan press. Prior to the forthcoming publication in *The Government of the Australian States*, and Davies's chapter in *Introducing Victoria* (1955) edited by Leeper, little attention had been paid to the operation of the electoral systems of the States, although there had been articles on the weighting of electorates in South Australia and Queensland on several occasions in periodicals such as *Australian Quarterly*.

The microscopic study of the Elmira, Greenwich or North-East Bristol variety has been even rarer. To date Mayer and Rydon's *The Gwydir By-Election* (1954) remains a solitary landmark, although D. W. Rawson and S. Hoetzing's *Politics in Eden-Monaro* is in the process of publication. The Gwydir study represents a high level of proficiency in electoral reporting, and were Australian political scientists more numerous and less busy, it could have been supposed that a rash of constituency studies would ensue. As for the Nuffield type of project whereby a whole general election is dissected, the problems of organization and co-ordination are probably insuperable at present. Indeed an account of a State general election going beyond the brief, but useful, skeleton of the Political Chronicles of the *A.J.P.H.* would entail travelling and local research on a scale beyond the range of one or two unaided teachers with the possible exception of the two smallest States. The two major electorate studies to date have both concerned marginal Federal country seats in New South Wales, and it would be desirable to broaden the sample to include some specimens of urban politics, a safe seat, and perhaps some other States. Then, too, the Gwydir study was atypical in that it focussed on a key by-election when party forces outside the electorate mobilized to an unusual degree. One of the most important missing pieces for psephological speculation is interviewing of the type undertaken in the Elmira or North-East Bristol studies in an attempt to isolate the

"floating" vote. Because of compulsory voting the phenomenon may be quite different from Britain or America, but to date we have little more than old wives' tales of a gloomy cast such as Eggleston's off-the-cuff comment in *State Socialism in Victoria* that the floating voter backs the popular side as indicated by the press or J. A. McCallum's observation in *Trends in Australian Politics* that compulsory voting "has brought the apathetic, the parasitic, and the venal to the poll". Only Portus in *Australia, an Economic Interpretation* (1933) gave the classic view of the floating vote, tolerant and eclectic, empirical and pragmatic, pursuing its own interests and unlikely to be panicked by scares or slogans. The best and fullest statement is Crisp's chapter on compulsory voting in the Hansard Society symposium, *Parliamentary Government in the Commonwealth* (1951), edited by S. D. Bailey; he is sceptical of any sweeping generalizations concerning the impact of compulsory voting on party success or electoral strategy, but even this is no more than the guess of a skilled observer.

A peculiarly Australian branch of electoral studies should concern constitutional referendums. Webb's *Communism and Democracy in Australia* (1954) describes the origins, argument and course of the 1951 referendum on the outlawing of the Communist Party in Australia, and can be regarded as the only Australia-wide study of electoral processes. Previously Parker in the A.I.P.S. symposium, *Federalism in Australia* (1949), edited by Sawyer, had propounded some general statements about the course of referendums, and analysed in broad outline the first twenty-three. His conclusions were followed by Livingston in the Australian section of *Federalism and Constitutional Change* (1956). The difficulties of working back to reconstruct earlier referendum campaigns would be substantial, but one such study of the 1926 referendum by Wildavsky is due for publication shortly, and others are in thesis form.

Public Administration

Far more than was the case with any other field of political studies before the post-war period, public administration was the preserve of a single man, Professor F. A. Bland of Sydney, and the only publications in the field were the writings of Bland or contained in the journal which he founded and edited, *Public Administration*. The work of Bland has already been the subject of a number of essays, contained in a special number of the journal (1955) on his retirement from the Chair of Public Administration and before his translation to the House of Representatives. Bland wrote regretfully of what he regarded as the decline of popular or parliamentary control over administration, particularly through weakening of financial control. His criticism runs along two lines, deprecation of movement towards the bureaucratic state when his writing is often derivative and sometimes little more than an application of English polemics of the Hewart school to the local scene, and examination of particularly Australian problems in relation to the failure of public corporations, reorganized public service and local government, where the writing is much better documented and more valuable. Part of the fault, Bland believed, was an under-valuation of administration when compared with politics, which could be remedied by better and more studies of administrative questions; part was the product of the malfunctioning of specific institutions which could be met by the creation of new institutions, such as advisory councils and regional bodies—as argued in his paper, "The Problems of Administration" in *Constitutional Revision in Australia* (1944), edited by Maughan, by increasing the life of the House of Representatives to five years and reforming parliamentary procedure—proposed in "Overhauling the Machinery of Government" in *Trends in Australian Politics* (1935), edited by Duncan, and by transferring functions from Commonwealth to State agencies and creating parliamentary committees—set out in "The Machinery of Government" in *Decentralization* (1948). Without cataloguing the substantial list of Bland's work, the bibliography of which may be found in the special number of *Public Administration* referred to, it is necessary briefly to call attention to and characterize his major works by name. Outside the main group stands *Government in Australia* (1939, 2nd ed. 1944), the only collection of source materials designed for the study of Australian government; despite its title it deals only with administration, and sources are limited to the Commonwealth and New South Wales. *Shadows and Realities of Government* (1923) was the first work of book length, and came early in the development of public administration as such in the English-speaking world. *Budget*

Control (1931, 2nd ed. 1936, 3rd ed. 1938, 4th ed. 1946) turned to a subject always of interest to Bland, parliamentary control of expenditure: the material was drawn, as was the case with *Shadows and Realities of Government*, primarily from the experience of New South Wales. *Planning the Modern State* (1934, 2nd ed. 1945) dealt with the same theme, the need to re-establish parliamentary control whilst revitalizing administration by decentralization and revision of certain problems of the public service.

Apart from Bland's work there have been but three works of book length on public administration. The first, in time and importance, was Sir Frederic Eggleston's *State Socialism in Victoria* (1932) which may be compared with Pember Reeves's earlier *State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand* (1902) in recording one of the great administrative experiments in the British Commonwealth. It has two main themes, the workings of public corporations in Victoria, and the study of various governmental interventions in the economy as through land settlement. Unlike subsequent writers or speakers who had seen the operations of Australian political institutions from the inside Eggleston was prepared to document his generalizations with particular cases of administrative and political history which gives the work a depth and vitality today which more recent essays totally lack. His personal experiences as an administrator led him to write with some bitterness of political frustration of the principles which underlay the use of the corporation. Although subsequent writers on statutory corporations have not made as much of this political interference, one suspects that it is because they lack Eggleston's knowledge or because their research or publication has been restricted by considerations of discretion. The second is by Parker, *Public Service Recruitment in Australia* (1942), and deals with a fairly specialized topic, but through its broad treatment, wide documentation and historical scope provide an excellent introduction to administrative organization. Its last chapter, "Administrative Cadre", remains the best discussion of the advisability of recognizing an administrative class in Australia and the methods of recruiting such a class. It showed an acquaintance with British and American work then unusual in Australia, and, without formulating an Australian political *geist*—the search for which played such an important role in Bland's work—provided detailed information about the Australian social-educational setting. The most recent work is Scarrow's *The Higher Public Service of the Commonwealth of Australia* (1957) which examines the formal regulation of conditions and recruitment of the Federal higher public service, growth of the class in numbers and influence, and gives some indication of the origins of its members; it is a skilled treatment of a fairly narrowly defined subject. Of unorthodox format but considerable utility is *The Government of Victoria* (1958) compiled by the Department of Political Science of the University of Melbourne, which lists and classifies the machinery and functions of government in that State.

In the field of social services two comparative studies have dealt with Australia. *Social Security in the British Commonwealth* (1954) by Mendelsohn treats social services in Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, with separate chapters on the development of social services in each country followed by comparative sections. Birch's *Federalism, Finance and Social Legislation* (1955) deals with the financial and constitutional background of the development of social services in Australia and other federal systems. Both works are of an unusually high level of competence.

To turn to the periodical field, there is here as substantial a body of writing as in any field of political studies in Australia, but almost confined to the single journal, *Public Administration*. In our analysis we have followed the list of topics suggested by Encel in that journal in 1956 as central to a hypothetical course in public administration although we add a thirteenth topic. The first subject, the history of administration in Britain, has remained the preserve of visiting lecturers from the United Kingdom. The opportunities for research into British institutions are so limited, and the prospects for research into Australian material so extensive and inviting, that one can expect that for some time only work commenced overseas such as Schaffer's article "The Idea of the Ministerial Department: Bentham, Mill and Bagehot" (*A.J.P.H.*, 1958) will be published here. The second topic, the Cabinet system and relations between Cabinet and the civil service, has been a badly neglected field; what explorations there have been came from the political, rather than the administrative, point of view and

indeed, the administrative aspect remains shrouded in secrecy, rent only by the illumination of occasional Royal Commissions at times when the system is functioning badly. Encel's article "Cabinet Machinery in Australia" (1956) is a useful first step, and with it should be taken Crawford's "The Role of the Permanent Head" (1954) and Penney's brief note on the early development of the Prime Minister's Department. The third topic concerns the growth of the public services in Australia, and has been one of the most prolific subjects, no doubt because it lends itself to straightforward historical or organizational analysis by the senior public servant, who until the last few years provided the majority of contributions to the journal. A number of agencies have been well served in this respect, but attention has focussed on the Commonwealth and the two largest States, and the selection of agencies has been fortuitous. Topics of public service legislation have been equally well covered, especially in two articles by Hayes (1956). Public service staff associations were the object of a great deal of interest in 1945-6, and arbitration has been the subject of an extended study (1956) by Crichton. Subramaniam in two recent articles examined the creation of the Commonwealth public service on Federation (1957) and the political rights of Commonwealth public servants (1958). Encel's fourth topic, financial machinery, has remained the province of economists for the most part, whilst administrative studies have been confined to pointing out the general principles of budgetary responsibility and control. Such articles are fairly numerous, reflecting Bland's interest in the subject. What is probably the most interesting field, Federal-State financial machinery, is discussed elsewhere in this article.

The fifth topic concerns public corporations, and here the opportunities for research are obvious, and the way pointed early by Eggleston. The articles fall into two main groups, those dealing with specific bodies such as Rydon's on the A.B.C. (1952) and the four in a special number of *Public Administration* (1957) devoted to the corporation, and those dealing with corporations as a class. In the latter category, besides such aspects as personnel, finance and control, and State-wide studies, valuable contributions come from Webb in "Freedom and the Public Corporation" (1954) examining the choice between corporation and ministerial department and Kewley in the special number on certain common attributes of the galaxies of corporations at the Federal and State levels. Much of the value which the individual studies could have possessed was lost through a formalistic concentration on function and structure which could have been discovered by reference to published sources, and also through official reticence to discuss the actual working of the corporation concerned except as a mechanical description of organization. The sixth topic, administrative law, has been ignored much as it has been by the law journals; the only contribution worth mentioning has been a regular series by Sawyer surveying the development of administrative law at two- or three-year intervals, and his contribution to the special number on public corporations. The seventh topic, government intervention in industry and trade and central economic planning, has been developed largely in relation to agriculture, at both the production and the marketing levels. Other discussions of governmental provisions of economic services, such as transport and power, have dealt with the problem of provision rather than of the impact such services might have on the private sector. Economic planning has attracted some interest from the early days of Sir Herbert Gepp's "An Economic Research and Advisory Council in the Modern State" (1938), but the planning process is too closely tied to Cabinet machinery to be easily exposed to the public gaze. The eighth topic is the administration of social services, health, education and other welfare state functions. This is one of the best covered fields, not least through the work of T. H. Kewley in *Public Administration* and elsewhere. A main theme has been the need for better research in the administration of social services generally, and pensions and insurance have been the subject of special studies. The ninth field, the influence of pressure groups on administrative action, remains untouched; so much of the administrative process is concealed by official secrecy. The growing literature in British studies may stimulate Australian work, but there is no guarantee that the detail of American study can be duplicated in a parliamentary system.

The tenth subject, comparative administration, has been handled mostly by visitors to Australia. Whilst the study of parliamentary government in Australia has centred around an examination of the differences between parliamentary institutions and practices here and

in Britain, Australian public administration as a discipline has been less self-conscious. Bland directed his attention to the point occasionally, but other contributions have been fragmentary. A case could be argued for making comparative philosophies of administration a separate topic for this hypothetical course. The first signs of discussion of the nature of the subject came in 1943 with Renwick's "Public Administration: A Suggestion for its Development as a Science" which advanced the Urwickian thesis. There followed Govan's "A Scientific Approach to Social Service" (1943), Rivett's "The Science and Technique of Administration" (1944), and Renwick's "Public Administration: Towards a Science" in *Australian Quarterly* (1944). Later discussions, few and far between, such as Hunt's "The Importance of Management Theory to the Public Service" (1950), have leaned away from the scientist position which has never been widely accepted. The eleventh subject, the problem of bureaucracy, is not effectively studied before Rivett's "Max Weber on Bureaucracy" (1948), although generalizations on the bureaucratic nature of Australian society, usually beginning with generalizations based on the large proportion of the total work force on the public payroll, are the small talk of popular political discussion. The reply to Rivett's article by Davies, and Parker's application to the Australian scene in "Public Administration as the Study of Bureaucracy" (1956) complete the list. Encel's twelfth topic, the classification of government activities, is not completely clear to us, but if the selection of instrumentalities was meant, then no work has been done in periodical literature, apart from casual and practical comments made incidentally for other purposes. The final topic, methods and procedure, was not included in Encel's list, but seems more suitable for separate discussion than as a part of the third topic, public service organization and practice, in part because it is a field particularly susceptible to the scientific approach, and therefore doctrinal argument. With the exception of one or two earlier articles on personnel management, O. and M. interest began only in 1953, and a large part of the literature is by a single person, K. E. Grainger. However, interest increases steadily from that time. A useful historical note may be found in Subramaniam's "Evaluating Personnel Efficiency in the Commonwealth Public Service" (1957).

Local Government

It is doubtful whether Australian scholars or history and geography have been more indifferent to the fate of local government in Australia. Besides its great burden of a monumental public apathy three other things need to be noted. First, local government in Australia is the constitutional creation of State government with all that tutelage to an excessively centralized system of State administration implies. Second, its problems are local variations of the three universal themes—insufficiency of power, of money, and of structure. Third, in a system of government which has been called a federation of capital cities, metropolitan government has inevitably become the primary focus of reformist zeal.

What has been written as government, not history, may be swiftly surveyed. There is, in the first place, no single comparative or single general treatise on local government in the six States. An early conspectus of local government authorities, their functions, and operations—Knibbs's *Local Government in Australia* (1919)—is hardly an exception. In aggregate the volume of writing is no more than two or three books, a half dozen short monographs, the series of papers read to the annual symposia organized by the Local Government Association of New South Wales since 1945, and some thirty or so articles in *Public Administration* (mainly semi-public addresses given to the Australian Institute of Public Administration), and some half-dozen M.A. theses, four of which are historical studies of local government development in the last century. Most of this work has been written in the last fifteen years, and the great bulk of it is concerned with local government in New South Wales. In the main it is the work of professional officers who form the vanguard of a particularly vigorous local government movement in that State. The pity is that with a few notable exceptions, Australian political scientists have generally shunned this field except to cut their first academic teeth.

In New South Wales there is no single published work on the structure and work of local government, and the occupation of the existing article-monograph literature is twofold: to advocate the cause of local government reform, and to describe aspects of its structure and operation. The symposium on *Local Government in the Post-War Period* (1945) is the best

characterization of the ideas which motivate the local government movement in New South Wales. Its twin articles of faith are "central control is remote control" and "local government keeps power with the people". These themes are pursued with typical energy in Bland's papers to the early conferences of the Local Government Association (especially his "Charter for Greater Local Government"), his articles in *Public Administration*—for example, "Is there a Future for Local Government" (1946)—and repeated by many other devotees of the movement such as Mainerd in his paper to the symposium of the A.I.P.S. on *Decentralization* (1948) or Spooner (the former Minister for Local Government) in a paper to the first Local Government Summer School (1945) "Future of Local Government". Much of this literature is preoccupied with a general review of local government, but finance and metropolitan government receive the closest attention in this and other special articles. The proceedings of the second summer school of the Local Government Association is wholly devoted to a discussion of the financial resources and responsibilities of local authorities in New South Wales. This collection of papers, two articles by Mainerd in *Public Administration*—"Local Government Finance" (1950) and "Municipal Trading" (1952)—together with the publication of an extensive study made by Sir Bertram Stevens, *Finance and Related Problems*, have given a considerable advance to New South Wales work in this field. It is only rivalled by the amount of writing on metropolitan government in this State. The complex and irrational *mélange* of authorities which govern Australian capital cities in all but one State, Queensland, is nowhere better exemplified than in the Sydney metropolis. The quest for survival, and order through uni-functional or all-purpose authorities or two-tier systems is the subject of much writing in *Public Administration* and elsewhere—Bland's article on "Metropolitan Government in Australia" (1938), his chapter in Robson's *Great Cities of the World* (1955, 2nd ed. 1957), Miller's two articles on "Greater Sydney" (1955), Tate's account of the "Cumberland County Council", the *ad hoc* metropolitan planning authority (1947), Nolan's "Sydney County Council", the Sydney electricity authority (1939), and Winston's *Sydney's Great Experiment* (1957). Aside from these two fields, there is little else of note except for Parker's monograph *One Hundred Years of Local Government Legislation* (1957).

In other States, the work on local government is with very few exceptions negligible. In Victoria, Davies's monograph *Local Government in Victoria* (1951) is one of the few studies which stands outside the thinly documented proselytizing literature of the local government movement in Australia. In this valuable account of the structure and functioning of municipal councils (together with a subsequent article in *Public Administration*, "Local Government in Melbourne", 1955) Davies depicts the confused and unstable condition of city government in terms which hold for almost all States. Apart from this work there is little else in Victoria except perhaps such general papers as Jenkins's "A Brief Survey of Local Government in Victoria" (1945). Greig's monograph *Notes on The Early History of Local Government in Victoria* (1925) is of more antiquarian interest. In Queensland, Morrison's short monograph, *Local Government in Queensland* (1952), Robinson's book, *For My Country* (1957)—a bizarre compilation of some useful facts—Chuter's two monographs, *Local Government Administration* (1919) and *Local Government Law and Finance* (1921), his paper "Local Government in Queensland" (1946) in *Public Administration*, and a paper by Slaughter, "Local Government Structure with Special Regard to the Administration of Greater Brisbane" (1947) read to the third Local Government Summer School in New South Wales, encompass the total literature on local government in this State. A forthcoming centennial volume on the Brisbane City Council by Greenwood and Lavery, however, will introduce the first large-scale study of a metropolitan government in Australia. In Western Australia Johns's monograph *Metropolitan Government in Western Australia* (1950) is the only published study of more than article length in that State. Its conclusions from an account of the public utility services, local government finance, and other agencies of metropolitan government reject perfectionist remedies in favour of progressive modification and adjustment. For a short general comment on the whole local government structure throughout the State there are only Tauman's and White's brief papers to the symposium on local government published in *Public Administration* (1946) and Johns's later article in the same journal (1949) "Development of Local Government in Western Australia".

In the two remaining States, South Australia and Tasmania, local government is scarcely served at all except for one paper by Shephard and one by Knight contributed to the special number of *Public Administration* (1946) on local government in South Australia.

International Relations

The literature of international relations concerning Australia or by Australians was little affected by academic research or departmental pontifications until the second world war. Far more than any other branch of political studies in Australia it was a field for the intelligent, well-read layman. To a great extent this literature, for the whole of our period, has served national interest by focussing on problems of Australian foreign policy rather than dissipating in studies of wider, world-wide, questions; the point that similar concentration must be exercised by the makers of Australian foreign policy was well made by Casey in his Milne lecture, *The Conduct of Australian Foreign Policy* (1952). The volume of periodical literature has been higher than in any other field, although the calibre of contributions has varied considerably, and the mean standard has been not very high. The journals of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, the *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin* (1937-46), *Australian Outlook* and *Australia's Neighbours*, regularly contain articles on the politics of other countries as well as international relations more narrowly construed, as does the journal of the A.I.P.S., *Australian Quarterly*, less regularly. The great majority of articles have dealt with Asian and Pacific affairs, although some attention has been paid to international organizations and European politics. Only rarely have Western Hemisphere affairs, or problems of Commonwealth territories outside Asia, been discussed. Other regular publications of assistance in the study of international relations are the series of *Current Affairs Bulletins*, now published by the University of Sydney, which are brief unsigned pamphlets often about international affairs, and *Current Notes on International Affairs*, published by the Department of External Affairs since 1936, which does much to fill the gaps left by the inadequacies of overseas reporting in the Australian press and the absence of informative weeklies.

To a very great extent Australian thinking about international relations and Australian foreign policy has been conditioned by geography rather than history. Australia has been concerned in world history for less than two hundred years, and has been an independent actor for barely four decades. There is little in traditional patterns of power and relations for guidance, but geographical realities are always present. Most recently geographical reality has meant recognition of Australia's exposed position as a remote outpost of the British Empire. In domestic affairs Australians have always been ready to listen to tales of El Dorado, untapped natural wealth, population unlimited, the Utopia of social experiment, but in external affairs there has usually been a slight air of paranoia, a widely held belief that Australia must live by her wits in a hostile and envious world.

In addition to formulating Australian foreign policy in a crucial period, William Morris Hughes contributed two books to the study of international relations, not to mention the autobiographical writings which often relate to his political activities. In *The Splendid Adventure* (1929) he gave his own views on most developments in Commonwealth relations over the period 1914-28, and particularly set out "to describe the working of the novel and complex machinery evolved by time and circumstance to serve the Empire during the war". In *Australia and War To-Day* (1935, 2nd ed. 1935) he argued that Australia should look to her own defences in view of the failure of the League and growing world tension; unlike most Australian writers of the time he cited German rearmament as the principal threat to world peace, not Japanese aggression against China, but then he was often given to fighting old battles. It was the latter book with its criticism of the League which led to his departure for a time from the Lyons Cabinet.

Apart from the writings of Hughes in the 1920's and 1930's, the works of book length on international relations were four symposia and a single monograph. The first work, *Studies in Australian Affairs* (1928), edited by Campbell, Mills and Portus, and sponsored by the N.S.W. branch of the Institute of Pacific Relations, contained three papers on international relations, on the legal problems of dominion status in international affairs, on the defence role of Australia

within the Empire, and on the lack of interest in foreign policy in the A.L.P. The second symposium, *Australia and the Far East* (1935), was edited by Sir Ian Clunies Ross and published under the auspices of the A.I.I.A. One-half of the papers were devoted to questions of trade, but this was a time when the threat of war had not completely displaced recovery from the depression as the focus of national policy. Their general tenor showed that hope had not been abandoned for a peaceful settlement in the Far East. The third, and by far the best collection, was *Australia's Foreign Policy* (1938), edited by Duncan and sponsored by the A.I.P.S. In his introduction Macmahon Ball pointed out that the attempt, which the symposium represented, to formulate a foreign policy for Australia failed because there was no coherent public opinion on world affairs in the country. He postulated three conditions for the creation of a considered foreign policy, knowledge of other countries, freedom in which alternative policies may be discussed, and "an intelligent and civilized spirit of patriotism, a social philosophy which is bent, not on finding occasions for suspecting foreigners, but on increasing the welfare of Australians". With certain unfortunate exceptions the second condition has generally prevailed, but the first and third have often been lacking. The provision of full and up to date information about other countries is, of course, an unending task. A clear formulation of Australian national welfare came only with the end of the second world war when it fixed on the two principles of securing alliances adequate to guarantee against any exigency in the Pacific area and of providing economic assistance for Australia's nearest neighbours in the Pacific and Asia. Macmahon Ball was right when he said the book had failed, for it reflected the absence of the first and third postulates: contributors took quite unrealistic guesses as to probable courses of conduct of other countries, and had little clear idea of where Australia's interest lay in a rapidly changing world, even though the papers reflected the growing threat of war. Also in 1938 the Victorian branch of the I.P.R. prepared a more specialized symposium, *Press, Radio and World Affairs* (edited by Macmahon Ball), reporting glumly the distorted views of international politics given in the Australian press, but failed to offer any substantial suggestion of how these might have affected policy formation. The monograph, Shepherd's *Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East* (1939), skilfully traced the changing relations between Australia and China and Japan, broadly to 1930, and then in some detail for the 'thirties. It made much greater use of economic sources than have most Australian writings on international affairs before or since—all too often an economist is invited to contribute a chapter which suffers greatly because of the fragmentary nature of the subject when torn from its various political settings.

The success of Allied arms in the Pacific opened a new chapter of Australian international studies. Whilst the League had been concerned primarily with Europe, and Australia had been content to follow in Britain's footsteps at Geneva, the new international organization was to be of far more interest to Australians. This was heightened by the key role played in the drafting of the Charter by Dr. H. V. Evatt as Minister for External Relations. In *Foreign Policy of Australia* (1945) Evatt reprinted a number of speeches, mainly statements in Parliament on the war, but in the later pages dealing with the first steps to post-war reconstruction on the international scene, the need for international organization, and the formation of the ANZAC alliance. In his second volume of collected speeches, *Australia in World Affairs* (1946), the theme was the new world system, and three aspects particularly of interest to Australians, the need to curb the great powers within the United Nations, and the need to have specialized agencies for trusteeship of some non-self-governing territories and for promoting social and economic welfare. Finally, in *The United Nations* (1948) Evatt traced the success achieved in pursuing these aims at San Francisco, discussed the operation of the U.N. over the first two years of its existence, and in particular the frustrations which stemmed from what he regarded as the Russian failure to observe undertakings given as to the use of the veto, and made some comments on developments then under way, such as the creation of the "Little Assembly". The post-war period of Labor government was dominated in foreign relations by Evatt, and, in the field of publications, prime emphasis was on the new relationships with the United States, the United Nations and southern Asia, and a corresponding diminishing in Commonwealth interest. Werner Levi published *American-Australian Relations* (1947) showing that the two English-speaking countries on opposite sides of the Pacific had been in irregular contact

from their earliest days. Rather in the Evatt vein, too, is Hasluck's *Workshop of Security* (1948) on the United Nations.

The advent of a Liberal-Country government in 1949 did not alter basic policy, nor did it produce any great change in the writing about international affairs in Australia. The Minister for External Affairs, R. G. Casey, who has been in office for most of the post-Evatt period, has written two volumes—containing mainly reprinted material. Before the Liberal victory of 1949, Casey reprinted under the title *Double or Quit* (1949) a number of occasional pieces written for the press and journals. They dealt with population problems, hence the title, and with labour relations, but included an address on foreign policy. Much more valuable is his *Friends and Neighbours* (1954), the second collection, which ranges over a number of topics, dealing with specific recent problems which have confronted the managers of Australia's foreign policy. It expresses a scepticism of the United Nations which has been obvious in recent Australian policy, and whilst by no means an apologia for his policy, is closely tied to the record which he himself made. Significant of the decline of the informed layman and the rise of the academic expert has been the shift in background of the authors of the various symposia prepared under Institute auspices. Thus *Australian Policies Towards Asia* (n.d., 1954 ?), a mimeographed volume of papers read at an I.P.R. conference in 1954 and edited by Greenwood, contains only one essay out of seven not by a university teacher. This has meant better documentation and perhaps more extensive exploration of sources, but it has not involved a complete abandonment of "ought" for "is". There have been few differences of opinion, or indeed of emphasis, within the group which constitutes the nucleus of contributors to the study of international relations since the war—Macmahon Ball, Greenwood, Harper and Sawyer—and therefore the cumulative contribution has been less than a first glance at the volume of writing might suggest. The case-study of a single episode in the conduct of Australia's foreign policy has been attempted only twice in publications for general distribution, both times in examinations of the Suez crisis, by Macmahon Ball in the *A.J.P.H.* and by Harper in *Australia in World Affairs*, 1950-1955.

In addition to the journals mentioned above, the study of international relations has been assisted by the inclusion in each number of the *A.J.P.H.* of a lengthy article, usually surveying the conduct of Australian foreign relations for the preceding six months in something of the style of the Chatham House annual *Surveys*. More recently, the appearance of the first of what promises to be a regular series on Australia in world affairs gives greater scope for analysis, and broader sweeps than the annual *Survey* might allow, even given the narrower specialization of the Australian studies. This first volume, *Australia in World Affairs, 1950-1955* (1957), edited by Greenwood and Harper, counted amongst its ten contributors one geographer, one lawyer, one economist and seven historians. Chapters deal with the various spheres of Australian interest, the United Nations, the Commonwealth of Nations, the Pacific, and southern Asia. Of equally high standard, though more limited scope, is Levi's *Australia's Outlook on Asia* (1958).

Outside the stream of academic writing on Australian policy in the post-war period three works warrant notice. The briefest is Burton's *The Alternative* (1954) subtitled "A dynamic approach to our relations with Asia". It differs from other work in minimizing the threat of Communist aggression, and arguing that American foreign policy in the Pacific is unwise in most aspects, and contends that many of the regional military alliances are contrary to the spirit of the United Nations Charter, and calls for repudiation of support for reactionary régimes in Asia. The next is unusual because it does not concentrate on Australian policy. Lindsay's *China and the Cold War* (1955) considers a problem which whilst important to peace in the Pacific and thus to Australia is more directly material to Australian interests by reasons of the attitudes of third parties to China. He proposes a policy for Western relations with China, justifying his course by analysis of the internal nature of the régime. The third is Eggleston's *Reflections on Australian Foreign Policy* (1957), a collection of papers written in the years before his death, including that printed in Grattan's *Australia* mentioned below. They followed the usual pattern of United Nations, Asia and Commonwealth, with one of the papers dealing with a "case", United States policy towards China. Another provided the check-list of Asian countries and their problems, which is to be found in many Australian works on foreign policy,

although it went beyond most in extending to western Asia as well. The essay on "The Commonwealth and Its Value" may be the most important, for it points to the dilemma that the changing composition of the Commonwealth presents. Most Australian commentators have been prepared to welcome the addition of new members unqualifiedly, but Eggleston observes that dilution may mean the end of the cohesion for action which gave the old Commonwealth much of its value.

Most of the survey volumes on Australia have contained a chapter on foreign policy. Thus Grattan's *Australia* (1947) in the United Nations series of the University of California contains a chapter by Eggleston which was largely historical whilst making some use of geopolitical considerations, with a closing passage on the merits of trusteeship and international promotion of social welfare in the Evatt vein. Grattan's *Introducing Australia* (1944, 2nd ed. 1949) concludes with a brief chapter "International Position" which discussed the relationship of an independent Australian foreign policy to a collective Commonwealth policy, and summarized Australia's role in the early days of the U.N. Grenfell Price's *Australia Comes of Age* (1945) is sub-titled "A Study of Growth to Nationhood and of External Relations"; it is actually a short popular history, which is unusual in giving half its space to the period of and after the Great War, and that exclusively centred on foreign affairs or closely allied topics such as immigration. Earlier still Hancock's *Australia* (1930) notes that Australian policy has been a quest for security, observes that the importance of the Pacific to Australia can be over-rated, and emphasises relations with the Commonwealth, but this was a work of the 1930's.

Demographic questions have always played an important role in the formulation of Australian foreign policy, and in writing about it. It is not without significance that the front paper of *Australia in World Affairs*, 1950-1955 is a map of South-East Asia showing population densities. Willard's *A History of the White Australia Policy* (1923) remains the definitive history of this element of Australian foreign policy. In the inter-war period the topic was discussed twice, in *The Peopling of Australia* (1928) edited by Phillips and Wood, and in *The Peopling of Australia: Further Studies* (1933) edited by Eggleston and Packer; an A.I.P.S. symposium *A White Australia* (1947) brings the story fairly up to date. Borrie in a paper there, and two papers for the 1950 I.P.R. Conference and the 1954 Commonwealth Relations Conference, deals with the topic from a demographer's viewpoint. His main work on the subject, *Immigration: Australia's Problems and Prospects* (1949), was sponsored by both the I.P.R. and the A.I.I.A. It examines demographic trends, Australia's absorptive capacity, post-war immigration policy, possible sources of migrants, assimilation and the ever-present "Eastern Pressures". Elkin in an article "Re-Thinking the White Australia Policy" in *Australian Quarterly* carried the story of attitudes to the policy to 1945 (the paper was reprinted in *A White Australia*) and made one of the few suggestions on record for considering the introduction of a quota of Asian immigrants. The responsible Minister, A. A. Calwell, in *How Many Australians Tomorrow?* (1945) examined certain social questions attendant on population policy, particularly the provision of social services.

Two recent works tending away from international relations as the quasi-historical study of relations of two or more specific countries as such and towards a more abstract treatment have been *Paths to Peace: A Study of War, Its Causes and Prevention* (1957), edited by Wallace, and *From Balance to Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis* (1956), by A. L. Burns. The first proceeds along established lines of generalization established in the social sciences to seek a general theory of the causes of war, the second follows the new discipline of the theory of games to create a model of what Burns regards as a new type of international system, determined by the power of destruction available through new weapons. Both are in a minority in that they avoid concentration on Australian foreign policy to consider the world system, and the symposium makes more use of non-academic writers than any comparable volume since the war.

Comparative Government

From the beginning the study of Australian political institutions has been intrinsically comparative. On the one hand parliamentary institutions were inherited from the United

Kingdom, and adaptations to local conditions, or more often local political ideas, were regarded as deviations from a proper norm—at least by a majority of writers. At the same time Australian federalism owed a great debt to American experience, and a much smaller inheritance to Canada's shorter history under a federal system, and so Australian federal institutions were sometimes discussed by comparison with American or Canadian phenomena at the start of the twentieth century. Thus Quick and Garran surveyed colonies and federal systems before examining the new Constitution of the Commonwealth, whilst Cramp in *State and Federal Constitutions of Australia* (1914), a work designed for secondary school students, followed Dicey and Bryce to set out the federal systems both of antiquity and current, before settling down to a routine account of the constitutional development of New South Wales, followed by the briefest of accounts of the other States, and an equally routine account of the movement to Federation and exposition of the Federal Constitution. H. B. Higgins in a lecture to the Balmain Citizens' Cultural Association, published as *Some Recent Constitutions* (1910), examined the limits of a written constitution with reference to contemporary developments in Greece, Turkey, Russia and South Africa. More recently whilst the latest British and American literature is zealously read, little original work on other countries is published by Australian writers. Australian scholars residing overseas have cast their nets widely, and the study of comparative institutions has greatly benefited thereby, but at home the pressure of lectures, the need for work on local topics, and the limited supply of primary sources from other countries has reduced publications to a handful.

Almost all that work has been directed to the Far East. Much may be found in the writings of FitzGerald, a historian rather than a political scientist, and Lindsay. Macmahon Ball's *Nationalism and Communism in Asia* (1952, 2nd ed. 1956) is probably the best-known work, providing brief characterizations of the political (and social and economic) problems of the entire continent; on a more popular level is *Near North* (1948), edited by Gilmore and Warner. More specialized is Macmahon Ball's *Japan—Enemy or Ally?* (1948), discussing the early days of Allied occupation of that country. In the field of European politics, the only substantial contributions have been the writings of Churchward and Rigby on Soviet affairs in various journals, and the few articles on America are most usually by visiting American scholars. It is a profitable vein, and with the growth in number of members sharing institutions which have at least a formal resemblance, meaningful comparison may be made easier. To mention sources, one which is of considerable utility, because of its high specialization, is *Australia's Neighbours*, the small leaflet appearing irregularly under the auspices of the A.I.I.A., and dealing with political matters in Asian and Pacific countries, and as has already been mentioned *Australian Quarterly* and *Australian Outlook* are frequently of assistance.

Political Theory

There has been remarkably little writing of or about political theory in Australia. Despite the experimental nature of Australian society in the days preceding and immediately after Federation, the political ideas in the air were brought from other countries and only the institutions set up to serve them had an Australian flavour. Métin's *Le Socialisme sans doctrines* (1901, 2nd ed. 1910) which discussed the policies of the working class movements of Australasia was well named. The main influences, the English Chartists and democratic socialists and the Americans George and Bellamy, were talked about and their works widely read, but there were no Australian counterparts with the exception of Lane, and he could not be classed a creative thinker. Jensen in *The Rising Tide: An Exposition of Australian Socialism* (1909) preached Darwinian socialism of the Jack London variety with overtones of Lysenko, although there was an Australian superstructure of pride in the natural wealth of the country, nationalism and a White Australia policy of the most virulent sort. W. M. Hughes in the more widely known *The Case for Labor* (1910) gave the case for gradualism and reformism, criticizing syndicalist theories then circulating through the I.W.W. Ross's biography, *William Lane and the Australian Labour Movement* (1937), gives much of the background of the small socialist wing of the Labor movement. Since the split over conscription the volume and calibre of political writing, even of the most ephemeral sort, by supporters of the Labor Party has declined. In 1949-51 the N.S.W. Fabian Society launched a series of pamphlets, all unsigned,

and modelled on the Research rather than the Tract series of the parent Society, but, with the exception of Number 7 "Labour and the Constitution" (1950), of decidedly inferior quality. A more substantial effort was made under the auspices of the Victorian Fabian Society in *Policies for Progress* (1954) edited by Davies and Serle. Its four themes are constitutional and administrative problems, economic policy, social services and foreign policy. The general tenor of the essays was sternly pragmatic, as befitted its Fabian association.

Sir Frederic Eggleston's *Search for a Social Philosophy* (1945) is often cited as a start to a non-socialist political philosophy for Australians, but the work is really a collection of unexceptional generalizations about development of institutions, and social psychology and relationships overcast by reflection of Smuts's holism. His *Reflections of an Australian Liberal* (1953, 2nd ed. 1953) is a far more solid work, with its generalization firmly tied to a shrewd analysis of the Australian political scene. An earlier effort in this direction was Mayo's *Democracy and Freedom* (1919). Influenced by contemporary writing on the irrational element in society and social psychology, Mayo criticized trends in Australian political life towards governmental intervention in society, promotion of class-warfare and irrationality in politics. In a dichotomy of socialism and democracy, he postulates social development as a goal which can be achieved only by governmental abstention from intervention, concentration of state activity on "moral criticism which is [its] chief duty" and avoidance of "social and industrial direction, for which [it is] radically unfitted".

There have been no journals given to the discussion of political principles or philosophy. The *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy* (from 1922) has contained nothing of immediate application to political studies, and only rarely articles of peripheral relevance, such as Partridge's "Some Thoughts on Planning" (1941) or Anderson's comments on Belloc's *Servile State*. Early proceedings of ANZAAS contained occasional papers on politics grouped in the "Social and Statistical Science" section. Thus at the 1907 conference at Adelaide W. M. Hughes read a paper on "The Limits of State Interference" in which he expressed a strongly collectivist view. At the same conference Francis Anderson offered a paper, "Liberalism and Socialism" which was included in the printed proceedings (1908) with Hughes's essay. At the 1909 Brisbane conference Max Hirsch read a paper with the same title as Hughes's earlier effort, but reflecting some of his own single-tax views.

Australian political studies have been even more barren of commentaries on the history of political ideas. Portus's *Marx and Modern Thought* (1921) is a solitary exception. It is a rather pedestrian account, but fair and accurate, and quite well suited to the W.E.A. series in which it appeared. An inadequate account of the early days of socialism in Australia may be found in Cole's *A History of Socialist Thought*, Vol. III, Part II, chapter XXII (1956). A number of theses have treated the history of political ideas. Of these, Gollan's *Radicalism and Socialism in Eastern Australia 1850-1910: a study in political ideas in relation to economic development* (1950) is the only one dealing with Australia. Recently in the appearance of two important essays on pluralism by Webb and a related paper on churches in the modern state by Pike in the collection *Legal Personality and Political Pluralism* (1958) edited by Webb, there is a harbinger of better times.

A difficult work to catalogue is the A.I.P.S. symposium, *Liberty in Australia* (1955). Two of the papers, "Freedom of the Mind" by Duncan and "The Rights of the Citizen" by Partridge, deal with the border area where political ideas meet constitutional law, and unfortunately sometimes criminal law, as well as affect legislative institutions and the conduct of administration. The field of civil liberties might be recognized as a separate discipline in the United States or India where it has a constitutional basis. In Australia the fragmentary provisions of the Constitution bearing thereon could not be so dignified, and the position of such rights in the interstices of statute law makes them elusive in the extreme. Suffice it to say that the two essays in question are eloquent and intelligent re-examinations of certain political ideas in the context of what was thought to be the onslaught of McCarthyism in Australia. The three other papers could not be brought under the heading of political ideas, but still are mentioned here for convenience. Sir Richard Boyer on "The Freedom of the Press" speaks of the role of the press, in a free society, with particular reference to self-control and monopoly. Downing

on "Economic Freedom" deals with some of the ideas of Wootton's *Freedom Under Planning* (1945) in an interesting discussion of economic controls. Bland in "Parliamentary Government and Liberty" berates the New Despotism in one of his poorer efforts. It might be added that the conference discussions of these papers as reported in the volume are of an unusually high standard.

Conclusion

Earlier writers had high hopes of Australian political studies. Eggleston wrote in 1932:

In the Australian Commonwealth . . . there is a political and social system which more nearly approaches the idea of a social laboratory than any other community in the world. There is no place where the conditions are so apt for the successful study of political questions: all the factors which should be examined to enable a complete judgment to be made are available; the origins of the various social activities are almost within living memory and the incidents in their history are carefully recorded in State papers; if the official record fails to reveal political motive, the pages of the Parliamentary debates are open to the earnest student; while the enthusiast may even consult the Press to ascertain the attitude of the man in the street towards his own property; statistics are available to give the exact results to those who are skilful enough to read them.

What of this expectation? If we were to compose a tabulated summary of the preceding pages it would simply point up the obvious: First, the volume of political literature even allowing for the surge of post-war writing, is still very modest. Secondly, it is extremely uneven in its pursuit—some fields are almost desert wastes (comparative government and political theory), some near wastes (local government), some newly occupied (electoral studies), some slowly developed (parliamentary government, political parties) and some highly cultivated (federalism, public administration, international relations). Thirdly, the annual proportion of books and monographs to articles and unpublished theses has increased markedly in the last ten years. Such a table would be of some interest, but there are other things to say.

The first thing to note is that writing has become more substantial, specialized, and professional. There is less taste for bumble-bee scholarship, more preoccupation with single fields or single problems for longer periods (public administration, electoral studies, and parties are notable examples), and more of the writing is the work of academic teachers of political science.

In the second place, interest is still almost exclusively centred in the study of Australian political institutions. Whilst an Overacker, Warner, Grattan, Scarrow, Brady, McHenry or Levi may contribute valuable studies of Australian politics, no Australian has yet written any notable study of North American nor indeed any European politics. This is not necessarily parochialism. Too much is being done in the field of international relations to suggest this. There are simply good reasons for wanting to fill our own larder first. There may be some, of course, who are "wicked enough not to want to contribute to the detailed study of Australian institutions", but the opportunities for sin are strictly limited. In any case rewards are still easy here, and there yet is no conflict for *lebensraum*. For similar reasons of utility if comparative government becomes a field of substantial research it will be Asia not Europe which will beckon Australian scholars.

The third feature is that both in their conception of politics and their manner of writing about it, Australian political scientists have generally followed the fashions current overseas, especially in the United Kingdom. One should, of course, point to such novel moments as Crisp's reversion of the time-worn descent from Crown to people in talk about the Commonwealth government, or Davies's identification of government with bureaucracy and the remaining institutions as a protective envelope, or Mayer's re-examination of the "movement-resistance" theme in writing about Australian political parties, or Giblin's ideas on federal finance, or Eggleston's work on public corporations, or Bland's early writing on parliamentary control. But these are not characteristic.

In the main, while we may claim some unique quality in our political institutions in the field of research neither in the choice of subject, nor in the ideas which inform it, nor in the method of enquiry, has there been anything like the same precocity or distinction. Chapters on Cabinet take their key from Jennings, and the putative parentage of recent electoral studies, work on pressure groups, international relations and public administration can be easily suggested. Indeed it is even doubtful whether in the field of federalism Australian writing has hewed a path substantially its own. To say this, of course, is not to criticize the practitioners who have followed in the footsteps of others. Compare, for example, the heavy dependence on American material of current British work on pressure groups. This is in the character of international scholarship. And besides there are special reasons in Australia. By their very nature derivative institutions create imitative tastes. Again, the curricula and material of undergraduate and post-graduate training reinforce these tendencies. In the field of professionalism, moreover, a late start with limited resources and small numbers is heavily tempted by short-cuts, pre-packaged methods, and pre-masticated ideas. This said, however, the question remains—can Australian political scientists, engaged as they are at present, contribute anything more novel to politics than an understanding of their own institutions?

These three attributes then appear to define the present condition of writing in Australian political science: it is newly professional; it is predominantly centred in Australian politics; and it is derivative in its techniques and concepts. What is likely to be attempted in the next decade? It scarcely needs a budget of research to point to the gaps, and there can be little doubt that the main pursuit of the coming years will be with these gaps rather than novel sorties into neighbouring areas. After all, no Australian institutions have been examined with the finality which Jennings achieved with Cabinet government and Parliament. Though the preceding pages may occasionally give, in the number and sweep of titles, the impression of intensive exploration, it is rarely so. None need fear that any field has been totally pre-empted, or that a great deal of what has been done cannot be profitably revisited.

University of Queensland

Correction

In the review in the May 1998 issue of Professor Creighton's *Dominion of the North*, by Professor G. S. Graham, a number of words were inadvertently omitted from the last sentence of the first paragraph. This sentence should read:

"It might be difficult to prove from documentary evidence that Francois de Laval, that austere mystic and ascetic, who was first bishop of the colony of New France, 'slept, by choice, between thin blankets well filled with fleas', but such dramatized tit-bits reflect the informed historian who is also a creative artist, and are not the specious facade of a 'popular' scribbler, who conceals his ignorance behind artistic adornment."

The Review Editor apologises for this error, for which he is entirely responsible.

Book Reviews

NEW ERA IN THE NON-WESTERN WORLD. Edited by Warren S. Hunsberger. New York, Cornell University Press, 1958. Pp. 152. \$3.

Political thinking among scholars normally far outruns the thinking of the politicians who control a country's destinies. In fact, except in moments when a nation enjoys exceptional leadership, as in the cases of the United States in 1933-6 and Britain in 1940 and in 1945-7, the politicians normally lag far behind the informed and articulate sections of their own communities.

A classic instance of this occurred at the end of 1938 in Australia. H. G. Wells, on arrival at Fremantle, fired off a well judged blast at the Chamberlain appeasement policy and the catastrophic consequences of the Munich settlement. He was immediately assailed in the most intolerant fashion by the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. J. A. Lyons. The intemperate attack on the visitor was the more surprising as Mr. Lyons normally chose his words carefully and made fewer personal enemies than any man who has so long been Australian Prime Minister. More recently we have seen attacks on distinguished Australian scholars such as Professor Macmahon Ball and Professor C. P. FitzGerald by politicians quite incompetent to pass judgment on the issues on which these scholars spoke with authority.

Now in the United States we see a number of universities doing research work and international surveys which are reshaping the outlook of many academic leaders in the United States towards today's world. Unfortunately, as in Australia, the State Department and the policy making agencies in Washington lag far behind these forward-probing leaders. How far is vividly illustrated in this exciting book published by Cornell University and entirely written by members of the staff of the University of Rochester.

The outstanding contribution comes from the president of Rochester, Cornelis E. De Kiewiet. He sheets home the blindness which Walter Lippman, James Reston, David Lawrence and other international commentators of the American press are repeatedly exposing in Washington's post-war policies. These are based, he feels, on America's inability to see the problems of the East and of Africa untrammelled by the nineteenth century preconceptions imposed by the colonial powers. Today, says De Kiewiet, the United States faces a world too great for it to dominate. The great challenge for Americans is to discover what he calls "the Wide View". This must first be seen by scholars in universities. Already the finest body of experts in world affairs is being developed in America. This body of thinkers is tackling the most serious barrier to effective comprehension in today's world. That barrier "is the rigid framework of Western experience in which we do most of our thinking. It is most difficult, if not impossible, to penetrate understandingly into the aspirations of Africa and Asia if we are formally ignorant of their history, their religion, or their philosophy."

Throughout both Asia and Africa today old political associations are being overthrown. There is a total fluidity in Afro-Asian developments which makes it certain that long before the end of this century the political map of today will be as out of date and useless as a political map of medieval Europe. Mr. De Kiewiet points out that where we use such terms as the power vacuum in the Middle East, Arab nationalism, Chinese imperialism, the third force of India, Sudanese independence or the Suez Canal crisis, we are, in fact, describing the shifting power relationship between East and West.

A frightening element in the relations between Asia and the West is the effect of the rapidly increasing Asian population. The vast mass of Asian peoples, Hunsberger says in his chapter on "Economic Realities", are probably worse off today than they were fifty years ago. While average incomes and living standards climb rapidly in the West, in Asia they remain static or deteriorate. "The great gap between individual incomes in these areas and those in Western countries is widening year by year. Communist promises seem more convincing in these areas than elsewhere." A basic trouble is, of course, that voluntary saving in countries like India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and China, is virtually impossible for most people. Taxation leaves them

no margin above subsistence. Therefore they cannot manage any form of investment, however humble, which would increase their productive power and earnings.

Here we face the root problem of the West in today's world. It seems insoluble until the peoples of the wealthier nations can be educated intellectually and morally to appreciate the necessity of surrendering a bigger fraction of their wealth (*via* steeper taxation) to provide the poorer areas—Asia, Africa, Latin America—with more and more machinery, vehicles and even raw materials.

Other chapters in the book, equally searching in their objective analysis of Asian developments, are "Non-Western Peoples and the World Community", by Vera Micheles Dean; "Revolution and Nationalism in the Non-Western World", by Harry J. Benda; "Science and the Non-Western World", by W. Albert Noyes, Jr.; and "Social Adjustment to Technological Innovation", by Joseph B. Gittler.

Adelaide

ROHAN RIVETT

RUSSIAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. By Derek J. R. Scott. London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958. Pp. 250. 34/9 A.

This book is offered as an introduction to the study of Russian political institutions, although it is in fact surprisingly detailed in some sections. It represents an elaboration of a lecture course given to students at Manchester University. Although published in 1958 it was completed in 1956 and the text has been somewhat hurriedly amended to take account of policy and structural changes during 1957. As the author recognizes in his preface the book was already somewhat out of date when it appeared in print.

Despite this the book is the most up-to-date and the most comprehensive of recent books on Soviet government. It offers a wealth of information not merely on Soviet political institutions, but on such topics as Soviet agriculture, education, law-courts, administration of industry, trade unions, and many other topics. Its coverage of the political system is very thorough and it includes quite a deal of information on frequently neglected aspects such as the administrative and local government structure. Although, as its title suggests, the book is largely concerned with Russian institutions, the author does not by any means adopt a narrowly institutional approach. Nor does he encourage misunderstandings of the Soviet system by over-stressing comparisons and contrasts with Western political systems. His approach is basically historical and his explanation of Soviet political institutions is always closely related to Soviet reality and to Russian historical experience. Judgments as far as possible are avoided, but where offered are given "on the assumption that a judgment is acceptable only in so far as its standards are Russian, a reasonable estimate of what Russians, in Russian circumstances, would find more or less satisfactory" (p. 18). The author freely acknowledges his sources, whether primary or secondary, and these are the more useful as they are included as footnotes accompanying the text rather than relegated to a special section at the end of the book.

The structure of the book is explained on page 20 in these terms—"Chapter I is intended to suggest some of the experience, practical and theoretical, upon which Soviet politics draw, and the nature of the purposes which it is their function to reconcile. Chapter II treats of the manner of the invention of the institutions claimed to be distinctive of the Soviet state—the Soviets, the Union and collective administration—and the place in this original creation of the highly unoriginal instrument known as the Stalin constitution. Chapter III examines the organisation and functions of machinery familiar to liberal states but functioning there to rather different purpose; elected bodies, the inner bodies elected by them, and the administrative departments headed by members of some of the latter. Chapter IV concerns the party, its organization, membership and manner of operation. Chapter V examines the structure which under the ministries discharges their main function, the operative management of the fully nationalised economy, and other systems of control, including the judicial system and the armed forces, which with the party and Soviet system make up the intricate web of Russian administration. In Chapter VI a brief attempt is made to explain how priorities of tasks are decided upon, obligations determined and performance of them secured."

This approach is inspiringly unconventional but its performance falls somewhat short of its promise. Although not unversed in Soviet institutions and history I found the account frequently difficult to follow and I imagine that the student making his first attempt at understanding the Soviet political system would suffer worse. This difficulty is partly because of the rather unusual method of ordering the material. Chapter I, despite its promising title of "What Russian politics are about", is mainly concerned with an account of Russian history before 1917. There is unnecessary duplication between Chapters II and III and in fact the over-detailed description of early institutions (in Chapter III) tends to obscure the exposition of the contemporary state structure (Chapter III). This is true not only of central government institutions, but of the administrative structure and of local state agencies. Many sections within chapters seem to bear no clear relation to the main chapter heading. Thus a section on Soviet education is included under the chapter on "The Web of Management" while a section on "Planning and Budgeting" is included in the chapter "Decision and Performance", although the banking system is included in the former chapter. Such peculiarities would seem to result from the effort to keep the diverse material within the limits of six chapters. A greater subdivision of material, more chapter headings might have made the task of exposition easier and the result clearer. The student is further handicapped by the absence of any charts or diagrams illustrating the political institutions described in the text. Nor is there any inclusion of either the Soviet Constitution or the Rules of the C.P.S.U., documents of considerable importance if not indispensable for the study of Soviet government.

Apart from the above technical shortcomings I feel that the book deserves some criticism for its perspective and evaluation of the system. First I think that a serious shortcoming of the book is its failure to evaluate the changes that have occurred in the Soviet system since 1953. By omission as well as by implication in various passages Mr. Scott does not rate these changes as of basic significance. I would agree that the Soviet state system remains essentially the same today as it was in the latter years of Stalin, but the changes though secondary are significant, and they require careful investigation and assessment. Conflicts within the higher party command are referred to but if any explanation is offered at all it is merely in terms of a "conflict of personality" (pp. 122, 151-2).

Secondly, I feel that the author does not do full justice to Soviet material since he tends to disregard evidence of improvement and liberalization of institutions but to acknowledge reports of failures, bureaucracy, non-observance of the law, etc. A more careful sifting and weighing of evidence might lead to rather different conclusions on such things as the role of local Soviets, the administration of industry, agricultural expansion, the role of public opinion, etc., and to an overall evaluation very different from that of "Russia's circumstances of permanent crisis" (p. 183). And here it would be useful at least to consider recent changes in terms of Marxist theory and of Communist Party objectives, neither of which are given much recognition in the analysis of Mr. Scott.

Mr. Scott follows the desirable practice of indicating the Russian words for various terms and agencies. It is fortunate that he does this as many of his translations are individual. While this might be justified in the effort to achieve greater accuracy in translation it may perhaps cause some confusion to the reader or student knowing no Russian. For this reason I think it better to use the official Soviet translation for such terms as *ukaz* (decree), *postanovleniye* (decision) and *rasporyazheniye* (order) and *polozheniye* (regulations) and *zakon* (law), rather than to use the terms "edict", "decree", "disposition" and "instruments" for the first four of these concepts. Similarly the usual translation of *sovnarkhoz*, "Regional Economic Council", while perhaps less accurate than the literal translation "Council of the Economy" is preferable because it is already in usage and because in itself it more accurately describes the organization referred to.

It is perhaps not the task of a reviewer to bring the book he is reviewing up to date. But it is nevertheless necessary to emphasise and endorse the author's preface where he acknowledges that the book is already sadly out of date. That this is so follows from the nature of the subject rather than from any shortcomings on the part of the author. But merely to draw attention to a few of the changes of the past year indicates a fact which is certainly under-stressed by

Mr. Scott, namely, the fluidity and changeability of contemporary Soviet institutions. Thus if Village Soviets lost their budgeting powers in 1935 (p. 78) they regained them under the new regulations on Village Soviets during 1957. Ballot papers as used in the latest Supreme Soviet elections (March 1958) contained the instruction to the voter to "leave uncrossed out the name of the candidate being voted for" (*Izvestia*, 22 January 1958; contrast p. 94). The statement that the five-year plans do not come before the Supreme Soviet (p. 105) is misleading. The current sixth five-year plan was reported on to the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet by M. I. Pervukhin in February 1957 (*Pravda*, 6 February 1957), while in December 1957 the economic plan for 1958 was reported on by I. I. Kuzmin, Chairman of Gosplan (*Pravda*, 20 December 1957). On both occasions the reports were followed by debate in the Soviet. The new Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet elected in March 1958 contains only fifteen Vice-Chairmen, one from each of the fifteen Union Republics (cf. p. 112). Mr. N. S. Khrushchev was not included in the new Presidium (cf. pp. 113, 148) presumably because his election as Chairman of the Council of Ministers made this impossible. By decision of the plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (February 1958) and the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet (March 1958) the bulk of the agricultural machinery formerly controlled by the Machine Tractor Stations is to be sold to the collective farms, and the M.T.S. are to be reorganized over the next two or three years into Machine Repair Stations (R.T.S.) to be supervised by the district Soviets (cf. pp. 203-4). Marshal Zhukov, who became a full member of the Presidium of the C.-C. of the C.P.S.U. at the end of June 1957 was dropped again in October the same year (cf. pp. 219-20).

Despite some defects the book represents an important contribution to text-book literature on the Soviet state system. In Australia at least it is likely to replace some old-established texts at least for the immediate future.

Melbourne

L. G. CHURCHWARD

THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM. By Theodore Draper. New York, Viking Press (London, Macmillan and Co.) 1957. Pp. xi + 498. 60/- A.

This is a carefully documented and admirably written account of the birth and infant years of the American Communist Party. As a volume in the series "Communism in American Life", it is in a sense a prelude to Draper's announced history of the party up to 1945 and D. A. Shannon's study of the latest years; but it is entirely self-contained, and makes enthralling reading.

In part this is due to the richness of the subject-matter: the pathos of the disillusiones of the Founding Fathers—Big Bill Haywood, John Reed, and Louis C. Fraina (or Corey, a classic case of "the victim of Communist vindictiveness who became a victim of anti-Communist vindictiveness"); the engaging spy-melodrama of Borodin's two suitcases of Russian Crown jewels, jettisoned in Haiti and in part pledged with De Valera's exile Irish Republic as surety for a loan of \$20,000, duly redeemed (interest-free) by the U.S.S.R. from Eire 28 years later; the Great Debate on whether capitalism had failed to "provide" or to "produce" the needs of life; the high comedy of the Comintern-compelled shotgun wedding of the rival parties in 1921 (the unity convention divided equally on all votes, but finally were brought to reason—and then could not agree on the "impartial" ninth member of the Executive: so then there were ten . . .); the confused and vulgar farce of 1922, with two underground parties (each producing a paper called *The Communist*), one running the legal Workers Party (organ, *The Toiler*) and the other the legal United Toilers (organ, *Workers' Challenge*)—and, for good measure, one of the undergrounds itself split into the rival caucusses of Geese and Liquidators. It would be a poor writer indeed, almost as poor as an official party historian, who could not make a good book out of such material, and Draper is a good writer, clear and epigrammatic, admirably objective and humane.

Perhaps the straight historical approach does not answer so many specific questions on the nature of the Communizing process as the introduction claims; and, except for the detail (but how fascinating that is!), there is perhaps not a great deal that will be very new or profound to those who have already experienced or closely studied Communism in lands on this side of the Curtain. But to this reviewer at least this matters little: the point is that Draper captures the authentic atmosphere which makes Communism humanly intelligible. The documents on which Kautsky bases *Moscow and the Communist Party of India* seem written by automata; Draper's Communists, even the ferocious sectarians of the foreign-language federations, are human beings. Admittedly this is to some extent a matter of phase: indeed a main theme of Draper's book is precisely the change from the inchoate beginnings, when heretics could still answer back, to the increasingly rigid control of an increasingly dehumanized centre. Ironically, the change came in the enforcement of the United Front line—"a loosening-up of the relationship to non-Communists and a tightening-up of relations to the Comintern"; but "any change of line would have served the same organizational purpose" (pp. 366-7). At all events, this humanity is one of the chief virtues of the book: it may well be that the ideal Communist will be non-human, but he has not arrived just yet; and there is surely more hope of understanding, and so possibly of undercutting, Communism if this is recognized. Without disparaging the merits of Kautsky's analysis of later developments, it seems to this reviewer that Draper's approach, if less scientific, is in the last resort more realist.

The central passage of the book is perhaps on pp. 249-50: "A point of no return was passed when Lenin decided to give up the illusion of the imminent world revolution. . . . All other landmarks of the Communist movement become secondary. . . . We have been accustomed to think and talk of the 'Communist revolution' in Russia. There was instead a revolution made by Communists. Men took power; no ideal was realized. . . . Before the Soviet régime became a political jungle in which some Communists could rule by force, intrigue, and improvisation, it had become an intellectual jungle in which all Communists had lost their way." This leads one to a sardonic reflection: without idealizing Lenin, it yet seems that in human terms there is a gulf between his way and Stalin's, and one cannot simply dismiss the tremendous impression which the first two or three years of the Bolshevik Revolution made on many observers not pre-conditioned to admire; and it was assuredly not material conditions but spirit which they admired. It might after all have been better for the poor old world if the world revolution had won out in 1919-21, when there was still, undeniably, idealism in Communism within as well as without the U.S.S.R.; for then, with the Russian brand robbed of the overwhelming prestige of the sole success in a world of Communist failure, the new order would have been far less monolithic. . . .

But these are dangerous thoughts, doubtless—it is a measure of Draper's quality that he provokes them—and it is more important to consider what actually came about. In his last pages Draper points to the real seduction of Moscow—that to faction-ridden Communists, who knew that they must have been wrong (since the Revolution hadn't come) but could not agree on the why and how, Moscow control seemed "a not entirely one-sided bargain"—it could give them the answers they craved, even if individuals were cast aside. "This last discovery of Moscow's usefulness was the most seductive and the most ruinous", and so "something critically important did happen to this movement in its infancy. It was transformed from a new expression of American radicalism to the American appendage of a Russian revolutionary power. Nothing else so important ever happened to it again."

It has happened in other times and places: "each generation has gone through the process of Communist disillusionment in its own way, and yet in the same way." The tragedy is that disillusion may come too late—

". . . there have been so many
Betrayals, the Germans and the Russians know. . . ."

THE HOPETOUN BLUNDER: the appointment of the first Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia, December 1900. By J. A. La Nauze. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press for the Australian Humanities Research Council, 1957. Pp. vi + 52. 5/- A.

One of the minor puzzles in Australian history has long been the action of Lord Hopetoun, as first Governor-General, in sending for Sir William Lyne, Premier of New South Wales, to form the first Federal Government in December 1900, rather than for Mr. (later Sir) Edmund Barton, the acknowledged leader of the Federal movement. Professor La Nauze has now, with the aid of the Deakin Papers, given for the first time a clear and elegant account of this episode, of Lyne's negotiations with his fellow Premiers, and of their ultimate failure and Lyne's recommendation that Barton should be sent for. La Nauze sees the whole episode very much through Deakin's eyes, and this is natural, since Deakin was the central figure in the negotiations, though not quite in the way usually supposed, since La Nauze makes it clear that it was not Deakin's own refusal to serve with Lyne, so much as his conversion of David Syme of the *Age*, on whose support Lyne had, with some reason, been relying, that was the decisive factor in making it impossible for Lyne to form an acceptable Cabinet.

It might perhaps be suggested that this standpoint has led to a slight harshness of judgment towards Lord Hopetoun and "the extreme provincialists of Sydney", if not towards Lyne himself. Hopetoun had been given full discretion, though La Nauze does show that he was aware that the Colonial Office expected Barton to be chosen. The Canadian precedent seemed to point to Barton, but he was not, like McDonald, holding an important office, and indeed was completely out of State politics, nor had he when last in Parliament even been leader of his own party. Moreover, the *Age*, at least, was loudly quoting the Canadian precedent as pointing to Lyne. Hopetoun was a sick man, without great political experience, and in no position himself to sound public opinion, even if this course had been proper. In the circumstances it is not surprising, perhaps, that he was persuaded by such advice as he received in Sydney that the constitutionally safe and proper course was to send for Lyne and, through him, to sound the State Premiers, which is in fact what Lyne proceeded to do. It is hard to see how else he could have taken soundings, if he was not prepared to take the responsibility of naming Barton when he found this would not be unanimously approved. There is some merit in the view expressed by Lyne in the letter in which he reported his failure to Hopetoun, that "the course pursued was the only one by which a true estimate of public opinion could be ascertained".

Nevertheless, the choice was a "blunder" since, even though constitutionally justifiable, it ignored the personal elements and passions involved and in the event lowered Hopetoun's prestige at the very outset of his term of office. Professor La Nauze has told us all we need to know of the surrounding circumstances, unless some day Hopetoun's own papers should throw a new light on the subject, and we must be grateful for his full and fair quotation of the evidence, much of which has not before been available.

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Problems of Australian Foreign Policy

January-June 1958

By JOHN ANDREWS

In this period there were no substantial changes in Australian foreign policy and no substantial changes in Australian diplomatic strength on quasi-permanent issues. Some new situations arose, as in the case of Antarctica, but these, perhaps partly as a result of Australian diplomatic effort, required no recasting of the previously stated positions. The situation in Indonesia removed, for the duration of this period, a good deal of the heat from the problem of West New Guinea. A somewhat new relationship between Australia and New Zealand was developed but did not come to full burgeoning until later. An important international conference, for Australian interests, on the law of the sea, produced, if not a completely satisfactory result, at least nothing that adversely affected Australian interests in these matters. If nothing illuminating came out of discussions about West New Guinea, the Australian position in the problem showed no deterioration. The general international situation produced no issues, although this was a period of long-term preparation for a Commonwealth general election, making for divisions between the parties beyond those that had already existed. In other words, even if there was no solution of certain continuing problems and even if there is still uncertainty about the desirable course of policy on some issues, it can be claimed that the Australian position was satisfactorily held.

Indonesia and West New Guinea

At the beginning of this period Australian relations with Indonesia pivoted on the question of West New Guinea. Later, the issue retreated into the background as the dissident movement in Sumatra and Celebes gathered momentum and the Central Government took steps to suppress it; at the end of the period it showed signs of being revived.

The end of 1957 saw the defeat in the General Assembly of a resolution sponsored by a group of Afro-Asian states recommending negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands on West New Guinea with the assistance of the Secretary-General. The voting was 41-29 (Australia)-11 and the resolution therefore failed to gain the necessary two-thirds majority. It also saw the announcement by the Australian and Netherlands Governments of an agreement to co-operate in certain administrative matters concerning their New Guinea territories and to establish liaison offices in each other's territory.¹ This was followed by allegations in some Indonesian quarters that a military agreement

¹ See this *Journal*, Vol. III, No. 2, May 1958, p. 143.

had also been reached, and on 3 January the Australian Embassy in Djakarta found it necessary to issue an official denial that Australian troops were being stationed in West New Guinea.

In early January it was reported in the Australian press that six volunteer divisions had been formed in Indonesia in connection with the West New Guinea dispute. On 9 January the Indonesian Ambassador to Australia, Dr. Helmi, stated in Canberra that his Government supported the formation of unofficial military units but that these would never be used in acts of aggression against the Dutch unless the Dutch attacked first. On 14 January Colonel Nasution, head of the Indonesian army, was quoted as saying that he disapproved of the formation of volunteer forces.

Considerable public interest in New Guinea matters developed in Australia as a result of papers and discussions at the Summer School of the Australian Institute of Political Science on "Australia and New Guinea" held in Canberra over the week-end of 25-27 January.² Perhaps the most interesting conclusion to be drawn from the proceedings was that, while there was general agreement about the objectives of policy in Australian New Guinea and a general acceptance of the vital importance of Australian strategic interests in the New Guinea area, there was little agreement on how Australian policy should deal with international aspects of New Guinea problems, particularly that of West New Guinea.

After the Minister for Territories, the Hon. Paul Hasluck, had read a paper on "Present Tasks and Policies", the Hon. A. A. Calwell, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Federal Parliament, emphasised that the main principles of policy in the administration of the Australian territories had been accepted for many years by both the political parties and by the general population; these he set out as the need of the indigenous populations for Australian tutelage and help over a considerable period, the need to prepare these people for the day when they will be able to choose freely their own political future, and the right of Australians, "insofar as protection of their own country is concerned", to protect the vulnerable and nearby Papua and New Guinea against invasion. He said:

There will be occasions when the Government and the Opposition will differ on some aspects of Territory administration, but I never expect to witness any real diversion of opinion on the things that matter; the Parliament has in effect a bi-partisan policy on Papua and New Guinea.

Other speakers, with commercial, plantation, and academic interests, criticised various aspects of administrative policy and procedure, but the basic objectives, whether in Mr. Calwell's or some other phrasing, were generally accepted and, indeed, by many taken almost for granted.

Similarly many speakers believed or assumed that New Guinea was a vital defence area for Australia and that in its own interest, as well as in that of the

² See J. Wilkes (ed.), *New Guinea and Australia*, Sydney, 1958.

New Guineans, it is essential to exclude from the area any nation other than the two now territorially concerned there. Mr. Hasluck said:

The trust to the people of Papua-New Guinea can only be carried out if there is peace, with freedom from enemy invasion of their country. The defence of Papua and New Guinea means defence by Australia. The power of Australia to defend all her territory depends in part on the security of Papua and New Guinea.

Mr. Calwell said: "If we allowed the Indonesians into Dutch New Guinea there would be no hope of holding the northern portion of Australia and the fate of this country would be sealed and certain." The present writer, in a paper on the New Guinea element in Australian foreign policy, quoted Sir Percy Spender in a speech before the First Committee of the General Assembly in November 1954 in the words "New Guinea has been shown to represent the very key to Australia's defence", and Dr. Evatt, the Leader of the Federal Opposition, in supporting Government policy to oppose the transfer of sovereignty in West New Guinea to Indonesia, saying "the defence of New Guinea is really integral to the defence of Australia". Andrews's own argument was that it is possible that the techniques of war that have been developed in the last decade or so, the range of the new weapons, the increased speed of operations, may all have made New Guinea a negligible factor in Australian defence; on the other hand,

precisely because the defence situation is so nebulous and changeable and because the eastern and the south-eastern Asian area is now, politically speaking, one of the most unstable areas in the world, it would be foolish and possibly dangerous to agree to any alteration of the present territorial arrangement and security situation, at least without adequate guarantees of the preservation of Australian interests Australia has no intention of using the New Guinea islands for attack against any other people; it is doubtful whether we could even make them a strong defensive base, in the sense of being able to prevent an aggressor from penetrating some parts of their long perimeter. Their positive military value to us is therefore probably low. But in what we might call a negative sense, the importance of denying the use of them to a potential aggressor who at his leisure might organize therein for attack—this consideration must still be given heavy weight, and among present possible choices the Australian popular preference has been plain.

Whether these views are acceptable to members of the nation's inner defence councils one cannot know, but they were not challenged at the Summer School. Mr. P. D. Phillips, Q.C., probably best summed up current non-governmental opinion:

It may be that New Guinea would be by-passed in a war fought with modern weapons, but the real point of strategical significance is whether it might become the base of a possibly hostile power before, and maybe long before, hostilities break out. I cannot believe that a responsible general staff framing a defence policy, however high-minded and however far-reaching their

scientific prognostications, could possibly disregard the embarrassment of a hostile establishment in that area Let us not disguise from ourselves or the rest of the world the reality of the strategic considerations.

Granting this near-unanimity on basic administrative policy and strategic importance, there was little agreement on foreign policy issues arising from the New Guinea area. This is because New Guinea-area questions, to some extent at least, tend to cut across some general lines of Australian foreign policy; it is, for instance, difficult to achieve one of the major objectives of policy, friendship with Asian nations, while remaining adamantly opposed to Indonesian arguments on the West New Guinea question, and no one was able to draw a clear picture of where, if necessary, the quest for friendship must give way to the maintenance of security. The present writer posed the following questions—

Is there a limit to the extent to which we permit New Guinea questions to affect adversely our relations with our Asian neighbours; if so, where is the limit? How can we gauge the effect that the West New Guinea issue may have on the course of political events within Indonesia, and are there any circumstances, such as an imminent Communist success in Indonesia, in which we would be prepared to modify our position on West New Guinea? To what lengths are we prepared to go to keep Indonesia out of the Communist camp?

—but was unable to suggest answers, nor were any offered to him. A number of possible ways of dealing with the West New Guinea problem were put forward, but none of them seemed likely to meet with Indonesian approval, and one could only conclude that there was little alternative to a continuance of the present *impasse*.

Foreign policy is not Mr. Hasluck's responsibility but in the course of discussion he did stress that the Dutch have rights in West New Guinea, so that he may be regarded as advocating maintenance of the *status quo*, with the addition of administrative co-operation between Australian and Dutch officials. Mr. Calwell declared as Labor Party policy that:

A mutual regional pact for security and welfare should be negotiated between Australia, Holland and Indonesia The Labor Party desires to maintain the status now existing in Dutch New Guinea, in our own Territory, and in Indonesia by an agreement for security against external attack and for uplifting the welfare of the inhabitants of the area

—though how the Indonesians are to be persuaded to agree to guarantee the Dutch *status quo* in West New Guinea we are not told. Mr. E. G. Whitlam, Labour M.P. for Werriwa, thought that a feasible solution was a trusteeship arrangement under United Nations, though whether this was to apply to the whole island or whether it was to be exercised by one trustee or a number were questions left un-clear, and, in any case, he did not take into account the very definite refusal by the Indonesian Government in the past to consider this as a solution. Mr. J. R. Kerr, Q.C., and the present writer put forward independently the concept of a Melanesian state as a long-term objective towards which the

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administrations concerned might work. Mr. Kerr's notion was for a state covering all the New Guinea territories and the British Solomon Islands; in accordance with the terms of reference of his paper, he argued the desirability of such an arrangement in terms of administrative efficiency, the common character of the people and their cultures, and of welfare; he saw his state as most satisfactorily taking its place as a Dominion within the British Commonwealth. Andrews would extend the state to take in the New Hebrides, and saw the presentation to the world of such an "United States of Melanesia" concept as the best counter, along the lines of indigenous nationalism and self-determination, to the Indonesian proposal to incorporate the West New Guineans in an Indonesian world. Both speakers emphasised that it was for the Melanesians to decide, when the appropriate time came, what form of political organization they would adopt, and argued that the most that should be done by the present administrations should be to co-operate administratively so that similar modern institutions would be built in all territories in case all the Melanesian peoples concerned wished eventually to be one people. Whatever the value of these suggestions, and there is some evidence that they are taken seriously by some sections of Dutch opinion, it is clear that, while they may provide an arguable base on which to rest the Australian case concerning West New Guinea, they are not likely to provide a "solution", in the sense of an arrangement which satisfies all parties concerned.

No public comment on these proceedings came from government circles concerned with foreign policy-making, so they are noteworthy as expressive to some extent of non-official opinion.

By early February it was clear that the dissident movement in Central Sumatra was preparing to take action. President Soekarno was reportedly notified of the "young Colonels'" demands while on a visit to Japan, the Central Government rejected on 12 February an ultimatum demanding resignation within five days, and on 15 February the rebels proclaimed a Revolutionary Government in Sumatra.

The Australian public was from the beginning interested in these events and some sections, at least, may have hoped that they would lead to the formation of a moderate and broadly based government in Indonesia. The *Sydney Morning Herald*, in an editorial on 8 February, said that:

The new government in Bungit Tinggi (the historic capital of Indonesian nationhood) backed by the moderates in Java and led by Dr. Hatta and his friends would be an ideal solution to many of Indonesia's present problems. . . . Unfortunately both Dr. Hatta and the Javanese Army leaders have so far sat firmly on the fence.

The day after the proclamation of the Revolutionary Government, however, the Minister for External Affairs, Mr. R. G. Casey, said that Australia was naturally very much interested in the stability and progress of our closest neighbour, Indonesia. Australians wanted to see there a government based on the will of the people of all Indonesia and representative of democratic opinion.

It was greatly to be hoped that, with this as their objective, the Indonesian people would be able to find a solution to the present situation peacefully. How this was to be done was a domestic matter for Indonesia. The question of recognition (of the Revolutionary Government) had not arisen. This correct, if, to some ears somewhat patronising, attitude Mr. Casey maintained throughout the conflict which followed.

Some Australians expressed apprehension that civil war might in fact bring chaos or Communism or both to Indonesia but could not find a *point d'appui* from which the situation might be controlled. The Leader of the Federal Opposition, Dr. H. V. Evatt, following his usual recipe of negotiation for disputant parties, asked in the House that the Government consider the offer of mediation in the dispute. The Prime Minister, Mr. R. G. Menzies, replied that the dispute seemed to be a domestic matter and Mr. Casey on 15 April, in answer to a renewed request by Dr. Evatt, said that mediation was "not feasible or desirable". In fact, the Indonesian Government had by then made it plain that it would reject any such offer.

Mr. Casey did, however, express further views in this 15 April speech. He said:

The possibility has been increased of international Communism extending its influence as a result of these troubles, even to the extent of a government with appreciable Communist content coming into existence in the Indonesian archipelago, which, on the experience of other countries, could have only one result. Indonesia has been negotiating for arms with several countries of the Soviet bloc, and there are persistent reports that its purchases include substantial numbers of MIG fighters and other modern military aircraft. Attempts are made to inflame Indonesian public opinion by allegations that SEATO is trying to intervene which I need hardly say is a completely false allegation. All these things must be very much in the minds of other countries, quite apart from the humanitarian feelings naturally aroused by the loss of life and the destruction of property. They entitle Indonesia's neighbours to express some views.

After discussing regional separatism and economic regionalism as causes of the dispute, Mr. Casey referred to Communism as a "further ingredient in this cauldron of strife and discontent", even though he considered that the conflict was by no means a simple clash between pro-Communist and anti-Communist forces.

The Communists clearly hope to benefit from the suppression of some of their forthright and vigorous opponents and from the economic deterioration which the Communists are doing so much to foster. All this has given deep distress to many people in Indonesia, including many devout Muslims who see the religious and cultural basis of their nation's life threatened by atheistic Communism. One of the reasons given by the dissident leaders for setting up a rival government in Sumatra has been their desire to keep Indonesia out of Communist control.

Mr. Casey emphasized the desirability of non-involvement.

The best thing for other countries to do is to keep out of the present fighting and to hope that the Indonesians can settle the dispute between themselves without further bloodshed and without other countries getting involved. . . . The possibility could arise of fighting developing to such an extent or in such a way that it might give rise to fears for international peace. Before deciding this was the case, there would have to be careful examination of the facts and of legal considerations, including domestic jurisdiction. I hope that all honourable members appreciate the need for restraint in anything we say at the present time. It would be easy for me to say something much more critical. I do not believe that such comments by me would contribute to a satisfactory and early solution of Indonesia's troubles. There are persons in responsible positions in Indonesia who value democratic processes, who understand the menace of the real imperialism of our times—international Communism—and who know that a country should respect international obligations and codes of behaviour. It is for Indonesians themselves to see that Indonesia attains a solution of this nature.

It is possible that the "more critical" things Mr. Casey did not say in the House were suggested in an article he wrote for the periodical *Review*, the journal of the Victorian Institute of Public Affairs, some weeks previously.

The greatest threat to stability of South-east Asia in recent times has come from the events in Indonesia. The campaign against the Dutch has contributed to a break-down of inter-island communications, a curtailment of exports, production, and of foreign exchange earnings; some pressure on essential food supplies and, in fact, a further aggravation of Indonesia's already substantial economic difficulties. This new deterioration in political and economic conditions provided fresh impetus to dissident leaders in Sumatra and Celebes to put fresh pressure upon the Central Government for political and economic reforms. . . . This disorder and actual hostilities are an obvious cause of concern to Australia. It is our desire to see a suitable and democratic Government in this country which is nearest to us, and we could be adversely affected by the emergence of stronger Communist influence or by continued disorder there.³

Within a very short time, however, it became obvious that the revolutionary forces would offer no effective resistance to the Central Government's attack and that the "young Colonels" had grossly miscalculated their military and political strength. Padang fell on 18 April, Bukit Tinggi on 4 May in the eleventh week of the rebellion, and Menado in the Celebes, the last flicker of organized resistance, on 26 June. On 20 May President Soekarno revived the West New Guinea issue while announcing a general mobilization of men aged eighteen to forty years, and on 25 June re-arranged his Cabinet without including in it either moderates of the Masjumi Party or Communists. Some Australian newspapers expressed concern lest the victorious Indonesian army, which had shown reasonable

³ Reported in *Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 Ap. 1958.

efficiency although not called on to perform any considerable combatant duties, might be led to undertake a West New Guinea adventure, but as the period closed the situation seemed back to "normal"—although there were hints of future worries both concerning an Indonesian arms build-up with the help of Western as well as Communist countries and regarding a possible diminution of Dutch determination to remain in New Guinea.

In summary, then, if the period did not see the development of chaos or of increased Communist influence that many Australians feared, neither did it bring any closer a solution of the vexing and persistent West New Guinea problem.

The Law of the Sea

Important questions of foreign policy and of national interest were involved in the discussions of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. This was held at Geneva from 24 February to 27 April and the Final Act of the conference was signed on 29 April. The leader of the Australian delegation was the Commonwealth Solicitor-General, Professor (now Sir Kenneth) Bailey.

The conference was convened under a resolution [1105 (XI)] of the General Assembly in order to "examine the law of the sea, taking account not only of the legal but also of the technical, biological, economic and political aspects of the problem" and was charged with embodying the results of its work in international conventions.

In a statement on 20 February the Minister for External Affairs, Mr. R. G. Casey, referred to three items of the agenda as being of importance to Australia; these were the question of the breadth of the territorial sea, that of the rights possessed by a coastal state over its continental shelf, and the proposals of the International Law Commission (which had prepared draft articles on the law of the sea for consideration by the conference) regarding the conservation of fisheries. On the first point, Australia in common with the United Kingdom, United States, and other maritime states adhered to a breadth of three miles, but other states again claimed more, and some considerably more. Concerning rights over the continental shelf, Australia had, on 11 September 1953, by proclamation declared the existence of sovereign rights over the natural resources of the sea bed and sub-soil of its continental shelf. The importance of the third point came from the novelty of the Commission's proposals.

The conference adopted conventions on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, on the High Seas, on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, and on the Continental Shelf. These constituted a substantial field of agreement and considerable progress in the creation of a system of international law relating to the sea. It is true that in the first of these no agreement was found possible on the vitally important matters of the width of the territorial sea and of the width of sea over which coastal states may exercise exclusive fishing rights; the convention sets out the rights of coastal states over the (undefined) territorial sea, the rights of ships of other states to traverse the sea, and describes

how the baselines may be laid down from which the width of the territorial sea may be measured, and, in addition, it sets out the rights (other than fishing rights) which a coastal state may exercise over the "contiguous zone" (the zone of high seas contiguous to the territorial sea of a state and extending seawards to a distance of not more than twelve miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured). To some people this failure to agree on the width of the territorial sea and on fishing rights in the contiguous zone makes the convention appear like *Hamlet* not only without the Prince but without all the rest of the cast as well except, symbolically, the two grave-diggers. This is probably too extreme a view, particularly since a further conference is envisaged, and it must be remembered that the other conventions represented positive achievement in international agreement.

Failure to agree was not due to a lack of proposals put before the conference. It would appear rather to come from the fact that it was not possible to divorce the questions of width of the territorial sea and fishing rights of coastal states over the contiguous zones; if these could have been considered apart agreement might have been possible, but for many states they are aspects of one single problem and the nature of the problem differs widely, and apparently irreconcilably, between certain states. Canada, for instance, suggested that while the three-mile limit for the territorial sea should be retained, in accordance with the position of important maritime nations such as the United Kingdom and the United States, a coastal state should have the same rights over fisheries in the contiguous zone as it has in the territorial sea, a provision which was acceptable to Australia, the United States, and some states whose coastal waters are important fishing grounds, but unacceptable to the United Kingdom with its traditional interests in near-coast North Sea fisheries. Other states pressed for an extension of the territorial sea to widths up to twelve miles or even, in one case, to any width desired by the coastal state "within reasonable limits", and the United States, by way of compromise, suggested that the territorial sea should be a maximum of six miles wide, and that the coastal state should have the same rights in regard to fishing in a contiguous zone of up to twelve miles from the baseline as it had in the territorial sea, providing that the rights of nationals of other states who had regularly fished in the outer zone should be preserved. The United Kingdom stated that with some reluctance it would agree to this proposal, but Canada, with its special interests in fishing rights off its west coast, would not accept the proviso.

When these and other proposals were voted on in committee those relating to the extension of the territorial sea beyond the three-mile limit were rejected, Australia voting in the negative. The United States proposal was narrowly defeated, Australia voting in the affirmative. The Canadian suggestion was defeated in its first part, endorsing claims to a six-mile territorial sea, but was accepted in its second part, relating to a twelve-mile contiguous fishing zone, Australia voting in opposition. In plenary session this latter Canadian proposal failed to gain the necessary majority (Australia voting "no"), and the reintroduced

United States proposal, in spite of the support of a large number of states including Australia, fared similarly; other attempts at a formula were defeated outright and it was clear that at the current stage agreement was not possible. At the end of the conference the United Kingdom, the United States, and France stated that although they had been prepared to compromise during the discussions on the three-mile limit, they continued to adhere to the view that the maximum permissible limit of the territorial sea is three miles.

The Convention on the High Seas embodies agreement on the principle of freedom of the high seas, access to the sea by landlocked states, registration and nationality of shipping, flags, safety at sea and the rendering of assistance to ships in distress, jurisdiction on the high seas, piracy, hot pursuit, and other matters. The Convention on Fishing and Conservation regulates fishing on the high seas and establishes a system of compulsory negotiation and arbitration to ensure that conservation measures are observed by nationals of all states.

Australia was particularly interested in the question of the rights of a coastal state over the natural resources of the continental shelf since this arises particularly in regard to the pearl fisheries in northern waters and to Australia's 1953 claim to sovereignty over resources. The convention defined the continental shelf as

the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources

and to "the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands". Australia was one of the sponsors of a successful proposal for the definition of "natural resources" as

the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil, together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.

This satisfactorily covers the species of pearl shell referred to in Australian Pearl Fisheries legislation, and, since the convention establishes the principle that a coastal state exercises sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural resources, Australian interests are adequately safeguarded.⁴

All in all, it is fair to claim that, despite the failure of the nations to agree on the questions of the territorial sea and of fishing rights in the contiguous zone, the Australian position on sea matters was held and, in regard to continental shelf rights, was satisfactorily embodied in international agreements.

During the period under review there arose one specific question of the law of the sea which had particular importance for Australia. In December 1957 the Indonesian Government issued a proclamation to the effect that waters between the Indonesian islands were henceforth Indonesian territorial waters. On

⁴ The texts of the conventions are given in full in *Current Notes*, Vol. 29, No. 6, annexes.

16 January, in a note to the Indonesian Government, Australia rejected this claim on the ground that it affected Australian rights to air and sea passage within the areas concerned. France, Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom took similar action, and the United States later stated an equivalent position. After a flurry in early January, during which it was reported in the press that HMAS *Anzac* was believed to be escorting the Dutch liner *Nieuw Holland* on its departure from Singapore, the issue faded into silence, probably partly because of growing Indonesian preoccupation with internal matters.

Antarctica

The year opened auspiciously in Antarctica with the arrival of Sir Edmund Hillary at the South Pole on 3 January, by Dr. V. E. Fuchs's arrival on 19 January, and by the completion of Fuchs's trans-continental journey on 2 March. This was one of the more spectacular achievements of the International Geophysical Year, but steady and valuable work was performed during the Antarctic summer by all the national parties participating in the programme, including the Australian.

There was progress in the diplomatic as well as the scientific field. Towards the end of 1957 the Government of the United Kingdom had proposed that Antarctica should be administered by an international commission composed of states directly concerned in Antarctic affairs and this, combined with questions as to what would happen at the end of IGY activities, stimulated discussions in the chanceries. The United States now came forward with a proposal, communicated to the Australian Government in a note delivered in Canberra on 2 May. This suggested the conclusion of a treaty between a number of countries "having a direct interest in Antarctica" (not listed in the note but presumably those taking part in the Antarctic IGY programme: Australia, Argentina, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, U.S.S.R.) for the following purposes:

(a) freedom of scientific investigation through Antarctica by citizens, organizations, and governments of all countries and a continuance of the scientific co-operation which is being carried out so successfully during the current International Geophysical Year;

(b) international agreement to ensure that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only;

(c) any other peaceful purposes consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. It was believed, stated the note, that such a treaty could be concluded without requiring any participating nation to renounce whatever basic historic claims it may have in Antarctica, or whatever claims of sovereignty it may have asserted. It could be specifically provided that such basic rights and such claims would remain unaffected while the treaty is in force and that no new rights would be acquired and no new claims made by any country during the duration of the treaty. In other words, the legal *status quo*

in Antarctica would be frozen for the duration of the treaty, permitting co-operation in scientific and administrative matters to be carried out in a constructive manner without being hampered or affected in any way by political considerations.

Australia was invited to participate in a conference on these proposals to be convened at an early date.

In commenting on the note on 4 May Mr. Casey said that the objectives set out in it had the warm support of the Australian Government which was a major participant in the IGY Antarctic programme. The IGY and international activity associated with it had highlighted the question of Antarctica because it had underlined both the great importance of the area from the scientific point of view and equally the importance of it not becoming a region of conflicting national endeavour. The United States had brought forward principles for international co-operation which would be a sound basis for a conference. It was important, in the Australian view, to concentrate realistically on gaining agreement on questions of world-wide importance; these were the assurance that the continent would not be used for warlike purposes and the dissemination throughout the world of scientific information obtained there. Given co-operation on these subjects questions of sovereignty between countries should become differences held quietly in abeyance rather than matters of actual dispute.

To this end the United States suggestion that the proposed treaty should provide for a freezing of all national territorial claims for its duration accorded very closely with the tendency of the Australian Government's thinking on this problem. Our title to the Australian Antarctic territory would not be impaired by the United States proposals.⁵

The proposals do in fact accord so well with Australian interests in the area and provide such a happy solution of the kind of problem raised by Russia's establishment of IGY bases within the territory claimed by Australia that one may be permitted to wonder whether Australian diplomats had a hand in their formulation. Whatever the future may hold in the way of the development of known and unknown Antarctic resources, the next best thing to the international recognition of the Australian territorial claim is probably the maintenance in existence of the Australian claim coupled with an international guarantee of the demilitarization of Antarctica.

By the end of the period under review all the nations invited to confer by the United States had accepted the invitation but no date had been set for the meeting.

Australian-American co-operation in the Antarctic was carried a stage further by the conclusion of an agreement, announced by the Minister for External Affairs on 7 May, whereby Australia accepted a "timeless loan" of the buildings, facilities, and supplies of the American IGY base of Wilkes Station in the Australian Antarctic Territory as from 1 January 1959.

⁵ Text of the note is given in *ibid.*, Vol. 29, No. 5.

Relations with New Zealand

Relations between Australia and New Zealand have been closer in the post-war period than previously, largely because of the ANZAC and ANZUS Pacts, membership of both countries in the South Pacific Commission and in the Trusteeship Council, co-operation in the maintenance of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya, co-operation in air transport, and so on. They became still closer during this period when New Zealand began to experience considerable difficulties in regard to external financial balances.

On 1 January New Zealand announced the imposition of a licensing system for all imports. It was explained that the deficit in the overseas trade balance had increased from £NZ 4 million in the year ending the previous September to an estimated £NZ 30 million for the calendar year 1957; overseas balances had fallen from £NZ 83 million to £NZ 45 million in December. This adverse movement had been mainly the result of the fall in prices on the world market for the small number of export lines supplying the bulk of New Zealand's overseas earnings and to increased competition from certain countries. It was not expected that the reduction in imports which would follow licensing would affect very greatly the level of Australian exports to New Zealand since these were largely machinery and other goods which could expect to be classed as essential for licensing purposes. At the end of June large increases in New Zealand income tax rates were also announced.

On 1 April the Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, met the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. Walter Nash, in Sydney for official talks while the latter was returning from a tour of Asian countries. A further conference for 14 and 15 June was arranged and a joint communiqué issued at its conclusion stated that trade relations between the two countries had been discussed, that it was intended that a conference between officials should review the 1933 trade agreement, and that it had been decided to modify some of New Zealand's financial commitments in relation to forces stationed with the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya. Mr. Nash said that Australia had shown an understanding of the trade problems affecting New Zealand and a helpful and constructive approach in considering what might be done to ease the immediate pressure on New Zealand's external balance of payments.

On 1 July Mr. Menzies announced that, following his discussions with the New Zealand Prime Minister, the Commonwealth Bank at the request of the Government had concluded an arrangement with the Reserve Bank of New Zealand to provide the Reserve Bank with a credit of £A 10 million during the year 1958-9. The New Zealand Government had indicated that the credit would be used to help finance New Zealand payments in Australia; the credit would be repayable in instalments over a short term of years.

It looked, therefore, as though Australian-New Zealand relations were entering a new phase.

Visit by Mr. Macmillan

History was made in early February when Mr. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, arrived in Australia. This was the first visit to Australia by a British Prime Minister while in office. Mr. Macmillan had consultations with members of the Federal Government and no doubt many matters of joint concern to Britain and Australia were discussed, but the speeches and communiqués that accompanied the various occasions did not suggest that any important decisions had been taken. Indeed, the *Sydney Morning Herald* in an editorial on 12 February described one joint communiqué as "a string of soothing platitudes" and an "empty and syrupy account". If, however, Mr. Macmillan wanted to make his visit simply a goodwill mission, he was amply successful.

University of Sydney

AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH STRUGGLE DURING
THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST PERIOD

During a recent regular meeting, on September 30, 1958, the *Kommission für die Geschichte des Kirchenkampfes in der nationalsozialistischer Zeit* decided to call an international conference on the concerns of the commission. The conference is to take place immediately following the 1959 *Kirchentag* at Munich. The dates have been set and arrangements are being made to meet in a conference center in Bavaria.

The commission desires the participation of American, British and European scholars in the study. Those interested, especially if they may be able to attend the international conference on August 17-20, 1959, should communicate with the secretariat at Alsterglaci 1, Hamburg 36, or with the undersigned at Candler School of Theology, Emory University.

FRANKLIN H. LITTELL.

The Problem of Australian Representation at the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament

By J. C. VINSON

Australia as an emerging Pacific power was concerned vitally with the discussion and settlement of Far Eastern problems undertaken at the Washington Conference of 1921-2. Participation in the first world war gave Australia added territory in the Pacific. It gave, too, a new sense of national independence but imposed, as never before, responsibility for national defence. The problem of security soon was complicated by Japan's continuation of its war-inspired imperialism at the same time that major Pacific powers, the United States and China, shattered the post-war settlement by rejecting the Treaty of Versailles.

These vital interests and the precedent of direct representation at the Versailles Conference¹ made Australians feel entitled again to direct representation when the Washington Conference was called by the United States. The Australian leaders were disappointed when an official invitation was issued to "the government of Great Britain" but none to Australia or the other members of the Commonwealth. The United States Government failed to understand the significance of Versailles and assumed the Dominions would be represented on the British delegation.² Eventually they were. While the United Kingdom alone was represented on all seven subcommittees at the Conference and no delegation could cast a vote unless all members approved, the Dominions still suffered some humiliation. For one thing, a Prime Minister could scarcely afford to represent his country in so secondary a position. For another, the Dominions would have less autonomy than they had enjoyed at Paris. The Australian delegate, Senator George Pearce, for example, might confer with Arthur Balfour, head of the British delegation at the Conference, on matters vital to Australian interests, such as the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Pearce could not take part in the direct negotiations; these were handled for the Commonwealth by Balfour alone.³ This system wounded national prestige, but Pearce had no difficulty in advancing Australian national

¹"Paris Peace Conference" Memorandum prepared for the State Department by Dennys P. Meyers.

²In granting the Commonwealth states a proportionate voice within a British panel, Wilson "seems to have been oblivious to the political maturity which this status conferred to them. Certainly the American people did not understand the implications of Wilson's act." "The negotiations preliminary to Far Eastern phase of the Washington Conference showed the United States to be very receptive, even anxiously expectant, for Dominion representation on a British panel delegation." "United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations", Meyers, Memorandum, State Department.

³Dominion representatives were active in the work of the subcommittees and participated in the debates. "Armament Conference Delegations", Meyers, Memorandum, State Department; Werner Levi, *American-Australian Relations*, Minneapolis, 1947, p. 120.

interests. The agreements reached at the Conference were satisfactory to Australia.⁴ Yet, in the slowly developing pattern of post-war Commonwealth and world relations failure to gain direct representation at the Washington Conference was held by Australia to be an unnecessary slight, an unfortunate precedent.

The matter of Australian representation at the Washington Conference first arose at the Imperial Conference in London. There it was decided, 2 July 1921, to invite the United States to discuss Far Eastern problems and, incidentally, naval disarmament.⁵ For some reason George Harvey, the American Ambassador, did not forward this dispatch to the State Department for six days. In the meantime, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes who had no definite knowledge of the British plan, but good reason to believe it would materialize, sent to the British Government an invitation to attend a conference on disarmament.⁶ Thus began, on a note of dissonance, a series of preliminary negotiations continually marked by confusion.

When Hughes agreed to expand his programme for disarmament so as to include the British proposal for a study of Far Eastern problems, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand became vitally concerned.⁷ Already the Imperial Conference, during the last week of June, had been the scene of spirited debate on the future of a vital instrument of British Empire policy in the Far East—the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Arthur Meighen, the Canadian Prime Minister, demanded unconditional termination of the Alliance; the United States would be offended by anything less. He threatened, if the Alliance were renewed, to take Canada out of the Commonwealth.⁸ The spokesman for the other members of the Conference, William Morris Hughes of Australia, favoured a renewal of the Alliance, provided it could be redrafted in a form inoffensive to America.⁹ Hughes was concerned with the Alliance only insofar as it would promote the security of his nation.¹⁰ It was expedient to have America's goodwill. Australia, nevertheless, was too near to provoke Japan by so abrupt an abrogation of the Alliance as advocated by Canada.¹¹ Hughes argued for a modified Alliance, acceptable to Japan and America. In drafting such a pact it would be helpful, he suggested, 22 June, to determine the precise nature of America's objections to the Alliance and perhaps settle these differences at a conference.¹²

⁴Australia was more concerned than any other nation with the outcome of the Conference. Participation constituted a "historical landmark". The grave threat of war in the Pacific had been removed. Sydney *Daily Telegraph*, 4 Ap. 1922. "Because we stood by the Empire there has come to us from the Washington Conference peace and security, saving us millions of money and enabling us to concentrate on economic affairs." Melbourne *Argus*, 20 Feb. 1922. This same paper felt that Pearce had done an outstanding job at the Conference; *ibid.*, 7 Jan. 1922.

⁵United States, *Foreign Relations*, 1921, Vol. I, pp. 19-21, Harvey to Hughes, 8 July 1921; Department of State, Decimal Files, 741.9411/136A, Harvey to Hughes.

⁶United States, *Foreign Relations*, 1921, Vol. I, p. 18, Hughes to Harvey, 8 July 1921.

⁷*ibid.*, pp. 21-4.

⁸"The Empire and the Alliance", *Nation*, 9 July 1921, p. 531.

⁹*Imperial Conference*, Cmd. 1474 (1921).

¹⁰Commonwealth of Australia, *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. XCVII, pp. 11630, ff.

¹¹A. L. Burt, *The Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth from the American Revolution*, Boston, 1956, pp. 745-6.

¹²"Present Problems of the British Commonwealth of Nations", *International Conciliation*, 167, Oct. 1921, p. 378.

The next day Charles Evans Hughes stated the American position in conversations in Washington, 23 June, with British Ambassador Auckland Geddes. The United States probably would accept as a substitute for the Alliance membership in a tripartite pact, a plan popular throughout the Commonwealth. When this news was relayed to the Imperial Conference, the deadlock over the Alliance was broken in favour of the moderate position championed by Australia.¹³ An important lead had been given by Secretary Hughes. The Imperial Conference, early in July, welcomed his call for a conference on disarmament and Far Eastern problems in Washington hoping there to negotiate a settlement of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which on 28 June had been extended for a year.¹⁴

To accommodate the Dominions, who felt entitled to direct representation, Lloyd George announced to Parliament, 11 July, President Harding's invitation to a disarmament conference and stipulated it was to be preceded by a preliminary conference on Far Eastern problems. Britain and the Commonwealth, Lloyd George declared, would gladly accept both invitations.¹⁵ In fact, Harding had made no mention of a preliminary conference. It was, however, not an unusual procedure and it suited the needs of British diplomacy in this instance. Lord Curzon, British foreign minister, immediately began urging Ambassador Harvey to approve the proposal for a preliminary conference. Curzon stressed its importance "as an essential preliminary to the second conference designed to limit armaments". He suggested it be held before 15 August in London so that Prime Ministers Hughes and Massey might attend. The two Prime Ministers, Curzon stated, had "very earnestly" urged such a course at the Imperial Conference meetings. Harvey, in reporting this interview to Hughes, added that Prime Ministers Hughes and Massey had seen him personally and "implored me to ask my Government to so arrange the program that they would not be prevented from attending especially as their

¹³Charles Evans Hughes Papers, Library of Congress, Beerits Memo, The Four Power Treaty. Also cited as Decimal File, 500.A4A/160. The *Montreal Gazette*, 27 June 1921, reported that the Conference was moving toward a three-power understanding to replace the Alliance. A week earlier it reported sentiment was running strongly against renewal of the treaty, but "something has happened to bring the alliance new friends". Decimal Files 841, o11m7/16. After this conversation between Hughes and Geddes, the United States was a third but silent member of the Alliance. "Anglo-Japanese Alliance", Meyers, Memorandum, State Department.

Hughes did not send Harvey a transcript of this conversation until 6 July. In the meantime, Geddes reported the meeting to Curzon. Curzon on 28 June, knowing what Hughes had said, asked Harvey to state the American position on the Alliance. The British Foreign Secretary indicated that he knew much more about the American position on the Alliance than the American Ambassador did. Hughes Papers, Box 4A, Hughes to Harvey, 6 July 1921; Harvey to Hughes, 8 July 1921, Decimal Files, 500 A4/1.

¹⁴*Com. P.D.*, Vol. XCVII, pp. 11630-40; Sydney Greenbie, "Australia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance", *World Work*, July 1921, p. 409; "The Empire and the Alliance", *The Nation and the Athenaeum*, 9 July 1921, pp. 531-2; "Wanted, a Far Eastern Concert", *The Nation and the Athenaeum*, 16 July 1921, p. 560.

¹⁵Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates*, 1921, Vol. 144, cols. 917-18; United States, *Foreign Relations*, 1921, Vol. I, pp. 53-4. The British Ambassador told Hughes, 30 July, that Harvey had, in an interview with Curzon, 10 July, warmly approved a preliminary conference. He had stated that it could meet either in London or Havana and that either Harding or Hughes would attend. This offer Harvey repeated the next day. It was the basis for Lloyd George's statement to Parliament on 11 July. Hughes told Ambassador Geddes that Harvey had no basis for such a statement, never informed his Government he had made it, and as Ambassador had no authority to make it. Geddes insisted, despite a very lengthy explanation by Hughes, that Harvey was responsible for the whole issue of the preliminary conference. Hughes Papers, Box 175, Interviews with the British Ambassador, 30 July 1921.

interests were in all essential respects wholly identical with ours". While Curzon officially endorsed a preliminary conference, it was the Dominion Premiers, according to Harvey, who insisted it be held.¹⁶

Secretary Hughes complicated the problem of Dominion representation by rejecting the proposal for a preliminary conference. Its advantages for Australia and New Zealand he understood, but its disadvantages for America must be considered also. The agenda of the proposed conference included Far Eastern problems because the Imperial Conference demanded it do so. Yet disarmament alone, Hughes declared, stirred the imagination and enthusiasm of the American people. A preliminary conference on Far Eastern problems would be challenged immediately as being nothing more than a British trick to side-track disarmament. It would be argued that should a Far Eastern settlement satisfactory to Britain be reached, or the conference end in failure, the diplomats of the Empire would go home. They would not attend a disarmament conference. Even if the preliminary conference were desirable, Hughes continued, it would be impossible for the United States, Japan, and China to prepare for it by 15 August. Finally, any conference sponsored by the United States must be held on American soil. Otherwise, both Senate and public opinion would condemn it as dominated by foreign influence.¹⁷ Lord Curzon, while impressed, did not feel those complexities to be as "difficult or trying as his own problem, especially respecting the Dominion Premiers".¹⁸ "He earnestly reiterates", wrote Harvey, 15 July, "the necessity of their [the Dominion Premiers'] presence and participation . . . in considering problems of the Pacific." Both Japan and China could make preparations to send representatives, the British felt, to this indispensable preliminary conference. Curzon would not, however, press the suggestion far enough, thought Harvey, to jeopardize the main conference. Obstructing the conference, the British foreign minister realized, "would invite disaster".¹⁹

Four days later, on 19 July, Harvey found Curzon determined still to have a preliminary conference. When given no encouragement and told it was entirely impractical, Curzon suggested as an alternative "a plan of quiet consultation in London during the next few weeks which would appease the Dominion Premiers. . . ." In these meetings, unattended by any publicity, the groundwork necessary for a quick solution of Far Eastern problems at Washington could be laid. Curzon hoped the Washington Conference itself would be brief. Otherwise, he and Lloyd George could not attend.²⁰

Secretary of State Hughes, upon receiving this communication, firmly rejected once more any formal preliminary conference. "This must be regarded", he added, "as this Government's final attitude." The question of representation, nevertheless, might be satisfactorily met. The date of the Conference, preferably November,

¹⁶United States, *Foreign Relations*, 1921, Vol. I, pp. 25-7, Harvey to Hughes, 11 July 1921. There is no indication in the note that Harvey had approved the preliminary conference as the British maintained.

¹⁷*ibid.*, p. 28, Hughes to Harvey, 13 July 1921.

¹⁸*ibid.*, p. 32, Harvey to Hughes, 15 July 1921.

¹⁹*ibid.*, p. 33, Harvey to Hughes, 15 July 1921.

²⁰*ibid.*, pp. 36-7, Harvey to Hughes, 19 July 1921.

might be moved up to late September or early October to meet the convenience of the Dominion Premiers. At the same time, Hughes did not reject the proposal for informal consultations. They might be helpful, provided the United States was party to all the meetings and all decisions were referred to President Harding for approval.²¹ This reply the British Government chose to interpret as American approval for informal consultation and asked, 27 July, that definite arrangements for them be made. Representatives of the British Empire, it was stated, were willing to come to the United States for these informal conversations. The closer the site to England, however, the greater the convenience for the busy leaders of the Commonwealth.²²

The British did not, from the language of this note, seek a formal preliminary conference, but it was, Hughes suspected, their objective still. In a conversation with Geddes on 28 July, Hughes, for the third time, refused a preliminary conference. In approving consultations he had in mind informal conversations such as might take place quietly among Curzon, the Dominion Premiers, and Ambassador Harvey. Should the British go so far as to send delegates to the United States, even for informal consultations, it "would partake of the nature of a preliminary conference". A meeting, such as the British suggested, could not be called "anything but a conference of the first importance. . . . To describe this as a consultation instead of a conference would be ineffectual." It could not be secret, for the conference could not meet without a formal invitation from President Harding. If formal consultations were held, the other powers invited to the Conference proper, France, Japan, Italy, and China, might feel slighted. Indeed, Shidehara, the Japanese Ambassador, already had protested against a preliminary conference or conversation because representation would be unequal. The United States and Great Britain would be represented by secretaries of foreign affairs while Japan would be represented by an ambassador. Furthermore Hughes argued, the British proposed a conference of a week's duration; it was doubtful whether anything could be accomplished in so brief a period. Failure to reach agreement in the preliminary conference might jeopardize the major Conference. Finally, American public opinion would not welcome any change in the plans announced by President Harding. While rejecting the British proposal for a preliminary conference, Hughes renewed his offer to hold the major Conference in September for the convenience of the Dominion Premiers. If they still could not attend the Conference, Hughes would be willing to see them in Washington on their way home.²³ The British Government did not follow this suggestion. After 2 August, it dropped the idea of a preliminary meeting and with it direct representation for the Dominions.²⁴

The American position did not please Prime Minister Hughes. In a public speech in London, 21 July 1921, he declared a preliminary conference was imperative; only when Pacific problems had been settled could disarmament be

²¹*ibid.*, p. 39, Hughes to Harvey, 20 July 1921.

²²*ibid.*, pp. 45-6, British Foreign Office to British Ambassador Geddes, 26 July 1921; Harvey to Hughes, pp. 46-7, 27 July 1921.

²³*ibid.*, pp. 47-59, Hughes to Harvey, 28 July 1921.

²⁴*ibid.*, pp. 50-51, Hughes to Harvey, 2 Aug. 1921.

attained.²⁵ The Imperial Conference, just before it adjourned in August, endorsed his view in a resolution. It stated that the United States proposed a preliminary conference in its original invitation but refused to follow through with it. A preliminary conference might have accomplished much. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance could have been replaced by "some larger arrangement between the three great powers concerned, namely the United States of America, Japan and Great Britain". The British proposals for a preliminary conference were described in detail and America's rejections recounted.

This conclusion was viewed with the utmost regret by the members of the Imperial Conference, who had devoted much time to the working out of arrangements which they understood would be equally acceptable to all parties and the abandonment of which, they feared, could not be otherwise than prejudicial to the great objects which all held in view.²⁶

Some Australian newspapers deplored so marked a slight, especially when the conference was to deal with issues so vital to Australia. The contributions of the Commonwealth nations to victory in the first world war had earned them the right to be considered as separate nations allied with the other Commonwealth countries.²⁷ The unwillingness of the United States to recognize that Australia was "old enough to vote" and its insistence on putting Australia in "its proper place", the nation's press resented.²⁸

The United States Government in the first decades of the twentieth century held that the British Commonwealth of Nations was a single unit properly represented by Great Britain. This idea became a conviction during the Senate debates on the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations Covenant when much emphasis was given the possibility of the United States being outvoted in the League by the Commonwealth, six to one.²⁹ Hence 1921 was not, from the American point of view, an auspicious time to champion direct representation for Australia at an American sponsored conference. Nevertheless, Hughes did not wish by his action to exclude the Dominions. In his first statement on the size of delegations, Hughes suggested that they have at least six members in order to give "full opportunity for Dominion representation, which the United States does not desire to make difficult".³⁰

An even smaller delegation was satisfactory to Lord Curzon who did not appear interested in having Dominion representation. In fact, the British foreign minister suggested that two or, at the most, three delegates would be enough for Great

²⁵*Com. P.D.*, Vol. XCVII, p. 11539.

²⁶Summary of Proceedings, Cmd. 1474 (1921), United States, *Foreign Relations*, 1921, Vol. I, pp. 53-4.

²⁷Greenbie, *op. cit.*; *Com. P.D.*, Vol. XCVII, p. 11631. Hughes said, "We had been a dominion and the war made us a nation."

²⁸*Sydney Sun*, 31 Oct. 1921.

²⁹Denna Frank Fleming, *The Treaty Veto of the American Senate*, New York, 1930, pp. 165-6. The United States adopted a reservation to the Treaty of Versailles in 1920 providing that it would not be bound by any decision made by the League "in which any member of the League and its self-governing dominions, colonies or parts of empire in the aggregate have cast more than one vote". *Congressional Record*, 9 March 1920. See also Henry Cabot Lodge, *The Senate and the League of Nations*, New York, 1935, pp. 170, 193, 201, 207, 240.

³⁰United States, *Foreign Relations*, 1921, Vol. I, p. 61, Hughes to Harvey, 23 Aug. 1921.

Britain. He urged, also, that the official delegations of all the powers represented at the Conference be limited. Thus, the combined delegations would be between twelve and twenty, a group small enough for easy conversation. Ambassador Harvey believed Curzon was anxious to limit Commonwealth representation to himself and Lloyd George, who were, Curzon implied, "quite competent . . . to speak for the whole Empire". Harvey did not suggest that representatives of the Commonwealth be included in the delegation. Curzon would have resented such an act as an intrusion on a matter "for their own arrangement". Nevertheless, Harvey did re-state Hughes's proposal for the delegations to include at least five or six persons in order to "avoid possibility of future criticism from the Dominions that might be based upon assumption that they were barred out of adequate participation through any plan or act of yours". The Ambassador added, in confidence: "I feel satisfied that Curzon and Lloyd George do not care to have the Dominions directly represented by their own delegates upon the same plane of authority as themselves." Furthermore, as the Conference would meet in November, neither Prime Minister Massey nor Prime Minister Hughes, already abroad for many months, could attend. Those men did not want subordinate officials representing their Governments in Washington, Harvey felt, and agreed with Curzon's plan to exclude Dominion representation.³¹ Even after getting this information, Secretary Hughes urged Harvey not to let the idea get abroad "that we have limited [the] size of the delegation and thus made impracticable Dominions' representation". He was instructed to make it very clear that the United States was willing to keep the delegations large enough to provide Dominion representation.³²

At the same time, Hughes hoped the British delegation would not exceed four members. The political situation in the United States made a four-man American delegation expedient and, in part, accounted for his attitude. It was necessary, Hughes was convinced, to include members of the Senate on the official delegation. On one hand, President William McKinley had put senators on the delegation to Paris in 1899; the Senate subsequently approved the Treaty of Paris. On the other hand, President Woodrow Wilson did not include senators on the official delegation at Versailles; the Senate defeated that treaty. Both the lesson of history and the determination of the Republican Party to reject the methods employed by Democratic President Wilson made it expedient for senators to be official delegates to the Washington Conference.

The administration was then faced with the embarrassing problem of excluding prominent but unwanted members of the Senate, in particular Senator William E. Borah, from the delegation. This was a difficult assignment. Borah had introduced into the Senate, in December of 1920, a resolution calling for a holiday in naval building by the United States, Great Britain, and Japan for a period of five years. Subsequently this resolution became the rallying point for a great popular demonstration in the United States demanding reduction of naval armament. For several months, the administration did not accommodate the popular clamour for disarmament. When President Harding finally did call the Washington Conference,

³¹*ibid.*, pp. 63-5, Harvey to Hughes, 27 Aug. 1921.

³²*ibid.*, p. 65, Hughes to Harvey, 29 Aug. 1921.

the press and public believed that Senator Borah, the champion of disarmament and open diplomacy, had forced the Conference on an unwilling administration. Consequently, he should be the first delegate selected to the Conference. The administration, already at cross-purposes with Borah on many issues, believed that to include on the delegation a man of such well-known anti-British feelings, such strongly independent opinions, and such definite aversion to "working in double harness" would jeopardize the entire meeting. At the same time, Borah could not be snubbed. He had too much influence with the American public. To exclude him from the delegation, without clear and sufficient reason, would obviously be bad politics.

Administration leaders, as a way out of the dilemma, agreed to restrict the American delegation to four persons holding high office not attained by Borah. Thus, to justify excluding Borah, the chosen four were the Secretary of State, the most prominent ex-Secretary of State, the leader of the Republican Party majority in the Senate, and the leader of the Democratic minority in the Senate. Secretary Hughes felt he had secured a perfect delegation. Free of the troublesome Borah, it included the key men in the Senate who might aid in passing treaties the Conference adopted.³³ When it appeared that the British of their own volition would limit their delegation to not more than four men, Hughes issued, 29 August, a definite statement that the American delegation would consist of four members.³⁴ Once more Harvey discussed the matter at length with the British foreign minister, finding him in complete agreement. "Curzon thus had full opportunity, if he desired, to provide for Dominion representation", Harvey wrote. "I do not see how your position could be more thoroughly safeguarded." Apparently the matter was settled; the Dominions would not be represented.³⁵

Therefore, Secretary of State Hughes received a rude shock three weeks later, on 20 September, when Ambassador Geddes called to say that "the British would probably desire to send five or six delegates; that this would be necessary to give the Dominions the representation". Hughes reminded the Ambassador of Curzon's previous agreement to send two or three delegates to represent Britain. The United States, Hughes explained, had to have at least four delegates in order to give the Senate proper representation, but had limited the delegation at that point "solely because of the British suggestion". While he thought the matter had been settled, Hughes did not insist on the previous agreement. He was willing to accept as large a delegation as the British wished to send; he was "particularly glad to know that the Dominions would be represented".³⁶ What caused the British Government to reverse its position? Lord Curzon had definitely excluded the Dominions in his earlier discussions with Harvey. It is possible that Harvey failed, as on several other occasions, to give an altogether accurate account of their conversation. Apparently though, Curzon represented his own view and had not cleared this issue

³³J. Chal Vinson, *The Parchment Peace: The United States Senate and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922*, Athens, Georgia, 1955, pp. 117-20.

³⁴United States, *Foreign Relations*, 1921, Vol. I, p. 65, Hughes to Harvey, 29 Aug. 1921.

³⁵*ibid.*, pp. 65-6, Harvey to Hughes, 2 Sept. 1921.

³⁶*ibid.*, pp. 71-3, Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a conversation with British Ambassador Geddes, 20 Sept. 1921.

with the Prime Minister. Lloyd George, after his failure to gain representation for the Dominions through a preliminary conference, sought constantly, but without Curzon's knowledge, some other means to bring delegates of the Commonwealth to Washington. Finally, he offered to make room for the Dominions on the British delegation. While this plan gave the Dominions a voice in the proceedings, it did not recognize their growing maturity as nations. It was, in fact, a humiliation.

Consequently, for some time after Lloyd George made his proposal, the Dominions hesitated to accept; it was doubtful that any of them would stoop to enter the delegation "through the back door".³⁷ Debate on accepting a secondary place on the British delegation took place in the Australian Parliament during September. The Parliament was distressed at Hughes's failure to gain a final settlement of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. As a result, Australia would have no delegate present when the Alliance was discussed at the Washington Conference. Both Parliament and the press doubted Britain's ability to administer Australia's vital problems in the Pacific and desired Australian representation at the Conference.³⁸ Responsibility for Australia's failure to gain representation generally was placed on the United States. Britain, the *Sydney Sun* reported, was "in no way responsible for Australia's exclusion".³⁹ The British Government wanted the Dominions represented. Otherwise, there could be no assurance that agreements resulting from the Conference would be approved by the Dominions when finally consulted. Although hurt and disappointed, the Dominions, except South Africa, yielded at length to the weight of British pressure and the desire to protect their own national interests. When agreement was reached, the British asked Charles Evans Hughes, 20 September, to allow them a six-man delegation.

For Australia the issue was not settled until Lloyd George, on 6 October, cabled Prime Minister Hughes to send a representative as a part of the British delegation.⁴⁰ Hughes was loath, at this time, to accept a subordinate place for his nation. It marked the failure of his plan to gain representation through preliminary conference; it meant that he could not, because of the inferior position offered, serve as the Australian delegate.⁴¹ He sought to place the responsibility for this turn of events on America by closing his argument in Parliament on the matter with the remark: "We did our utmost at the Imperial Conference to secure representation of the dominions, and it was only when the United States slammed

³⁷Burt, *op. cit.*, p. 747.

³⁸*Com. P.D.*, Vol. XCVII, p. 11793; *Sydney Sun*, 15 Sept. 1921.

³⁹*Sydney Sun*, 19 Sept. 1921.

⁴⁰*Com. P.D.*, Vol. XCVII, p. 11713. By this time both Lloyd George and Curzon had decided not to attend the Conference. Harvey believed, and Philip Kerr and others of his English friends confirmed, that Lloyd George's real reasons for not attending were personal and political. Eager to match wits with the slow-thinking Harding, he was not pleased at the prospect of negotiating with so formidable an adversary as Hughes. Lloyd George decided the Conference would not afford him what he needed politically—a spectacular personal success for the Empire. If Harvey was correct in his analysis, Lloyd George probably was personally interested in a brief preliminary conference at which he could dispose of the troublesome Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Hughes Papers, Box 4A, Harvey to Hughes, 28 Sept. 1921.

⁴¹Hughes was reported to be anxious to go to the Conference as a delegate. The *Sydney Daily Telegraph* maintained that unless he could be credited as a full delegate, his participation would constitute a humiliation for Australia. Furthermore, Hughes could not on such a mission expect political immunity during his absence. *ibid.*, 16 Sept. 1921.

the door in our face that we stopped."⁴² The Australian Parliament was by now convinced that protection for the country's interests should outweigh hurt pride in determining policy. On 6 October, it was announced that Senator Pearce would leave immediately to join the British delegation to the Washington Conference.⁴³

No insult to Australia, as intimated by William Morris Hughes, was intended by Secretary of State Hughes. Yet it could not be said that he was displeased at the failure of the Commonwealth to gain direct representation. Regard for the wishes of Great Britain and fear of the virulent Anglophobia of a minority of Americans made it impolitic as well as dangerous for Hughes to support direct representation for the Dominions at the Washington Conference. Hughes believed a preliminary conference would raise far more problems than it would solve. The events of the Washington Conference justified the Secretary of State's judgment. Such a conference would have made it difficult, if not impossible, for Hughes to gain control of American public opinion at the outset of the Washington Conference as he was able to do. This control of public opinion was his strongest weapon in the vital and difficult task of winning final Senate approval of the Conference treaties. At the same time, Hughes put no obstacle in the way of Dominion representation for he realized the advantages of having the Dominions present at the Conference. He remarked to a friend that the United States Senate was represented on the American delegation to commit the Senate in advance, and the Dominions were represented to forestall any later challenge to the agreements made by the British Government.⁴⁴

In the long view of history, it was Woodrow Wilson at Paris rather than Charles Evans Hughes at Washington who departed from traditional American policy in regard to the status of the Dominions. No permanent precedent and no permanent legacy of ill will resulted from Hughes's practices. Indeed, so great was the satisfaction, both in the United States and Australia, with the accomplishments of the Washington Conference that the disagreement over representation was soon forgotten.

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⁴²*Com. P.D.*, Vol. XCVII, p. 11716.

⁴³*Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 Oct. 1921.

⁴⁴"Armament Conference Delegations", Meyers, Memorandum, State Department.

Representation in the Emergent States of the Commonwealth

By COLIN A. HUGHES

There has been a growing volume of discussion on "the export of electoral systems" to non-Western polities.¹ Professor Mackenzie recently advised the collection of case-studies,² and the accumulation of such factual material has already shown great improvement in the past three or four years, through academic studies and the reports of those designing and administering electoral systems in non-Western states, independent or emergent. This article turns to a somewhat larger question, the theories of representation which, whether explicit or implied, have influenced the selection of imported, or the design of home-grown, electoral systems. Of course it would be difficult to speak meaningfully of the theories, or ideologies, or attitudes, underlying electoral systems without describing the machinery. One harassed federal legislator said at the start of the debate on franchise reform in the Central African Assembly:

In this matter there is enormous scope for the study of basic principles before one can work out details of any franchise scheme. That, I think, is one of the peculiarities of this particular subject, that very often when you try to discuss it with anyone, they will concentrate on the mechanics of the particular system which you are trying to explain instead of getting back to the principles on which any mechanics must be based.³

It may well be that this study will suffer by moving between the two levels, but the novelty of the institutions involved may help to excuse the division of attention.

We may begin by noting two systems of representation which failed to develop or take permanent root, corporate representation and states' rights representation.⁴ The introduction of unicameral forms of Crown Colony government led to corporate representation by nomination. Elective corporate representation was introduced in a few isolated instances, e.g. the Gold Coast, but usually the corporate selection was a suggestion to the Governor who by convention almost invariably appointed the person selected by the appropriate interest group. This form of representation has declined for two reasons: in those

¹ W. J. M. Mackenzie, "Representation in Plural Societies", *Political Studies*, Vol. II, No. 1, 1954, and "The Export of Electoral Systems", *ibid.*, Vol. V, No. 3, 1957; I. Tinker, "Malayan Elections: Electoral Pattern for Plural Societies", *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. IX, No. 2, 1956; J. A. Laponce, "The Protection of Minorities by the Electoral System", *ibid.*, Vol. X, No. 2, 1957; T. Franck, "Popular Participation in Multi-Racial Government", *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. IX, No. 3, 1956; Hansard Society, *Problems of Parliamentary Government in the Colonies*, London, 1953, esp. Ch. 5.

² W. J. M. Mackenzie, "Electoral Systems and the Politics of Emergent States", *A.P.S.A. News*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1957.

³ Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 7, 5 March 1957, 2812.

⁴ A. De Grazia, *Public and Republic*, New York, 1951, pp. 81-8.

territories where the major economic interests are externally owned and controlled, their direct representation runs counter to local nationalism, and where they are locally owned and controlled, the rise of party systems makes unwelcome the retention of a separate bloc which could overturn the results of a popular election. The idea of a states' rights theory of representation has developed only in the West Indies where geography and history have combined to give the constituent units of the federation a pronounced individuality. In Nigeria, Central Africa and Malaya, the characteristic differences are tribal, racial or communal rather than territorial. The classic devices of weightage in the lower chamber, parity in an upper chamber and federalization of Cabinet have all been tried, but it appears likely that, as in Australia, effective recognition of states' rights will come from the party system rather than the constitution.

Unfortunately, one of the most important developments in the emergent states—the spread of adult suffrage—must be dismissed with equal brevity.⁵ In Asia, West Africa and the West Indies adult suffrage has come either with independence or the achievement of semi-responsible government, and the consensus of most would be that it has worked satisfactorily in educating the population and producing stable governments.⁶ In some territories, such as Ceylon and Pakistan, the organization of the electorate into common or separate rolls is still debated, but nowhere is there a demand for restriction of the franchise. Only in the territories of Central and East Africa, together with the adjacent island of Mauritius and the more distant colony of Fiji which, for reasons of space, must be overlooked here,⁷ is the introduction of adult suffrage still one of the burning issues of politics, and the attendant choice between separate and common rolls a matter of the first importance. It is to this hard core of the problem of representation that the greater part of this paper will be devoted.

In the half-dozen territories of Central and East Africa small British settler communities, ranging from six or seven per cent. of the total population down to less than one-half of one per cent., must find some accommodation with the interests of the indigenous Africans.⁸ To consider the arguments of the European community first, there are three postulates which are generally agreed amongst the settlers; first, that adult or a very wide franchise should not be introduced; second, that the franchise should not be limited on grounds of race; third, that the settler community will have to retain political control for the foreseeable future. Beyond these, there is disagreement as between common and communal

⁵ The literature is surprisingly scanty; cf. B. Keith-Lucas, "Electoral Reform in Sierra Leone", *Pol. Studs.*, Vol. III, No. 2, 1955; G. Bennett, "The Gold Coast General Election of 1954", *Parl. Affairs*, Vol. VII, No. 4, 1954; and also S. Sen and M. Abbas, "The General Election in the Sudan", *ibid.*, Vol. VII, No. 3, 1954.

⁶ But see Sir I. Jennings, *The Approach to Self-Government*, Cambridge, 1956, Ch. IV.

⁷ In Cyprus there is also a problem of representation, but it is complicated by external questions which have monopolized attention.

⁸ There are, of course, substantial Asian communities, which in four of the territories are more numerous than the European, but they stand somewhat apart from the main struggle. One suspects that they will be able to reach a settlement within whatever compromise the other two races may achieve.

rolls, and on the degree of enfranchisement to be permitted, but these basic propositions are sufficient to attempt a construction of the theory of representation from which they derive.

The criticism of adult suffrage proceeds on two lines: that it is all very well elsewhere, but cannot yet be applied in Africa, or that part of Africa of which the critic is speaking, and that it is not at all certain that it will work anywhere. In the first category we find the Tredgold Commission⁹ of Southern Rhodesia whose members believed that adult suffrage requires a homogeneous electorate "at a fairly high standard of civilization and divided by political divisions, based on the policies and record of government and opposition, and not confused by differences, such as race or colour, that tend to create artificial divisions cutting across the real issues".¹⁰ In the second, we find Mr. Coutts, the Electoral Commissioner for Kenya,¹¹ who pointed out that adult suffrage has existed in Great Britain for only six elections and caution should be shown in trying the broad franchise in Africa until the British, and other experiments, have worked a bit longer.¹² There is a general suspicion of adult suffrage: the Tredgold Commission pointed out that in some countries extension of the franchise "to people who were incapable of exercising it with judgment, or who lacked the necessary political tradition" led to the breakdown of popular government, with the likelihood that fascism is merely the reaction when popular government is extended to those unworthy of the privilege of voting.¹³ To many European settlers, if not to the electoral commissioners just quoted, the election of the Labour Government in 1945 and the repudiation of the Prime Minister who had just won the war for the Empire, showed that even in more mature communities a wide franchise can mean colossal blunders. Two points are implicit in both lines: the franchise is a privilege to be given to those who are likely, if not absolutely certain, to exercise it properly; the type of government produced is more important than the electoral system which produces it. Thus the constitution-maker decides from first principles what type of government is wanted and then tailors the electoral system accordingly. This position was stated by the Government of Northern Rhodesia in its White Paper on Constitutional Change:¹⁴

The constitutional arrangements should ensure that the government of the country will continue to rest in the hands of responsible men, men with understanding and sufficient education and experience of affairs to be able to reason and to exercise judgment between alternative courses of action. The electoral

⁹ *Report of the Franchise Commission*, 1957, Salisbury, 1957, hereafter cited as *Tredgold Report*; the chairman was the Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Clarkson Tredgold, Chief Justice of the Federation.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 3.

¹¹ *Report of the Commissioner appointed to Enquire into Methods for the Selection of African Representatives to the Legislative Council*, Nairobi, 1955, hereafter cited as *Coutts Report*; the Commissioner was Mr. W. F. Coutts.

¹² *ibid.*, p. 7.

¹³ *Tredgold Report*, p. 4.

¹⁴ *Proposals for Constitutional Change in Northern Rhodesia*, Lusaka, 1958.

system must encourage the return of men or women who are prepared and indeed disposed to consider and balance the interests of all racial groups, and who are prompted primarily by a spirit of public service to the whole community; it must discourage the return of extremists who would look to sectional interests alone.¹⁵

To come to this priority of result over method is to differ from the main stream of modern democratic thought which argues that the characteristic of democracy is the right of all to choose their government, and the best form of government is that which preserves a system of free election. However, the distinction between right and privilege is not firmly drawn; thus within a few lines of the passage in which they call the franchise a privilege, the Tredgold Commissioners speak of the principle that every man "should have a say in his own government" and then state that this right must be exercised without detriment to the right of others.¹⁶

Refusal to restrict the franchise on grounds of race may be traced back to Rhodes's injunction of equal rights for all civilized men. However, there may be other criteria for restriction as prescribed by Lord Malvern:

We must unhesitatingly reject a doctrine that our supremacy at present rests on colour of skin; because, in fact, it rests on our superiority of technical skill, education, cultural values, civilisation and heredity. We must be sufficiently realistic to appreciate that there is no proof that we have a paramount monopoly of these qualities; it is in the ultimate interests of the Europeans to encourage the more backward people to acquire these qualities.¹⁷

What civilization means in this context is not satisfactorily defined. Perhaps, as Mrs. Huxley says, it is only a question for the philosophers, for the Africans concerned have so clearly accepted whatever standards European settlers care to display: "Equal rights, therefore, for all who have reached a certain standard of education (let us hope a fairly high one); for all who accept certain common standards of social behaviour, ethics, respect for the law, service to the community."¹⁸

The point is made that there cannot be permanent domination by an aristocratic minority, but exactly what the alternative could be is not made clear. One suggestion is that there must be an élite of some sort: Lord Malvern quotes Marriott on the failure of Athenian democracy and the Nigerian nationalist leader, Dr. Awolowo, on the need for an élite in every society,¹⁹ and in the speech just quoted he also says: "We must reject permanently the idea that our concept of democracy can consist of a mere counting of heads", and

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁶ *Tredgold Report*, p. 3.

¹⁷ Southern Rhodesia, *Legislative Assembly Debates*, Vol. 33, Part II, 23 June 1952, 2629-30.

¹⁸ E. Huxley and M. Perham, *Race and Politics in Kenya*, London, 1944, p. 194; but note Rhodes's dictum: "My motto is equal rights for every civilized man south of the Zambesi. What is a civilized man? A man, whether white or black, who has sufficient intelligence to write his name, has some property or work, is in fact not a loafer", as quoted by W. K. Hancock, *Survey of Commonwealth Affairs*, London, 1937, Vol. I, p. 188, n. 1.

¹⁹ Southern Rhodesia, *Leg. Ass. Debs.*, Vol. 33, Part II, 23 June 1952, 2628-9.

We must ensure that the franchise is a privilege to be exercised by those who have attained a certain standard; but at the same time we must not deny opportunities to all people to attain that standard and must by all means in our power encourage them to do so.²⁰

This potential conflict between a limited franchise and what could eventually produce adult suffrage is perhaps explained by the expectation of what will happen as more and more Africans qualify for the franchise: they will support the European policy of a qualified franchise, thereby making it a popular policy; they will join existing, *i.e.* European, political parties; and "there is quite a sporting chance that they will play with the Europeans in their political habits and not represent any kind of colour at all". If this expectation proves wrong, then the Africans already on the roll will have to be disfranchised.²¹

Prior to the substantial absorption of Africans into the political system, what theory of representation justifies the maintenance of what is admittedly a minority government? There are at least two possible explanations, virtual representation and trusteeship. The distinction I would draw between the two would be that, in the case of trusteeship, there is a duty on the trustee to consider the interests of his "constituents" as final, whilst the virtual representative *may* give priority to some other larger interest, such as the welfare of the whole nation. The option for virtual representation is clear in the terms of reference of the Tredgold Commission: "To consider and report on a system for the just representation of the people of the Colony in its Legislative Assembly, under which the Government is placed, and remains in the hands of civilized and responsible persons . . .".²² Most settler members accept this principle; thus one member, a Captain Robertson, of the Federal Assembly:

Sir, the hon. member poses me a question, do I represent Africans? [MR. CHIRWA: Does the Federal Government represent Africans?] I am part of the Federal Government, Sir. I do not know whether the hon. member means the Cabinet, or whether he means this House, which I look upon as the Government of the people. Sir, even as I look upon my position as an elected member for the Luangwa constituency as having its obligations and duties towards the people within that constituency, regardless of whether they are white or black, I am equally confident that the gentlemen who represent our Government today are equally imbued with a similar sense of duty. If the hon. member likes to think otherwise, he is just as much entitled to his beliefs as I am.²³

The theory of trusteeship which was supported by official members of Legislative Councils has declined as the elected settler members have assumed greater responsibility and authority in colonial government.

The anti-settler camp contains two groups, the Africanophiles in the United Kingdom and the African nationalists themselves. A recent pamphlet by Mr.

²⁰ *ibid.*, 2630.

²¹ *ibid.*, 2639-40.

²² *Tredgold Report*, p. 1.

²³ Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, *Parl. Debs.*, Vol. 7, 5 March 1957, 2823.

Tom Mboya of Kenya may be taken as typical of the nationalist position.²⁴ In a brief introduction Mr. Mboya advances certain "convictions" which support his political proposals. They are that men are fundamentally equal regardless of race, colour or creed, and that all should participate in their own government on terms of equality with all others; society exists to "enable all individuals to live in amity together and to co-operate for their common good", and government exists to serve individuals, so the state should be organized to produce the maximum freedom for each consistent with equal freedom for others. The form of multi-racialism now existing in Kenya is predicated upon the existence of communal groups and impedes the introduction of democracy. The qualified franchise does not achieve any end but the support of European supremacy:

The argument that full democracy is impracticable because not all men have developed a sense of responsibility, ignores the important question as to who shall be the judge and on what criteria judgment is to be based. Does the possession of wealth, academic education or other social status conclusively prove that a person is politically more responsible than those who lack these things? And what is meant by a sense of responsibility? Surely it could be said that the South African White voter exercises his vote responsibly because he returns a government which is committed to European supremacy? But from the point of view of the African people, virtually unrepresented in the South African Parliament, the Europeans are not using their vote responsibly as they are not considering non-European needs and desires.²⁵

Mr. Mboya does not consider differences of "culture" or "civilization", apparently equating them with racial differences. As for the multiple voting system introduced by Mr. Coutts, Mr. Mboya demolishes it by pointing out that if the possession of one qualification is necessary to show that a person is politically conscious, it might be difficult to recognize degrees of political consciousness. A qualified franchise set on European levels of income or education may be unrealistic considering the natural wealth of the country, and the creation of a graded system of African voting is likely to mean that should the decision to establish a Common Roll be taken, only the handful of Africans at the top of their roll would be eligible. Mr. Mboya is prepared to admit that universal franchise in Kenya quite possibly could lead to the return of self-seeking or incompetent individuals, but observes that this can happen with more mature electorates and is the only way by which Africans will gain voting experience and mature judgment.

The Africanophile is more ready to recognize the need for some protection for settler groups. A typical statement of the Africanophile view is *Advance to Democracy*, a pamphlet of the Fabian Colonial Bureau.²⁶ The word "partnership" has come into extensive use in Central and East Africa, but there has been little

²⁴ T. Mboya, *The Kenya Question: An African Answer*, London, 1956, Fabian Tract 302.

²⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 32-3.

²⁶ *Advance to Democracy: A Report to the Fabian Colonial Bureau on the Implications of "Partnership" in multi-racial societies*, London, 1952, Controversy Series Number Eight.

clarification of its meaning, either in social policy or political development, except to say that at the official level it represents a retreat from the paramountcy of African interests. (The Capricorn African Society is to establish "Colleges of Citizenship" in Kenya and Rhodesia to offer courses in philosophy, politics and government, and instill the ideas of partnership and common nationalism; no doubt such teaching will stimulate the development of the theory of partnership.) The Fabian report suggested that it should include recognition by Africans of the right of settler communities to remain and "take their share in building a democratic society based on the equality of individuals", which meant an acceptance of "the compromises which democracy demands and without which it cannot exist".²⁷ The report expected a transitional period leading to full democracy; during this period differences must be maintained to protect weaker communities, but with flexibility for easy alteration of constitutional machinery. With respect to the franchise this would involve the introduction of direct elections where they do not exist, and the expansion of elected blocs to give greater experience of representation to both representatives and electorate. Communal representation is rejected for the usual reasons, and a common roll sought:

What is required is the recognition that individual members of all communities are citizens of one country and that each is a member of the local population in the district in which he lives. The only kind of electoral district which meets this requirement is a geographical constituency, served by a member who represents all its people and not those of one racial community alone. The link between a member and his constituency is the foundation of parliamentary government.²⁸

As the common roll would be unacceptable to minority communities at present, two devices are suggested to offer protection for minorities: a bicameral legislature with an upper chamber based on parity between communities and a lower chamber largely elected from a common roll, and reserve seats where the common roll is applied.

Having discussed broad principles, it might be useful to consider their application. The Coutts Report, slightly modified by the Kenya Government, brought in for the first time direct elections for Africans on a communal roll. Despite a vigorous campaign by the Government for registration only one-third of those thought to have been eligible registered; apathy and suspicion of the declarations of property or income necessary to qualify have been blamed. The election itself was carried out without incident, and, considering the novelty and the elaborate system of three different colours of ballot, it is surprising that barely one-half of one per cent. of the ballots were rejected. The poll was high, some eighty per cent. However, one commentator²⁹ reports that during the campaign

²⁷ *ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

²⁹ G. F. Engholm, "Kenya's First Direct Elections for Africans", *Parl. Affairs*, Vol. X, No. 4, 1957.

there was a steady movement from a moderate to a more radical position on the part of all candidates, and that the results which were to reflect the weightage given to age and experience showed little distinction in selection of candidates between those voters with one, two or three votes to cast. The defeat of "moderate" Africans and the solid support which the newly elected members have given the demands of Mr. Mboya for increased representation to achieve parity with Europeans in the Legislative Council, suggests that the limited franchise, with qualification and weightage, still failed to produce a pro-European African bloc.

In Southern Rhodesia the Tredgold Commission proposed a common roll on which there would be two classes of voters, ordinary and special. The qualifications for ordinary voters should be based on property, or a smaller amount of property with a rising educational qualification; the range should be from an income of £720 or property of £1,500 to an income of £300 or property of £500 plus in either case the completion of four years of secondary schooling. For the special voters' qualifications, the Commissioners proposed an income of £180 and ability to fill in the registration form unaided. Ordinary and special votes should be counted equally, except that the total of special votes should not equal more than one-half the total of the ordinary votes, *i.e.* special votes could not total more than one-third of those counted. When they were more numerous, their individual value would have to be depreciated accordingly. However, the Delimitation Commission should be instructed to seek to include no more than one-third voters with special qualifications in any one constituency. These recommendations were substantially modified by the Southern Rhodesian Government in preparing electoral legislation under which all voters cast the same type of vote. Instead of classes of votes and voters, there are ordinary voters roughly equivalent to the ordinary voters proposed in the Tredgold Report, and two groups of special voters, the first with an income qualification of £240 for the preceding two years average, the second merely "gainfully occupied and employed" for the two years preceding enrolment, and having completed primary school. However, when special voters reach twenty per cent. of total enrolment in the Colony, the category will be closed, and thereafter those special voters already on the roll will remain as ordinary voters. In addition the income and property qualifications will be revalued from time to time to recognize fluctuations in the value of money, what one might call a gold clause in the Franchise Act.

The Southern Rhodesian proposals substantially influenced the first federal Franchise Act. The same two classes of ordinary and general voters are created, but the Tredgold Report is followed by retaining separate seats for different classes of voters. The general voters will return 44 members (out of a total Assembly membership of 59), and will also vote with the special voters to elect a further eight members. It was this legislation which was referred by the African Affairs Board, and approved by the British Government over the strong opposition of the Labour Party and many groups in Britain.

In Northern Rhodesia the Government after extensive consultation published its proposals for franchise reform, also modelled in part on the Tredgold Report.³⁰ It proposed a common roll with two types of voters, ordinary voters who had complied with the requirements for the federal franchise and special voters who had complied with the special voters' requirements of the Federal Act. There would be twelve ordinary electorates in which the special votes might not count for more than one-third of the total, six special electorates in which the ordinary votes might not count for more than one-third. The ordinary electorates would have been concentrated in the Copper Belt area and would be expected to return European members, the special electorates would have been rural and expected to return Africans. To avoid an urban-rural conflict on racial lines, there would be four "amalgamated" constituencies, two made up of the six special electorates but reserved for European members, two composed of the twelve ordinary electorates but reserved for Africans. In the amalgamated electorates a reverse system of weightage to that used in the constituent electorates would have been applied. However, the qualifications for special voters would be steadily increased so that after a period of ten years when the special category would be closed, the income qualification will have risen 300 per cent. for those with no educational qualification or just over 100 per cent. for those who had completed two years at secondary school, and the property qualification by 150 per cent. for those with no educational qualification, with a new alternative of the original property holding together with two years secondary education. Once on the roll a voter might not be removed because he subsequently fell below the income or property qualification. The Government of Northern Rhodesia estimated that such a franchise would produce about 20,000 ordinary voters and about 24,000 special voters, roughly equal in numbers in the Copper Belt, with the special voters six times more numerous than the ordinary voters in rural areas, but the estimate was implicitly denied by the Member (*i.e.* quasi-Minister) for Education and Social Services, who pointed out that only one-seventh of African children today could complete primary school, and only one-fortieth two years of secondary school.³¹

Having dealt in some detail with the electoral systems, it would be as well to analyse a trifle more carefully two further points arising from the underlying theory of representation of the settler community. First the explanations advanced for a qualified franchise. To the Tredgold Commission there were three arguments and qualifications: education—"all things being equal a man with a mind trained and disciplined is unquestionably at an advantage with an untutored fellow"; means—"under our present economy, a man does not earn more than a subsistence unless he has certain qualities of mind and character"; character—the difficulties which the Commission had in coming to grips with this concept may be indicated by a somewhat extended quotation:

³⁰ These proposals were part of a scheme for constitutional reform which was defeated in the Legislative Council and then modified by the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

³¹ *The Times*, 12 May 1958.

The most formidable difficulty in evolving tests of fitness to exercise the franchise lies in the fact that it is well nigh impossible to evolve a satisfactory test of character, and character must enter into the picture. Intelligence in itself is not enough for it does not necessarily equate with a right attitude of mind. A disinterested and altruistic approach to problems affecting the common weal is obviously desirable in those exercising an influence in the affairs of state, but this is not measured by examination results or even by success in acquiring an income. But as against this it may be pointed out that even the most estimable character is not in a position usefully to exercise the franchise unless he has judgment as well as virtue. Moreover, self-interest in the political approach is not wholly to be condemned, provided it is informed and enlightened.³²

It might be asked what the Commissioners imagine to be involved in the act of casting a vote. Is it an act of faith in a representative based on an appreciation of his ability and character, or is it a deliberate selection between alternative policies offered by different candidates, who will be more delegates than representatives? For the Tredgold Commission at least the former is not enough:

An uneducated peasant, from a remote area, might possibly be able to form some sort of judgment on the personal qualities of a candidate. But, under our system of parliamentary government, that is not enough. A voter must be able to form an opinion as to the true merits of the policy for which the candidate stands. This he certainly could not do.³³

In fact prior to the appearance of a party system in which Africans play a significant part, it is likely that there will be little to choose between the policies of different candidates of the same race, but even if this is overlooked their view is unsatisfactory. By that judgment which should be shown by voters it may be supposed the Commissioners mean an ability to see the likely consequences of a policy and to assess the integrity of a candidate therefrom. We may consider an example other than the South African one provided by Mr. Mboya. An African candidate in Kenya who urges that Africans should be given the right to acquire land in the White Highlands apparently offers a simple policy which can be grasped by any illiterate tribesman. But the settler would argue that the implementation of such a policy would lead to a flight of capital from the country and consequent economic stagnation, and a candidate who proposes such a policy must be a demagogue, either ignorant of the realities of government or prepared to injure the country to secure short-term political advantage. Should the candidate or the voter who supports him say that they are quite prepared to see these consequences of economic disruption to secure social or political goals, what then? The intention of the whole system of qualifications is to confine the franchise to those who have been sufficiently integrated into European social patterns through education and the labour market to begin to follow European values in the selection of goals. Education means not an education in techniques

³² *Tredgold Report*, p. 4.

³³ *ibid.*, p. 6.

but in a scale of values; property and income signify achievement of a status which will be sought only when those values are accepted; character is that moral strength which comes with a particular set of values. The vote is not a right or a privilege, despite the uncertainty of the Commissioners on this point—they have been misled by prevailing, and perhaps vulgar, terminology. The vote is a trust to be exercised in pursuit of a set of values. Mill might be quoted:

The suffrage is indeed due to him, among other reasons, as a means to his own protection, but only against treatment from which he is equally bound, so far as depends on his vote, to protect every one of his fellow-citizens. His vote is not a thing in which he has an option; it has no more to do with his personal wishes than the verdict of a jurymen. It is strictly a matter of duty; he is bound to give it according to his best and most conscientious opinion of the public good.³⁴

Fortunately for the voter here there is no need to formulate his own opinion of the public good, for he may adopt one ready-made, that of the settler community. Should it be the case that the attempts of Westernized Africans to pursue these values are not accepted as genuine, then the whole argument stands revealed as an attempt to maintain minority rule by manipulating and distorting established theories of representation.

The second point that I would like to re-examine in greater detail is the decision to move towards a common roll. All schools of thought join in condemning communal representation and rolls as maintaining or deepening racial divisions. To Mr. Mboya they are a means of preventing the African majority from coming into its own:

The objection to multi-racialism must . . . be based on the grounds that its existence is dependent on the maintenance of racial groups, and as such it is an impediment to the establishment of democratic rights. Secondly, the present multi-racial form of government is forcing a conflict of politics based on self-preservation. Each group is fighting to accumulate gains as a group, and consequently the maximum limit to which the minorities are prepared to go is parity between each of the three races. To them proportional representation would mean African domination just as much as to Africans the present set up means European domination. Democracy is unacceptable to the Europeans because they think in terms of equating their group participation and the participation of the Africans as a group. They are still not concerned with individuals, only with races.³⁵

To the Africanophiles, separate electorates force communal politics and inhibit the development of inter-racial organizations, and all political interest centres on "a frustrating, embittering and fruitless contest centred on numerical calculations".³⁶ To the settler too they mean the worsening of communal relations. Thus the Tredgold Commission:

³⁴ *Representative Government*, Ch. X.

³⁵ Mboya, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

³⁶ *Advance to Democracy*, p. 5.

When the voters in a constituency are all drawn from one section of the community and when conflict, real or apparent, arises between the interests of that section and other sections, it is asking too much of human nature to expect that the member for the constituency should fearlessly support the view that he knows will be unpopular with his constituents. In a country with racial groups, at widely different stages of development, the appearance of conflict of interest between such groups must constantly arise. Only those with exceptional political insight can be expected to realize that, in each case, a solution that sets the interest of their own group first must, in the long run, be detrimental to all. Only a man of exceptional moral fibre can be relied on to press for the long view, involving compromise and concession of immediate benefits by his group, especially as this course must lay him open to a charge of disloyalty to his group. Conversely, a member avowedly representing a racial group, consciously or subconsciously, feels himself, in a measure at least, absolved from his broader duty to the community as a whole. . . . We believe that this is not merely a matter of theory. Instances spring to the mind in which systems of racial representation have led to the deliberate exploitation for political purposes of racial differences.³⁷

To challenge the contention that communal representation worsened communal relations would be to examine Indian and Ceylonese politics for the past half century.³⁸ I would merely say that I believe the case not proven. Communal relationships are too complex to permit a single causal explanation; and institutions rarely have the influence on politics that is at first suspected. Whilst in India it could be argued that forty years of communal representation saw steadily worsening communal relations, the experience of Ceylon is ambiguous, and in Fiji the refusal to establish a common roll has meant a period of relative communal peace, albeit at the cost of political retardation. If one could assume that the introduction of communal representation did not necessarily prove a source of inter-group irritation, what utility might it have for representation?

The tide of pluralist theory in this century had passed before the phenomenon now known as the "plural society" received its classic definition from J. S. Furnivall:

. . . A plural society: a society, that is, comprising two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit. . . . In a plural society there is no common will except, possibly, in matters of supreme importance, such as resistance to aggression from outside. In its political aspect a plural society resembles a confederation of allied provinces, united by treaty or within the limits of a formal constitution, merely for certain ends common to the constituent units and, in matters outside the terms of union, each living its

³⁷ *Tredgold Report*, p. 5.

³⁸ cf. e.g. Jennings, *op. cit.*, p. 97, and *The Commonwealth in Asia*, Oxford, 1951, pp. 28-34; S. Namasivayam, *The Legislatures of Ceylon*, London, 1951, pp. 58-68.

own life. But it differs from a confederation in that the constituent units are not segregated each within its own territorial limits. In a confederation secession is at least possible without the total disruption of all social bonds, whereas in a plural society the elements are so intermingled that secession is identical with anarchy.³⁹

For this last reason two of the classic Indian (and now Ceylonese) solutions to communal difficulties, partition or communally-oriented federation, are impossible in most of the territories of Central and East Africa. But if the deep divisions of the plural society were recognized as permanent and not necessarily dangerous, might it not be possible to devise political institutions predicated on the permanence of differences, and not attempting to conceal or eliminate them? Two items of Asian experience are significant for Africa here. Clear proof was given during the period of Congress ministries, 1937-9, that any communal settlement must embrace not only the constitutional system, but the party system as well. More recently the use of guaranteed rights for the protection of minorities has indicated an attempt to ensure that Leviathan is shackled, rather than incorporate the minorities into the state. To acknowledge the permanence of communities would mean an acceptance of the pluralistic multi-national state envisaged by the Austrian Social Democrats,⁴⁰ rather than the homogeneous Westernized society which most seek built on the powdered shards of tribal society, in which tribal and even racial differences would be preserved in form only, not in content. For the machinery of government it would mean a substantial departure from the transfer of the central institutions of British parliamentary government, with monolithic parties, solid majorities and unlimited parliamentary supremacy. No matter how carefully the electoral system may be structured to ensure protection of diverse interests, it is certain that for such a glittering prize of a strong central government, every effort will be applied to circumvent restrictions.

Where it appears that the Coutts system has failed to achieve its purpose, and the Tredgold proposals and their offspring will fail, is more immediate, for the view of political behaviour on which they are based is wrong because it is quite unrealistic. There is no indication of familiarity with electoral experience or with contemporary psephological writing: the Tredgold Commissioners give no indication of familiarity with the Prussian three-class system and its anomalies,⁴¹ and Mr. Coutts insists that multiple voting based on superior qualifications was devised by Mr. Nevil Shute.⁴² But apart from such limitations, there is unfamiliarity with what must be the great conclusion of the detailed electoral studies—the extent of irrationality in voting behaviour, no matter what the educational, or economic or social status of the voters concerned. From their knowledge of Western societies and acquaintance with indigenous societies still in the tribal state, they suppose that age, wealth, education, experience of responsibility, will lead to conservatism and acceptance of a particular set of values. Most students

³⁹ *Netherlands India*, Cambridge, 1939, pp. 446-7.

⁴⁰ cf. R. Schlesinger, *Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe*, London, 1945, pp. 209-24.

⁴¹ cf. C. Seymour and D. P. Frary, *How the World Votes*, New York, 1918, Vol. II, pp. 22-3.

⁴² *Coutts Report*, p. 38.

would say that detribalization and economic development through the spread of Western techniques and an approximation to Western conditions of living breed hostility to Western political domination, but this view is not yet admitted in East or Central Africa except by the supporters of apartheid. Experience is certain to show that there is no easy descent of Niagara by steps. It may be possible by skilful navigation to veer or tack briefly, but it is impossible to prescribe a timetable with easy resting stages. It may be possible for a time to moor to a rock above the falls as the South African Government is doing; it may be possible to shoot the falls and find a broad and placidly flowing stream at the bottom. But it is not possible to halt, or, as Lord Malvern suggested, turn back, once the descent has started, without overturning the boat.⁴³

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⁴³ This paper is a slightly modified version of one read to Section E of the 1958 ANZAAS Congress at Adelaide.

The Relationship between British Policies and the Extent of Dutch Power in the Malay Archipelago

1784-1871

By NICHOLAS TARLING

The expansion of Britain's economy from about the middle of the eighteenth century was reflected in her increased mastery of the China tea trade, and it was this trade that accounted for the importance of the Malay Archipelago in British commercial policy. The difficulty of financing exports from China without extensive imports of specie was one of long standing, though as the century drew to a close it was gradually being surmounted as a result of the East India Company's territorial expansion and its consequent hold upon the Indian opium supplies, for which a demand was developed in the Celestial Empire. Meanwhile, however, it remained necessary for the Country Traders—the private traders in the East—to collect jungle and marine produce from the Malay Archipelago as a further contribution to the Company's Canton investment.

The failure of the Dutch to compete successfully with the British, which became more evident as the century proceeded, helped to account for their concentration upon Java, over much of which they were able to acquire sovereign possession and enforce the increased cultivation of colonial products like coffee. In the greater part of the Peninsula and Archipelago, their position had long largely rested upon contracts and treaties with the native states, contracts and treaties more concerned with questions of commerce than questions of government, more with deliveries of products than transfers of sovereignty. Naval forces operating from principal Dutch settlements had excluded foreign traders and held this commercial empire together. Now economic weakness reduced their effectiveness, and even the old spice monopoly—still of some, though decreased, importance—was threatened. The Dutch became the more sensitive about the right they assumed—one never admitted by the British Government, one continually denied by the Country Traders—to exclude foreign navigation from the Archipelago. As Dundas, of the India Board, was to remark in 1791:

The jealousies and apprehensions of the Dutch relative to the Navigation of the Eastern Seas . . . rest on a ground they dare not avow—I mean their consciousness of the radical and internal weakness of their sovereignty in the Eastern Isles, and they are afraid that the communication we may have with the Natives would lay the foundation for their total shaking off of the miserable dependence in which they are held by the Dutch.¹

¹ H. Furber, *Henry Dundas, First Viscount Melville, 1742-1811*, London, 1931, p. 103.

The future of the Dutch empire in Java and beyond was, however, affected by motives in British policy which were other than commercial. The increase of French influence in the United Provinces, it was conceived in London, would prejudice the security of south-east England; and too vigorous a support of British commercial interests in the Archipelago might help to precipitate the collapse of the Anglophile régime of the Stadhouder. This would involve, furthermore, a threat to the security of the whole empire in the East. The French might acquire the use of British bases on the continent of India and in Ceylon and renew their menace to the territorial dominion of the Company. From the Archipelago itself they would impede or cut off the all-important trade with China through the Straits of Malacca and Sunda. Substantially the Dutch had to retain their empire, and the interests of the Country Traders could not, it was realized, be allowed to bring about its disruption. British policy towards the Dutch empire must be a matter of uneasy compromise between local commercial pressures and broader imperial necessities: if only for selfish reasons, it must be weighted in favour of the Dutch.

In the context of vigorous French rivalry with the British in the East, and of vigorous opposition to the Stadhouderate in the United Provinces, this was the only valid policy for the British Government. Its principal defect was illustrated in 1780. Bitter disputes between the British and the Dutch arose, not over the commerce in the East, but over the question of neutral trade in the War of American Independence, and the British declared war to prevent the Republic's joining the League of Armed Neutrality. The destruction of the long-standing alliance afforded the Patriot Party in the United Provinces an opportunity to overthrow the Stadhouder régime, and the struggle involved an increase of French influence there. In the east the French were able to make use of Dutch bases, above all Trincomalee, and the exploits of Suffren presented a major threat to the English Company's trade and territory. Britain's policy towards the Dutch Empire had to be changed, if only for the sake of security, but, since the bid to retain Dutch friendship had failed, there would now be nothing to lose if commercial interests were afforded more play. In the war, therefore, several Dutch possessions were taken by the British.

In the peace negotiations with the Patriots, the Shelburne Government attempted, though without success, to secure Trincomalee, and also exerted some pressure on behalf of British commercial interests in the Archipelago. "The Dutch have hitherto kept themselves Masters of the Navigation of the Eastern Seas. . . . It will . . . be necessary that the liberty of navigating those seas should be asked for and granted." These were the terms of the instructions sent by the foreign secretary, Lord Grantham, to the British envoy, Fitzherbert. They were based on a memorandum received from the Company, which had demanded "liberty to navigate and trade to the islands in the Eastern Seas without molestation". In the preliminary negotiations, conducted with the French, Fitzherbert put forward, as he reported,

first the demand contained in the East India Company's minute of *navigating* and *trading* to the Islands in the Eastern Seas. And secondly (finding that proposal inadmissible), the Right of free Navigation in those Seas, which is mentioned in Your Lordship's Letter . . . , and which . . . I have succeeded in obtaining.²

Even about this, however, the Dutch plenipotentiaries were deeply concerned: the article should be withdrawn, "or at least . . . so explained as to point out clearly that nothing more was meant by it, than a demand of the free navigation of those Seas, which was not to be extended to any share in the commerce of the Spice Islands".³ Their concern was not unjustified. The article, the Foreign Office declared, was indeed intended to ensure the essential navigation to China through the Archipelago, but, in so doing, it would permit British subjects to trade within the East Indies at places where the Dutch were not established. The Company's aim would be realized in the sense that the article ensured the right "to an uncontrolled Trade to any of the islands situated in those Seas, not possessed by the Dutch".—"It was by no means the intention of the East India Company to pretend to any Trade with the Dutch Establishments there, nor to attempt it in any manner whatever, so that no jealousy whatever need be entertained on that score."⁴ But the Dutch might well be "jealous". Their position in the Archipelago depended upon treaties and contracts, frequently not involving sovereignty or "possession", and naval forces were lacking: the abandonment of the right to exclude foreign navigation would under these circumstances remove the last barrier to foreign trade even within the "Spice Islands".

Before the war, the British had not insisted on an explicit understanding over the question, and the matter had been brought into the negotiations by the Shelburne Government no doubt with the intention of proving to the opposition in Parliament that the peace was not entirely disadvantageous. The restoration of the old Anglo-Dutch alliance would have been a preferable alternative, and the succeeding Fox-North administration would have been prepared to modify the British demands if it could have been attained.⁵ The Patriots, however, could not go so far, and indeed could make political capital out of a demonstration of the alleged hostility of Great Britain. The offending article thus became the sixth of the definitive treaty of 1784.

In the East, the deterioration of Anglo-Dutch relations was illustrated by the foundation of Penang in 1786. Without occasioning an outright clash with the Dutch—it was more or less beyond their sphere of influence—it would provide the additional security for the Bay of Bengal and for the Straits route that their alliance with the French seemed to render necessary. It would also be of some

² Grantham to Fitzherbert, 18 Dec. 1782, F.O. 27/2; Observations of the Court of Directors, 10 Dec. 1782, F.O. 27/15; Fitzherbert to Grantham, 19 Feb. 1783, and enclosure, F.O. 27/5.

³ Fitzherbert to Grantham, 3 Feb. 1783, F.O. 27/5.

⁴ Grantham to Fitzherbert, 9 Feb. 1783, F.O. 27/5; Fletcher and others to Grantham, 12 Feb. 1783, F.O. 27/15.

⁵ Hence the delaying of the final signature of the treaty. Manchester to Fox, 3 Sept. 1783; Fox to Manchester, 13 Nov. 1783, F.O. 27/7.

value as an *entrepôt* for the Country Traders who collected produce to add to the Company's resources in China. The occupation of Riau further to the south might have been more desirable, so far as the route to China and the Archipelago trade were concerned, but over that island the Dutch had renewed earlier claims in 1784.⁶

In the United Provinces the advance of Patriot power and French influence went hand in hand. The direct object of France, the foreign secretary, Carmarthen, declared in April 1787, appeared to be "the total annihilation of the present Constitution of the Republic and the consequent reduction of that country into a Province dependent . . . on the dictates of the Court of Versailles". The indirect object of France was "no less than the depriving us of our most valuable rights in the East Indies, if not an absolute conquest of our possessions in that quarter".⁷ No doubt the financial difficulties under which the French monarchy was sinking would in fact have prevented any such attempt, but in London active measures were considered necessary, and in the autumn Anglo-Prussian intervention in the United Provinces effected the overthrow of the Patriots and the restoration of a friendly régime.

British policy towards the Dutch empire had to be defined anew. In so doing, the members of the India Board accepted as axiomatic the view that it was to British advantage that the Dutch should substantially retain their empire in the East: indication of an alternative policy would discredit the Anglophile régime in the Republic, and thus adversely affect the security of England and of her empire in the East. There was, however, also the belief that, with the restored régime, the British could negotiate an agreement that would provide more particularly for British strategic needs in the East, and effect some agreement over commerce in the Archipelago, an agreement, on the other hand, that would not be to the disadvantage of the Dutch, and would in fact provide a reasonable and lasting basis for friendship and alliance between the two powers.

Dundas prepared a memorandum on the terms for such an agreement. While the Dutch settlement at Negapatam, retained in 1784, would be restored, Britain should have the exclusive use or preferably acquire possession of Trincomalee. In the Archipelago, the Dutch should transfer their rights over Riau, a station that would afford added protection to ships proceeding through the Straits to Canton and provide an *entrepôt* for the collection of Archipelago produce for transmission to China. In return the spice monopoly would be guaranteed: Dundas argued that if the monopoly were destroyed the price of spices would fall, and the British would therefore do better to have the credit of upholding it. In Sumatra, the English Company still had factories on the west coast, its only possession in the area apart from Penang; but Dundas proposed that no British

⁶ For some account of Dutch relations with Riau, see E. Netscher, "De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak, 1602 tot 1865: Historische Beschrijving", *Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen*, Vol. 35, 1870, pp. 170-84, 189-203.

⁷ Carmarthen to Harris, 6 Ap. 1787, F.O. 37/13.

traders would in future carry on trade, and no British settlements would be made, east of the easternmost point of Sumatra.

He recognized the importance of a cordial agreement over these points between the two powers: "the alliance cannot be durable, if there is one particle of jealousy intermixed with it". The acquisition of Trincomalee would add to the security of the British empire, but the weakening of the alliance would threaten it, and it would be better initially not to demand its transfer since this might provoke Dutch "jealousy". The other members of the India Board, Mulgrave and Grenville, favoured making the proposal for immediate acquisition, however, and the Board's memorandum for the Foreign Office also included the demand for Riau, which Dundas himself had considered would not arouse Dutch apprehension.⁸ In this he was at once shown to be mistaken, and the whole system, as the Ambassador, Harris, put it, was placed on "a slippery footing".⁹ There are indications that Grenville was prepared to abandon commercial claims in the Archipelago if Trincomalee could be secured. The Dutch Company might take over the supply of the China Treasury: "and in this case the article of navigation could be so confined as to relate merely to a commodious and safe passage through the Eastern Seas to China, to the exclusion of all trade to or from the islands situated there".¹⁰ Yet, even with concessions over the Archipelago, which Harris was not slow to offer, it appeared that the Dutch would not yield Trincomalee on terms that would satisfy the British.¹¹

In 1790 negotiations were resumed by the new Ambassador, Lord Auckland. The emphasis now shifted from Trincomalee, for it was thought that the need for a naval base in the Bay of Bengal might be satisfied by the settlement then being formed in the Andamans: if, however, there were still to be guarantees of the spice monopoly, Riau must be obtained.¹² Again there was strong Dutch opposition to its transfer. The prospect of a new base in the Andamans reduced the importance of Penang, and Grenville and Dundas agreed that it would be better to "shove that into the bargain" than to give up the hope of obtaining Riau, for which, they decided, there was "no substitute . . . the moment we, by giving the spice trade exclusively to the Dutch, depart from an unlimited communication directly with the Malays in their respective islands".¹³ Simultaneously Auckland proposed to withdraw both the offer of a spice guarantee and the demand for Riau, and apparently it was decided that this, after all, was not the least desirable of alternatives.

⁸ Dundas, Grenville, Mulgrave to Carmarthen, 21 Dec. 1787, F.O. 37/20; Memoranda in Dutch Records A/10, 26, Commonwealth Relations Office, London.

⁹ Harris to Carmarthen, 11 March 1788, F.O. 37/22.

¹⁰ Grenville to Harris, 27 Feb. 1788, *The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq., preserved at Dropmore*, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Vol. III, pp. 445-6.

¹¹ Harris to Carmarthen, 18 July 1788, F.O. 37/23 (the *projet* enclosed is attached to Auckland's despatch of 21 Jan. 1791, F.O. 37/33); Malmesbury to Carmarthen, 7 Oct. 1788, F.O. 37/24.

¹² Auckland to Leeds, 5 May 1790, two despatches, F.O. 37/28; Dundas to Grenville, 30 May 1790, Dropmore Papers, Vol. I, p. 588.

¹³ Grenville to Dundas, 25 June 1790; reply, 1 July 1790, Dropmore Papers, Vol. I, pp. 590, 591.

There thus remained the problem of the Dutch empire as it had been illustrated by the disputes over Article 6 of the treaty of 1784. The Dutch wished it stated that the right of navigation, therein admitted, was not a right of trade,¹⁴ but were confronted with the Foreign Office's comment that this would be "inconsistent with our General Right by the Law of Nations to navigate and trade to any places as well in the Eastern Seas as elsewhere, not occupied by the Dutch or any other nation".¹⁵ Dundas's proposals had failed, but some compromise over the question was clearly required: indeed, as Auckland remarked, "the omission of all explanation whatever respecting our commercial claims in the Eastern Seas" was a circumstance "which would subject our Friends at Amsterdam to more clamour than they will chuse to incur".¹⁶ The problem was, however, an intractable one, and, in the given state of the Dutch empire, no words could be found to frame a compromise. Auckland, for instance, suggested that the British might simply promise not to trade within the Moluccas, but Grenville did not consider this would be satisfactory:

If the Molucca Islands mean those only of which Holland has *bona fide* sovereignty or occupation, perhaps there would be less difficulty in that point, but I suspect these words would include many to which we do now trade, and always have, and which the Dutch only mean to conquer.¹⁷

The desirable explanations were deferred, and ultimately no treaty was concluded at all.

Perhaps this weakened the Anglophile régime in the United Provinces: certainly the Stadhouderate collapsed in face of the invading French armies of 1794 and 1795, and a new Patriot régime appeared in the shape of the Batavian Republic. The British Government at once took measures to seize strategically important Dutch colonies, and this necessary shift in policy, as in the war of 1780, also afforded commercial motives play. Many posts in India, Ceylon, and the Archipelago were occupied, and, while there were temporary readjustments after the treaty of Amiens of 1802, in the Napoleonic war Java itself was taken. The approach of peace led to a reaffirmation of traditional British policy towards the Dutch and their empire. Castlereagh indicated in 1813 that Britain would, generally speaking, restore occupied colonies, provided Holland appeared strong enough and friendly enough to justify this, but not even the Prince of Orange could expect the restoration of all the old Republic's overseas possessions.¹⁸ Clearly the foreign secretary believed that there was again the opportunity to place Anglo-Dutch relations in the East on a more rational basis, and yet maintain Anglo-Dutch friendship.

¹⁴ Auckland to Leeds, 30 June 1790, F.O. 37/29.

¹⁵ Leeds to Auckland, 1 Feb. 1791, F.O. 37/33.

¹⁶ Auckland to Leeds, 8 Feb. 1791, F.O. 37/33.

¹⁷ Auckland to Grenville, 13 Feb. 1791, Dropmore Papers, Vol. II, pp. 31-2; Grenville to Auckland, 29 July 1791, *ibid.*, p. 145; Grenville to Auckland, 2 Sept. 1791, F.O. 37/35.

¹⁸ Aanteekening, 18 May 1813, H. T. Colenbrander (ed.) *Gedenkstukken der Algemeene Geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840*, 's-Gravenhage, Vol. VI, part 3, pp. 1881-3.

In a sense this was done in 1814. Most of the British conquests, with the principal exceptions of Ceylon and the Cape, were transferred to the new kingdom of the Netherlands. But no provision was made in the Convention of that year for the settlement of pre-war disputes over the Archipelago. In part this was realistic: certainly by 1814 the East India Company had no real interest in the spice trade; nor was it now much concerned with the Archipelago and with profiting from the operations of the Country Traders there, since Indian opium now substantially provided for the tea investment at Canton. But Raffles's administration of Java and the opening of the trade to the East under the Charter of 1813 had led to the establishment of British merchants on that island, interested in distributing British textiles and purchasing coffee.¹⁹ These viewed with concern the restoration of British sovereignty and the prospect of a policy of commercial exclusion. The extensive renewal of treaties and contracts with the native states outside Java upon which the Dutch Commissioners-General embarked after the restoration of the colonies likewise aroused the apprehension of Country Traders and Penang merchants. Raffles had pointed out the legal weakness of the Dutch position in the Archipelago and believed that the British should assure their trade and influence there by themselves establishing settlements and concluding treaties with the native princes. The Indian Government was especially impressed with his emphasis on the importance of protecting the China route: and so he gained the authority under which he concluded a treaty of friendship with the yet independent Sultan of Atjeh at one end of the Straits of Malacca and acquired rights to a factory on Singapore island at the other.

In London, the Government had seen that new decisions must be taken on the Archipelago. Raffles's schemes must be used, not to overthrow the Dutch empire, but to press upon the Dutch a compromise by which its continuance could be reconciled with local British interests. So far as the latter were concerned, the Government could not, it was decided, either "acquiesce in a practical exclusion" of British commerce from the Archipelago, or in complete Dutch control of the "keys of the Straits of Malacca". The prospects for a compromise would be affected by the preliminary question of "the extent of the rights claimed by the Government of the Netherlands in the Eastern Seas". The Dutch, Castlereagh considered, must

distinguish how much of this claim rests upon strict possession, how much upon concession from the native princes, and by what limits in point of space or by what rules of intercourse the Netherlands Government proposes to consider the rights and authority of that state to be restrained or modified towards the subjects of other powers frequenting those seas.

In a letter to Clancarty, the British Ambassador to the King of the Netherlands, Castlereagh hinted at the kind of compromise he hoped to achieve. The

¹⁹ J. Crawford, *History of the Indian Archipelago*, Edinburgh, 1820, Vol. III, pp. 501-3; H. R. C. Wright, "The Anglo-Dutch Dispute in the East", *Economic History Review*, 2nd Series, Vol. III, No. 2, 1950, pp. 229-39.

Dutch, he wrote, could not expect to establish the sort of dominion the British had in India.

Better far will it be for His Majesty [the King of the Netherlands] to hold Java and any other of his old possessions in direct colonial sovereignty, in which of course he will establish the system he thinks the wisest, but which after all, my opinion is, ought not in prudence to be one of exclusive trade, but that beyond these limits his object should be to have an understanding with that power (I mean Great Britain) which may open the native commerce of the other islands to a fair and friendly competition, without the establishment of any other preponderating military or political authority in those seas to counterbalance that which the Dutch now and long have exercised.²⁰

The Dutch Colonial Minister, Falck, denied any determination to exclude foreign commerce or obstruct the China trade, but it was apparent to Clancarty that the claims the Dutch could base upon their contracts with native powers could practically effect exclusion and close the entrance to the China seas.²¹ This suggested that the compromise must turn upon the interpretation of these treaties, which were now being substantially renewed. The whole question was further complicated by the emergence of a factor that had not apparently troubled British negotiators pre-war, but which the India Board pointed out in a memorandum on the Clancarty correspondence: it would be difficult to insist upon any British rights in respect of the commerce with treaty powers—with native states in contractual relationship with the Dutch—

without admitting at the same time the equal right of other European nations, and of the Americans, to their share also. Perhaps as the policy of extending British establishments or connexions in the Eastern Islands has hitherto been considered by the British Government as at least extremely doubtful, the utmost length to which our preliminary demand ought to go (and even this subject to the political considerations suggested above) should be a stipulation that the Dutch will form no new engagements, especially on the island of Borneo where the possibility of an opening for us is the greatest.²²

There was now concern lest Britain's example might tempt other great maritime powers to intervene in areas along the all-important route to China.

It appears to have been assumed in London, no doubt justly, that decisions taken over the Dutch empire need no longer be so sensitive to public opinion in the Netherlands: as a result of the defeat of France, and of experience of French domination, the new Dutch régime was more stable than the old, and the security

²⁰ Castlereagh to Clancarty, 13 Aug. 1819, No. 13, Secret, F.O. 37/107, also Colenbrander, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, Part 1, pp. 130-2; Castlereagh to Clancarty, 13 Aug. 1819, private, F.O. 37/107, also Colenbrander, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, Part 1, pp. 132-3, and N. W. Posthumus, *Documenten betreffende de Buitenlandsche Handelspolitiek van Nederland in de negentiende eeuw*, 's-Gravenhage, Vol. II, pp. 29-30.

²¹ Clancarty to Castlereagh, 20 Aug. 1819, F.O. 37/107, also Colenbrander, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, Part 1, pp. 135-9.

²² Memorandum undated, D.R. A/30, numbered 12.

of British interests in the East was no longer likely to be threatened by the appearance of hostile influences in the Netherlands. But the India Board argued that there was still reason for restraint in dealing with the problem of the character and extent of the Dutch empire: if there was no longer—to use Carmarthen's term—an indirect threat, there was the possibility of direct intervention by a major maritime power in the area. Perhaps the expansion of American trade in the East during the war, and the general post-war feeling of insecurity, led to some exaggeration of this menace. Without doubt, however, it weighted the decisions in British policy once more in favour of the Dutch.

The compromise agreed upon after the negotiations in London of 1820–24 differed from that envisaged by the India Board. The Dutch, as advised by Elout, who had been one of the Commissioners-General, wished to avoid any actual definition of the extent or character of their claims, any inquisition into the structure of their empire. But, while the British accepted the spice monopolies in enumerated Moluccan islands, the Dutch in the course of negotiations did admit an article by which the two parties agreed that no treaty should be made thereafter by either with any native power in the Eastern Seas

tending either expressly or by the imposition of unequal duties to exclude the trade of the other party from the ports of such native power; and that, if in any treaty now existing on either part, any such article to that effect has been admitted, such article shall be abrogated upon the conclusion of the present treaty.

It was stated to be understood that all existing treaties had been communicated by the one party to the other, and all made in future would be so communicated. In fact the vast bulk of the existing Dutch treaties were not communicated to the British.

This article became Article 3 of the definitive treaty of 1824. Article 2 of that treaty was designed to give Dutch trade “the sort of protection which the British trade enjoys in the Indian ports” and under limitations allowed protective duties in Dutch possessions. The view was early advanced in Penang that the Dutch might acquire sovereign rights in native states by treaty or otherwise—might convert them into Dutch possessions—and then impose there the protective duties of Article 2 rather than the equal duties of Article 3. Such treaties as the Netherlands plenipotentiaries had communicated in 1824—treaties with Borneo princes, the rulers of Pontianak, Sambas, and Mempawa—had, however, been renewals of old contracts, involving surrender of sovereignty,²³ and thus it was clear that the provisions of Article 3 were intended to apply to the sort of treaty by which the Dutch should acquire sovereignty or possession. What the position would be if the Dutch should acquire sovereignty over a native state by conquest, and not by treaty, was less obvious: no doubt an agreement

²³ Fullerton's memorandum, Straits Settlements Factory Records 100 (7 Ap. 1825), Commonwealth Relations Office; Fagel and Falck to Canning and Wynn, 16 March 1824, D.R. A/31, numbered 44. For the treaties, see C. M. Smulders, *Geschiedenis en Verklaring van het Tractaat van 17 Maart 1824*, Utrecht, 1856, pp. 167–74.

over contractual relationships seemed adequately to cover most of the Archipelago.

In any case it was impossible to define the position too elaborately without arousing the jealousy of other powers. "The situation in which we and the Dutch stand to each other is part only of our difficulties", wrote Canning, one of the plenipotentiaries; "that in which we both stand to the rest of the world as exclusive Lords of the East, is one more reason for terminating our relative difficulties as soon as we can."²⁴ A challenge to the Dutch must be avoided, for it was felt that this might invite the intervention of other major powers on areas flanking the route to China. But too obvious and too close an agreement with the Dutch might provoke other powers to intervene against the two allies.

These considerations throw light on other important articles in the treaty of 1824. The Dutch had at first opposed and then finally accepted the occupation of Singapore, and they also proposed to leave Malacca provided the British left Sumatra. As Falck put it, a line would be drawn between their respective possessions, through the Straits of Malacca and passing north of Riau. In the treaty the proposed line was replaced by articles, effecting this same division in different words, less likely to arouse the jealousy of others.²⁵ A difference arose over Atjeh, which was important for its position at the head of the Straits. It was now British policy to resign all Sumatra to the Dutch and the more effective their control, the more effectively they would be able to exclude other major powers. Raffles's treaty of friendship with the Sultan raised a difficulty, however, which could only be overcome by including in notes attached to the treaty stipulations binding the Dutch to establish security in Atjeh without infringing its independence.²⁶

Falck's dividing line and the articles substituted for it did not extend as far as Borneo, though he certainly believed that Borneo was to be left to the Dutch. This, however, was not stated in the treaty, partly because of fears that the British Parliament might object to the "abandonment" of Borneo as well as of Sumatra, and partly because so extended an Anglo-Dutch agreement, if it were explicitly expressed, might arouse jealousy among other powers.²⁷ Indeed the

²⁴ Note by Canning on Courtenay's memorandum of 15 Jan. 1824, D.R. A/31, numbered 8.

²⁵ Memorandum on Singapore, enclosed in Falck's note of 23 Dec. 1823, D.R. A/30, numbered 61; Memorandum of 15 Jan. 1824, D.R. A/31, numbered 8.

²⁶ Courtenay's memorandum on the Special Secret Committee's letter of 11 Feb. 1824, 12 Feb. 1824, D.R. A/31, numbered 34.

²⁷ See Hora Siccama's letter of 26 Oct. 1858 in P. J. Elout van Souterwoude (ed.), *Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis der Onderhandelingen met Engeland, betreffende de Overzeesche Bezittingen, 1820-1824*, 's-Gravenhage, 1863, pp. 311-13; P. H. van der Kemp, "Mr. A. R. Falck in zijn Vastlegging van onze Aanspraken op geheel Borneo", *De Indische Gids*, Vol. XXXIII, Part 1, 1911, pp. 1-20; J. E. de Sturler, *Het Grondgebied van Nederlandsch Oost-Indië in verband met de Tractaten met Spanje, Engeland en Portugal*, Leiden, 1881, pp. 283-4; and Falck's notes on Elout's comments on the treaty in A. R. Falck, *Gedenkschriften*, 's-Gravenhage, 1913, Appendix, p. 569, note. Compare Falck's remark in the plenipotentiaries' conference of 9 Jan. 1824, D.R. A/30, numbered 55. See also G. W. Irwin, "Nineteenth-century Borneo: a Study in Diplomatic Rivalry", *Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde*, Vol. XV, 1955, p. 65.

British plenipotentiaries probably felt that the arrangements made over treaty states removed the need, referred to earlier by the India Board, for an "opening" on the island of Borneo.

The merchants of Penang and Singapore were opposed to Dutch extension on any terms, even if unaccompanied by protectionist measures, because they saw it as a threat to their *entrepôt* traffic, as a constriction of the scope of their operations. In the 1840's the Foreign Office is found taking their part. In the case of the state of Siak on the east coast of Sumatra, the British were faced with a threat of Dutch conquest, and, in the absence of any precise stipulation in the treaty of 1824, they attempted to counter this by reviving a treaty with the Sultan made on behalf of the Penang Government in 1818.²⁸ In the case of neighbouring Djambi, they faced the question of a Netherlands treaty with a native power. Here limitations on the Dutch could have been securely grounded on the treaty of 1824. But the Foreign Office was doubtful:

It must not be forgotten that if we admit that the right of conquest has not been limited by the treaty . . . , and if we confine our representations to Holland to the introduction by that power into a treaty with a native state of any article tending to exclude British trade, Holland may very easily put an end to the discussion by leaving no further doubt as to her real position with reference to those states, and by claiming at once the sovereignty over them.²⁹

The Dutch indeed claimed that the stipulations of Article 3 did not apply when they acquired sovereignty even if they acquired it by treaty: in that case Article 2 alone applied.³⁰ With this Palmerston was inclined to agree:³¹ and so the question of sovereignty, initially raised by the problem of conquest, and then asked in relation to contracts, displaced the basis of the 1824 compromise. The distinction then drawn between treaty states and possessions was now blurred.

Article 2 had indeed been found to afford little protection for British trade in Dutch possessions. The Foreign Office endeavoured in the recession of the 1830's to uphold the cause of the merchants in Java, related as their interests were to those of important textile manufacturers at home. It was the failure to obtain any real satisfaction from the Dutch that was largely responsible for the Foreign Office's decision to take up the Straits Settlements complaints. By 1838 the official view had already shifted far from that of 1824: "an extension of Dutch influence or territorial possession", it was remarked, "would in all probability be attended with consequences injurious to British interest and should be looked upon with jealousy by the Government of this country."³²

A more profound challenge to the territorial settlement of 1824 ensued with the Borneo adventure of the 1840's. This again was stimulated by the dis-

²⁸ Palmerston to Disbrowe, 8 March 1841, F.O. 37/227.

²⁹ Mellish's memorandum, 20 May 1841, F.O. 37/233.

³⁰ Kattendyke to Disbrowe, 20 Ap. 1842, F.O. 37/235.

³¹ Draft to Disbrowe, and minute of 10 Dec. 1846 attached, F.O. 37/260.

³² Strangways to Barrow, 9 Jan. 1838, F.O. 37/213.

appointing results of the negotiations with the Dutch over the Eastern Seas. When the Indian Government advanced the suggestion—derived from James Brooke—that coal from Brunei, a state of north-west Borneo, might be found useful for the Company's steamers, the Foreign Office declared in 1842 that it found no obstacle in the treaty of 1824 to an agreement with that state.³³ The real impulse behind the appointment of Brooke, now Raja of Sarawak, as agent with the Sultan in 1844, came, however, from concern at Dutch policy, and similar sentiments lay behind the foundation of the colony of Labuan near Brunei in 1846.³⁴ Brooke later became "Commissioner and Consul-General for the Sultan and Independent Chiefs of Borneo", a position, according to his instructions of February 1848, designed "to afford to British commerce that support and protection . . . peculiarly required in the Indian Seas in consequence of the prevalence of piracy . . . and by reason of the encroachments of the Netherlands authorities in the Indian Archipelago".³⁵ Alarmed for the security of their Empire, the Dutch sought to strengthen their position in Bali, Lombok, Celebes, Borneo and beyond. The arrangements of 1824 had been further disrupted.

The appointment by the British Government in 1853 of a Commission of Inquiry to investigate Brooke's proceedings indicated, however, that the Borneo adventure had ceased to have its earlier significance.³⁶ With the general improvement in economic conditions in the 1850's and 1860's, there was indeed less pressure on the Foreign Office to preserve commercial opportunities for British manufacturers in the Archipelago. In any case domestic influences were prompting the Netherlands Government gradually to liberalize their protectionist policies. In these decades, nevertheless, the Foreign Office demanded tariff concessions, reviving all available claims against Dutch extension in the Archipelago and turning to account the feeling of insecurity this created at the Hague. The explanation of this apparent contradiction is obvious. The doubts about Article 3 had destroyed the 1824 compromise over British commercial opportunities in treaty states, and a liberal system there could now be guaranteed only by the general liberalization of tariffs in Dutch possessions. From the British Government's point of view, some such guarantee was obviously necessary in view of the complaints against Dutch extension—especially on the east coast of Sumatra—which emanated from Penang and Singapore from the late 1850's. In fact it was not of course likely that the *entrepôt* merchants would readily reconcile themselves to Dutch extension even under such a guarantee, and it was not surprising that they should have remained unsatisfied when the Foreign Office signed the Sumatra treaty of 1871, whereby the British withdrew all their objections to the Dutch advance on that island, even in Atjeh, in return for a promise of equal commercial treatment.

³³ F.O. to India Board, 19 March 1842, F.O. 37/238.

³⁴ F.O. memorandum, 25 June 1846, C.O. 144/1.

³⁵ Palmerston to Brooke, 23 Feb. 1848, F.O. 12/6.

³⁶ See Stanley's memorandum, 2 Aug. 1852, F.O. 12/11.

At one time it was thought that Borneo, too, might have been included in this settlement, but the Admiralty had decided that French naval activities on the opposite shore of the South China Sea—the left flank of the China route—gave Labuan a new importance. Moreover, as long as Brooke maintained a virtual independence in Sarawak, it was thought impossible to make an arrangement with the Dutch over its future disposition. Such an agreement might only precipitate his making it over to a major foreign power, which would render Labuan valueless and menace the right flank of the China route.³⁷

These strategic considerations were indeed once more playing an important, even a principal part in British policies towards the Dutch empire. While the Dutch extended their empire as a means of excluding all major powers from the Archipelago, the British themselves preferred the Dutch to the other major powers. As the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Lord Wodehouse, wrote in 1860:

I believe the policy of Mr. Canning's treaty was much the wisest, *viz.*, to leave to the Dutch the Eastern Archipelago. . . . The exclusive colonial policy of the Dutch is no doubt an evil, but it has been much relaxed of late. . . . It seems to me in many respects very advantageous that the Dutch should possess this Archipelago. If it were not in the hands of the Dutch, it would fall under the sway of some other maritime power, presumably the French, unless we took it ourselves. The French might, if they possessed such an eastern empire, be really dangerous to India and Australia, but the Dutch are and must remain too weak to cause us any alarm.³⁸

Though, as earlier, the Foreign Office was no doubt exaggerating the French threat, its negotiation of the treaty of 1871, given these presuppositions, was a diplomatic triumph in the sense that commercial concessions were secured in return for the recognition of a territorial arrangement desirable in itself. The Straits Settlements nevertheless felt that their interests had been sacrificed, and this feeling was intensified when the Dutch, apprehensive of foreign intrigue, plunged into war with Atjeh in 1873. The British intervention in the disturbed west coast states of Malaya in 1874 and 1875 was not, however, designed to compensate the disappointed Settlements. The Government was again influenced largely by strategic motives: its change of policy in Malaya was dictated by the fear that if it did not intervene, another power would do so, and gain a foothold in the neighbourhood of Singapore. There were indeed rumours that Germany was seeking a naval base in the area.³⁹

³⁷ More detailed treatment of this aspect of the subject will be found in the *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. XXX, No. 3, Oct. 1957, in chapters 5 and 6 of my work, "British Policy in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago, 1824-1871".

³⁸ Wodehouse's memorandum, 18 Aug. 1860, F.O. 12/28.

³⁹ These conclusions are justified by valuable recent research into the correspondence of Lord Kimberley. See C. D. Cowan, *The Origins of British Political Control in Malaya*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1956, pp. 208, 212.

Fifty years before, the Dutch had been excluded from the Peninsula, again as the result of the British policy of protecting the entrance to the China Seas. The extent of the Dutch empire was indeed largely determined by the decisions over a whole century of the predominant power in southern and eastern Asia. This is not in itself surprising, but the historian may well wonder at the motives and content of the policies that did in fact draw the boundaries of the nation states of the Malay Archipelago of our own day.⁴⁰

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⁴⁰ This article is substantially similar to a paper read before Section E of the ANZAAS Conference at Adelaide in Aug. 1958.

Socialist "Rethinking" in Britain and Australia

By JAMES JUPP

I

The Australian Labor Party has been out of office for nine years, its British counterpart for seven. During that time there has been an appreciable improvement in the living standards of the people, and a steady diminution of the appeal of socialist slogans and ideas developed in times of hardship. It is true that in Britain the Labour Party seems likely to win the election due in 1960. The collapse of the Suez invasion and the tightening of the economy to prevent inflation have reacted in the party's favour. The serious divisions which reduced the party's cohesion between 1951 and 1955 have been overcome by replacing an old, tired leadership by one which is prepared to compromise with the party militants and to reorganize the party machine and policy. Whether there is a strong, positive movement of opinion in favour of Labour, such as produced the 1945 landslide, is still doubtful. In Australia, where Labour's problems are far more serious, the possibility of winning an election is remote and the need for a positive programme to produce a definite response from the voter, acute. The A.L.P. has been slower than the British party to settle down to the task of "rethinking".¹ The relations between intellectuals and practising politicians are much more tenuous in Australia than in Britain, and the habit of following behind Britain in developing theories has become increasingly marked.

The British Labour Party has only officially begun to tackle policy since the election of 1955, the first in this century at which the sitting Government has increased its majority, and the only one, apart from the Depression election of 1931, at which the Labour vote has dropped. The elections of 1951 and 1955 were fought on Labour's past record, coupled in the latter year with a promise to ban atomic tests, which failed to hold the voters. "Consolidation", associated with the name of Herbert Morrison, had degenerated from a philosophy of caution in 1951, to the psychology of defeat in 1955. The British Labour Party was declining organizationally and ideologically and failing to meet the challenge of a Right-wing government operating a prosperous welfare state. If the old drive was to return, it seemed necessary to look again at some of the basic assumptions with which the Labour movement had grown up.

This need to "rethink" policy has led to a spate of publications in Britain, and to a lesser extent in Australia, during the past seven years. Though nowhere approaching the bulk and scope of the policies of the 1930's, there is a conscious attempt to emulate the enquiring spirit of those days, against a different, and in

¹The word "rethinking" came into vogue in Britain about 1951 and was used in the *New Fabian Essays* of the following year. It is now in general use to describe the new policies of the moderate Right wing of British Labour.

most respects less stimulating background. Before the war the most vocal groups were on the Left, but some steady work was being done by the moderates of the New Fabian Research Bureau, whose detailed studies passed unnoticed in the more exciting campaigns of the time. It is the latter group, including Hugh Gaitskell, Douglas Jay, Professor Arthur Lewis and others, which has now taken the initiative. In Britain, as in Australia, it appears at first glance "that such fresh thinking as has been done in the last few years has come almost entirely from Right-wing Labour men and has, for that reason alone, been condemned out of hand by the Left".² This is, of course, exactly contrary to the situation twenty years ago. The Left, represented in Britain by Aneurin Bevan³ and the bulk of the individual Labour Party members, and in Australia by the dominant section in the party and trade union leadership, has been forced on the defensive, a position to which it is unused, and by nature unfitted to maintain.

It is ironical, in these circumstances, that the Left initiated "rethinking". The "Bevanite" movement brought out *Keeping Left* as long ago as 1950, while individual Bevanites played an important part in writing the *New Fabian Essays*, published two years later. This was in keeping with the traditions of the Left. In 1928 the Independent Labour Party had published *Socialism in our Time*, its answer to the "gradualism" of Ramsay Macdonald. Between 1933 and 1937 the Socialist League laid much of the groundwork for Labour's *Immediate Programme*.⁴ As the Labour Government ran through its programme, so it fell to the Left again to provide an alternative. The situation changed when the Labour Party lost power in 1951, and the former New Fabians were freed from the limitations of office. *Socialist Commentary*, the monthly of a new group, Socialist Union, began to appear as a programme formulator, less propagandist than the Bevanite *Tribune*, and more concerned with domestic politics and concrete programmes than the *New Statesman*. Socialist Union, including among its members Hugh Gaitskell and other influential Fabians, was soon in the lead in formulating policy. As the Bevanite quarrel with the party leaders became more bitter, Socialist Union began to gain an audience among trade union officials and members of Parliament. The Left was handicapped in elaborating a definite programme by its nature as a protest movement. In contrast to the 1930's, the "intellectuals" of the party were committed to Keynes and Beveridge rather than to Marx. The general climate of opinion was unfavourable to a radical restatement of the party's socialist aims. In the race between the Bevanites and Socialist Union to capture the ideological initiative, the latter very soon drew ahead, and with the election of Gaitskell to leadership of the party, their ideas have penetrated into the policy forming committees of the Parliamentary Party and the National Executive.

The *New Fabian Essays* of 1952, which inspired the publication of *Policies for Progress* in Australia two years later, gives some indication of the tendencies which were to develop in socialist thinking. C. A. R. Crosland, in an essay on "The

²Professor H. W. Arndt, *Labour and Economic Policy*, Chifley Memorial Lecture 1956, Melbourne, p. 8.

³Bevan's exact position is doubtful, since he became "Shadow Foreign Secretary".

⁴The *Immediate Programme* (1937) was the basis of the 1945-51 legislation.

Transition from Capitalism"⁵ sees the Labour Government as having established a form of "Stateism". This new system, while it is not socialism, is sufficiently capable of supplying the needs of the people and the economy for further experiments to be less radical than those made between 1945 and 1951. He argues "that the further multiplication of public boards on the present model will not bring us rapidly nearer the socialist goal",⁶ a theme which played an increasing part in the recent controversies, and which Crosland developed further in his *Future of Socialism*, published in 1956. R. H. S. Crossman, on the other hand, reacts against Stateism by warning of the dangers of a "veiled form of totalitarianism",⁷ a subject to which he too returns in *Socialism and the New Despotism*. Roy Jenkins holds that "where there is no egalitarianism there is no socialism",⁸ taking up an approach repeated in his *Pursuit of Progress* of the following year, and dominating the thinking of Socialist Union and particularly of Hugh Gaitskell.

Soon after the publication of *New Fabian Essays* two short books appeared outlining the differing approaches to socialism which were contending for the support of the Labour Party.⁹ Aneurin Bevan's *In Place of Fear* covers the same ground as Roy Jenkins's *Pursuit of Progress*, but does so in an entirely different way. *In Place of Fear* has a world view and created much more interest than *Pursuit of Progress*. It is rather more forthright in its support for further nationalization because, as Bevan writes, "the power relations of public and private property must be drastically altered".¹⁰ Roy Jenkins, while wishing to see a more radical extension of public ownership than was suggested in the official Labour programme *Labour and the New Society*, takes up the argument for public shareholding in industry and for state ownership of competing firms, rather than of whole industries. This approach did not seem at the time to be very different from the attitude of Bevan and his supporters. Increasingly the two arguments drifted apart, leaving the Left as supporters of nationalization, against the Socialist Union who pointed out that "an industry may be partially nationalised by the government taking over one or more firms within it".¹¹

The different approaches to socialism are not, even now, fully distinct from each other. What has become indisputable in Britain is the predominance of the small group of Socialist Union and its sympathizers, taking its inspiration from the pre-war New Fabian Research Bureau and from Hugh Dalton. This supremacy has been maintained by two recent publications, *Twentieth Century Socialism*, a Penguin Special, and *The Future of Socialism* by C. A. R. Crosland. The former is the fullest statement of Socialist Union's policy since its inaugural pamphlet *Socialism—a New Statement of Principles* came out in 1951. It is an optimistic restatement of many of the basic socialist beliefs, not unacceptable to the Left, though it denies the existence of "two stereotyped antithetical systems", and calls

⁵*New Fabian Essays*, London, 1952, pp. 33-68.

⁶*ibid.*, p. 63.

⁷*ibid.*, p. 29.

⁸*ibid.*, p. 69.

⁹A. Bevan, *In Place of Fear*, London, 1952, and R. Jenkins, *Pursuit of Progress*, London, 1953.

¹⁰Bevan, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

¹¹Socialist Union, *Twentieth Century Socialism*, London, 1956, p. 86.

the Welfare State "neither capitalism nor socialism".¹² C. A. R. Crosland takes up this theme, but puts the entire emphasis on attaining equality through fiscal policy, reformed education and partial state ownership without outright nationalization. Despite some differences it would be fair to say that Crosland, Gaitskell and Socialist Union form a consistent school of thought, one which is now represented in official party statements on equality and nationalization. Individual ideas have been expressed by G. D. H. Cole and others, but they cannot be said to fit into any coherent and widely accepted philosophy. Professor Cole, in his pamphlet *Is this Socialism?*, published by the *New Statesman* in 1954, questions whether the Welfare State "is even on the way to becoming Socialist".¹³ R. H. S. Crossman, following up points made in the *New Fabian Essays*, discusses the threat to freedom presented by the growth of the state. "The modern state, with its huge units of organization", he writes, "is inherently totalitarian, and its natural tendency is towards despotism. These tendencies can only be held in check if we are determined to build the constitutional safeguards of freedom—and personal responsibility",¹⁴ a line of argument that led some commentators to see Crossman as an "old fashioned liberal". John Strachey in his *Contemporary Capitalism* has reverted to the arguments of *The Coming Struggle for Power* in talking of "last stage capitalism" as a threat to democracy. He stands by Marxism as a method, though no longer as a science, and his theories are, as a result, quite unacceptable to the fairly orthodox Keynesian economists who dominate the "rethinkers".

In Australia there has been nothing like the revival of interest in a new philosophy of socialism. Unlike the British party, the A.L.P. has never given much scope to abstract thinkers, and its platform is, as a result, a superficial outline of piecemeal reforms, despite the vague generalizations on Democratic Socialism accepted at Brisbane.¹⁵ Nevertheless, there have been some attempts to emulate Britain in "rethinking". *Policies for Progress*, published by the Victorian Fabian Society in 1954, tried to fulfil much the same function as the *New Fabian Essays*. Ideas were discussed which have been taken up by some sections of the Labour movement. The favourable attitude to extend nationalization expressed by Alan Davies is in contrast to that of the British "rethinkers", whom he terms "neo-socialists". Professor Arndt, on the other hand, is much nearer to the British school of thought in defining socialism as

an approach to the social and economic problems of our society which arises from moral revulsion against the acquisitive spirit and class domination of capitalism; which advocates the elimination of large property incomes and of the power which goes with private property under capitalism; which favours the gradual transfer to some form of public ownership of all major industries operating on a substantial scale; which is prepared to go a long way in using the power of public control over private economic

¹²*ibid.*, pp. 15, 17.

¹³G. D. H. Cole, *Is this Socialism?*, London, 1954, p. 15.

¹⁴R. H. S. Crossman, *Socialism and the New Despotism*, London, 1956, p. 24.

¹⁵The Presidential Address by F. E. Chamberlain (p. 5 of the Official Report of the Twenty-second Federal Conference) gives an extremely general definition. The new Interpretation (pp. 57-8) is broadly liberal-democratic in tone too.

activity where this is necessary for the common good; and which aims at a society in which there will be real equality of opportunity for the children of every family.¹⁶

On the face of it this definition, which would be completely acceptable to Socialist Union in Britain, is also reasonably acceptable to the Left. But it is clear from Professor Arndt's Chifley Memorial Lecture of 1956, and the reception which it received, that his views, like those of his British counterparts, have very little in common with the traditional socialist views expressed in the original aims of the British and Australian Labour Parties.

Some attempt to analyse the position of the A.L.P. has been made by Dr. John Burton in his two pamphlets, *The Light Grows Brighter* and *Labour in Transition*, published two years ago. Many of the measures advocated in the former pamphlet are already in operation in Britain, and Dr. Burton takes his definitions of Socialism from Professor G. D. H. Cole. In *Labour in Transition* there is a more serious attempt to assess the difficulties in the way of the A.L.P. attaining its aims. He sees the Labour parties of the world as "facing transition from purely industrial parties concerned with urgent improvements in the social conditions of the workers, to parties which seek improved social conditions for workers through a changed social organisation". This process he calls "the transition from Labour to Democratic Socialism", "a luxury which people without tolerable working and living conditions cannot yet afford". His analysis of the position in which Labour parties find themselves forces him to the conclusion that they "should not be on the defensive in prosperity", but should break free from sectional backing and try to attract people to "broader objectives based on economic and social justice".¹⁷ He seems forced by the logic of his argument to take up a position very similar to that of the British "rethinkers". He concludes that "Democratic Socialism does not rest on centralization, economic planning, conformity to a pattern in industrial organisation or in economic life, nationalisation or ad hoc controls, with which Socialism has, in recent years, been associated in the public mind".¹⁸ This is markedly different from the outline of Democratic Socialism given by the Fabian Society of N.S.W., which defines it in terms familiar to those who have read the propaganda of the 1930's, with its emphasis on planning.¹⁹

II

The most noticeable feature of recent thinking in British and Australian Labour circles is the "retreat from nationalisation". This is particularly surprising in Britain, where the Labour Government carried through a radical nationalization programme in a short space of time, a programme which has justified itself from the practical point of view. In Australia, where "State Socialism" was as likely to be associated with Right-wing governments as with the A.L.P., there is perhaps

¹⁶A. Davies and G. Serle (eds.), *Policies for Progress*, Melbourne, 1954, p. 59.

¹⁷Dr. J. Burton, *Labour in Transition*, Canberra, 1956, p. 11.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹⁹See Fabian Society of N.S.W., *What do you know about Democratic Socialism?*, Sydney, 1953, where it states that "Socialism is based on public enterprise and involves planned organisation of production and distribution in accordance with conceptions of social benefit" (p. 13).

more room for questioning and disillusionment. In neither country is there much doubt that party, and even "intellectual" attitudes to nationalisation are more lukewarm than at any time since socialization was written into the parties' programmes after the first world war. For prestige reasons a Labour government must re-nationalize those industries handed back to private ownership. At Brisbane the A.L.P. committed itself to the principle of "no sale or curtailment of nationalised services and/or assets, excepting by a referendum of the people".²⁰ The British Labour Party officially promises the re-nationalization of the steel and road haulage industries. But it seems plain that this will be fairly near the limit and that an industry will have to be essential, monopolistic and inefficient all at once if it is to be a certain candidate for nationalization in the future.

Twenty years ago it was generally accepted that socialism involved a great measure of collective ownership. Mr. Attlee wrote in 1937 of the socialist society towards which the party was moving: "All the major industries will be owned and controlled by the community, but there may well exist for a long time many smaller enterprises which are left to be carried on individually."²¹ Today, the present Labour Party leader, Mr. Gaitskell, has retreated from this position. His recent Fabian pamphlet damns the whole idea of state-owned corporations with very faint praise. He writes: "Thus, in the next phase, public ownership achieved by an alliance with fiscal policy, and not just nationalisation as conceived in these last twenty years, may well become a major instrument of Socialist policy."²² This cautious attitude is close to that of Professor Arndt, who represents in Australia the nearest approach to the school of thought embracing Gaitskell, Crosland and former Labour M.P. Sir Hartley Shawcross, to whom nationalization was "as dead as the dodo". In 1956 Professor Arndt stated that he no longer believed "that Labor should aim at a socialist economy in the old meaning of the term, an economy in which all or most of the means of production are publicly owned and the whole economy is centrally planned and controlled".²³ To say, as the Left in Britain and Australia says, that this is to abandon socialism is no answer, for, as Professor Arndt goes on to say,

the time has come for Labor to free itself from the absurd situation in which the Party has ceased to believe in its official platform, does not dare avow any part of it for reasons of political expediency and does not dare disavow it for fear of offending the pious traditionalists in its ranks.²⁴

That the same attitude is common in Britain is plain from a look at C. A. R. Crosland's *The Future of Socialism*. Reviewing the reasons why "for the first time for a century there is equivocation on the Left about the future of nationalization",²⁵ Crosland concludes that "we should now have a definite preference for the 'competitive public enterprise' approach; although there will occasionally be cases (such as steel) where state monopoly still provides the right answer".²⁶ This is

²⁰Conference Resolution 47.

²¹C. R. Attlee, *The Labour Party in Perspective*, London, 1937, p. 153.

²²H. T. N. Gaitskell, *Socialism and Nationalisation*, London, 1956, p. 36.

²³Arndt, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²⁴*ibid.*

²⁵C. A. R. Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, London, 1956, p. 466.

²⁶*ibid.*, p. 482.

rather far from the traditional Labour aim of "the common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange". Indeed it has been rumoured that the school of thought to which Crosland and Gaitskell belong favoured the deletion of this clause from the party constitution.²⁷ It was unprepared to press this view for the reasons which Professor Arndt ascribes to the retention of the socialist plank in the A.L.P. platform.

The retreat from nationalization, then, is firmly established, at least among those most active in forming policy in the British Labour Party. In the A.L.P. there is less of a retreat than a standstill. The Brisbane programme contributes little to the "rethinking" of the party's aims. The phrase "social ownership or social control" allows the widest possible latitude, and the Conference quickly discharged a Victorian resolution outlining a specific programme for wholesale nationalization and municipalization.²⁸ In practice the A.L.P. seems to stand where the British leaders would like to put their own party. State ownership in Australia has, for economic reasons, often been forced on non-Labour governments, and for the same reasons has not always been a spectacular success. The constitutional barriers to nationalization, for instance of banking, have discouraged even the most ardent advocates of public ownership in Australia. Without constitutional change there is little prospect of a Labour government carrying through much more than buying back shares in individual firms, or of strengthening competition between public and private firms. This "backdoor approach" to nationalization is exactly similar to the proposals put forward by Crosland and Gaitskell. Thus, despite continued emphasis on the socialist aim by a section of the A.L.P., there is no convincing evidence that the party is any more radical in its approach to state ownership than the Labour leadership in Britain.

Before considering the theoretical arguments behind the retreat from nationalization, it would be well to look at some of the practical political objections which are being raised. As working politicians the leaders of the British Labour Party cannot ignore the lukewarm attitude to nationalization which they met in the elections of 1951 and 1955. In Australia, too, the outcry against bank nationalization, and the assumption that this issue was responsible for the defeat of 1949, must be present in the minds of those who wish no further extension of socialization. The monopolization and consequent efficiency of most basic Australian industries has made the attack on the inefficiency of capitalist competition rather irrelevant, while high living standards have reduced the emotional appeal of "public ownership". The two latter elements are at work in Britain to some extent, although inefficiency is still notorious in such important industries as building and textiles. The attitude that nationalization is an electoral liability is bluntly stated

²⁷Mr. R. R. Stokes, M.P., a member of the Labour "Shadow Cabinet", said shortly before his death: "What we ought to do is to change the wording of the policy statement, which now reads that we aim at 'the ownership *and* control of the means of production, distribution and exchange' to 'ownership *or* control', for I believe we can get pretty well all we want by control" (*Manchester Guardian*, 3 June 1957).

²⁸Official Report, pp. 57-8.

by Crosland,²⁹ and must underlie the thinking of most active Labour politicians. While it is not strictly true that the unions have cooled off too, the plans for the engineering and building industries produced by the unions concerned are not pursued with anything like the fervour shown by the miners and railwaymen before the war. Workers in the steel and sugar industries enjoy good labour relations, and the spread of co-partnership in the latter industry has probably increased worker indifference to change. A further practical consideration favouring caution is the extent to which industries threatened with state ownership can become the agents for propaganda hostile to the party. In Britain every private bus and truck, every bag of cement, and most potent, every packet of sugar, carried slogans in favour of private enterprise. The danger that insurance agents or bank clerks would become political campaigners, and that giant firms like I.C.I. or B.H.P. would run a full-scale advertising campaign against state ownership would be enough to discourage a Labour government with a small majority.

An important factor helping to decrease enthusiasm for state ownership is that Soviet Communism is no longer regarded as favourably on the Left as it was before the war. The fear of being confused with the Communists undoubtedly led to the insertion of the word "Democratic" in the A.L.P. Objective in 1957. For the same reasons, the Socialist International, at its Frankfurt Conference in July 1951, adopted a statement on the "Aims and Tasks of Democratic Socialism", which is in many respects close to the decisions taken at Brisbane, and to the preamble to the platform adopted at Adelaide in 1953.³⁰ The Socialist International asserts that "Communism falsely claims a share in the Socialist tradition". The Frankfurt, Adelaide and Brisbane statements are all an attempt to distinguish Democratic Socialism from Communism, even at the risk of depriving the term of any real meaning at all. All set as aims what have in most cases already been achieved in the Western democracies. Complete state ownership is equated with dictatorship. The Socialist International states quite categorically that "Socialist planning does not presuppose public ownership of all the means of production", which is clearly contrary to the declared aim of the British, Australian and many European socialist parties, though not, of course, to their practice. To distinguish themselves from the Communists, Labour parties have adopted the equation of state ownership with loss of liberty, which was always the strongest argument of the anti-socialist.³¹ As Socialist Union writes of the U.S.S.R.:

All economic power has been transferred to the state and the result is not a 'society of the free and equal'—as Marx believed—but a totalitarian tyranny. The state also commands all political

²⁹*The Future of Socialism*, p. 473, argues that the 1955 voting in chemical-industry seats showed no enthusiasm for the official election policy of nationalization. The voting figures in steel towns showed the same tendency, though Mr. Crosland supports the re-nationalization of steel. In fact there was a marked swing against Labour in all high-income industrial towns, reflecting, if anything, general satisfaction.

³⁰The Frankfurt Manifesto is found in pp. 138-41 of the British Labour Party Annual Report for 1951. The Adelaide preamble is on p. 54 of the Official Report of the Twenty-first Federal A.L.P. Conference, Hobart, 1955, the Brisbane decision on pp. 57-8 of the Twenty-second Conference Report.

³¹*cf.*: "Imagine all the machinery of bureaucratic tyranny and inquisition . . . and you get some idea of what Socialism promises" (*Anti-Socialist Union Speakers Handbook*, 1911, p. 23).

power, and so is subject to no effective restraints at all. . . . The advances towards common ownership in Britain under its post-war Labour government have also raised doubts about the efficacy of the usual methods of political democracy in controlling publicly-owned industry.³²

Thus, while socialists like Cole and Crossman try to devise new techniques such as "workers' control" or "full responsibility to Parliament", the bulk of the "rethinkers" prefer to drop the contentious issue of nationalization altogether.

A theoretical case has been built up against further nationalization, which, while it may be little more than a rationalization of the objections outlined above, is important for an understanding of the new developments in socialist thinking. Hugh Gaitskell has redefined socialism as being "about equality", and has built up a case against nationalization on the grounds that it is not a necessary or central means to this end. Equality has, of course, been the main socialist theme since the "Utopian" days of the early nineteenth century, although pushed rather into the background by the advent of Marxism and completely repudiated by Stalin and his followers. In Britain the quest for equality, led by such diverse thinkers as Bernard Shaw and Professor Tawney, has always had a strong appeal, due mainly to the fairly rigid class differences of the country, and to the liberal-democratic traditions of the professional classes. A genuine shock, as of contact with another world, can be found in the memoirs of those like Lord Beveridge, Beatrice Webb or Earl Attlee, who came from prosperous backgrounds into the working class districts of thirty or more years ago. Hugh Gaitskell, in an address on "Recent Developments in British Socialist Thinking", traces a continuous line of thought from Tawney, through Dalton, Douglas Jay and E. F. M. Durbin down to the present, in which Democratic Socialism, modified by Keynes and Beveridge, is seen as a movement towards equality, based on fiscal policy and the redistribution of income through social services. The argument against state ownership is that it is an ineffective and clumsy means of working towards equality. As Crosland writes:

State ownership of all industrial capital is not now a condition of creating a socialist society, establishing social equality, increasing social welfare, or eliminating class distinctions. What is unjust in our present arrangements is the distribution of private wealth; and that can as well be cured in a pluralist as in a wholly State-owned economy, with much better results for social contentment and the fragmentation of power.³³

It is further argued that the redistribution of property brought about by exchanging private shares for government compensation stock has been small, that the effect on income distribution has been negligible and that profit sharing, pension schemes, co-operative, trade union and local government ownership are more democratic and acceptable means of distributing the ownership of wealth.

The logical case for state ownership, instilled into at least three generations of Labour supporters, has a strong intellectual and emotional appeal. Consequently, the new school of thinking in Britain has tried to redefine socialism, and to make its policies fit into an ideological framework in the same way that the case for

³²*Twentieth Century Socialism*, p. 124.

³³Crosland, *op. cit.*, p. 497.

public ownership does. Because socialism is about equality, it is argued, further state ownership is only relevant if it leads towards that end. It was central to the classic socialist argument, and particularly to Marxism, that ownership of the means of production was the basis of the class system, and therefore of inequality. The increasing disparity between the ownership of capital and the management of industry has detracted from the validity of the further argument that ownership also gave the capitalist control over the economy of the country. The growing success of socialist parties and trade unions have weakened the claim that the state was "the executive committee of the bourgeoisie".³⁴ High profit and corporation taxes have reduced distributed profits to about three per cent. of the total personal income in Britain, so that they are no longer the inexhaustible supply of revenue for the community which they once seemed. The final limitation forced on the theory that capitalist exploitation creates inequality is that the disparity of incomes after taxation in Britain seems, on the face of it, rather less than the disparity in the U.S.S.R., where high incentives are paid to certain classes of managers, bureaucrats and skilled workers. Yet it is still a matter of elementary observation that the living standard of the richest one per cent. is far higher than could be obtained on the maximum after-tax income, and that Britain still has a class structure more rigid and immediately noticeable than in Australia, Scandinavia or the U.S.A. If, then, the aim of socialism is equality, and yet, after nationalization, steeply differentiated taxation, comprehensive social services and other levelling measures there is still very noticeable inequality, it is argued that different methods will have to be used to attain the desired end. In the economic sphere it is argued that nationalization cannot lead to equality, because the basis of inequality is in the ownership of property and wealth, and that the transfer of private assets to the state in exchange for compensation stock is not a transfer of wealth, but merely of legal ownership and control. So long as the principle of full compensation is kept to then the effect on the ownership of wealth will remain slight. The answer to the problem of changing the ownership of wealth from individuals to the community, argues the British Labour Party in its statements *Towards Equality* and *Industry and Society*, lies in the buying of shares in industry outright, and in encouraging co-operative and municipal ownership. Certainly no socialist of any school would disagree with these proposals, provided that state ownership continued to be recognized as the most practicable form of attaining collective ownership. Municipal ownership, already fairly advanced in Britain, can be encouraged, and indeed the Labour Party is committed to the virtual elimination of house ownership for profit by the transfer of all rent-controlled housing to local authorities.³⁵ The co-operative movement, which controls about fifteen per cent. of all retail trade in Britain, can be fostered by removing some restrictions on its activities, such as resale price maintenance agreements prohibiting the payment of dividends on purchases. The objection to reliance on these alternative forms of public ownership seems to be that British local authorities have shown nothing like the initiative in acquiring and managing property in recent years, which they did in the days of "municipal

³⁴For a full discussion along these lines see John Strachey, *Contemporary Capitalism*, London, 1956, particularly Chapters 14 and 15.

³⁵*Homes of the Future*, Labour Party, London, 1956.

socialism" between 1880 and 1914. The co-operative and trade union movements, too, have been slower in expanding into the business field than similar movements in Scandinavia, Germany or Israel. The third alternative, state ownership of shares, which already exists in British Petroleum, for instance, merely puts the state in the place of the passive shareholder. The suggestion that the projected National Superannuation Fund should finance itself in this way seems sound, but in this case it has been made clear that state ownership of shares would not bring state control. One wonders whether large-scale state ownership of shares will ever reach the stage where there is a real redistribution of wealth, and if it does, whether the end product will be very different from nationalization with a gradual redemption of stock. The experience of Australia suggests that a Conservative government will tend to sell back government shares, a far simpler process than denationalizing a completely reorganized industry.

III

The discussions about equality cannot arouse the intensity of controversy among socialists that arguments against further nationalization undoubtedly will. The "rethinkers" have incorporated into their ideology many of the arguments and practical proposals which, ten years ago, were regarded as the mark of the Left. "Comprehensive education", that is the "one stream system" already in operation in Australia, the United States and Scotland, was pioneered by the teachers, who form an important element in those Labour parties around London which were the backbone of Bevanism. The abolition, or serious modification of the public schools, favoured by some party leaders, has always been central to Leftist educational theory in Britain. The problems inherent in limiting the scope of high status private education are very difficult of solution, and have not yet been solved in the United States or in Australia. The attempt to change a long-established society is more difficult than preserving the egalitarian elements in a new, pioneering country but it is one which must be undertaken by any radical party in Britain. In the field of redistributive taxation, too, the "rethinkers" are close to the Left. The argument that tax evasion through expense accounts, the absence of a gift duty or a capital levy or gains tax, was the main cause of continuing income inequalities, was given much prominence by Aneurin Bevan.³⁶ The new emphasis on redistributive property tax may have some relevance to Australia, too.³⁷ In fact, many of these proposals would only serve to bring the education and taxation systems into line with those in other countries.

The liberal-democratic outlook of the "rethinkers" is at one with the socialist traditions of the party on the issue of equality. Once again, though, the emphasis is different. The traditional socialist aim of raising the status of the worker through some form of "workers' control" is completely rejected by Gaitskell and Crosland, though they show more favour to the egalitarian possibilities of profit-sharing or

³⁶Bevan, *op. cit.*, Chapters 4 and 7.

³⁷Thus Dr. Burton: "The purpose of inheritance tax is not revenue collecting, but social equality" (*Labour in Transition*, p. 15). This is the approach suggested by Dr. Dalton in *The Inequality of Incomes* in 1920, and taken up by Hugh Gaitskell.

co-partnership. Gaitskell believes that the whole idea of workers' control "had been largely discarded by 1945".³⁸ Crosland gives little or no consideration to experiments in joint management operating in West Germany or Yugoslavia. His whole treatment of industrial relations is one of the least satisfactory sections of his work, as he refuses to envisage any change in trade union structure and functions.³⁹ His belief that industrial friction is largely the result of social inequality is not borne out by Australian experience. Some form of workers' control is still widely advocated in the British Labour movement, although its only consistent academic advocate has been Professor G. D. H. Cole. The Union of Post Office Workers and the National Union of Railwaymen both support union participation in management. The National Union of Mineworkers, once a syndicalist stronghold, has seen former miners rise to the positions of Chairman and Labour Officer of the National Coal Board, and strongly encouraged the "pit to management" scheme operated by the Board. Much of the dissatisfaction with nationalization to which the "rethinkers" rightly draw attention, has been due to a failure to extend the joint consultation machinery set up by the statutory requirements of the public boards. In sidestepping the whole issue, the "rethinkers" have ignored a basic socialist belief and an important contribution to solving the problem of status inequality.⁴⁰

The attainment of equality is not a major issue in Australia, because of the nature of Australian society. Where the A.L.P. is learning from the British Party is not in such abstract discussions, for which it is at present not fitted, but by studying the practical reforms carried out between 1945 and 1951 in Britain. Some of these reforms would undoubtedly have been brought in by the Chifley Government had it not been for constitutional barriers. Thus in Australia, in contrast to Britain, socialists are paying great attention to the machinery of government. The constitutional issues which occupied the minds of Sir Stafford Cripps and Professor Laski in pre-war Britain now hardly enter into political discussions there.⁴¹ In Australia, on the other hand, it is clear that the A.L.P. cannot go ahead with carrying out its platform unless the political system is altered. Appreciation of this is growing in Labour circles. Constitutional issues were reviewed by Professor Sawyer in *Policies for Progress*, while the 1957 Chifley Memorial Lecture was devoted to the same topic.⁴² Six resolutions calling for drastic constitutional change were discharged at the Brisbane Conference, but resolutions favouring uniform taxation and an Australian Interstate Commerce Commission show an appreciation of the problem of divided power.⁴³ The Federal President called for "a continuing

³⁸H. T. N. Gaitskell, *Recent Developments in British Socialist Thinking*, London, 1955, on p. 28, where he deals with trade union membership on nationalized boards, giving no attention to alternative proposals.

³⁹Crosland, *op. cit.*, pp. 343-50.

⁴⁰The official policy statement *Public Enterprise*, July 1957, goes some way towards "workers' control" by suggesting workers' meetings to discuss the major policy decisions of nationalized boards.

⁴¹Crossman, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-17, suggests changes making government more amenable to public pressure, and more fully in control of nationalized industries. It is noticeable, in this respect, that Labour showed no enthusiasm for the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries set up in 1953 [see evidence of Herbert Morrison, Select Committee (P.P. 235 of 1953), pp. 48-62].

⁴²E. G. Whitlam, *The Constitution versus Labour*, Melbourne, 1957.

⁴³Official Report of Twenty-second A.L.P. Federal Conference, pp. 48-9.

campaign directed towards informing the people, in reasonably detailed form, as to the type of legislation we require to give effect to our policy, and showing clearly where the constitutional barriers are created".⁴⁴ Clearly a more definite attitude to the whole question of federalism is an essential in Australia on which no guidance can be expected from Britain or anywhere else.

Many of the practical policies adopted at Brisbane and confirmed as electoral planks at Adelaide earlier this year, are similar to ideas developed in the British Labour movement, though it would be going too far to suggest that they were consciously adapted. One resolution, approving of "the establishment on a national basis of a complete health service, to be curative and preventative in its activities", reasserts A.L.P. support for the scheme attempted by the Chifley Cabinet, and carried out in Britain under Aneurin Bevan. The A.L.P. does not yet seem to have extricated itself from the problem of increasing pensions and social service payments without overburdening the Budget. The British party, which was seriously divided over the priority of claims between defence and the Health Service, has had to give serious consideration to this question and has recently adopted a scheme for a self-financing National Superannuation Fund, to secure retirement on half-pay to all. Opposition to the "insurance principle" by Australian Labour has restricted party thinking along these lines. Nor is the conflict between re-investment, defence and social service requirements in an inflationary situation as consciously realized in Australia as in Britain. Dr. Burton suggests, for instance, that "Democratic Socialism would have no hesitation in applying the necessary income tax and other measures needed to increase social services and pension income, and to divert men and resources from capital accumulation to the building and staffing of schools and hospitals".⁴⁵ Clearly there is some scope for expansion in this direction, but it is limited, particularly in a rapidly developing new country. Unless defence costs cease to be treated as a constant,⁴⁶ socialists will need to direct their attention to using the state to increase rather than diminish capital accumulation and to encourage increased productivity rather than the redistribution of a stationary national income. In the field of social services, in particular, the lack of expert opinions on social and economic problems among Australian Labour politicians could be a severe handicap to "rethinking".⁴⁷

IV

Until last year "rethinking" was all in the direction of modifying the socialist aims of Labour. In the last eighteen months, however, a new element has emerged which might have an important influence in the opposite direction. The Communist

⁴⁴*ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴⁵Burton, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁴⁶Neither C. A. R. Crosland nor Hugh Gaitskell give much consideration to the economic effects of defence expenditure in their written works, preferring to treat them as a fixed item in any Budget.

⁴⁷The national superannuation policy in Britain was largely worked out with the help of Professor Titmuss, Brian Abel-Smith and other academic experts. Perhaps a recent pamphlet by Professor Downing, *Raising Age Pensions*, Melbourne, 1957, will provide the A.L.P. with some pointers, but there is no evidence of this as yet.

Party of Great Britain has lost one-third of its members since the Hungarian revolution, and on past experience it seems that most of them will eventually become active members of the Labour Party. In Australia the Communists are insulated from overseas events by an exaggerated Australian nationalism and a concentration on industrial affairs rather than on ideologies. Despite this it is clear that the A.L.P., purged of its Catholic Action element, is rather more susceptible to Left-wing ideas than in the past. Those who leave, or are no longer attracted to the Australian Communists, may thus become a significant influence on the formation of policy. The break-up of the Independent Labour Party in Britain between 1932 and 1937 brought several thousand active Leftists into the Labour Party, and their effect on the Socialist League and the Labour Left in general was considerable. The same might be true of those flocking out of the Communist Party. Since 1948 doubts over Stalinism have created new groupings of ex-Communists on the fringe of the British Labour Party, which, coupled with tiny but active Trotskyist groups inside,⁴⁸ have been pulling against the tide to the Right. These small groups, centred on London, Glasgow⁴⁹ and Liverpool, have now come together with such recent converts from Communism as Peter Fryer, former *Daily Worker* correspondent in Hungary. Although the Socialist Forums, the initial organization set up in 1957, have now dissolved, most of their members have reappeared in the Victory for Socialism movement inside the Labour Party, and in the clubs organized by *Universities and Left Review*. Some form of independent Marxism has always formed an important "lunatic fringe"⁵⁰ of the British Labour Party. Its reinforcement from the shattered Communist Party cannot be ignored simply because the extreme Left must, by its nature, remain an unrepresentative minority in the British Labour movement.⁵¹ The beginnings of a similar tendency can be seen in Australia, where the journal *Outlook* seems to express the views of those who look towards Yugoslavia, Poland and even China to sustain the illusions lost over Russia.

The picture given above of the Right capturing the ideological initiative should not be taken to imply that the British and Australian Labour Parties as a whole are about to abandon their original socialist aims. In Britain many Left-wing ideas have been incorporated into the new egalitarian philosophy of the party. In Australia the abstract thinker seems to have little contact with the leadership, let alone the members of the A.L.P. Moreover, in both countries the great bulk of active party workers, as opposed to the voters, still have a strong attachment to the traditional aims of socialism. In Britain this attachment had been accentuated in the past two years by the noticeable swing to the Left on the part of the trade unions under new leaders. Mr. Gaitskell, who before his election to leadership was on the extreme Right of the party, now relies on Left-Centre trade union leaders for support, on Aneurin Bevan and R. H. S. Crossman in developing foreign policy,

⁴⁸Although the officially Trotskyist Revolutionary Communist Party, which dissolved into the Labour Party in 1949, had fewer than 1,000 members, Trotskyist influence has been a nagging problem in certain local Labour parties, and a significant trend.

⁴⁹The Glasgow breakaway of 1954 was led by veteran Communist Harry MacShane in protest against the "cult of the individual" built around the Scottish District Secretary!

⁵⁰The phrase is Earl Attlee's.

⁵¹It might be noted that the great campaigns of the 1930's were kept going by about two per cent. of the British Labour Party's membership.

and on a diminished but still strongly Left-wing band of party militants in the constituencies. The dilemma in which both parties find themselves is that they must appeal to a comfortable and increasingly conservative electorate, and to a still militant membership. The British and Australian Labour Parties are, then, being forced into a difficult ideological position. The question they must answer is whether the socialist case, developed over a century and accepted in varying forms by parties all over the world, is still a valid political philosophy in the conditions of a controlled and prosperous society, to which some would go as far as to deny the name capitalism. Much of this control and modification of the social system in Western Europe and Australasia has been the result of pressure from Social-Democratic Parties. The area of agreement, which is characteristic of a stable democracy, has moved further to the Left in recent years than would have been thought possible before the war. The continuation of planning and state ownership by Conservative governments has blurred the distinction between "free enterprise" and "planning" which used to be the distinction between socialists and their opponents. Mass parties cannot go out of existence when their immediate aims have been achieved. They may attempt to carry on purely as interest groups or as machines for attaining power. The dangers of this course should be apparent from the recent history of the A.L.P. Neither party can make headway without some semblance of an ideology, and one which corresponds to the ideals of militants and voters alike.⁵²

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⁵²No account has been taken of foreign policy, or of the impact of Catholic Social policy in Australia, because of the absence of parallels between the two countries.

Public Enterprise in New South Wales

By R. S. PARKER

Introductory

The main purpose of this paper is to re-examine certain questions about the history of State government industrial and commercial undertakings. The paper is concerned with activities in New South Wales similar to, but narrower in range than, those studied in Sir Frederic Eggleston's book on *State Socialism in Victoria* (1932). The questions are asked from a different point of view—that of the relationship of public enterprise to political party policies, especially the socialist aspect of Australian Labor Party policy. This is a re-examination because similar questions have been raised about the Australian enterprises in a number of earlier writings.¹ However, some of these were mainly directed to other questions, some were avowedly propagandist in character, and none attempted a systematic survey, on any consistent criterion, of the whole of a defined group of enterprises in a single State. Nevertheless the present study, undertaken independently as part of a general survey of government in New South Wales, led inescapably to the same conclusions as the earlier ones, though covering a longer time-span. The detailed investigation for this study was largely the work of Mr. T. D. Harris, former Research Assistant, for whose help the author is grateful.

To define the scope of the paper: it briefly scans the relevant aspects of the record of 33 New South Wales government agencies which have been entrusted primarily with selling some commodity or service to the public or to other government agencies, with the right to charge a more or less commercial price, whether or not an "economic" price. However, to keep the paper manageable some special classes of enterprise which might come within this definition have been excluded—for example, commodity marketing boards, activities with a strong social service element like hospitals and housing, and certain traditional public utilities such as harbour, water and sewerage services.

The questions raised are of the following kinds. How far does the New South Wales history reflect doctrinal differences between the main political parties? What were the actual reasons for setting up each agency? Does the State show a steady development of public enterprise, have there been spurts and lags, or has there been any secular change in the character of these undertakings? How far have the undertakings been judged "successful", upon what criteria of "success"

¹F. A. Bland seems to have been a pioneer in this field, as in so many others, with a paper on *The Administration of Government Enterprises* read before the Federal Public Service Conference of 1925. He published an article with the same title in *Economic Record*, May 1929. This does not directly discuss the issue of "socialism". The others which do are: J. B. Brigden, "State Enterprises in Australia", *International Labour Review*, Vol. 16, 1927, p. 16; H. V. Evatt, *Australian Labour Leader*, Sydney, 1940, Ch. LXVIII, "Experiment of The State Enterprise"; C. Hartley Grattan, "Australian Labour Leader", *Australian Quarterly*, Sept. 1940; Brian Fitzpatrick, *Public Enterprise Does Pay*, Melbourne, 1945.

and why were many of them brought to an ignominious end? Apart from debating rhetoric, has any of the political parties really considered and treated public enterprise as an experiment illustrating and testing social theory—whether conservative or radical? Do the present nature and scale of public enterprise in New South Wales have any lessons for the debate about the future of socialist ideals?

The paper cannot appeal to exhaustive research on the history, nor does it pretend to answer these questions definitively. It represents a short preliminary exploration of the subject—which quite well deserves a book—and it presents some tentative hypotheses for discussion and further research.

Motivation of the Labour Enterprises, 1910-17

When the McGowen Ministry came into office in 1910 as the first Labour Government in New South Wales, there already existed a few of the State enterprises that interest us: the Government Railways and Tramways, the Government Tourist Bureau, the N.S.W. Government Savings Bank (established 1906), and the Cockatoo Island Dockyard which was operated by the Public Works Department. By 1916, when the conscription split ended the Labour régime, about nineteen more enterprises had been established. In his first year as a non-Labour Premier (1917) W. A. Holman completed this spate of new enterprises by setting up a State Drug Depot and a pair of sawmills on the north coast. These 21 enterprises were as follows (showing dates either of establishment or of declarations as Industrial Undertakings):

Industrial Undertakings:

Building and Construction

State Brickworks, Homebush (1912)	Building Construction Branch (1913)
State Brickworks, Botany (1912)	Maroubra Quarry (1913) (merged with Building Construction Branch 1917)
State Limeworks, Botany (1912) (under same management as Botany Brick- works)	Walsh Island Dockyard (1921)
State Limeworks, Taree (1912)	State Monier Pipe and Reinforced Concrete Works (1914)
State Metal Quarries, Kiama (1912)	State Sawmills, Craven and Gloucester (1917)
Rozelle Joinery Works (1912) (under Timber Yard from 1914)	
State Timber Yard and Building Works (1913)	

Industrial Undertakings:

Other

Clothing Factory (1913)	Power House, Uhr's Point (1914)
State Bakery (1914)	State Trawling Industry (1915)
State Motor Garage (1914)	State Drug Depot (1917)

Other Enterprises

Meat Industry Board (1912)
Public Trust Office (1914)
State Coal Mine (1916)

Some of these enterprises did not mean a net addition to government activity. The Cockatoo Dock was transferred to the Commonwealth in January 1913, and later in the same year the new dockyard at Walsh Island, Newcastle, was begun. In other cases, such as the Clothing Factory and the Drug Depot, Labour's innovation consisted in gazetting an existing section of a government department as an Undertaking under the Special Deposits (Industrial Undertakings) Act of 1912. Most of the 21 enterprises were "declared" at some time as Industrial Undertakings, the exceptions being the Public Trust Office (under the Public Trustee Act 1913—opened 1914), the Meat Industry Board (which took over the Homebush saleyards and abattoirs from the City Council in 1912), and the State Coal Mine (State Coal Mines Act 1912—opened 1916). The Walsh Island Dockyard was actually operated by the Public Works Department through the whole of its chequered career (1913-33), except for about four months as an "Undertaking" between October 1921 and February 1922. The significance of the Industrial Undertakings category will be explained in a moment. None of the surviving pre-1910 enterprises was included in it.

Twenty-one enterprises seems an impressive figure, but its importance can be gauged only by examining the nature of the list.

It is almost certain that a non-Labour government would not have established most of these enterprises, and it is true that in the 1910 election campaign Labour candidates had made some play with promises of "nationalization", mentioning, among other things, nationalization of "land" (for closer settlement schemes), of the "iron industry", of brickyards (to bring down prices), and of the North Shore ferries. By 1912 it had become a habit with Opposition members to assail the Labour administration as "a Government which is trying to bring forward every socialistic project it can think of". But the industrial undertakings programme that actually emerged involved very little "nationalization", and reflected considerations of administrative convenience as much as of Labour policy.

The only undertakings which were taken over from private owners were the State Bakery, the Monier Pipe and Reinforced Concrete Works, and the Rozelle Joinery Works, all modest individual businesses, and all acquired by ordinary commercial purchase. The Rozelle Works, declared an Undertaking in 1912, had in fact been bought in June 1911 by the Railways Department for the sole reason that they stood on land which the department needed for railway extensions and the alternative to purchase was to meet exorbitant claims for "severance" payments.

The outstanding fact is that the list as a whole bears no relationship to "key points in the economy", "exploitation of workers", or "monopoly profits at the expense of consumers", and only a partial relationship to "trusts and combines to raise prices"—prominent phrases in Labour platforms and propaganda. It is seemingly no accident that the "industrial undertakings" programme was sponsored by Arthur Griffith, Minister for Public Works (and Railways), since the great bulk of the undertakings were in the single field of building and constructional supplies, and most of these began operations in order to facilitate supplies to government departments, mainly the Works and Railways Departments, at economical prices. At first they did not sell to the public at all, and when they did, it was not consumer

goods they had to offer, but in the words of one Opposition taunt, commodities such as "bricks for capitalists". Indeed it became quite common, once the schemes were under way and seemed successful, for Opposition members, sometimes in joke but often in earnest, to ask if the Government would not establish other enterprises in different parts of New South Wales, in order to provide employment or stimulate local economic activity.

In addition to the building and construction group, a number of the other enterprises were established mainly to meet departmental needs, and were actually operated as ordinary branches of departments through most of their history. The State Clothing Factory, declared an undertaking in 1912, had previously been part of the Stores Supply Department and always supplied government departments alone (mainly with uniforms and working clothes). In the same category was the State Drug Depot, "declared" in 1917. The State Bakery, declared in 1914 on its purchase from a private firm, supplied government departments, institutions, and municipal depots, and for a time the Railway Refreshment Rooms. The State Coal Mine at Lithgow was associated with a 1910 election promise to provide employment for miners, but it did not open until 1916 and closed down the following year. Its actual function was conceived as providing an independent source of supply for the Railways—a purpose in which the Opposition concurred, especially after Labour spokesmen had made it clear that one mine would achieve this object and there was no intention to nationalize private mines generally. The Electric Power House at Uhr's Point, Sydney Harbour, was built "to augment City Council supplies", and its customers were the Council, the State Timber Yard and Brickworks, and the Meat Industry Board.

What does this leave, out of the McGowen-Griffith-Holman contribution, in the way of State enterprise supplementing private enterprise for the benefit of the consuming public? There was first the Public Trust Office, to provide services for deceased estates at cost and forbidden by its statute to make a profit. There was secondly the Meat Industry Board conducting saleyards and abattoirs. There was thirdly the State Trawling Industry, established in 1915 on the advice of a fisheries expert to develop previously unexploited resources and provide cheap food for the masses. There was fourthly and lastly the State Motor Garage, declared an undertaking in 1914, and qualifying for this present category only because by 1920 it was doing 43 per cent. of its business of hiring vehicles directly with the public—its services to government duplicating those of the departmental Central Garage which continued to operate. However, a number of enterprises in the building construction group, such as the brickworks, in time made extensive sales to the public even though this was not their primary purpose.

It appears, therefore, that apart from the Railways and Tramways and Savings Bank which pre-dated the Labor Party's experiments, the extent of State enterprise not providing commonplace departmental services (and these mainly in the building field) was insignificant. It is true, of course, that a number of the Labour enterprises, both quasi-departmental and others, were intended to break monopoly price-rings or to supply goods or services which private enterprise could not or would not offer at a reasonable price. These included the Brickworks and Limeworks,

Dockyard, Public Trust Office, Metal Quarries, Drug Depot, Timber Yard, Bakery, Trawling Industry, Coal Mine, Power House, and Monier Pipe Works; and two-thirds of this group were successful in that object, and continued to be so. It is equally true that those which successfully competed with private enterprise incurred the implacable hostility of the successive non-Labour parties, even though their principal effect was to reduce the cost of government. But from the point of view of what were supposed to be the Labor Party's general social doctrines, the interesting point is that the practical motive behind nearly all the enterprises was nothing more than this one of reducing governmental costs. Where this did not involve competition with private enterprise they were thoroughly applauded by the Opposition of the day, because the predominant motive, as declared by Griffith himself, corresponded completely with the prevailing business philosophy.

As an example, the essentially practical approach of the Minister of Public Works was perfectly illustrated in Griffith's reply to a question about the Kiama Metal Quarries. What he said was:

We can land broken metal in Sydney at 5s. per ton, whereas to-day the various Government departments and the municipalities are paying 8s. per ton for the same stone. As my own department and its branches will require next year about 80,000 tons, the saving of 3s. per ton will be immense, and I think that is a justification for the establishment of a Government quarry.²

One imagines that, apart from the question of undercutting private enterprise, few non-Labour Ministers would quarrel with this reason for the Public Works Department running a quarry, and few politicians of either political camp nowadays would be inclined to dignify a departmental quarry as an experiment in socialist enterprise.

But what of the philosophy behind the Industrial Undertakings Act? Did this measure—the only general legislation governing Labour's State enterprises—represent a blueprint for increasing government control or intervention in the economy? Nothing of the kind. It was a brief statute of eight sections, which, in effect, went a little way beyond satisfying Opposition demands for clear-cut commercial accounts of the transactions of government enterprises. Early in the McGowen Government's term of office, these demands were raised in connection with the principal existing "four corporate bodies"—the Railways and Tramways, the Sydney Harbour Trust, the Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board, and the Hunter District Water Board. Although the questioners were at first referred to the annual reports of these bodies, Griffith later said that he thought it perfectly proper that their accounts should be put on a profit and loss basis. And this, in relation not to these bodies but to the bulk of the new Labour enterprises already discussed, was the sole purpose of the Special Deposits (Industrial Undertakings) Act of 1912. As Griffith said in introducing it:

It provides that for each industrial undertaking there shall be a special account, to which shall be debited all the charges incidental to the carrying on of the particular business, the salaries connected with it, the interest on the capital sum, the loss in depreciation, and all the proper debits of the industry; whilst, on

²N.S.W. *Parl. Debs.*, Second Series, Vol. 41, p. 1993.

the other side, the value of its products must be placed to the profit account, so that every year the balance sheet will show everything just as clearly in a Government undertaking as in a private concern. . . . A balance sheet will be published every year, . . . so that hon. members will be in a position to judge these industrial undertakings on the only legitimate basis—that is, the fair, legitimate profit or loss.³

Laudable though this purpose is, it would seem to lie within the limits of an accountant's interest rather than threatening to inaugurate a co-ordinated programme of State socialism.

As a footnote to this account, it may be added that Griffith carried his commercial principles a little further than was required by the principle of self-sufficient financing. When twitted with the fact that some of his undertakings were not supplying their products "at cost", but charging profitable prices, he replied:

When we started the brickworks and the metal quarries, it was my intention to charge the different departments merely the actual cost; but it was decided later on that it was best to charge the current market price, and let the industries show their fair legitimate profit.⁴

In fact, he found no difficulty in pitching his prices somewhat below those of the private brick combine and the producers of other building materials, while still showing a profit in most of the building supply undertakings.

New Labour and Non-Labour Enterprises since 1917

What additional State enterprises have been set up in New South Wales since 1917, and why?

The Lang Labour Governments made two contributions, the Government Insurance Office (1926) and the State Lotteries (1930). That they made no more is easy to understand in the light of Lang's expressed attitude to socialism and all its works. "We always left that to the dreamers, the book-worms and the long-haired University professors, who skirted on the fringe of the Labor Party", he remarks in his memoirs. His summary expresses a commonplace which is probably a clue to the whole subject of this paper:

Those of us who were engaged in active politics, depending upon the votes of the people, realised that the average Australian is not worried about the ultimate structure of society and its institutions. He is worried about how much is in his pay envelope, whether his children are getting proper opportunities, his own recreation and the security of his family in sickness and old age. . . . The first Federal Labor Party Platform adopted by an Interstate conference on January 24, 1900, was a very simple document. . . . It said nothing about Socialism, or who would operate industry. . . . McGowen in the State and Fisher in the Commonwealth were in no way interested in Socialism. They were too busy with the problems of day-by-day government. . . . There was something beguiling about the idea of the workers owning all the factories, dividing up all the production equally and treating everyone on the basis of equality. But who was going to run

³*ibid.*, Vol. 44, p. 3063.

⁴*ibid.*, p. 3064.

it? . . . An A.L.P. Conference in those days was usually a gathering of very practical-minded men and women. . . . Few of them wanted the worries of management.⁵

Hence there is a faithful echo of the motives of 1910-16 in Lang's declaration that "there would have been no Government Insurance Office in New South Wales, had not the insurance combine tried to hold a pistol at the head of my Government in 1926". The occasion was Lang's legislation to make workers' compensation insurance compulsory. As part of the business resistance, most of the private insurance companies fixed prohibitive rates. So the small Treasury Insurance Branch, which had long carried the fire and public risk insurance of State government offices, was renamed and expanded to take workers' compensation insurance at competitive rates—which soon brought the recalcitrant private companies to heel. The Government Insurance Office prospered, and in 1941 was empowered to undertake all classes of insurance business. That this is a sufficiently unsocialistic State activity is attested by the fact that the New Zealand government has been in the insurance business since 1869, and its life office has long been the largest in the country.

The N.S.W. State Lottery was established by Lang to raise revenue for hospitals, after churches and other charitable bodies had admitted the inadequacy of direct appeals.

The N.S.W. Government Tourist Bureau, which had previously been operated departmentally, was, curiously enough, declared an Industrial Undertaking under Griffith's Act by the Bavin Government in 1929. It made losses in this status during the Depression, and reverted to direct ministerial control in 1936.

At the end of 1932, Mr. M. F. Bruxner, Leader of the Country Party and Minister of Transport in the Stevens coalition Government, established the first State road passenger transport services—an undertaking which in time far surpassed in size and importance all the previous enterprises since 1910. The justification given for entering this field was that under the stress of the Depression private omnibus services had become so unprofitable that there was no longer sufficient transport to meet public demand. The Lang Government of 1930-32 had attempted to rationalize private bus transport by a system of licensing which some criticized as helping to drive private operators off the roads. But the system was adapted to secure State ownership by Bruxner, who was described by an ex-Labour Minister a few years later as having "maintained and extended the transport monopoly as vigorously as any other man in the public life of New South Wales could have done".⁶ The tramways had been separated from the Railways Department in 1930 and were incorporated with the State bus services in the new Department of Road Transport in 1932.

The Government Savings Bank of New South Wales was a casualty of the financial difficulties of the Lang Government in 1931-2 and of its conflict with the Commonwealth over Lang's infringement of the Financial Agreement of 1927. When

⁵J. T. Lang, *I Remember*, Sydney, 1956, pp. 134-6.

⁶W. G. K. Duncan (ed.), *Trends in Australian Politics*, 1935, p. 39.

it was liquidated in 1933 its savings bank business was transferred to the Commonwealth Bank; but it had also administered the scheme of advances to settlers originated in 1899. This work was entrusted by the Stevens Government in 1933 to a new corporation, the Rural Bank of New South Wales, which has become a large investing institution. Like the Insurance Office, it has many counterparts in Australia and New Zealand, and all it owes to Labour is an authorization in 1947, on the traditional pattern of taking obvious opportunities to compete with private enterprise, to conduct general banking business.

Since 1941 New South Wales has had continuous Labour government, under which extensions of public enterprise have been few in number, but in some cases important. Two of these were restorations of earlier enterprises. The Walsh Island Dockyard had been allowed to run down during the late 'twenties, and after accumulating a £1 million loss during the Depression, had been closed by the Stevens Government in 1933 and its remnants of machinery sold by auction, virtually at scrap prices. The McKell Government, in accord with a 1941 election promise to improve employment opportunities in Newcastle, used the wartime need of ships and engineering services as a reason for establishing in 1942, with some of the old facilities but on a more suitable site in Newcastle harbour, the N.S.W. Government Engineering and Shipbuilding Undertaking. With initial financial help from the Commonwealth Government, this proved an effective enterprise both during and after the war, and at present employs about 1,800 people. It has undertaken shipbuilding for the Commonwealth, dredge repairs and other services for the Public Works Department, merchant ship repairs and general engineering, and it operates a floating dock.

As some earnest of further intentions, the 1942 bill for the Dockyard at first contained a general clause authorizing the Governor-in-Council to set up other industrial undertakings, as the Minister-in-Charge, Mr. J. J. Cahill, said the Government was committed to consider, "at the appropriate time, the re-establishment of such State enterprises as the needs of the people demand". However, the Legislative Council removed this clause, and a separate statute was used in 1946 to re-establish a State Brickworks. The original works had been sold by the Stevens Government in 1936 under circumstances to be described shortly. The profits of the new Brickworks had by 1951 covered the initial losses of the establishment years. The financial operations of both of these restored undertakings are conducted on the same principles as those of their predecessors, that is, by means of a special deposit account in the Treasury.

The Government legislated to set up a State Tileworks in 1947, but this project has so far been operated by a private company under lease. In 1951, just over forty years after being proposed during Labour's first victorious election campaign, the Sydney Harbour ferries were placed under a Sydney Harbour Transport Board comprising a group of departmental heads—the object being to maintain the service because the private company seemed unlikely to escape from deep financial waters.

Next to the Government Railways, the Electricity Commission of New South Wales, established under special statute in 1950, is now the largest public utility undertaking of any kind in the State. It has a staff of 7,000 and generates 95 per

cent. of the power used. Centralized control of generation seems to be mainly a response to technological demands. In New South Wales it represents essentially a transfer of functions from county councils and municipal and shire councils under the Local Government Act, to a single State corporation. Only a very small proportion of electricity supply in the State has ever been generated by private enterprise. Of the two firms operating in Sydney when the Commission was established, one is still litigating over the terms of resumption.

How Fared the Enterprises, and Why ?

Let us now briefly review the life-histories of the whole body of State enterprises. For the moment we shall consider them solely in terms of survival, services rendered and financial results—roughly the criteria of Griffith himself.

Of the four enterprises established before 1910 as separate undertakings, the Railways and Tramways and Tourist Bureau remain as State services, though trams, of course, are on the way out for technological reasons. The Railways have always been by far the largest State enterprise, now employing over 50,000 people. They have a vital developmental as well as service aspect. They have always been heavily subsidized from Consolidated Revenue. They are suffering the same technological strains as similarly outmoded forms of transport the world over. Despite the regular subsidies, for years their revenue accounts have been millions in debit, the losses being recouped from Consolidated Revenue surpluses. Their situation is too complex for appraisal here, but in any case, they have no special association with Labour policy. The Cockatoo Dock still operates as a Commonwealth instrumentality. The business of the Government Savings Bank has accrued in the hands of the Commonwealth Bank since 1933. Its transfer from the State's control was the combined result of the desperation of Lang's Depression policies and the determination of non-Labour State and Commonwealth administrations to exploit that desperation to the full.

As for the Labour-sponsored enterprises after 1910, of a total of 25 considered here, seventeen went out of existence as separate undertakings, including the Brickworks and Dockyard which, as already shown, were revived successfully after 1941. This happened from two distinct sets of causes: on the one hand misadventure, inherent unsoundness or bad management; on the other hand direct or indirect sabotage by non-Labour interests or governments.

The Rozelle Joinery Works, acquired as a by-product of a Railways land transaction, and declared an undertaking in 1911, were destroyed by fire in 1914, and their outstanding obligations and staff were transferred to the Timber Yard. The Botany Brickworks producing sandlime bricks met with little demand from either departments or the public. It was over-capitalized owing to experimentation with machinery, and could not economically produce the quantities that could be sold. It ceased to operate in 1917. The associated Limeworks at Botany and Taree also failed. The Botany Limeworks was closed down for most of the period after 1914, as it was found impossible to produce lime at a rate that would meet working expenses. The Taree works was leased to the Broken Hill Proprietary Company on a royalty basis from 1914 to 1916 and from 1917 on a rental basis.

It was degazetted in 1919 together with the other works mentioned in this paragraph. These four were the only undertakings that clearly failed through misadventure or inherent unsoundness.

A second group of three enterprises were expensive failures, largely as a result of bad management, and were sold by non-Labour governments on the ground of their heavy losses. More sympathetic policy and administration might have saved them, but their troubles were not entirely due to deliberate administrative sabotage, as is taken for granted in Mr. Brian Fitzpatrick's pamphlet on this subject (*Public Enterprise Does Pay*, Melbourne, 1945).

The Walsh Island Dockyard incurred unnecessarily heavy costs throughout its history because its site was subject to heavy silting and all workers and supplies had to be transported to and from the mainland. Except for a few months in 1921-2 as a declared undertaking, it was always a branch of the Public Works Department and so was more directly subject to the changing whims of Ministers than the more independently managed enterprises. Nevertheless it was making profits in the years just before the Depression. Then it suffered hard times, workers were turned off, and its machinery and equipment were apparently allowed to go to rack and ruin. It accumulated a loss of £1 million during the Depression, and the Stevens Government felt no inclination to resuscitate the derelict monster. They sold what equipment they could at give-away prices and closed the Dockyard about 1933, leaving the remainder to rust.

Next in this group was the State Timber Yard at Uhr's Point (alongside the power station). In its infancy in 1914 it suffered from the increased pressure of work imposed by the transfer of staff, stock and business from the burnt-out Joinery Works—without any records or accounts. At first its manager's purchasing powers were hampered by a Board of Administration of three public servants—two of whom received sitting fees that were charged against the Yard. This was ended, but the Yard could not effectively compete with the tightly organized Timber Merchants' Association. It had to pay expense claims on import tallies which the Commonwealth Government insisted must be made by nominees of the Association. It was given no reservation rights over local timbers and was at the mercy of the private industry in obtaining these. In face of these difficulties managers came and went—some five managers and three acting managers in nine years. The result was reckless trading, over-generous discount and credit terms and delivery services. This desperation was increased by the fact that although the yards were equipped to meet all government needs, several departments persisted in buying from the Timber Merchants' Association, so that the Yard could not work to anything approaching its full capacity. Moderate profits were made in 1916, 1920 and 1921, but in other years great losses occurred. So in spite of the Auditor-General's view that the Timber Yard had "saved the government very considerable sums", it virtually collapsed under its own overhead, and the Fuller Government had no difficulty in defending its sale in 1923.

The third enterprise in this group, the State Trawling Industry, owed its difficulties partly to inefficient management and partly to a conflict between the two aims announced by Holman himself in 1914—the supply of cheap and fresh

fish "as a food for the people", and the development of an important natural resource as "a commercial success". A Royal Commission in 1912 had commented on the poor supply and condition of fish for the Sydney market, and had urged the development of trawling. Under its first manager, who was more of a scientist than an administrator, the State enterprise succeeded only too well in improving the supply, since by 1920 there were heavy gluts, the Industry was grossly over-capitalized, and the system of distribution—by retail shops in Sydney alone—was quite inadequate to dispose of the surplus fish. The over-capitalization was largely due to the addition to the fleet in 1919 of four Newcastle-built trawlers which cost nearly twice as much as the original three, and were poorly built and powered. It seems rather tendentious of Fitzpatrick to attribute this liability to deliberate intent on the part of George Fuller, the responsible Minister in Holman's Nationalist Government, but as Premier after the change of management in 1920 he did little to alleviate the position. According to the Auditor-General,

The second management made many improvements, and so cut down unnecessary expenditure that it looked as if the trawlers, when divested of non-essential adjuncts, were taking a new path to success. The divestment, however, was not carried out as required, and the unprofitable assets reverted to the trawlers. . . . It was practicable to rescue the trawling industry at an earlier stage. . . . The consistent support afforded proved incompetence was phenomenal.⁷

There were critical reports, not on the basic soundness of the enterprise, but on its policy and administration, by the Mason Allard Royal Commission into the State public service in 1920, by a Public Service Board investigation in 1922, by an official enquiry into alleged gluts in 1922, and by a Royal Commission into inefficiency and suspected corruption in the manager's negotiations for coal contracts, also in 1922. According to Dr. Evatt, the last enquiry was made an excuse by the Fuller Government for closing the Industry in February 1923. The assets were sold at considerable loss in a falling market for shipping, so helping to blacken the general picture of the trawling experiment.

There was another group of three enterprises which, though they achieved for a time their basic object of saving public money, were afterwards deliberately prevented from meeting the superficial profit-and-loss test, by methods more clearly attributable to what the Auditor-General called "unsympathetic official action" than in the case of the preceding group. These were the the State Bakery, the Power House at Uhr's Point, and the Sawmills at Craven and Gloucester.

The Bakery supplied government departments, institutions and municipal depots at prices lower than those charged by private bakers. Additional plant was installed in 1917 in order to supply the Railway Refreshment Rooms. But the volume of orders was not sufficient to allow this part of the business to operate at a profit, and the Bakery did not re-tender for the Railways pastry contract after 1919. Bread-making plant was becoming technically obsolescent and apparently this fact was used to dispose of plant until there was hardly enough to continue

⁷*Report of the Auditor-General on State Industrial Undertakings, 1921-2, p. 3.*

operations. With the stopping of municipal depot orders in 1922, the field of operations had been restricted to uneconomic proportions and loss was inevitable. The first small loss showed up in 1922-3, and this was sufficient for Fuller to sell up the Bakery, despite the fact that its accumulated profit in 1923 was over £10,000—quite sufficient to wipe out its loan capital.

The Power House was intentionally run throughout at a small annual loss, amounting by 1923 to £11,000, but the Auditor-General reported that its low charges to State undertakings had saved the government two and a half times that amount in three years. It was sold to private buyers in 1923.

The Sawmills operated with success until 1921, when a large order from the Commonwealth War Service Homes Commission was cancelled and only nominal compensation was made. As a result large stocks had to be disposed of in a falling market. Seeking rehabilitation, the mill needed further rail access to suitable timber supplies. The Government would not authorize the extension. Evatt's quotation from the Auditor-General's 1924 remarks on the result is worth repeating for the neat official sting in its tail:

Had the railway been extended for a distance of approximately two miles at a cost of about £5,000, figures have been produced which indicate that loss would not have been sustained. As the result of governmental policy, this expenditure was not incurred, and the business has been sold. It may be mentioned, however, that the company which purchased the Sawmills is managed by the late manager of the undertaking, who is also a large shareholder.⁸

Evatt missed, however, the poetical justice of the sequel. Unable to operate without the access railway, the private company went into liquidation in August 1924 and part of the assets were purchased by the Public Works Department.

We can dismiss very briefly three undertakings for which there was probably never any excuse for separation from their parent departments, though they accumulated profits, while "gazetted", totalling £38,000. The Clothing Factory and the Drug Depot operated satisfactorily throughout, but supplied only government departments. Both were re-merged with the Stores Department in 1922. The State Motor Garage by 1921 was doing nearly half of its business with the public, but this was partly because its services to the government were duplicating those of the departmental Central Garage. The Motor Garage was ordered to work only for government after June 1922, and reverted to departmental status from October 1923.

Thus in 1922 and 1923 the Fuller Nationalist Government alone had sold or otherwise disposed of eight industrial undertakings, while four others had failed before that time. Four more of the most successful were similarly fated, though they survived and flourished for another dozen years. The story of the Homebush Brickworks, the Building Construction Branch, the Kiama Metal Quarries and the Monier Pipe Works is detailed *con amore* by Evatt and Fitzpatrick, so that in the words of Scheherazade "nothing would be gained by repeating it here". By all

⁸*Report of the Auditor-General on State Industrial Undertakings, 1923-4, p. 25.*

standards including commercial ones their record remained unassailable, even when debited after 1926-7 with the equivalent of State and Commonwealth income tax (a decision of Mr. B. S. B. Stevens as Treasurer in the Bavin Nationalist Government of 1927-30), and despite the inroads of the Depression. However, in accordance with party policy the Stevens-BruXner Government decided in 1933 to dispose of them. The Building Construction Branch was restricted in its activities and merged in the Department of Works and Local Government in 1936. In spite of sustained opposition including cogent protests by their original creators Griffith and Holman (the latter of course being long out of the ranks of Labour), the other three enterprises were all sold by 1936—the Brickworks to the very combine they were established to combat. In 1937 a Royal Commission rejected charges of fraud in respect of these three transactions, but its terms of reference were carefully framed to exclude consideration of whether the sales were contrary to the public interest, and the Commissioner refused to take into account the conspicuous contributions of some of the purchasers to United Australia Party funds. (See Dr. Evatt's account.)

We are thus left with the following list of current public enterprises in New South Wales (established at the dates shown):

Set up under Labour governments

Metropolitan Meat Industry Board (1912)	Government Engineering and Ship- building Undertaking (1942)
Public Trust Office (1914)	State Brickworks (1946)
State Coal Mines Authority (1916)	Electricity Commission of N.S.W. (1950)
Government Insurance Office (1926)	Sydney Harbour Transport Board
State Lotteries (1930)	(1952)

Set up under non-Labour governments

N.S.W. Government Railways (1855)	Department of Road Transport (1933)
Government Tourist Bureau (1905)	Rural Bank of N.S.W. (1933)

Public Enterprise, Party Policies, and Socialism

Of the State undertakings now in operation, the transport group are the only ones that have not had consistent success both commercially and in providing services to the public. (None of them is any longer confined to supplying government departments only.) Taking past and present together, it seems, as Brigden, Fitzpatrick and Evatt were at pains to point out, that the claim of conservative politicians that State enterprise is inherently inefficient and cannot pay its way is the last accusation that can be levelled with any show of truth at public enterprise in New South Wales. Outside the bedevilled field of passenger transport, at least 22 out of the thirty enterprises surveyed in this paper were efficiently and economically run during most of their history, and many have been highly prosperous by commercial standards. Some of the others could also have succeeded but for being deliberately weakened by government or departmental policy. The majority thus met the kind of standards set up by McGowen, Griffith and Holman, by private

enterprise itself, or, say, by the State Auditor-General. Fitzpatrick remarks that the Auditor-General was "always, whoever occupied the office, a good friend to the state undertakings", and Fitzpatrick and Evatt delight in quoting that official's annual reports at length. But they are eminently quotable as vindications of the enterprises from this strictly commercial point of view, and as showing that such was really the point of view even of their Labour sponsors in the early days. To quote them once again, the 1918-19 Report stressed that

The motive for the conduct of these undertakings . . . is not presumed to be an active competition with other producers to their detriment, but rather to effect savings to the State administration by giving it a first class article and ensuring that it shall not pay unduly therefor.

Later on, in 1923-4, the Auditor-General's verdict was that in the immediately preceding years

The industrials were forced into open competition with private enterprise. It was soon shown that enterprises, under capable management, could survive, notwithstanding even unsympathetic official action. When however it was determined to extensively restrict the field of operation. . . loss was inevitable.

However, defending the record of public enterprise solely in terms of balance sheets answers only superficial criticism by anti-socialists. As already shown, the non-Labour politicians have scarcely taken this criticism seriously themselves. It was mere hypocrisy for them to force some of the weaker enterprises into commercial losses in order to provide an excuse for liquidating them. The cynicism of these attacks was clearly demonstrated later, when a non-Labour government insisted on selling out the very undertakings that had prospered commercially through thick and thin. The real reason was, of course, that they had in fact proved at least as efficient as private enterprise, and more particularly, had made their products available at prices free of monopoly or cartel profits, thus justifying their existence on the very principle to which the business world gave lip-service—the principle of free competition. By any political standards, let alone socialist ones, the disposal of these enterprises, especially the sale to a notorious private combine, was a betrayal of a public trust, not only by depriving the public domain of valuable assets, but also by forcing on the community a more costly service than it would otherwise have had, for the sole benefit of a few money-making *entrepreneurs*.

But, to repeat, all this is only of peripheral interest for socialism or Labor Party policy. In that context the question is whether the record of public enterprise in New South Wales represents a significant Labor Party contribution towards its avowed programme of socialization. And the answer must be in the negative, as all the earlier writers mentioned above have demonstrated with unimpeachable arguments to which I can add little. One point has been suggested earlier on. The surviving enterprises established by non-Labour governments, together with the Electricity Commission which is really the culmination of a long administrative evolution, overshadow both in mere size and in importance to the economy the whole of the distinctively Labour experiments put together. Further, the "distinctively Labour" experiments ignored the more important socializing planks in

the early Labour platforms, and pre-dated the more thoroughgoing "socialization objective" of 1921. As Fitzpatrick put it:

Holman and McGowen and Griffith . . . were not challenging the capitalist mode of production. They were trying to soften its impact, at some points, on the consumer. They did not concern themselves with the means of production in order to try to substitute a system of production for use for production for profit. But they did try to ensure that prices to the consumer, and incidentally profits to the capitalist producer, should not be inordinate.⁹

And note that the "consumers" were, for the most part, government departments. Grattan's statement is even more pointed:

It has not proved to be the case that state enterprise brought Australia to the point of teetering on the edge of socialism; . . . the curious miscellany of state enterprises put into operation by Holman and McGowen seems now to be characteristic of a pre-industrialised economy.¹⁰

In fact, the only hint of socialism in the story is that in some of the earlier enterprises, without detriment to the profit-and-loss account, employees benefited from profit-sharing, paid holidays, bonuses for good conduct, and superannuation schemes, all of which were far in advance of practices then prevailing in private industry. Management, however, has always been conducted on orthodox business or bureaucratic lines. There is little to distinguish the giant modern public corporations either from government departments on the one hand or from large private corporations on the other.

If State capitalism on these lines is a far cry from socialism, it is because it has been allowed to operate, at the State level in Australia at any rate, only in fields which were not vital to the economy as a whole, or if vital, were unprofitable to private enterprise though a necessary condition for its development and continuance. This fact, in conjunction with the actual character of the New South Wales Labour experiments, is what gives relevance to Dr. Evatt's remark that "unless founded on iron and steel, State industrial enterprise is apt to be too occasional and too trivial to be completely successful".¹¹ As to iron and steel, the McGowen Government abandoned in mid-passage its own legislation for a State ironworks, which was provided for in its policy platform and recommended by a Royal Commission in 1911, and subsidized the Broken Hill Proprietary Company to enter the steel production field for the first time. But the big undertakings of all kinds, both private and public, have waxed strong. The "trivial" undertakings of the Holman era not only belonged to a pre-industrial age, but were too vulnerable—because of their "triviality"—to the vagaries of transient governments. And the writers I have quoted were right in saying that whether big or small, State industrial undertakings as we have seen them in Australia "do not form parts of a "socialization pattern". Apart from other considerations, it has, of course, become

⁹Fitzpatrick, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁰Grattan, *op. cit.*, pp. 75, 76.

¹¹Evatt, *op. cit.*, p. 551.

clear that public enterprise at the level of one State in a federal system cannot be the basis of any kind of "socialization pattern"—at least, any kind that is conceived in economic terms.

Apart from its relevance for students of Labour policy, this analysis may have a wider interest for political scientists and historians looking for new interpretations of the role of government in Australian politics. It is one of a number of case-studies of various issues which seem to converge on the question of how far the early and relatively extensive intervention of government in the Australian economy should continue to be explained in terms of political party initiatives, of a Labor Party inspired by a "socialism without doctrines" setting the pace and imposing its will in an ideological struggle with "parties of resistance" defending a philosophy of *laissez-faire*. Like the other studies, this paper points rather towards the view so ably expressed in the last chapter of Professor Bruce Miller's *Australian Government and Politics*, that all Australians envisage "development" as the prime concern of government; that the political parties—all of them—are merely the media through which different organized interests register demands for their chosen lines of development; that no party consistently pursues any doctrinal ideal—whether "socialism" or "liberalism"; and that every party is willing, at times, to promote State activities that benefit the vested interests behind it—activities, for example, like fish shops to feed the Sydney voters, or a Rural Bank to finance the vociferous farmers.

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Politics and "Responsibility" in Australian Trade Unions

By D. W. RAWSON

I

Discussion of the role of trade unionism usually centres on the two issues of political activity, especially party-political activity, and the unions' responsibility¹ for the efficient functioning of the economic system within which they operate. These two issues are usually connected. Trade unions in most countries are associated with one or more political parties and this political allegiance may weaken or over-ride a non-partisan concern for the immediate health of the economy. This is particularly likely if, as is usually the case, they are associated with radical parties which hold that the economy as it exists is incapable of efficient operation.

Appeals to unions to accept a broader responsibility in industry have taken three main forms. The first, and oldest, is the attempt, "in the public interest", to discourage strikes. The second is the demand for union endorsement of increased productivity and of schemes which, it is hoped, will bring this about. The third, a more comprehensive variant of the second, is that the unions should accept some responsibility for the entire conduct of industry and, if necessary, use their influence and strength to ensure that management fulfils its tasks as efficiently as possible and with the greatest possible benefit to consumers as well as employees.

In their attitudes to these questions, all union officials are affected by political considerations, and usually by party considerations. Those who are least equivocal in their attitude are probably the members of the Communist Party, who deny any responsibility for the efficiency of a capitalist economy. According to L. L. Sharkey, in what remains the principal Australian statement of Communist trade union theory: "The strategical aim of the Communists in the trade unions is precisely the one indicated by Marx; to inscribe on their banners the revolutionary watchword, 'abolition of the wage system'."²

The Communist Party has also followed Marx in denying that the workers are capable of achieving any real or permanent improvement of their conditions under capitalism and, at least as late as 1942, argued that they in fact failed to do so in Australia.³ Therefore, the only way in which trade unions can really benefit their members is by their part in "fighting for the proletarian dictatorship".

No Australian trade union leader could retain office if his policies were based solely on the principle of "abolition of the wage system". The union rank and file demand better conditions under capitalism and will not be satisfied with leaders who proclaim this to be a naive delusion. Further, most unionists have little

¹"Responsibility" will convey to conservatives the meaning intended. Communists may obtain the same effect by substituting "class collaboration" throughout. It is hoped that the use of the term will become clear to others as the argument proceeds.

²L. L. Sharkey, *The Trade Unions*, Sydney, 1942, p. 11.

³*ibid.*, p. 19.

sympathy for many of the political campaigns which the Communists regard as part of the "fight for the proletarian dictatorship" and will eventually remove leaders who involve them in sacrifices for ends which they do not share. The Communist union official, and his superiors in the party machine, thus have very difficult problems of adjusting strategy and tactics, and the failure to do so, resulting in a series of unsuccessful strikes, was a major factor in the reduction of Communist influence in the unions between 1948 and 1954. However, while unionists are not prepared to make sacrifices to help bring about the destruction of capitalism, they are equally unprepared to make sacrifices to maintain it. As long as the Communist official confines himself to the immediate welfare of his members, his lack of concern for the interests of the economy at large gives him great freedom of manoeuvre and suits the mood of his members well enough.

There are occasions when Communist officials show concern for the future of particular industries, but even under these circumstances they deny that the employees involved are under any obligation to ensure the success of such measures as they propose. As for the economy as a whole, they are presumably convinced that ultimately there must be revolutionary changes, and that these changes will be followed by sweeping and rapid improvement in the conditions and the status of their members. If so, it would be natural to regard economic deterioration which led to a more radical mood among industrial workers with some satisfaction. At any rate, Communists would certainly feel no obligation to prevent such deterioration. They would oppose anything which offered the illusory promise of benefits to the workers through acquiring some kind of interest in the efficiency of capitalism, and if they saw that the promise could be other than illusory their opposition would be, if anything, strengthened. Communist officials are normally the first to call for stoppages of work, and the last to agree to end them. They are, with rare exceptions, the only officials to defend strikes which are frankly political in the sense that they are not intended to bring immediate gains for the workers who take part in them. They have opposed incentive payment schemes, in principle and in particular industries. Their industrial activities throughout have been political in character, in that they have been based upon objectives which are much broader than those usually regarded as involved in industrial relations, and also in the more restricted sense that their primary purpose has been to strengthen the position of the Communist Party as a political organization, though not necessarily as a parliamentary one.

At the other extreme, the viewpoint which characterized the former A.L.P. industrial groups is also fairly clear in its attitude to the existing economic system. The ideological and organizational centre of this viewpoint has always been found among Catholics, but Catholicism is not a necessary ingredient. In fact, among trade union officials, some of the most articulate exponents of the "group" point of view are non-Catholics. The establishment of a greater measure of social harmony, opposition to Communism and a lack of support for socialism, assuming the latter term to involve the nationalization of most industries, had primarily a religious basis for the members of the Catholic Social Movement, but recommended themselves for other reasons to the Movement's fellow-travellers, such as Laurence Short

of the Federated Ironworkers' Association and Lloyd Ross of the Australian Railways Union. These objectives, like those of the Communists, have involved those who pursue them in partisan questions which have come to affect their industrial activities.

Short has expressed a view of trade union responsibility which would be accepted by this group.

The question is, as I believe it, that the unions in Australia have arrived at the stage in history where they have become not only protesting organisations but also contributing organisations. The worst effects of capitalism have been overcome by the unions. There is still a lot to be done, but unions in this country have reached the stage where they must start thinking about the economy of the country and particularly about the economies of the industries in which their members work. If the industry in which they are employed is languishing, the welfare of their members will begin to suffer. If the industries are prosperous and expanding, it points to an improvement of union wages and conditions.⁴

If the Communist's danger is of becoming preoccupied with the destruction of capitalism, the industrial grouper's danger is of becoming preoccupied with the preservation of capitalism. In either case the rank and file may consider that their immediate interests are being ignored. However, an aggressive pursuit of members' interests is quite compatible with concern for the economy as a whole. In particular, strikes may be regarded as undesirable and a last resort and yet conducted frequently and vigorously. The acceptance of capitalism by American unions does not prevent their conducting more protracted strikes than their Australian counterparts, while Short himself has drawn attention, with every appearance of satisfaction, to the large number of strikes conducted by the Ironworkers' Association under his leadership.⁵ A willingness to call strikes is only one of the criteria by which attitudes towards the existing economic system may be judged. It is only possible to say that, within a given union and under the circumstances of the post-war period, we would expect Communist officials to be most likely and industrial group officials least likely to attempt strike action.

Between the two extreme groups of Communists and industrial groupers the uncommitted majority of union leaders sometimes present an unhappy spectacle. In the years following 1945 they welcomed the support of the industrial groupers, who were then gaining strength. Later, as the groupers became more powerful the "traditionalist" trade union leaders gradually became hostile to them and eventually switched to outright opposition, which almost of necessity involved lining up with the Communists on a number of issues, both industrial and political. The remarkable outcome of this process is that they have acted with greater consistency when on the side of the Communists than when on the side of the groupers, though they would not accept most of the premises of Communist industrial policy. Most union officials simply feel more comfortable in an intransigent position than in a collaborationist one, and this is particularly the case in Australia.

⁴Quoted in *News-Weekly* (Melbourne), 8 Sept. 1954.

⁵Reported in *Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 Ap. 1958.

It is a difficult, and perhaps strictly an impossible, task for any group to decide the extent to which its interests are best served by giving consideration to the interests of "society" or "the community". Nevertheless, every group has to work out a rough answer if it is to do anything for its members at all. People such as wheat farmers, doctors, importers and, I would argue, the Communists and the industrial groupers among trade union officials, have worked out their own rough answers which, whatever the rest of us may think of their wisdom or morality, provide a basis for consistent action. Most other union leaders, however, have never been able to work out a satisfactory answer, and as a result they sometimes present the appearance of being half cajoled and half bullied by the other trade union factions.

The people whom I have called the traditionalist union leaders can be further divided, and in fact insist on dividing themselves into so-called "political" and "industrial" factions, according to how much importance they attach to the electoral success of the Labor Party as a factor in gaining trade union objectives. In this sense we may call most of the leaders of the A.C.T.U. "industrial" unionists, while the leaders of the A.W.U. present "political" unionism par excellence. However, this distinction is a relative one. Even the "industrial" union leaders have shown themselves to be much affected by political considerations, and by the tradition that they are the vanguard of Australian radicalism.

In many countries political radicalism had no spontaneous origin within the trade unions and required to be introduced from outside. In Britain, which provides the most obvious comparison with Australia, the unions have formed a permanent Right wing within the Labor Party, the most reluctant to accept a socialist policy⁶ and now the least interested in its continued application. The Australian Labor Party, by contrast, took its most important Leftward step, the adoption of the socialization objective in 1921, at the instigation of the leading trade union officials, and with the declared aim of retaining union support.⁷ For at least forty years proposals involving large-scale social reconstruction have obtained their greatest support from trade unions and been resisted not only by Labour politicians but by local A.L.P. branches. The traditional British conception of radical constituency parties and conservative trade unions is reversed in Australia. Radicalism has remained so important a factor in Australian unionism partly because the union officials have come to regard it as their own; not imposed on them by "intellectuals" but imposed by them, in the name of the Labour movement, on unwilling politicians.

It is reasonable to expect a connection between radicalism and a lack of responsibility towards existing society. Presumably, the less satisfied we are with

⁶"Right up to 1914 any attempt to commit the Labor Party to Socialism would have endangered trade union support. . . . The war, however, had made an immense difference to trade union opinion. . . . The new generation of trade unionists was at any rate much more Socialist than the old." G. D. H. Cole, *A History of the Labour Party from 1914*, London, 1947, p. 53.

⁷"The members of the Federal Executive [of the Labor Party] knew that the mass was not satisfied with the programme and objectives of the Australian Labor Movement. It was decided to convene the conference and it was decided that the conference should consist of representatives of trade unions. They wanted to get from these representatives an ultimatum as to what they really wanted." E. J. Holloway opening the 1921 All Australian Trade Union Congress, *Official Report*, p. 3.

the society we live in, the less we will be concerned with the danger that our self-interested actions may undermine that society. Australian trade unions have usually assumed that only very exceptional circumstances, such as a war which has full union support, justify any restraint on union activities. Most Australian union officials would deny, at least initially, that an economic crisis could also make it morally improper for the unions to insist upon claims without consideration for their broader effects. The operation of the economy—so runs the traditional view—is not the unions' affair, though they must attempt to minimize its inevitably unjust operation against their members.

Nevertheless, particularly over the last decade, non-Communist union leaders have moved some distance towards the characteristic assumptions of trade unionism in the United States—that rising living standards for employees require rising productivity, that employers and employees have substantial common interests and that union activities which impede productivity are undesirable, though they may be necessary from time to time. But they have moved very slowly towards the public statement of such views, and even more slowly towards consistent action based upon them. They are wary of going any further than the cautious proposition of R. R. Broadby, the former Secretary of the A.C.T.U., that "Australian workers have gained under capitalism and will continue to gain if they put organisation into the political and industrial field".⁸

The A.C.T.U. President, A. E. Monk, provides an interesting partial exception to this attitude. In an address given last year Mr. Monk said:

The trade union movement exists to procure higher and better living standards. It knows that such are not possible without higher productivity. It is easy enough to talk about the desirability of increasing productivity. We don't deny the proposition. What we do insist on is that the Australian worker shares in that increase.

He then went on to mention "some of the directions in which the Australian Trade Union Movement is positively playing its part in steps to increase productivity", namely the apprenticeship system and attitudes to automation. He concluded:

I have tried to indicate the interest of the trade unions in increased productivity in co-operation with Government and employers. It is in keeping with the trade union attitude that we have joined with employers' representatives on the Ministry of Labour Advisory Committee Standing Committee on Productivity. This newly constituted committee has evolved out of the Council's interest in productivity.⁹

On such questions, however, Mr. Monk's position is hardly typical, as may be seen from the A.C.T.U.'s subsequent withdrawal from the Ministry of Labour Advisory Committee—Standing Committee on Productivity and all.

Especially during the period when they regarded the Communists as their principal opponents within the trade union movement, the traditionalist officials

⁸Quoted in *Courier-Mail* (Brisbane), 19 March 1954.

⁹A.C.T.U. *Bulletin*, May 1957.

were often caught hesitating between two irreconcilable views of their own functions. Most liked to think of themselves as thoroughgoing reformers, who must defend a great under-privileged section of the community without being preoccupied with the broader effects of their actions; but they also saw themselves as directors of a valuable factor of production which during this period was chronically in short supply, and thus with positions of great responsibility in a society which they wish to retain and reform rather than destroy and rebuild.

The attitude of the A.C.T.U. to incentive payments provides an illustration of the difficulties into which their uncertainty led them. Piece-work, of course, has always been common in Australian industry and more sophisticated forms of incentives spread rapidly after the war. They were met with a rather ambiguous but generally hostile attitude on the part of the A.C.T.U.¹⁰ In 1951, while reaffirming its suspicions, the A.C.T.U. Congress instructed its officers to enquire into the use of incentives in Australia and overseas. The enquiry revealed a marked contrast between policy and practice in many unions.¹¹ It was found that "some unions officially opposed to the operation of incentives permit their members to work under incentive schemes", and that many unions were not aware whether their members worked under such schemes or not. However, if the unions had failed to give a lead to their members, the A.C.T.U. officers were no more willing to give a lead to the unions. The officers adhered rigidly to their terms of reference and expressed no opinion on the desirability of incentive schemes, though it was possible to surmise that they regarded them with some favour as a means of increasing production. Their principal argument, which was accepted by the 1953 All Australian Trade Union Congress, was that since incentive schemes were now firmly established it was useless to oppose them indiscriminately. All that could be done was to bring them as much as possible under union supervision.

The A.C.T.U. showed at its worst on the incentives issue. It had originally been hostile to the principle of incentive payments (as distinct from examining cautiously the effect of particular schemes) because of nothing more coherent than a vague distrust of employers. If the unions had genuine objections to the principle they might well have greatly retarded its acceptance in industry. If, on the other hand, they had decided to sanction the principle from the beginning, they would at least have had a chance to supervise the introduction and development of the various schemes. Because they did neither, the schemes not only spread rapidly, but did so without the unions taking any effective part in their introduction; often even without their knowledge.

The principal complaint of its industrial group critics was that the A.C.T.U. failed to consider the reconciliation of union demands with the health of the economy. The Melbourne paper *News-Weekly*, speaking in effect for the Catholic Social Movement, complained during the margins dispute of 1954 that the A.C.T.U. showed

¹⁰*News-Weekly* complained in 1952 (25 June) that: "Incentives were put on the agenda paper in 1945. Since then, every effort to get a trade union policy on this vital issue hammered out has been met with evasion and procrastination." This was because "the A.C.T.U. has been content to chug along on a nineteenth century conception of a class war between exploiters and exploited".

¹¹Summarised from the *Executive Report* of the A.C.T.U., Melbourne, 1953, pp. 22-31.

no interest in the long-range effect of its claims; that it was like "a small boy who has been deprived of something and has become so obsessed with obtaining it that he completely ignores the advantages and disadvantages of success".¹²

To those who accept the assumptions of *News-Weekly*, the British Trade Union Congress appeared, by contrast, to be a model of responsibility and decisive leadership. As *News-Weekly* put it: "A long tradition of statesmanship by T.U.C. leaders has given the decisions of its General Council a degree of moral standing which has yet to be gained by its Australian counterpart."¹³

There are organizational reasons why the A.C.T.U. might be expected to play a less active part in union affairs than does the T.U.C.¹⁴ It is an untidy federation of six Trades and Labour Councils and individual unions and, despite recent changes in the composition of its executive, final authority in most matters rests with the Trades and Labour Councils. But the A.C.T.U. leaders demonstrated, even during the anti-Communist period, that they could act decisively if they desired; when, for example, they forced the Communist-led unions to disaffiliate from the World Federation of Trade Unions. When the dispute for control of the A.L.P. broke out in 1954, the A.C.T.U. leaders promptly declared themselves in favour of the official A.L.P. and Dr. Evatt, and to some extent involved the A.C.T.U. itself on the same side. Since that time, the general body of non-Communist union officials has acted with greater decision. There have been attempts to by-pass the arbitration system in which, at various times, effective co-operation has been achieved not only between Communist unions and the A.C.T.U., but between Communist unions and the Australian Workers' Union.¹⁵ Though these changes of alignment were not solely the product of the political struggle for the control of the Labor Party, they were clearly influenced by that struggle, as were a number of lesser industrial decisions. The ease with which this realignment took place, and perhaps the fact that it took place at all, together with the patent uneasiness of many non-Communist unionists when they feel obliged to accept responsibility for capitalism in operation, all owe something to the distinctively Australian tradition of radicalism among union leaders.

This radicalism is primarily a product of the past; so much can be said without necessarily denying its present validity. The sources of the tradition are to be found somewhere in the relatively short history of the Australian Labour movement up to the beginning of the second world war.

¹²*News-Weekly*, 3 March 1954.

¹³*ibid.*, 29 Sept. 1954. Two years earlier, during a visit of the General Secretary of the T.U.C., *News-Weekly* reported: "Sir Vincent Tewson's talks to Labor members throughout Australia have been enlightening, interesting and have indicated in terms of responsibility that the British trade union movement has 'grown up'. To this extent, the Australian trade union movement, or more correctly certain sections of it, have something to learn." 30 Ap. 1952.

¹⁴However, the A.C.T.U., unlike the T.U.C., takes part directly in negotiations on conditions of employment, both within and outside the arbitration system.

¹⁵According to *News-Weekly* (2 Jan. 1957), the report of the Communist Secretary of the Waterside Workers' Federation to the union's conference stated: "From the start of this [shearing] dispute we have kept in close contact with the Federal officials of the A.W.U. and the State officials in Queensland and New South Wales. However, from the start we have made it clear that we would have to be kept well informed of the various developments. A.W.U. officials, both Federal and State, readily agreed that the fullest information should be supplied at all times, and in fact they sought our assistance in regard to methods of organisation following our experience in the January and February [waterfront] stoppage this year."

II

Writers as opposed in other respects as Lenin and Selig Perlman have agreed that trade unionism does not become a socialist movement spontaneously. In general, it is true that socialist theories have had their origin among "educated representatives of the propertied classes—the intellectuals"¹⁶ and have required grafting on to the trade union movement. In Britain, in most of Europe and in America, the unions provided neither the source of socialist theory nor its most persistent advocates. Within each Labour movement which turned to political action, union officials have usually remained a conservative influence.

The history of the Labour movement during the first fifteen years of the Labor Party is still too obscure to allow anything more than speculation on the ideological characteristics of its various sections. What is quite certain is that, by the first world war, there was a recognizable industrial wing, comprising most of the unions, which had taken up a position on the Left of the movement which it has never lost.

In 1913 Lenin wrote: "The leaders of the Australian Labor Party are trade union officials, an element which everywhere represents the most moderate and capital-serving element, and in Australia it is altogether peaceful and wholly liberal."¹⁷

By Lenin's standards the Australian union leaders might have been "moderate and capital-serving", but the implication that they were a conservative influence within the Labour movement was becoming demonstrably false. By 1916 N.S.W. unions had formed an "industrial section" from which the local Labour Leagues were specifically excluded, in order to force more aggressive action from the Labor Party, of which they were the least "moderate and capital-serving element".¹⁸

The rapid emergence of union leaders as the centre of radicalism in Australia during the period 1910-20 has an obvious explanation—their disappointment at the record of Labour governments during a period of acute difficulty for unionists. Labour governments with parliamentary majorities—the first in the world—took office in the Commonwealth and New South Wales in 1910 and in Queensland in 1915. The first two ended in schism and collapse in 1916, after a long period of growing union disappointment. Hopes of rapid union gains when Labour government held control of Parliament were partly dashed twenty years before they were even put to the test in New Zealand and thirty years before they were fully tried in Britain. If this had occurred at a time of high wages and full employment the result would probably have been a lessened interest in political action and a tendency towards "business unionism". Occurring when real wages were falling, unemployment was rising and there was no prospect of cheaply-won strike victories, disillusionment with the reformist Labor Party left a fundamental redistribution of power in the community as the only hopeful prospect.

¹⁶V. I. Lenin, "What is to be Done?" *Selected Works*, Lawrence and Wishart, 1936, Vol. 2, p. 53.

¹⁷V. I. Lenin, "The Labour Government in Australia", in L. L. Sharkey (ed.), *Australia Marches On*, Sydney, 1946, p. 11.

¹⁸See V. G. Childe, *How Labour Governs*, London, 1922, Ch. 4.

A minority of union officials passed through a short period of revolutionary syndicalism with the Industrial Workers of the World. The majority turned to the reconstruction of the Labor Party. The party's record seemed to show that the steady stream of reforms which had been expected would not be forthcoming without constant union pressure. Only the union officials shared with the politicians the advantage of being full-time members of the Labour movement. The Labor Party branches, sharply divided between city and country interests, and often controlled by municipal cliques, would not take the lead.

The real inspiration of trade union radicalism was not a coherent social theory or even a vague sentiment of brotherhood, but the belief that the working class would always be at a disadvantage until union officials and those who thought like them held the positions of power in society. Not only of parliamentary power, for their lost parliamentary leaders had been "corrupted" by the class to whose level they had suddenly been elevated. The socialization of industry, union leaders believed, would introduce a new era of co-operation and raise living standards, but the strength of its appeal lay in its promise of a society in which accepted standards of behaviour and achievement would be an idealized version of working class standards.

By this process the leaders of Australian trade unionism became the leading radicals of the country. Australian unionism suddenly became more radical because of the relative failure of Labour government; the union leaders were disappointed, not because these governments had failed to inaugurate socialism but because they had failed to protect and improve the conditions of unionists under capitalism. Under the conditions of the time, many union officials became militant socialists, and their socialism is still an important factor in the make-up of their spiritual descendants who direct the modern union movement, but at heart they did not care much for the problems, the difficulties, or even for the promise of a socialist system. Their socialism was—and is—an adjunct of their two real aspirations; improved conditions for their members and an egalitarian community with a healthy contempt for imported Governors, Legislative Councils, dinner jackets and the rest of the apparatus of the rule of property. When, in 1927, the militant trade unionists of N.S.W. found in J. T. Lang a leader who symbolized the common man in one of his more aggressive manifestations and who pursued the interests of trade unionists with little respect for constitutional traditions or even for other sections of his own party, they helped raise him to a peak of power and popularity which no other Australian Labour leader has approached. That Lang did not pretend to be a socialist did not dissuade them; it probably did not even occur to them.

This, however, is looking ahead. Whatever the explanation, radical and even revolutionary unionism gained strength in Australia at the end of the first world war. Though the Federal Government's ban and a reaction against syndicalism combined to kill the I.W.W., the pursuit of radical aims was continued through the A.L.P., the Industrial Labor Party in N.S.W. and subsequently, through the Communist Party. In its early years, under the leadership of J. S. Garden, the Communist Party of Australia was directly in the line of descent of Australian militant unionism and, although its leaders flourished their connection with the Communist International, it owed less to Moscow than the I.W.W. had owed to

Detroit and Chicago. The Communist Party was regarded as a radical "ginger group" whose leaders had not placed themselves outside the main body of Labour. During the N.S.W. Labour split of 1923, both factions sought the support of the Communists, although, when the faction fight was temporarily settled, elements from both sides combined to exclude Communists from the A.L.P.¹⁹ The question of Communists in the Labor Party lost its urgency only when the trade unionists who had given the Communist Party its early character deserted it in 1925-6. During this period the more radical union leaders within the A.L.P. became accustomed to regard the Communists as a minor variant of themselves—a habit of mind which revived in the 1930's when a reconstructed and very different Communist Party of Australia began to concern itself with union elections.

Trade union radicalism remained alive throughout the 'twenties, becoming even vaguer in its postulates and programme. It was becoming apparent that, if any Australian government had the power to pursue socialist policies, it was the Federal Government, but Labour remained in Opposition in the Federal Parliament until 1929, and the Left wing of the party was able to avoid deciding what it meant by socialization in terms of actual legislation. The union leaders were able to concentrate on the more detailed problems which arose at the State political level, and among which they felt at home. Socialization could wait, at least until there was a Federal Labour majority, while the unions saw to the pursuit of unionism's sectional demands through the State Parliaments. Not that most of the unionists, nor for that matter most of Labour's opponents, drew any clear line between socialism and legislation to benefit unionists. But while union officials may have regarded sectional legislation as steps toward socialism, they were more concerned with such reforms as ends in themselves.

The model State government which seemed to exemplify the hopes of Left-wing union men was the first Lang Government of 1925-7 in N.S.W. With child endowment, widows' pensions, improved workers' compensation and the 44-hour week introduced within eighteen months, N.S.W. union officials vied with each other in praise of "the best Premier we've ever had", while unionists in other States made envious comparisons with the records of their own Labour governments. By governing in the interests of unionists, Lang's Government gained a quite undeserved reputation for radicalism.

A connection between radicalism and union militancy remained in the minds of unionists, though during this period the two were not necessarily related. The connection was much strengthened during the Depression, when it became impossible to defend the sectional interests of unionists without recourse to radical measures. Many union officials demanded the abrogation of some traditional parliamentary practices, though without any clear idea of what they hoped to gain as a result. The A.C.T.U.'s demand for the declaration of a "state of emergency" in 1931, though the product of confusion rather than revolutionary strategy, showed that

¹⁹The episode is discussed in the writer's thesis, *The Organisation of the Australian Labor Party 1911-1941*, University of Melbourne, p. 94.

the unions had few inhibitions as to means, though they had no clear idea of ends. If put to the test, of course, it is most unlikely that the unions would have made any serious challenge to constitutionalism.

Lang, once more in power in N.S.W., temporarily became a radical because this was the only way of remaining a militant. The other leaders of Labour governments abandoned the militant pursuit of wage-earners' interests, if they had ever begun it, because they were unable or unwilling to become radicals. The Depression welded still more firmly in the minds of Left-wing union leaders the militancy which they understood and the radicalism which they felt should accompany it but to which they had still given little thought. It is important to remember that most of those who led the union movement after 1945 were already active in union affairs during the Depression. Some were prominent as far back as the heyday of radicalism in the early 'twenties.

In the mid-'thirties the officials who had partly inherited and partly helped to make this state of mind encountered men who were both militant and radical, knew relatively clearly what they meant by both terms and had a firm grasp of the connection between the two—the new type of Communist union official.

The Communist Party of Australia had passed through two transmutations since the days when it had been a self-appointed ginger group conducted by and for the more radical officials of the unions affiliated with the Sydney Trades and Labour Council. Garden and his associates had left it because they were not willing to separate themselves from the main body of the Labour movement, and particularly from the Labor Party.²⁰ For a time after this it was run by a group of doctrinaire Sydney Communists who were unable to gain any influence in the unions. In 1929, the victory of the Sharkey-Miles faction opened a new period in Australian Labour history.²¹ The Communist Party under Garden had been dominated by men who had already won prominence in the union movement. Their Communist Party was a political auxiliary which they had founded from their positions of power in the Trades and Labour Council. Sharkey's party was dominated by men who had no influence of any kind except the backing of the Comintern. They had to make the Communist Party a position of power from which to enter and ultimately gain control of the unions. Whereas Garden and his supporters had been union officials who wanted to run a Communist Party, Sharkey and his supporters were Communists who wanted to control trade unions. With one exception (and he was a relic of the earlier régime) the new Communist leaders included no union officials.

Sharkey and his group gained control through Comintern intervention and the rein of international supervision was now tightened once and for all. The

²⁰In expelling Garden from the Communist Party, after he had announced that he was no longer a member, the Central Committee stated: "Under the cloak of 'permeation', Comrade Garden has allied himself with the reformist politicians to such an extent that he has been instrumental in enabling these people to 'permeate' the trade union movement and make it an appendage of the political machine." *Workers' Weekly* (Sydney) 10 Dec. 1926. Garden subsequently became a Labour member of the Federal Parliament.

²¹For two equally disingenuous accounts of this process, but the only ones in print, see E. W. Campbell, *History of the Australian Labour Movement: a Marxist Interpretation*, Sydney, 1944, pp. 131-8, and L. L. Sharkey, *An Outline History of the Communist Party*, Sydney, 1945, pp. 22-5.

carefree days of the mid-'twenties when the party took nothing from the Comintern but a few slogans, were henceforth over. Whether because of international prompting or because of natural inclination the Communist Party maintained a stream of abuse against the A.L.P. and its leaders, Left, Right and Centre, until 1933, with intermittent spates of insult until 1935. The Labour Left wing, centred primarily in the unions, received this abuse with apparent equanimity. The denunciation of the "left-social-fascists" as the "conscious tools of capital"²² and the "chief social support of the bourgeoisie in the period of capitalist decline"²³ became too stereotyped to be taken very seriously by its victims, and perhaps even by its proponents. The Labour Left tended to think of the Communists as well-meaning extremists, the violence of whose anti-Labour aberrations could be explained and largely excused by the wretched record of the A.L.P. during the Depression. The Left-wing union officials claimed to be socialists; their vagueness as to the implications of socialism made them more likely to be sympathetic towards others who made the same claim.

After 1935 the Communists, following the decision of the Comintern to seek co-operation with other Left-wing parties, offered friendship. In N.S.W., where a campaign to remove Lang's strongly entrenched machine from control of the Labor Party was in progress, the union leaders, who had now turned against their former hero, not only accepted Communist assistance but allowed the leadership of the movement against Lang to pass into the hands of Communists.²⁴ In other States, co-operation at the political level was rejected by all but the extreme Left of the A.L.P., but there was no attempt to organize opposition to the gradual expansion of Communist strength within the unions. Communists who won leading positions in important unions, such as Thornton of the Federated Ironworkers' Association, Ross of the Australian Railways Union²⁵ and Healy of the Waterside Workers' Federation, found no difficulty in working with A.L.P. members who, in the early stages, outnumbered Communists on the governing bodies of their unions.

Neither the leaders of the trade union movement nor the Labor Party showed much concern at the increase of Communist power. The only exceptions were those who, like the leaders of the Australian Workers' Union in the industrial field and Lang in the A.L.P., felt their own positions directly threatened.²⁶ There were some issues in international affairs, such as collective security and the use of sanctions against Germany and Italy, on which the official leaders of the trade union movement had more in common with the Communists than with the leaders of the A.L.P.

It is hard to say how far the Communist entry into trade union leadership would have proceeded if only the Communists themselves and the "traditionalist" union officials whom they encountered in the 'thirties had been involved. The Communists might well have taken over the A.C.T.U. soon after the war, but it

²²*Workers' Weekly*, 13 March 1931.

²³*ibid.*, 15 Ap. 1931.

²⁴See Rawson, *op. cit.*, pp. 320-3.

²⁵Dr. Ross broke with the Communist Party in 1940.

²⁶The A.W.U. altered its rules to prevent members of the Communist Party holding office in the union in 1937.

is most improbable that they would have remained for long at the head of a united trade union movement. Whatever the precise outcome, the position of the "traditionalist" union leaders would have become much less ambiguous. Some would have been obliged to see themselves as pro-Communist. A much larger number would have become anti-Communist without equivocation. Faced squarely with the challenge of politically-oriented Communist unionism, most of them would have been driven further toward the separation of industrial and political policies, and perhaps toward a view of unions as "contributing organisations" as later envisaged by Short.

However, all this remains speculative. Before the Communists had gained much strength, a third force had appeared. As a further complication, it was one which encouraged "responsibility" in unionism not because it was non-political in outlook but because "responsibility" was in accord with its political goals. As a result the "traditionalists" were left as a third, centre party, in a position to play off one extreme against the other and to postpone indefinitely a closer examination of the logic of their own position.

The Catholic Church in Australia had followed with attention and alarm the growth of the Communist Party since the Depression. Just as Communists began to appear again among the union leadership, there was an issue which brought Communists and the A.L.P. Left together and separated both from the Catholic hierarchy—the Spanish civil war. This issue drew the attention of some outside the Labour movement to the growth of Communist influence in the unions, and its political implications. His contemporaries recall the fervour with which a young law student at Melbourne University, Bartholomew Santamaria, entered the lists on behalf of Franco. So the ground was prepared for the only force which could meet the Communists on their own ground of dogmatic certainty.

The ideology and the organization of the Catholic Social Movement, which Santamaria built up and which, from 1943, gradually began to exert an influence in trade union elections, have yet to be fully examined, but several of its features are obvious. It was, of course, opposed to Communism. It was also opposed to public ownership of any kind except as a last resort to prevent private monopoly. On the positive side it had a strong element of distributism, and favoured the replacement of large-scale business by smaller independent proprietors where possible. Its followers were prepared to accept responsibility for maintaining and increasing productivity and to seek better relations between employers and employees. They presented themselves as free from both the out-dated radicalism of the traditional union leaders and the diabolical logic of Communist industrial strategy. Apart from any ultimate doctrinal basis, there was a secular and pragmatic case to be made for making capitalism work as efficiently as possible and it was one which appealed to a number of non-Catholic union officials and would-be officials.

The Social Movement's attitude to "responsibility" might have tended to make business unionists of its adherents and to leave them relatively unconcerned with political reform, but much stronger influences were at work to tie them to the Labor Party. Most of their programme could only be achieved through governmental action, and the Labor Party, with its high proportion of Catholic members

and voters, was the obvious vehicle for this purpose. Apart from pursuing its own objectives, the Social Movement was determined to keep the A.L.P. free from Communist influence. Finally, the Labor Party was so closely connected with unionism that the most effective means of defeating Communists in union elections was to gain official A.L.P. support.²⁷ Party endorsement could be used to win control of unions which could be used in turn not only to carry out suitable industrial policies but to gain a stronger position within the party.

Many union officials who had little sympathy for the ideology of the Catholic Social Movement were glad to avail themselves of its organization in the immediate post-war years, when they suddenly found themselves threatened by the Communists. The latter, after making rapid progress during the war, were on the verge of gaining control of the A.C.T.U. and all but a few of the larger unions. The result was the formation of the A.L.P. industrial groups which were dominated by the Catholic Social Movement and which, from 1946, began to challenge the Communists at union elections. They were opposed from the start by many of the traditionalists, both because of their probable domination by non-socialists and because of suspicion of intervention by the Labor Party in union affairs. Consequently, the Catholic social ideology enjoyed unchallenged supremacy within the groups, whose supporters at the same time rapidly consolidated their position within the Labor Party machine and gained footholds in State and Federal Parliaments.

The next change in the balance of forces was again influenced by political considerations, this time on the Communist side. The Communists, no doubt encouraged by wartime popularity and by some notable strike victories in 1946-7, readily responded to the international hardening of the Communist attitude to the non-Communist world in the following year. In industrial affairs, the Communist Party behaved in a way which was not only frankly "irresponsible" but convinced many who had hitherto been sceptical that it was using trade unions led by its members for political purposes, and that one of these purposes was simply the weakening of the Australian economy. The coal strike of 1949 was particularly important in strengthening this belief.

Coupled with this activity was a tactical error which was also politically motivated. Though well aware of the Catholic Social Movement, which it had been the first to "expose" in 1945,²⁸ the Communist Party later ignored its existence. This was because, with the opening of the cold war, it was no longer Communist policy to differentiate among those who rejected Communist leadership. Those whom the Communists wanted to eliminate from union leadership were not merely the Social Movement or the A.L.P. industrial groups but a larger and vaguer body, the "Right wing", including not only the industrial groups but the traditionalist leaders in temporary alliance with them. "It is clear", wrote E. F. Hill, Victorian Secretary of the Communist Party in 1950,

²⁷From the beginning, the C.S.M. believed that external regulation of union ballots was required if Communists were to be defeated at union elections, and this was a further reason for seeking Labor Party backing. "The Labor Party can give the workers the means of solving the problem [of Communist strength] by secret ballots and impartial returning officers in union elections." *Freedom* (predecessor of *News-Weekly*), 18 Nov. 1945.

²⁸In the pamphlet, *Catholic Action at Work*, which purported to reproduce various "Movement" documents.

that the struggle for working class unity is a struggle not only against the Chifleys and the Evatts²⁹ but against the Monks and Broadbys³⁰ and of course the Shortells, Littles and so on.³¹ As the crisis of capitalism deepens—and in every way it is deepening day by day—so will the efforts of the reformists, be they Chifleys, Evatts, Monks or Broadbys, intensify to save capitalism. A crucial part of the united front in action is the securing by the Communists of the clearest understanding of these facts. In turn, the Communists must patiently and persistently explain to the workers the part that these people play.³²

This policy, of course, served to consolidate the very amorphous "Right wing" which it denounced. As a result, the development of the cold war left the party almost isolated. Its legal existence was threatened. Its General Secretary was gaoled for sedition and there was hardly a serious protest from outside the party itself. The coal miners, under Communist leadership, struck in 1949 and the Federal Labour Government took action to break the strike, with the full support of "Right-wing" union officials, until the miners rejected the advice of their officials and returned to work. From 1950 the industrial groups, with the support of some "Right-wing" Trades and Labour Councils, won control of one Communist-led union after another until only the Seamen, the Waterside Workers and the Building Workers Industrial Union could be said to be even predominantly under Communist leadership.

There followed further changes of attitude in which both industrial and political issues were involved. On the Communist side there appears to have been a tacit withdrawal from a dangerously isolated position, not without some opposition from within the party. On the industrial group side there began a period of spectacular success, both in union elections and within the Labor Party, which soon aroused the suspicion of the traditionalists. The groupers had shown signs of turning their attention from Communist-controlled unions to some in which the position was uncertain, and even to some which were unquestionably in the hands of members of the Labor Party. The Labor Party itself was being influenced increasingly by the policies of the Catholic Social Movement and there were indications that the groupers were using or would use their control over the Labor Party to circumscribe the activities of the trade unions. Nothing was more effective in provoking traditionalist hostility than the decision of the Victorian A.L.P. executive in 1954 that affiliated unions should not make representations to the State Labour Government except by way of the executive. This seemed a direct reversal of the traditionalist view that the political wing should be subject to the unions.

Simultaneously with these political developments, industrial issues were also tending to bring the traditionalists closer to the Communists. In 1951, just as the Communist Party began looking for allies among the Labour Left, the post-war boom received its first serious check. This was reflected in a "tougher" attitude towards union claims by both State and Federal arbitral bodies. The Communists,

²⁹i.e. the Parliamentary Labor Party leaders.

³⁰i.e. the traditionalists.

³¹i.e. the union officials in closer alliance with the industrial groups.

³²*Communist Review* (Sydney), July 1950.

of course, had always denied that the use of arbitration could be anything more than a tactical convenience. Following a number of unfavourable decisions, notably the rejection of applications for increased margins in 1952, the abolition of quarterly adjustment of the basic wage in 1953 and the frequent imposition of fines on unions for strikes and bans on overtime, hostility to the arbitration system became more general among non-Communist leaders. There were enough decisions of this kind, even during the years of the revived boom of 1953-6, to keep alive the traditionalists' suspicions towards the working of the economy, and their doubts were confirmed by the arrival of the current recession. The industrial groupers had no love for the arbitration system as such, but they rejected the assumptions of inevitable class conflict and the partiality of the State and its instruments which underlay the Communist and, to a lesser extent, the non-Communist positions.

The eventual open break between the traditionalists and the industrial groupers, and the *de facto* alliance between traditionalists and Communists which followed, is a most complex example of the intermingling of political and industrial considerations. Traditionalist policy, industrial as well as political, changed very rapidly, partly as a result of events within the Labor Party which were out of the control of the unions. At the same time, changes in Labor Party policy could not have occurred so rapidly or so completely if many unions had not previously taken up a more militant industrial position, especially in their attitude to arbitration. Rightly or wrongly, consciously or otherwise, this predisposed them towards a more radical attitude to the affairs of the A.L.P.

We may take as a starting point in this process a statement by Tom Wright, Secretary of the Sheet Metal Workers' Union and *doyen* of the Communist union officials, in January 1954:

Unfortunately, the A.C.T.U. has failed and failed miserably so far to defend the basic wage. Surely it is now clear that appeals to judges of the Arbitration Court are futile and that the whole trade union movement must be mobilised on a nation-wide front for direct negotiations with employers and for industrial action to restore wage levels.³³

A meeting of unions called by the A.C.T.U. in March, spurred on by another unfavourable court decision on margins, declared that the Federal court, as constituted, was "a menace to the industrial peace of this nation" and demanded "nothing short of the repeal of the [Arbitration] Act" to make way for "an entirely new instrument". In the meantime, increased margins were to be sought by direct bargaining with employers. Discussion of what the "new instrument" should be was postponed, and Communist proposals for protest strikes were defeated. One Communist spokesman said that the debate "revealed the absolute bankruptcy of the reformist leaders of the A.C.T.U."³⁴ Nevertheless, the party's principal paper was sufficiently encouraged to headline its report "A.C.T.U. Decisions are Basis for United Action".³⁵

³³*Tribune* (Sydney), 13 Jan. 1954.

³⁴J. McPhillips in *Communist R.*, Feb. 1954.

³⁵*Tribune*, 17 Feb. 1954.

By now, the Communists recognized the distinction between the industrial groupers and the traditionalists, and were prepared to seek collaboration with the latter, though in no very enthusiastic manner. "These differences" (between groupers and traditionalists) said E. F. Hill in February 1954,

have profound effects upon the masses. These men [the traditionalists] represent those sections of the bourgeoisie who see danger in cutting down the mass basis of the A.L.P. as the Industrial Groupers are doing. With their particular motives we are not for the moment concerned. We are concerned that this struggle does assist the mass revolt of the A.L.P. members and does assist the development of unity in the ranks of the working class:—does assist the ultimate goal of one party of the working class. As L. L. Sharkey has said: 'The Communist Party stands for the broadest united front with the A.L.P. rank and file and also with those A.L.P. leaders who fight for a progressive policy for the Labour movement.'³⁶

Over the following months the A.C.T.U. leaders gradually formulated a plan for a completely revised and greatly weakened arbitration system.³⁷ Meanwhile, the dispute for control of the A.L.P. broke out, with the traditionalist officials overwhelmingly supporting Evatt and opposing the groups. The next A.C.T.U. Congress, which met in September 1955, declared its support for Evatt and for the policies adopted by the Labor Party since the dispute began, which related principally to foreign policy.³⁸ It also proposed a complete reform of the arbitration system, involving panels of conciliators and arbitrators stripped of both judicial status and penal powers.

Though the Communists certainly did not control the Congress and were defeated on a number of issues, a party spokesman declared that:

Although not identical with our whole programme, the Congress decisions are in line with our immediate programme. . . . Speaking generally its decisions form a pattern comparable with those of the 1945 Congress, which was the last Congress in which the progressive forces in the trade unions had majority support. These decisions have also been adopted by the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party. As a result the policies of the Communist Party, the Labor Party and the A.C.T.U. on such matters are very close.³⁹

After the Congress the tendency for traditionalist officials to become more militant in industrial policy and more radical in politics continued. In 1955-6 the Australian Workers' Union, once the most unqualified supporter of arbitration and the most bitter opponent of Communism among the unions, conducted strikes of shearers in N.S.W. and Queensland against awards of State and Federal arbitral bodies. In conducting these strikes it sought and obtained the co-operation of the Waterside Workers' Federation and the Queensland Trades and Labour Council, both of which were led by Communists. The 1956 Convention of the A.W.U. asked

³⁶*Communist R.*, Feb. 1954.

³⁷A.C.T.U. *Executive Report*, Melbourne, 1955, pp. 24-6.

³⁸*Minutes of the All Australian Trade Union Congress 1955* (cyclostyled) in the National Library, Canberra.

³⁹J. McPhillips in *Communist R.*, Oct. 1955.

its executive to consider holding a ballot of members on the substitution of collective bargaining for arbitration as the union's normal approach to industrial questions.⁴⁰

In January 1956 M. C. Jordan, Assistant Secretary of the Melbourne Trades Hall Council and formerly one of the Communists' principal opponents, made a statement which paraphrased Wright's of two years before.

It now seemed certain that Australia's labour force would have to be mobilised for industrial action to obtain some semblance of wage justice. . . . Wage rates had for long been in the hands of a perfect system—the Arbitration Court—designed to keep wages down.⁴¹

Some months later J. Kenny, Assistant Secretary of the N.S.W. Trades and Labour Council, who in 1948 had been named by the Communists as one of the "Right wing" which they wished to isolate and defeat, told a meeting that the unions would abandon arbitration unless Federal and State governments took action to stop "the ruthless use of penal clauses".⁴² J. H. O'Neil, Secretary of the Hobart Trades Hall Council, said that the Federal Arbitration Commission's basic wage decision of 1957, which among other things failed to restore quarterly cost-of-living adjustments, "would again demonstrate to all unionists the futility of all applications to all arbitration tribunals".⁴³ Some months earlier the Hobart Trades Hall Council provided an unusually clear example of the importance attached to political issues by refusing to accept a union delegate on the grounds that his position as State President of the breakaway Australian Labor Party (Anti-Communist) was "politically detrimental to, and constituted a serious menace to, trade unionists and workers throughout Tasmania".⁴⁴

Meanwhile the withdrawal of A.L.P. recognition from the industrial groups in all States led to the defeat of group candidates in many union elections, until the Ironworkers' Association and the Clerks' Union were the only Federal unions under group leadership.

The industrial group leaders have shown that they too are prepared to allow political questions to influence industrial policy. They have secured the affiliation of their unions to the breakaway Democratic Labor Party, which cannot form a government and the immediate purpose of which is admittedly the negative one of keeping the A.L.P. out of office. Such a step would be much harder to justify on industrial grounds than affiliation to the A.L.P. More seriously, some group officials have flirted with the idea of disaffiliating from the A.C.T.U.⁴⁵ At a time when, as the groupers themselves admit and indeed complain, the A.C.T.U. has become virtually the only channel of communication between unions and the Federal Government, this is another step which would be difficult to justify except for political reasons.

⁴⁰*S.M.H.*, 2 Feb. 1956.

⁴¹Quoted in *Age* (Melbourne), 3 Feb. 1956.

⁴²Quoted in *S.M.H.*, 26 Aug. 1956.

⁴³*Mercury* (Hobart), 1 May 1957.

⁴⁴Quoted in *ibid.*, 16 Nov. 1956.

⁴⁵For example in an article by J. P. Maynes, Federal President of the Federated Clerks' Union, "Union Must Examine A.C.T.U. Link", in *The Clerk*, July-Aug. 1957.

Their reluctance to appear on the same side as the Communists, or to seem to condone class conflict, has prevented the groupers from taking any useful part in discussions on the reform of arbitration. In 1954, when the future of arbitration was beginning to seem the most important single issue facing the unions, *News-Weekly* showed an indecisive approach which has continued to mark group supporters. It stated that:

In pressing for the reform of the Arbitration Court, the A.C.T.U. is barking up the wrong tree. There is a strong case for the reform of the Arbitration Court, but not on the grounds of obtaining cost of living adjustments to the basic wage.⁴⁶

In subsequent debates on the subject, industrial group representatives have had nothing to contribute which was not common ground to all factions.⁴⁷

Industrial policy is not dominated by Labour politics any more than Labour faction fights are primarily due to disputes over industrial policy. It is clear, however, that each affects the other. It is clear also that the traditionalist majority of union leaders is quite content to find itself in agreement with the Communists on both industrial and political matters and probably finds such an alliance more congenial than one with those who reject socialism in politics and demand "responsibility" in industry.

III

The Australian Labour movement, unlike its closest counterparts in Great Britain and New Zealand, has become a battle-ground for the two vigorous international ideologies of our time, Communism and Catholicism. Adherents of both want to gain control of the trade unions and the Labor Party, and rightly, according to their lights, make no rigid distinction between the two fields of action. The traditionalist majority, which outnumbers both, has its own collection of attitudes which in practice limit the separation of industrial and political policies.

The traditionalist position has assumed that it is possible for unions to dominate the Labor Party without industrial affairs being in turn influenced by politics. This is never likely to be achieved. A trade union movement which is not only intimately associated with a party but regards itself as the guardian of the party's virtue, cannot hope to keep its activities free from political influence. There is something to be said for Wright's view that:

⁴⁶*News-Weekly*, 27 Jan. 1954. Later contributions on the same subject have been similarly lacking in positive content: e.g. an article "New Deal Promised in Arbitration Act Reform", *ibid.*, 18 Ap. 1956.

⁴⁷The Special All Australian Trade Union Congress of June 1956 discussed the arbitration system as recently revised by Federal legislation. The only contribution from an industrial group source appears to have been an addendum to an executive motion, which condemned the failure of the new Act to ensure the predominance of conciliation rather than arbitration. This is a commonplace of trade union thinking, and the addendum was readily accepted. There was no attempt to defend the attitude of *News-Weekly* (18 Ap. 1956) that arbitral bodies should retain penal powers while Communists remained strong in the unions. The 1955 Congress had unanimously condemned the use of penal powers. *Minutes of Special All Australian Trade Union Congress 1956* (cyclostyled) in the National Library, Canberra.

A marked feature of the reformist trade union leadership is their identity and oneness with Labor Party leadership, a development which has become more pronounced in recent years, a development lying like a dead hand on important organs of the Labour movement.⁴⁸

The charge applies with at least equal force to the ties between the Communist Party and its union officials.

It is at least arguable that it would be in the interests of the traditionalist leaders to move toward the position of their British counterparts, who have maintained a clearer division between industrial and political activities. This would almost certainly involve accepting a greater measure of industrial "responsibility", since a movement which tacitly acknowledges that it is not to be preoccupied with the machinery for creating a new society is driven into a certain obligation to improve the working of the existing society, if only in the material interests of its members. But the influence of forty years is not shaken off easily, and for some forty years the main body of union officials have seen themselves as the champions of radicalism within the Labour movement. The powerful effect of political issues on industrial relations, the willingness to co-operate with Communists and the reluctance to accept "responsibility" under capitalism all owe something to this fact.

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⁴⁸*Communist R.*, Aug. 1951.

Australian Political Chronicle

January-June 1958

THE COMMONWEALTH

The first half of 1958 was a relatively uneventful period in Federal politics, due principally to the logic of the parliamentary situation. The Australian Labor Party, acutely conscious of its electoral vulnerability, made no serious attempts to win the initiative from the Government. The Government, for its part, saw no need to make any special efforts to win popular favour. The coming election, which was subsequently announced for 22 November, cast few shadows before it into this period. Several of the more notable events in Federal Parliament represented merely the closing stages of processes which began in 1957 and which were recorded in the previous number of this Chronicle.

Defence Policy

The special committee on the organization of defence, headed by Sir Leslie Morshead,¹ was reported in the press to have completed two reports²—the first having been referred back to it by Cabinet for further consideration—by the beginning of February. Both the progress of the committee and the exact nature of its reports remained a subject for speculation, since the Government at no stage released them for publication. The Government's decisions were announced by the Prime Minister on 19 March.³ The Departments of Supply and Defence Production, which for some years previously had been placed under the same Minister, were to be amalgamated. The Minister for Defence was to have over-riding authority over the three Service departments, but there was not to be an amalgamation of the departments dealing with defence under a single Minister, as the Morshead committee had proposed.

These changes did little to satisfy those who had been attacking the Government's record in building up the armed services. Labour spokesmen complained that Australia remained without effective defences after a long period of heavy government spending.⁴ Several Government members, notably Mr. Bostock and Sir Wilfred Kent Hughes, spoke in favour of the integration of the Service Departments and the Department of Defence, while avoiding more general criticism of the Government.⁵ The *Sydney Morning Herald*, which had been among the Government's most outspoken critics, returned to the attack, in particular singling out the Minister for Defence (Sir Phillip McBride).⁶ There seems little likelihood that the changes introduced will in themselves have much effect. The Government's opponents were probably more pleased by Sir Phillip McBride's announcement in May that he intended to retire from Parliament.⁷

Mr. Townley, the former Minister for Immigration, took over the ministries of Supply and Defence Production, which are to be amalgamated. The Immigration portfolio went to Mr. Downer, one of a number of members elected as relatively young men in 1949 none of whom, with the exception of Mr. Hasluck, had previously become Ministers.

¹See *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. III, No. 2, May 1958, p. 231.

²Except where otherwise indicated all references may be checked in the *Age*, 24 Jan. 1958-30 June 1958.

³*Com. Parl. Debs.*, (H. of R.), 19 March 1958, pp. 433-8.

⁴*ibid.*, pp. 439-42.

⁵*ibid.*, pp. 706-8, 770-2.

⁶*Sydney Morning Herald*, 20 March 1958 (leader).

⁷*Advertiser*, 10 May 1958.

Banking Legislation

This was another matter which was carried over from the previous year, but it can be dismissed more summarily.⁸ The fourteen bills involved were reintroduced in March and, after being guillotined through the House of Representatives, were again defeated in the Senate.⁹ The three Democratic Labor and Queensland Labor Senators again voted with the Opposition. The Government could then have requested a double dissolution but did not do so, presumably because the issue was not a particularly suitable one on which to fight an election and because, if the entire Senate had to face the electors, the D.L.P.'s chances of retaining the balance of power would have been greatly increased. Mr. Menzies's closing comment on the episode was: "The Australian electors will have a golden opportunity when next they vote to cast a Senate vote which will prevent the views of the lower House from being frustrated."

Country Party Leadership

Sir Arthur Fadden resigned as Leader of the Country Party and as Deputy Prime Minister on 27 March. The Minister for Trade, Mr. J. McEwen, was elected unopposed as Leader and the Postmaster-General, Mr. C. Davidson, was elected Deputy Leader. Sir Arthur Fadden announced that he would continue as Treasurer until the elections, when he would retire from Parliament. There was some press speculation as to whether Mr. McEwen would "accept" the Treasury after the presumed return of the Government. Mr. Menzies, however, remarked that there was no rule that the Leader of the Country Party had a right to the Treasury or any other particular portfolio. "These things are worked out in private discussions between us", he said.

The A.L.P. and the D.L.P.

Events during these months confirmed that the division between the Labor parties was not likely to have an early end. Much attention was given to a statement by Dr. Evatt during a television interview in April that the A.L.P. would welcome a "half-way house" in settling the dispute. Specifically, he proposed an exchange of preferences, beginning with the imminent Victorian State elections. He added that he would consider relinquishing his position as Leader if he thought that this would bring about unity, but that the A.L.P. was not prepared to change its vital policies. D.L.P. spokesmen flatly rejected these overtures. Senator McManus and others had already made it clear that they demanded not only the removal of Dr. Evatt as Leader but "the dropping of the A.L.P.'s pro-Communist foreign policy".

There were indications that the D.L.P. was drawing still further apart from the A.L.P. In February the Federal President of the D.L.P., Mr. R. Joshua, had said that his party would join with the A.L.P. if Communist influence was removed. However, by May Mr. Joshua was saying that the D.L.P. had "no common objective, no sympathy and no connection with the A.L.P." It was notable that Senator Cole, when announcing that he would continue to oppose the Government's banking legislation, made it clear that his objection was not to private banking but to the private banks' hire-purchase activities.¹⁰

Mr. B. A. Santamaria, Secretary of the Catholic Social Movement, the activities of which gave rise to the Labour split in 1955, also appeared on television. He said that "the fight against Communism in the trade unions and generally" was now being carried on by the National Civic Council, of which he was President. While not a member of the D.L.P., he supported its cause. There could be Labour unity, he said, in a Labour party which was socially progressive and inflexibly anti-Communist—not merely non-Communist.

The A.L.P. and the Trade Unions

Simultaneously with the hardening of the attitude of the D.L.P., a more familiar type of difficulty confronted the A.L.P.—friction between the party and some trade union leaders. With few exceptions, non-Communist union officials had been sympathetic towards Dr. Evatt

⁸See *A.J.P.H.*, Vol. III, No. 2, May 1958, p. 230.

⁹*Com. P.D.* (Senate), 26 March 1958, p. 451.

¹⁰*Courier-Mail*, 17 March 1958.

and his supporters and opposed to the D.L.P. However, many of them, and particularly the A.C.T.U. President, Mr. Monk, held views which sometimes embarrassed the parliamentary Labour leaders. At the Citizenship Convention in January, Dr. Evatt attacked the Government's migration policy and demanded a quota of sixty per cent. of British migrants. Mr. Monk read a paper which, while not touching on this particular issue, argued that immigration could not be "turned on and off like a tap", even at a time of some unemployment. However, he argued that at such a time the Government should recruit only migrants for whom there were vacancies. This seemed a moderate enough view, but it led to a clash between Mr. Curtin, M.H.R., and Mr. G. Hayes, Assistant Secretary of the A.C.T.U., as to whether it represented A.C.T.U. policy. Labour politicians objected still more to a statement by Mr. Monk in March, the import of which was that unemployment was not at that time serious, though government action was required to prevent it increasing.

Within the trade union movement there was a swing away from Mr. Monk's position and towards attaching more importance to the defeat of the Federal Government. This was indicated by the A.C.T.U. executive's decision to withdraw from the Ministry of Labour Advisory Committee, on which it had been represented since 1954.

In June a meeting of delegates of the A.C.T.U., the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party and the A.L.P. Federal Executive decided to reconstitute the Federal Labor Advisory Committee, representing all of these bodies and with provision for the Australian Workers' Union to join also. However, the A.W.U. refused to take part in these talks because of the influence of Communists on the A.C.T.U., and declined to join the reconstituted Advisory Committee for the same reason.

Industrial Affairs

The Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission granted an increase of 5/- in the basic wage in May. All three judges agreed on an increase, though Mr. Justice Wright held that it should have been "substantially higher".¹¹ The increase still leaves the Commonwealth basic wage lower than the wage fixed by State arbitral authorities in all States except S.A. The difference ranges from 3/- per week in Melbourne to 7/6 per week in Perth. The Commonwealth basic wage now ranges from £12/3/- per week in Brisbane to £13/8/- in Sydney. The A.C.T.U.'s claim for a restoration of quarterly adjustment was again rejected, and it appears likely that an annual basic wage case will become the accepted practice. Meanwhile, the A.C.T.U.'s rather diffident attempts to circumvent the arbitration system in general appear to be making little progress because of the even greater diffidence of employers' organizations.

The affair of Frank and Dennis Hursey, who were prevented by members of the Waterside Workers' Federation from working on the Hobart wharves, allegedly because they refused to pay a compulsory levy to assist the A.L.P., dragged on throughout this period and is still the subject of a court action at the time of writing. For this reason, discussion here will be postponed. Those who require interim information may like to compare the rival versions given in *News-Weekly*, especially on 2 April and 14 May, and in advertisements published by the union in several metropolitan papers on 12 April.

Brief Notes

Book Censorship

The Minister for Customs, Senator Henty, announced last year that the importing of particular books would be prohibited only with the advice of the Literature Censorship Board, and that a list of the banned books would be published for the first time. The list, when it appeared in April, consisted of 178 items. It was made clear that this contained only those publications which were of a "literary", as opposed to a "purely pornographic", character.¹²

¹¹*ibid.*, 13 May 1958.

¹²*Com. P.D.* (Senate), 17 Ap. 1958, pp. 577-81.

Immigration Act

Amendments to the Immigration Act abolished the dictation test, substituting a system of entry permits. Other alterations restricted the Minister's power to order deportation and provided for more liberal treatment of non-criminal deportees and suspected prohibited immigrants.

Airlines Policy

Federal Cabinet refused Trans-Australia Airlines and Ansett-A.N.A. permission to buy Caravelle and Lockheed Electra aircraft respectively, arguing that excessive competition in re-equipping would destroy the already questionable stability of the industry. After further negotiation, T.A.A. and Ansett-A.N.A. were given permission to buy two Electras each.

D.W.R.

NEW SOUTH WALES

Parliamentary Session

Members assembled on 26 February for a session lasting until 23 April and produced a number of useful measures. The most controversial was the Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Bill,¹ which proposed to relax some of the rental and eviction controls of the 1948 Act. Premises unleased between 1 December 1957 and the date of proclamation, and those leased after that date but unleased for a period of three years, were to be exempted. Though these provisions were modest enough, the bill was a major concession by the Government and must be seen as part of its dispute with the Commonwealth over loan monies for housing.²

The Opposition, which had bitterly attacked the Act in the past, welcomed the legislation, but decided to press for further amendments, the main effect of these being to remove the three-year limit, thus virtually decontrolling all houses and flats as they become vacant, and the Government's acceptance of them aroused strong Labour opposition. The State executive of the Australian Labor Party demanded their immediate abandonment. The Premier promised re-examination of the proposals but refused to withdraw them, and the Government pushed through both Houses a Common Law Procedure and Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Bill, which gave the courts discretion to consider hardship when fixing eviction dates. This bill won the vital support of a joint executive and Labour Council deputation and weakened attempts by the Left wing, led by Mr. E. J. Ward, M.H.R., to organize party opposition.

Also controversial was the Road Maintenance (Contribution) Bill which provided for a ton-mile tax of one-third of a penny on trucks with a capacity of more than four tons. The bill was a further attempt to force interstate hauliers to help maintain N.S.W. roads, and as such was accepted by the Opposition, but Mr. Morton suggested amendment to exempt certain primary products and livestock as in the similar Victorian legislation. He also asked for relaxation of the tax to exclude trips less than fifty miles and trucks of less than six tons capacity. Otherwise the bill went beyond its avowed object and became "another vicious general revenue grab". Public, and some trade union, reaction to the bill was hostile and the Minister for Transport, Mr. Enticknap, met strong Caucus criticism. However, despite a deputation from the A.L.P. State executive and the Transport Workers' Union, Cabinet refused to amend the bill and the tax came into effect from 1 May. The Australian Railways Union favoured the tax and its State Secretary, Dr. Lloyd Ross, said the tax was essential to make hauliers contribute to road upkeep and to allow the railways to compete "on an even basis", but his equivalent in the T.W.U., Mr. A. G. Platt, said Dr. Ross was "talking through his hat". On 3 June Dr. Ross again attacked road hauliers when he said that the proposed "piggy-back" system, an American method of transporting loaded lorries by rail, "would be declared black unless run by the railways themselves". In June a Road Tax Protest Council, including hauliers, councils and primary producers, was formed in Sydney to seek repeal or amendment of the legislation. There is a suggestion that it will be challenged as discriminatory, since Crown vehicles are exempt.

¹Unless otherwise indicated, references to the factual information on which this material is based may be found in *N.S.W. Parl. Debts.*, 26 Feb.-29 March 1958 and *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 Jan.-18 June 1958.

²See *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. III, No. 1, Nov. 1957, pp. 99, ff.

Four other bills, though less hotly disputed, were significant. The Local Government (Amendment) Bill, which proposed nearly seventy amendments to the 1919 Act, was largely a machinery measure, as was the Bread Industry, Manufacture and Delivery (Amendment) Bill. The Matrimonial Causes (Amendment) Bill and the Fire Brigades and Bushfires (Amendment) Bill were unexceptional.

Early in March Mr. Darby (Liberal, Manly) reopened the question of lunacy reform. He reminded the House of its motion in April 1957 calling for such reform and criticized the Minister for Health for undue reliance on an expert committee. Mr. Sheahan promised that a bill would be presented which would give the Act "such a jolt that no one will recognise it" and the House passed Mr. Darby's motion without division.

Prison Reform

The attempted escape from Parramatta Gaol on 13 January of Darcy Dugan, a notorious criminal, led three Liberal M's.L.A. to call for an enquiry into prison conditions. The Minister of Justice, Mr. R. R. Downing, gave them permission to visit N.S.W. gaols at will and, after several surprise visits, the party submitted its report to the Parliamentary Liberal Party. Covering security, sanitation, rehabilitation and homosexuality, it was alleged to have made "unprintable" disclosures. On 4 March the Minister for Health, Mr. Sheahan, speaking for the Minister of Justice, made a ministerial statement in which he attacked the report as "untrue in almost every detail" and "most unhealthy" in its preoccupation with homosexuality. On 18 March Mr. Doig (Burwood) moved that a Select Committee be appointed to enquire into N.S.W. gaols. Supporting his motion, he showed that the gaol population had been too large as far back as 1952, but failed to make a case for an enquiry on other grounds.

The Administration

The Protestant Churches continued their campaign against gambling and found themselves in uneasy alliance with the breweries and United Licensed Victuallers' Association. Though their particular target was the jackpot tote introduced last year,³ they also oppose the licensing of poker machines, which are the mainstay of the hotels' main competitors, the registered clubs. Rev. Dr. Malcolm Mackay of Scots Church said that the N.S.W. Council of Churches and the N.S.W. Committee of the World Council of Churches planned "to bring pressure to bear in political circles" and "to combine various public bodies" in organized protest.⁴

On 11 May the new Leader of the Country Party, Mr. Davis Hughes, announced his party's "unanimous" intention to ban poker machines. Gambling, he said, would be a critical issue at the next election.⁵ The Liberal Party, already divided on the issue, was caught unprepared and, despite several meetings, could only produce an undertaking to ban 2/- machines. Even this produced a hostile reaction from the R.S.L. Clubs Association. On 11 June the State Council of the Liberal Party issued a statement in which it said it was "improper and impracticable" for any government to ban gambling.

In March it was announced that equal pay for women would be introduced in N.S.W. before the next election. Despite Mr. Cahill's assurance that "there will be no problem as far as the economy is concerned", employers' representatives dubbed the proposal "an election stunt" and said it would price N.S.W. out of every market. However, until legislation is introduced only speculation is possible. "Equal pay" may mean one basic wage, equal pay for equal work, or any number of less common concepts like equal pay for equal effort. It, and the allied proposal for three weeks' annual leave, were shelved while the Premier, the Chairman of the Public Service Board, Mr. Wurth, and the Under-Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Coady, visited the U.S.A.

Liquor Industry

Liquor remains a live issue in N.S.W. and at the beginning of the year the Premier's opponents in the A.L.P. succeeded in carrying a State executive motion calling for investigation

³See *ibid.*, Vol. III, No. 2, May 1958, p. 232.

⁴*Daily Telegraph*, 7 Jan. 1958.

⁵*Sun-Herald*, 11 May 1958.

of freights assistance to breweries.⁶ The motion stemmed from recommendations of a liquor sub-committee, which includes Messrs. E. Ward and D. Curtin, M's.H.R., that any concessions to Sydney breweries be discontinued and that the Government move to end the "tied-house" system, but the dispute had begun last year with complaints by Grafton Brewery and Grafton A.L.P. branch that Sydney breweries were underselling the local company because of special rail concessions to the North Coast. The circumstances were well calculated to provide the maximum embarrassment to the Government. Mr. Cahill was shortly due to leave for New York and the Opposition had already taken the offensive on gambling and prisons administration.

On 20 March the Opposition Leader, Mr. Morton, moved as a matter of urgency that Sydney breweries be given no freight concessions and that the Government should review its bulk-loading contracts. The Grafton Brewing Co. Ltd., he said, had suffered "severe discrimination" amounting to "a breach of basic justice". When the Government used its majority to defeat the motion he proposed a censure motion in much the same terms. The motion alleged that favourable freights for Sydney breweries repudiated the Government's decentralization policy by "sabotaging" the Grafton brewery, and caused the Railways to lose "large amounts of revenue". In his opening speech Mr. Morton said the first Grafton beer had been produced in December 1952 and by an "odd coincidence" two months later the first bulk-loading contract, to Lismore, began operations. Lismore was the largest town in the area which the Grafton brewery hoped to serve and the Railways lost £35,000 per annum by bulk-freighting beer to Lismore. Unless the Government remedied the position it would be obvious that it was "in the pockets of the Sydney breweries".

In his reply Mr. Cahill said that there were no differential rates for beer and other freight. The only brewery given any preference was the Grafton one, which had been helped by freight concessions and rebate of road taxes. For three years the company had made a substantial profit and it was only in 1957, when flood and then drought on the North Coast affected local industries, that a trading loss of £82,000 had been made. The "general economic position in the area" and the increase, in March 1956, of the Commonwealth Government's excise charges had led to a drop in sales. If bulk-loading rates were destroying the brewery, he argued, "why did not it happen in 1954, 1955 and 1956"? After a quite restrained debate the motion was defeated, but the Independent member for Hurstville, Mr. C. Evatt, clashed with the Speaker in division and was finally suspended for two days. He claimed that members of the Government should not vote on a motion concerning brewers "from whom they draw their Party funds", but refused to substantiate his charges or withdraw.

The Ebasco Report

In January the Minister for Transport, Mr. A. G. Enticknap, released the Railway Commissioner's comments on the above report. Ebasco Services Incorporated, an American business efficiency organization, investigated railway affairs in 1956-7 at an estimated cost of £100,000. Till this year this cost had been the main target for criticism, but Mr. McCusker raised the issue of industrial relations. Though doubtful of Ebasco's figure of £9,500,000 a year, he agreed that substantial savings could be effected by dieselization and electrification, replacement of obsolete rolling stock, reorganization of workshops and goods yards and mechanization of accounts. Most important of these was dieselization, but this will involve the closing down of workshops in some "railway towns", with subsequent reduction in employment. Mr. McCusker made it clear that railway policy would be tempered by the retention of "some employees beyond the number which might be actually required", but the State Secretary of the Railways Union, Dr. Lloyd Ross, bluntly announced that declining employment is inevitable if the department implements the main features of the report. The A.R.U., he said, will oppose the Ebasco recommendations "either in their original form or in the modified McCusker version" till "social plans" are drawn up in consultation with the unions.

⁶*Truth*, 9 Feb. 1958.

State of the Parties

At the A.L.P. Annual Conference in mid-June the executive was increased from 32 to forty members, but the balance of representation remained the same. The "official" ticket sponsored by the outgoing executive under Mr. Campbell was almost wholly successful, and Left- and Right-wing representation is about equal with moderates holding the balance. The combination of Right-wing and moderate votes defeated a motion seeking repeal of the Government's rent legislation. On the last day Conference directed the Government "to immediately implement the first plank of our platform, namely the abolition of the Legislative Council". The resolution was a victory for Mr. Dougherty, Federal Secretary of the Australian Workers' Union, who has campaigned for abolition of the Upper House since his election to it last year,⁷ and was carried by a two to one majority. When the Opposition Leader, Mr. Morton, called the directive "complete humbug and hypocrisy", the Acting Premier, Mr. Heffron, said he had "no doubt" that it would be followed by the Government.

Jubilant at its Wagga by-election victory, the Liberal Party began the new year with hopes high. "We believe", said Mr. Morton, "that Government is within our reach." In March the Opposition parties announced an election pact, whereby joint parliamentary party meetings will be held and joint policy speeches made by the two Leaders. If successful, the Country Party Leader will be Deputy Premier. However, of the four marginal seats won by Labour after three-cornered contests in 1956, only one, Liverpool Plains, is covered by the agreement. It will be left to the Country Party in return for a Liberal monopoly in the new Wagga seat, but Mudgee, Young and Dubbo may still lead to clashes.

In May the Country Party Leader, Colonel Bruxner, who is 76, resigned his position and Mr. Davis Hughes (Armidale) was elected in his stead. Mr. C. B. Cutler (Orange) was elected Deputy Leader to replace Mr. S. D. Dickson (Temora) who also resigned because of age. Colonel Bruxner, who has been in the State Parliament since 1920, was one of the original "True Blue" Progressives and has been Leader of the party, except for a brief period of voluntary retirement, since 1922. He was Minister for Local Government and Main Roads in the Bavin-Buttenshaw Government from 1927-30, Deputy Premier and Minister for Transport in the Stevens-Bruxner and Mair-Bruxner Governments from 1932 to 1941 and was Acting Premier in 1936. Mr. Davis Hughes was a science master before entering politics in 1950 and two years the Mayor of Armidale. He served six years in the R.A.A.F. and rose to the rank of Squadron-Leader. The new Deputy Leader, Mr. Cutler, entered Parliament in 1947 at the early age of 29. He is now forty and Mr. Hughes is 47.

Despite internal quarrels the Democratic Labor Party still survives and remains a threat to the Government. But its hopes of winning even one seat were finally blighted in the Wagga by-election. The resignations in January of the State President, Mr. Manning, and two other executive members have reduced its appeal still further. Mr. Manning and the hard-headed General Secretary, Mr. Kane, have always had difficulty in working together but the precise reason for the resignations is not clear. Mr. Manning claims that the party has turned sectarian. He opposes the granting of second preferences to the Liberal Party and the D.L.P.'s "ludicrous" attempts to link the Cahill Government with Communism. Mr. Kane says Mr. Manning has "sold out" to Ansett-A.N.A. Airlines and, since becoming one of its executives, cannot stay in a party which opposes its monopoly practices. In the course of the argument Mr. Manning made the extraordinary statement that the D.L.P. was now dominated by "the same element which destroyed the unity of the A.L.P.—the die-hard Right-wing Industrial Groupers".

P.B.W.

VICTORIA**Parliament**

Victorian politics centred around the State elections. The short parliamentary sitting, from 18 March to 3 April, considered several important measures, but its debates were primarily electioneering in tone. The Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Agreements Bill passed through

⁷See *A.J.P.H.*, Vol. III, No. 2, May 1958, p. 233.

its final stages without any opposition.¹ The Monash University Bill also met with general agreement. Debate concentrated on the location of the proposed new university, and the extent to which it should be concerned with technology. In the absence of any general acceptance of a provincial site, it has now been officially agreed that the Monash University will be somewhere in Melbourne and that it will be primarily technological in its initial stages.

With an election in the offing, the parties went to great lengths in looking for issues. The Australian Labor Party brought in a measure for the control of hire-purchase.² The Labour Council leader, Mr. Galbally, attacked high interest rates, "condemned by St. Thomas Aquinas", and spoke of his bill as a "charter of the hirers' redemption from a state which is worse than that of Egyptian bondage". Sir Arthur Warner hedged and only succeeded by the narrow margin of seventeen votes to fifteen in defeating the second reading. In the election hire-purchase proved to be the major, and some would say the only genuine, issue between Left and Right which was not obscured by inter-factional battling on both wings. Other hares started by the A.L.P. only limped along. Mr. Shepherd, the party Leader, raised as a matter of parliamentary privilege the statement attributed to Premier Bolte that "the Labour Party has set itself up as a supporter of the criminal classes". The statement in question was prompted by A.L.P. opposition to the floggings at Pentridge. Most of 1 April was taken up with the debate which became increasingly disorderly. Other issues raised in Parliament were mainly thinly disguised electioneering which failed to make much impression. The demand that children, forced to destroy pet rabbits under a Government order subsequently rescinded, should be compensated, was only one of the many attempts to snatch issues out of the air.

Election Issues

With the end of the parliamentary session on 3 April the election campaign got under way. On the Government side the main plank was simply the Bolte administration's record, coupled with a plea not to return to the "bad old days of minority rule". The A.L.P. fought on hire-purchase, on the housing problem caused by the abolition of rent control and on a dubious policy of lower charges and better services. There was little to arouse enthusiasm in Mr. Shepherd's policy speech, delivered at Footscray Town Hall on 6 May. Tram and train fares were to be kept down, or even reduced. More would be spent on roads and schools. The keynote was "put the family first" and Mr. Shepherd promised more schools and better education, cheaper hospitalization, a housing and slum reclamation programme and expanded social services. Mr. Bolte limited his promises, possibly because he was virtually certain to have to carry them into effect. His opening speech, at Ararat on 13 May, dwelt on the Government's record, and made a number of comparatively minor proposals, including the creation of a special accident hospital, and the setting up of a Ministry of Local Government. Like Mr. Shepherd, he promised to seek more money from the Commonwealth for housing and roads.

For the two main parties it was an election of promises, aimed at everybody, with no relation to any long-term aims or political ideals other than in Mr. Shepherd's words, "fighting for a better share of the State's wealth for all". The two minority parties could not hope to form a government, and did not feel obliged to offer as much. Sir Herbert Hyland, opening the Country Party campaign in Leongatha on 7 May, was critical of the Liberal Government. Unashamedly parochial, the Country Party simply promised to go on asking for more money for country roads, water supply, electricity and soldier settlement, and to go on opposing rises in freight charges. The Democratic Labor Party was the only one whose campaign speech attracted more than passing attention, but not because of its content. The opening meeting at Richmond Town Hall on 12 May was attended by two carloads of police, but this did not prevent the cutting of the landline through which the party Leader, Mr. Frank Scully, was due to broadcast. Once order was restored the D.L.P. programme was seen to be mainly concerned with the same general promises as the A.L.P., in particular in calling for the reduction of hire-purchase rates. But this was not the main drive behind the D.L.P. campaign. As

¹*Vic. Parl. Debs.*, 1956-8, pp. 3934-53.

²The Hire Purchase Agreements (Amendment) Bill, *ibid.*, pp.3963-76.

Mr. Scully wrote, on the eve of poll, "for Labor voters, A.L.P. or D.L.P., tomorrow's election is really a referendum", between the rival factions. This strain increased in D.L.P. propaganda, until a leaflet issued shortly before the poll could declare: "Evatt Labor is a Communist front". All D.L.P. preferences were directed away from the A.L.P.

The Legislative Assembly

Once under way the campaign proved very quiet and the results of the Legislative Assembly poll on 31 May were no surprise. In terms of seats before and after the last two elections they were as follows:

				1955 Dissolution	1955-8	1958 Election
Liberal-Country Party		11	34	38
Victorian Liberal Party		4	—	—
Country Party	12	10	10
Australian Labor Party		25	20	18
Democratic Labor Party		12	1	—
Progressive Labor	1	1	(returned as A.L.P.)
				—	—	—
Total	65	66	66

In terms of votes the results are by no means clear-cut, despite the very equitable redistribution of Assembly electorates. Compared with the last election the figures are as follows:

		A.L.P.	D.L.P.	L.C.P.	C.P.	Others
		%	%	%	%	%
1955	..	33.7	12.7	37.5	9.5	6.6
1958	..	37.9	14.4	37	9.3	1.4

and in terms of average vote per constituency contested

		%	%	%	%
1955	..	43 (50)	19.4 (44)	40 (59)	38.1 (17)
1958	..	42 (60)	15.8 (60)	39.9 (61)	39 (15)

Clearly the votes bear little relation to the number of seats won. As a regional party, standing in only fifteen electorates, the Country Party can always expect the maximum of seats for the minimum of votes. The D.L.P., at the other end of the scale, has a vote so evenly spread that it has little hope of returning any members in an election based on single-member electorates. The two major parties strengthened their hold on the voters to a small extent, but essentially Victoria remains a four-party State in terms of voting, with a three-party Parliament. The limited degree of polarization to the two main parties was the only really surprising feature of the election.

The direction of D.L.P. preferences towards the Liberal-Country Party, and the failure to shred away much of the D.L.P. support over the past three years, were the basic elements in the A.L.P. rout. D.L.P. second preferences were counted in 26 electorates, and with few exceptions showed a remarkable degree of discipline. In the twenty electorates with three-cornered contests, the percentage of D.L.P. second preferences going to the Liberals varied between 77.3 per cent. and 93.5 per cent., with the sole exception of Dandenong, where there was a leakage of 33.5 per cent. to the A.L.P. In all but two of these seats the Liberals were returned. In four-cornered contests with the Country Party, there was a slight seepage in that direction, with a seventy per cent. second preference to the Country Party in Gippsland West, where votes had been directed that way. In the Legislative Council elections of the following month, D.L.P. discipline was even greater, with the percentage of preferences given to the Liberals ranging between 79 per cent. and 88.3 per cent. In six out of the seven Council provinces counted, the Liberal was returned. Despite its origins in the Labor Party, it seems that the D.L.P. can rely on four out of five of its supporters directing their preferences against the A.L.P. and securing the return of a Liberal government.

The swing towards the A.L.P. was by no means uniform. Comparing figures for the redistributed electorates, the A.L.P. percentage vote rose in only 37 of the 55 seats for which

comparisons can be made. The Liberal-Country Party vote can be compared for sixty electorates, and declined in 33 of them. Generally speaking, the Democratic Labor vote declined, but even this was not a universal trend. Comparisons made in forty electorates show declines in 26 of them. A feature of the D.L.P. vote was its increase in the northern suburbs and its stability in some of the original centres of the split in the A.L.P. The Country Party vote swung wildly, depending on the intervention or withdrawal of the Liberals. One characteristic of the election in the countryside was a swing against the Government in most areas, and the failure of its fairly open campaign to break the Country Party.

The A.L.P. representation is confined to the solid industrial belt of North and West Melbourne, to the newly industrialized south-eastern suburb of Oakleigh, and to the two seats which divide the declining provincial city of Bendigo.³ It kept out of most of the Country Party strongholds, and its voting strength in other country areas did not increase remarkably. Many of the solid Labour seats became even more impregnable. There are now eight seats with more than sixty per cent. voting A.L.P. and all showed substantial percentage increases for the party since 1955. The only other consolation which the party can gain from the results is its increasing strength in the newly industrialized areas on the fringes of the city, in Geelong and in the Latrobe Valley.

The Liberal-Country Party claims to be the only State-wide party. Here again, though, there are clearly recognizable strongholds in the eastern and southern suburbs and to a lesser extent in the Western District. The L.C.P. also holds eight seats with over sixty per cent. of the vote, all of them in the residential eastern and southern suburbs. In the industrial belt the Liberals recorded remarkable declines, sinking as low as 9.4 per cent. in Yarraville and 10.9 per cent. in Richmond. There is a marked tendency in such areas for the Liberals to trail the D.L.P., and for the real electoral battle to be between the two Labor parties. In the countryside the Liberals lost ground, losing Bendigo to Labour. Of the ten Liberal seats outside metropolitan influence, eight were won on Democratic Labor preferences. Even Mr. Bolte slipped from 62 per cent. of the vote in 1955 to 58.2 per cent. in his Western District seat of Hampden. The prosperity of the metropolitan area, on which Mr. Bolte fought his campaign, is not completely shared by the provinces, and little advance has been made in decentralization, vigorously supported by the Country Party and the D.L.P.

The D.L.P. increased its percentage vote by running a State-wide campaign in sixty electorates. In terms of seats fought its percentage slipped, but not nearly as far as one would have expected. The D.L.P. maintained a reasonable average vote, which was evenly spread over the whole State. Fifty-two of the sixty candidates gained votes in the range ten per cent. to twenty per cent. One, in the outer eastern suburbs, fell to 9.8 per cent., while seven in the inner suburbs represent the hard core with between twenty per cent. in Flemington and 35.1 per cent. in Richmond, where the party Leader, Mr. Frank Scully, lost his seat. There appears at first sight to be a correlation between the D.L.P. and A.L.P. vote, which is what one would expect, but this is by no means universal. In some seats it would seem that the D.L.P. has drawn much of its vote from those who were Liberals in 1955. It is questionable whether a party whose voters so loyally give their preferences to the Liberals can really be regarded as basically a Labor party. The D.L.P. is a centre party, and as such, is a convenient place of temporary rest for those discontented with the Left and Right.

The bulk of D.L.P. voters are Catholics, and many Catholic parish magazines supported D.L.P. candidates. Taking the Gallup Poll estimate that 85 per cent. of the D.L.P. vote is Catholic, well over half the Catholics in Victoria must have voted for the party, though there was no consistent relation between Catholic population and the D.L.P. vote from area to area. It is doubtful whether the vote of enfranchised New Australians will swell the D.L.P. support, as many Victorian A.L.P. leaders fear. There is no consistent trend in the D.L.P. vote in those areas where New Australians are concentrated. In Fitzroy, the "Latin quarter", the party's vote fell from 30.2 per cent. for Barry in 1955, to 18.5 per cent. in May. In Footscray, with

³For the figures on which this section is based see Table at end.

a high proportion of East Europeans, the D.L.P. lost its deposit. The D.L.P. is still an Irish-Catholic Centre Party⁴ which is distinct from the A.L.P., bitterly hostile to it, and sufficiently in control of its voters to carry them along with the policy of keeping the "Evatt Labor Party" out of office at the State and Federal level.

The Legislative Council

The Legislative Council elections on 21 June aroused little interest. The Government was anxious to back its absolute majority in the Lower House with a clear margin in the Council, particularly since the obstructive alliance between the A.L.P. and the Country Party which wrecked the bread legislation.⁵ The A.L.P. fought on the slogan "The Council is your protection against arbitrary rule", directly contravening the party platform, which calls for the abolition of the Upper House.⁶ The voters could be excused for turning out in smaller numbers and voting a higher proportion of "informals" than they had on 31 May. Results were:

	A.L.P.	D.L.P.	L.C.P.	C.P.	Others
	%	%	%	%	%
1955	39	17	30.3	6	7.7
1958	39.4	15	35.6	5.5	4.5

with two provinces, both Country Party strongholds, uncontested. The composition of the Council before and after the election was as follows:

	A.L.P.	D.L.P.	L.C.P.	C.P.	Others
Before	10	5	10	8	1
After	9	—	17	8	—

The inequitable distribution of Council provinces thwarted the Liberals in their objective, leaving the Country Party still holding the balance. The demolition of the D.L.P. and the cutting back of the A.L.P. reflects the six-yearly rotation of Council members. The results compared with 1955, rather than 1952, when the retiring M's.L.C. were first elected, show a gain of one seat, Bendigo, by the A.L.P. Sir Clifden Eager, defending his independence as Council President, was defeated by an official Liberal in East Yarra on D.L.P. preferences.

The elections have strengthened antagonisms between the two Left-wing parties and between the Country and Liberal-Country parties. A brawl developed at the Annual Conference of the State A.L.P. over the suggestion that all second preferences should in future be directed towards the D.L.P. to attract a leakage from that party. As 33 D.L.P. preferences were counted in the two elections and none of the A.L.P.'s, this seemed a reasonable suggestion. So great was inter-party bitterness that the resolution was regarded as a "grouper's plot", its sponsors were jostled and it was not considered. The continued support for "Unity Tickets", which defeated all but one industrial group candidate in the Waterside Workers' elections in June, further antagonized the D.L.P. The prospect of any reunion is more remote than ever. There will be three-cornered fights in all Victorian Federal electorates, and one A.L.P. Senator is likely to be replaced by Democratic Labor. The Country Party, too, is growing increasingly hostile to the Liberal Government. In an angry scene in the Legislative Assembly on 9 July, Sir Herbert Hyland, the Country Party Leader, referred to Mr. Bolte as a "mongrel" and to Mr. Turnbull, Minister for Lands, as a "stupid looking goof".⁷ Attempts to persuade Mr. Dudley Walters, Country Party M.L.C., to accept the presidency of the Council, thus giving Mr. Bolte a majority in both Houses were behind Sir Herbert's outburst. The characteristic of post-election politics, as of the election itself, has been bitter recrimination between parties which, at first sight, have much in common.

⁴Over one-third of the D.L.P. candidates had Irish names, a higher number than for any other party.

⁵*Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. III, No. 2, May 1958, p. 236.

⁶State Platform, Point 57.

⁷Melbourne Age, 10 July 1958.

Legislative Assembly Election Results, 31 May 1958

Legislative Assembly vote divided according to areas: (1) = aggregate vote (formal); (2) = percentage vote in the area; (3) = percentage of total vote derived from the area.

North and West Suburbs (18 seats)

	A.L.P.	D.L.P.	L.C.P.	C.P.	Others	Total
(1)	207,694	70,392	84,058	—	4,229	366,373
(2)	56.6%	19.3%	23.0%	—	1.1%	100%
(3)	40.3%	35.6%	16.5%	—	24%	26.9%

South and East Suburbs (19 seats)

(1)	125,854	42,933	208,403	—	6,073	383,263
(2)	32.9%	11.2%	54.4%	—	1.5%	100%
(3)	24.4%	21.7%	41.0%	—	34.5%	28.0%

South and East Outer Suburbs (7 seats)

(1)	65,166	18,606	90,524	—	—	174,296
(2)	37.6%	10.6%	51.8%	—	—	100%
(3)	12.6%	9.5%	17.8%	—	—	12.8%

Provincial Cities (6 seats)

(1)	50,760	17,813	42,845	11,024	1,313	123,755
(2)	41.3%	14.3%	34.5%	8.9%	1.0%	100%
(3)	9.8%	9.0%	8.4%	8.4%	7.5%	9.0%

Western District (6 seats)

(1)	32,283	16,895	59,022	14,077	—	122,277
(2)	26.3%	13.8%	48.2%	11.7%	—	100%
(3)	6.2%	8.6%	11.6%	11.0%	—	8.9%

Gippsland and North Eastern (6 seats)

(1)	23,950	19,236	24,001	52,337	—	119,524
(2)	19.9	16.1%	20.0%	44.0%	—	100%
(3)	4.6%	9.7%	4.7%	41.4%	—	8.7%

Murray Valley (4 seats)

(1)	10,782	11,519	—	49,743	5,984	78,028
(2)	13.7%	14.8%	—	64.0%	7.5%	100%
(3)	2.1%	5.9%	—	39.2%	34.0%	5.7%

State of Victoria (66 seats)

(1)	516,489	197,394	508,862	127,181	17,599	1,367,525
(2)	37.9%	14.4%	37.0%	9.3%	1.4%	100%

Note: The basis for the above areas is as follows: *North and West Suburbs:* all that built-up part of Melbourne north of the Yarra, together with the waterfront seats of Albert Park and Williamstown. *South and East Suburbs:* all that built-up part of Melbourne remaining with the exception of the seats defined as "Outer South and Eastern Suburbs". *Outer Suburbs:* the seats of Box Hill, Dandenong, Evelyn, Morningson, Mulgrave, Ringwood, Scoresby. *Provincial Cities:* The six seats dividing the cities of Geelong, Ballarat and Bendigo with their surroundings. *Western District:* All the country seats in the west of Victoria except those included in the Murray Valley. *Gippsland and North Eastern:* All the country seats in the east of Victoria except those included in Murray Valley. *Murray Valley:* The four country seats of Mildura, Murray Valley, Rodney, Swan Hill.

QUEENSLAND

During the first half of this year Parliament conducted its six-week sitting in a gratefully quiet manner, broken only by occasional eruptions between the Queensland Labor Party (with all officers and no men) and the Australian Labor Party (with all men and no officers) as they accustomed themselves to the idea of the permanency of the Labour split. This division within the Opposition is still the new Government's great source of strength, giving the two parties to the coalition the chance to learn both how to govern and how to get along with each other. Tension between the Country and Liberal Parties has been decently suppressed, since its main source (the negotiation of an electoral redistribution) has been well hidden from public view, open discussion of the topic being postponed until later in the year. The electorate seems almost to have welcomed the change from the garish rig of its late rulers to the sober grey of its present.

The March portion of this first session was opened with Mr. Wood (A.L.P. and Leader of the Opposition) moving for an adjournment because of the Government's failure to cope with "the gradually worsening unemployment".¹ The Q.L.P., with "no desire to embarrass the government", sorrowfully supported the attack and voted for it in the division, which was lost. But two days later, when Mr. Gair brought in the Q.L.P.'s want of confidence motion, based as much on charges of maladministration of the police force as on unemployment, the A.L.P. watched the debate for ten hours before Messrs. Wood and Lloyd jumped up to cry "a pox on both your houses" and to lead the A.L.P. from the chamber, leaving but five Q.L.P. to vote "aye" in the division. At last *everyone* knew where they stood.

With these little troubles out of the way Parliament settled down to legislation, and 22 bills received assent in the next six weeks. Among the more important were:

(a) *The Commonwealth and State Statistical Agreement Bill:*

A ratification of an agreement between Commonwealth and State to establish an Integrated Statistical Service for both Governments, the whole cost to be borne by the Commonwealth. The Opposition supported the bill.

(b) *The Co-operative Housing Societies Bill:*

This regulates the formation, registration, and management of co-operative housing societies, and authorizes the Treasurer to guarantee the repayment of loans obtained by such societies from lending institutions; its intention is to "encourage the formation of co-operative housing societies".² The bill was not opposed.

(c) *The Roads (Contribution to Maintenance) Act Amendment Bill:*

This bill is a good measure of the Government's inexperience. It amends the botched up 1957 Act, which was modeled on Victorian legislation and intended to ensure that all vehicles of four tons and over in use in Queensland pay a reasonable amount towards "road maintenance". The Victorian Government's discovery of a way to tax interstate hauliers without contravening Section 92 of the Constitution came from heaven to the Queensland Government, the proximity of Brisbane to the interstate border having allowed intra-state hauliers to cart their loads across the border and then return them to any point in Queensland without paying the tax on intra-state loads. The 1957 Act, imposing the same tax on interstate as on intra-state transport, was drafted in the belief that any exemptions extended to intra-state hauliers would have to be extended to their interstate counterparts,³ and no such exemptions were granted. The reaction in rural areas was quick and noisy, primary producers joining with local authorities to demand exemptions. These demands were most forcibly brought home to the Government at the Country Party Conference in April, a week before the Amending Bill was introduced, and the bill is simply the outcome of that pressure, a fact much remarked by the Opposition. The Minister, in introducing the bill, said that "it will in no way strengthen the Act against a legal challenge", a remark which may have indicated the Liberal Party's opinion of this Country Party amendment (which was supported by the A.L.P. but opposed by the Q.L.P.).

¹*Qld. Parl. Debs.*, Vol. XX, 1958, p. 1649.

²*ibid.*, Vol. XXII, 1958, p. 1959.

³*ibid.*, Vol. XIX, 1957, p. 1496.

(d) *The Liquor Acts Amendment Bill:*

This bill is noteworthy less for what it did (substantially, to reduce the number of members required for the licensing of a club, and to introduce local option, except in proclaimed tourist areas), than for what it failed to do (namely, to liberalize the liquor laws). Broadly speaking, the Country Party is indifferent to such liberalization, but rather concerned about the votes it could lose,⁴ while the Liberal Party is inclined to liberalization. Hence the Minister's complaint that this was a political "hot potato". The debates on this subject in the Liberal and Country Party Conferences this year show a strong pressure from below in the direction of liberalization so that Cabinet will probably have to reconsider Sir Arthur Fadden's warning that "you cannot afford to be labelled as a wowsierish government".⁵

Administration

The year opened with a frightful row when, on 10 January, the State Transport Deputy Commissioner cancelled the licences of two transport firms in Toowoomba because they had been charging impermissibly low freight rates. (This was admitted by the companies, who said that they were forced into it by a reduction in railway freight rates.) Local resentment at the "harsh and dictatorial action of the government" prompted Cabinet to say that the action had been initiated by the Deputy Commissioner and that the Cabinet Secretary had made a mistake when he attributed to Cabinet the actual decision to cancel the licences.⁶ On 3 February the Supreme Court refused an application by the two companies for an injunction against the Commissioner, which was hailed by the Premier as a "vindication" of Cabinet's stand (Cabinet, it appears, having indeed "approved" though not "taken" the decision). But the State Full Court did not "vindicate" Cabinet when it overruled the Supreme Court a month later. The outcry came as a shock to a Cabinet trying to get the Railway Department on to a firmer base, and the Premier subsequently promised that the whole transport "set-up" would be reviewed.

Activity in the Department of Labour and Industry, under the administration of Mr. Morris (Liberal Party, Deputy Premier), has been by its nature hard to assess. In 1957 the Minister convened a conference of employers and employees in the hope that a State equivalent of the late Federal Ministry of Labour Advisory Council would issue from it. But the committee which emerged has only met twice, and its achievements have not been divulged to the outside world. Similar ambiguity attends the over-publicized Queensland Promotion Delegation (*alias* the "Morris Dance"), a group of business men led by the Minister who made a world tour to attract industries to Queensland. When reproached with the apparent failure of this enterprise, Mr. Morris, not unconvincingly, replied that (a) such results are naturally not achieved overnight and (b) what has been achieved is naturally of a confidential nature.⁷ Similar difficulties prevent a proper estimation of Morris's development of the "Tourist Industry" (in which all Queenslanders have a complete faith). But if, at present, he appears to have done little in these fields, he has done nothing at all towards providing the Opposition with a rod for his back, which is itself no mean achievement for a Minister of Labour.

The action of the Treasury which provoked the most dispute was, oddly enough, seven Orders in Council of 6 March under the Harbours Acts. These effected a reconstitution of the harbour boards, the membership of which has hitherto varied in number from seven to thirteen and has been determined by all electors on the rolls in the appropriate locality. The Orders standardized the board numbers at two Government members and seven others to be elected by the local councillors. Apart from the mystical advantages of standardization, the Treasurer sought to save the best part of the £20,000 that it had cost to conduct the elections by the adult franchise method. The Opposition's Proposed Disallowance of Orders in Council⁸ was based solely on its objection to the Government's efforts "to filch from the people their democratic rights". One still wonders what it was all about. More important was the approval of a £2½ million plan to develop the Mourilyan harbour so that it can cope with the new aluminium

⁴*Courier-Mail*, 11 Ap. 1958.

⁵*Sunday Mail*, 13 Ap. 1958.

⁶*Courier-Mail*, 24 Jan. 1958.

⁷For report see *Qld. P.D.*, Vol. 221, 1958, pp. 76, ff.

⁸*ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, 1958, pp. 2055, ff.

industry at Weipa. But perhaps the most important of the Treasurer's activities was his preparation of Queensland's case at the February Loan Council meeting, where he secured £1,788,154 extra funds to deal with drought and unemployment. Of this, £625,154 was Queensland's share of the extra direct grant to all States, £663,000 was approval for Debenture Borrowing, and £500,000 was a special grant. The Government was entitled to use the whole of the latter for the reduction of the State's deficit, but in the event it gave £200,000 of it to unemployment relief. The local authority and public body loan programme was a complete success and for the first time ever 100 per cent. of the loan allocations were raised. The total allocation of February's extra funds was as follows: Semi-governmental and local authorities, £888,000; governmental works and housing, £400,000; drought assistance, £500,154 (including £300,154 to Consolidated Revenue to offset reduced receipts).⁹

North Queensland's development was further pushed by the establishment of a Sub-Department of Development, with headquarters at Townsville, and the appointment of Mr. W. Hansen as Acting Director, with the job of advising on potential and established industries in north Queensland. In the event, his first task was to advise on cyclone damage to Bowen in April, for which the Government subsequently authorized a programme of £255,000 for restoration, of which £30,000 related to State property, £50,000 to Council property, and £50,000 to public utilities, all of which was wholly borne by the State or boards concerned; a further £125,000 was available to help private citizens.

By and large it seems that, if the Government has lost a few friends in high places it has gained many from below. It has effectively killed the myth that the "Tories" would bring immediate disaster to the "workers", and at least the public service union has expressed a strong approval of its new masters. The police union, also, is very much happier under the new administration.

By-elections and Council Elections

These have been, perhaps, a shade less ambiguous than usual as indicators of the state of the parties.

Flinders

At the general election last year, Mr. W. H. Lonergan (Country Party) defeated Mr. F. M. Forde (A.L.P.) by one vote, and the enquiry by the Elections Tribunal¹⁰ disclosed that one of the presiding officers at the election had so improperly conducted a poll that the election was void. The by-election on 17 May was strongly contested by all parties, the local electors seeing the most bewitching procession of top-brass in their history. A.L.P. and Q.L.P. tore at each other with the result that the final (unofficial) figures were: Lonergan (Country Party), 1,948; Forde (A.L.P.), 1,534; and Katter (Q.L.P.), 780. The result, generally acknowledged as an endorsement of the new Government, was also significant for the fall in the Q.L.P. vote, Mr. Katter securing only eighteen per cent. as against his 28 per cent. in the general election.

North Toowoomba

Different, however, were the results of the North Toowoomba by-election on 31 May, the result of the death of Mr. Wood, the late Leader of the Opposition, in March. Mr. Wood's death left the Parliamentary Labor Party virtually leaderless, and it was of great importance to the A.L.P. (and, indeed, to the general level of parliamentary life) that Mr. Duggan be returned. In the 1957 general election in this electorate, the A.L.P. scored 44 per cent., Liberals 38 per cent. and Q.L.P. eighteen per cent. of the votes. The Liberal Party, in an attempt to woo the Roman Catholic vote away from the Q.L.P., overruled the local choice of Mr. Yeates and selected Mr. G. M. Godsall, a Roman Catholic and a publican, for its candidate. The results were Duggan (A.L.P.), 63 per cent.; Godsall (Liberal Party), 32 per cent.; and Whittaker (Q.L.P.), five per cent. Undoubtedly Mr. Duggan's extraordinary victory (which brought him

⁹*ibid.*, 2 Oct. 1958, p. 580.

¹⁰See *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. III, No. 2, May 1958, p. 238.

the leadership of the Opposition) was partly the result of his personality and standing, but many people in the Liberal Party feel that the party lost votes by overruling the local choice in its selection of Mr. Godsall. Equally remarkable was the decline of the Q.L.P., which has been attributed to a plot by the Q.L.P. to beat Mr. Duggan by pushing the Liberal candidate at the expense of their own; and it is said to be evidence of this plot that the Q.L.P. selected Mr. Whittaker, for he polled least well of all the Q.L.P. candidates in the Council elections in April. The story had sufficient currency to draw an assertion that he was trying to win from Mr. Whittaker in the *Courier-Mail* on 5 May. If Mr. Whittaker's tale is true, then the by-election was a disastrous forecast for the Q.L.P.

Council Elections

These were held in April, and in Brisbane (but not in rural areas) were fought on party lines with interventions from Independents and small, local "parties". The Liberal Party does not appear as such, but is more or less unofficially associated with the Citizens' Municipal Organization. Electors each have two votes, one for Mayor and one for the local alderman. Voting is compulsory. The 24 wards in the City of Brisbane are identical with the 24 metropolitan State electorates, which allows a comparison of the Council election with the 1957 State election. In the following table the 1957 percentages have been computed on what were called the "valid votes",¹¹ while the 1958 percentages have been computed on the total number of votes cast (including informals)¹².

	1957 %	Mayor 1958 %	Aldermen
C.M.O. or L.P.	43	42	42
A.L.P.	.. 33	38	40
Q.L.P.	.. 23	11	9

Allowing for the difference of issues in Council as opposed to State elections, allowing for the fact that the C.M.O. purports to be "non-political", allowing for the appearance of minor "parties" and strong Independents in the Council elections, allowing for the prominence of Cabinet personalities in the Q.L.P.'s metropolitan team at the State elections, the Q.L.P. decline in the metropolitan area, taken in conjunction with its decline in Flinders and North Toowoomba, suggests that that party commands very much less support now than it did twelve months ago.

A.W.U. versus The Rest

As reported in this *Journal*¹³ the Australian Workers' Union announced its withdrawal from the Queensland Trades and Labour Council on 8 January, and since then the gap between the A.W.U. and the rest of the A.L.P. has widened. In March the Mt. Isa Industrial Council made what the A.W.U.'s Queensland branch Secretary, Mr. Bukowski, called "a cheeky attempt to draw up an award covering all Mt. Isa employees without consulting the A.W.U.",¹⁴ and in the same month the A.W.U. accused the Building Workers' Industrial Union of the usual "body-snatching".¹⁵ These troubles found further expression within the Queensland Central Executive of the A.L.P. (of which Mr. Bukowski is President), where it took the form of a dispute over (a) the readmission to the A.L.P. of former Brisbane Lord Mayor Roberts, (b) the disciplining of the President of the Bundaberg A.L.P. for criticism of the leadership, and (c) the amount of rent to be paid by the A.L.P. to the A.W.U. for premises in an A.W.U. building. The A.W.U. faction lost on all these issues and bitterly complained of unfair victimization.¹⁶ Smarting from its defeat, it subsequently founced out of both the Australian Labour Day Celebrations Committee (because of the inclusion of two Communists from other unions) and

¹¹*ibid.*

¹²*cf. Detailed Results of the City of Brisbane Election, 1958*, published by the Brisbane City Council.

¹³*A.J.P.H.*, Vol. III, No. 2, May 1958, p. 242.

¹⁴*Worker*, 17 March 1958.

¹⁵*Courier-Mail*, 29 March and 18 Ap. 1958.

¹⁶*Worker*, 7 Ap. 1958.

the actual celebrations themselves. It also refused to attend the party-unions conference in Brisbane in May. If, as has been suggested, the dispute between the two factions has been restrained in this period because of the need for by-election unity, then the immediate outlook for Labour harmony is gloomy.

R.E.D.

SOUTH AUSTRALIA

On the parliamentary front there is little to report during the period under review.¹ It has been the custom of late years for the S.A. Parliament to rise in December, reassemble briefly in June in order to pass Supplementary Supply and Estimates and then to adjourn until late in July when the main business of the annual session gets under way. Although the Labor Opposition has repeatedly called for meetings of Parliament in March, the Government has preferred to concentrate parliamentary business in the latter half of the year. In accordance with this practice Parliament met for three days, 17, 18 and 19 June.

Proposed Legislation

The Lieutenant-Governor's address opening the fourth session of the thirty-fifth Parliament contained promises of bills on rail standardization, increased loans for home purchases and ratification of the steelworks and oil refinery agreements entered into by the Government earlier in the year, none of them contentious issues.

Ministerial Changes

Taking advantage of the Supplementary Estimates debate, the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. M. R. O'Halloran, raised the question of the portfolio of the Minister of Works. For 28 years (the last 25 continuously) Sir Malcolm McIntosh had administered this and other portfolios with quiet efficiency, but upon his retirement on grounds of ill-health the Attorney-General, Mr. C. D. Rowe, M.L.C., on 14 May took over the Ministry of Works in addition to his other duties. Mr. O'Halloran's complaint was that such an arrangement deprived the House of Assembly ("which is supposed to represent the people") of one of its allotted five Ministers. The Premier, Sir Thomas Playford, in reply made it clear that he would soon appoint a new Minister of Works from the House of Assembly, and on 25 June Mr. David Brookman, member for the southern farming electorate of Alexandra, was sworn in as Minister of Works and the Marine. Mr. Brookman, of a well-known S.A. family, has sat for Alexandra for ten years and was at the time of his appointment a member of the Public Works Committee.

Consorting with Aborigines

A petition of 7,525 signatures was presented to Parliament by the Labour member for Norwood (Mr. D. Dunstan) asking that the Police Offences Act, 1953, be amended insofar as it made consorting with aborigines a crime. The Government later promised to repeal the relevant section.

Death of Mr. J. Fletcher, M.P.

The death of the member for Mount Gambier, Mr. John Fletcher, was reported on 5 June. Although holding his seat since 1938 as an Independent, Mr. Fletcher gave fairly consistent support to the Government, particularly in vital divisions, and he had enjoyed immunity from Liberal and Country League intervention. The by-election was set for 12 July and as Mr. Fletcher had announced his contemplated retirement from politics both major parties had already selected their candidates. It was thought for a time that the Democratic Labor Party might enter the contest, but in line with its recent policy in S.A. of saving its funds for general elections it refrained from contesting Mount Gambier. A third candidate appeared, however, when Mr. J. A. Barry nominated as an Independent in the hope of inheriting Mr. Fletcher's following.

¹References to the factual information on which this material is based may be found in *S.A. Parl. Debs.*, 17-19 June 1958, and in the *Advertiser* and the *News*, 7 March-30 June 1958.

The L.C.L. centred its campaign around the achievements of the Playford Government in general and its development of the south-east of S.A. in particular. The Australian Labor Party with a strong local candidate in Mr. R. F. Ralston, conducted an intensive door-to-door campaign, emphasising the lack of industries for Mount Gambier.

The by-election resulted in a Labor Party victory:

J. A. Barry (Ind.)	1,888	On distribution of Barry's preferences
A. T. Cocks (L.C.L.)	2,348	3,408
R. F. Ralston (A.L.P.)	3,339	4,167
Informal	89	

The state of the House of Assembly is now: L.C.L., twenty; A.L.P., seventeen; and Independents, two seats.

Mr. Chambers and the Australian Labor Party

Following his declaration on 24 April that he would not contest the Federal seat of Adelaide against the endorsed A.L.P. candidate, there was renewed speculation concerning Mr. Cyril Chambers's relations with the Labor Party. Eventually, after he had given assurances that he would not in future attack its leadership, Mr. Chambers was re-admitted to the party at the A.L.P. Convention, 16 June.

The Snowy Waters Dispute

The dispute between Sir Thomas Playford, the Commonwealth Government and the Governments of N.S.W. and Victoria continues on its inconclusive way. The concern of the S.A. Premier has been to ensure that S.A. is guaranteed a fair share of the diverted waters during drought years. Upon the Commonwealth Government introducing the proposed agreement into the Senate the S.A. Government on 17 April issued a writ against the Commonwealth, seeking a definition of the Murray Waters and challenging the constitutionality of the Tooma diversion. So far the writ has not been proceeded with, the Premier and the Prime Minister several times having appeared to be on the point of agreement. The N.S.W. and Victorian Governments, however, have yet to be fully consulted about S.A.'s amendments, and the prospect is still one of long negotiation and further conferences.

Television Enquiry

The Australian Broadcasting Control Board met in Adelaide 26-29 May to conduct its enquiry into the granting of private television licences in S.A. There were three applicants—Southern Television Corporation, sponsored by the *News*, Television Broadcasters Ltd., in which the *Advertiser* was the principal shareholder, and Consolidated Television (S.A.) Ltd., controlled by Consolidated Press of Sydney. The evidence, which was extensively reproduced in the *Advertiser*, was particularly enlightening on the ties between the *Advertiser* and the *Herald* of Melbourne, and on Mr. Rupert Murdoch's relations with the *News*.

New Industries for South Australia

In the race for industrial development S.A. has been well to the fore, a fact that was emphasised by a series of announcements in March.

On 7 March an official statement was released by the Premier and the Chairman of Directors of Broken Hill Proprietary, Mr. C. Y. Syme, that the company proposed to establish a £30 million steel making plant, rolling mills and associated works at Whyalla. The following week General Motors Holden announced that they would spend an initial £5 million on a new plant at Elizabeth, the Housing Trust's satellite town north of Adelaide. It was intended that there should be eventual employment for 7,000 people. The month culminated in the disclosure on 26 March that a joint agreement had been signed by the Premier and executives of Vacuum Oil Company providing for the building on a site south of Adelaide of a £16 million oil refinery designed to produce more than one million gallons of petroleum products a day.

R.L.R.

TASMANIA

It is rare for any State to see so many sensational and controversial events as have marked the history of Tasmania during the first six months of 1958. The Orr affair was political only insofar as the Attorney-General refused to intervene to seek a reopening of the case of the dismissed Professor as requested by a deputation from the Scots Kirk in Hobart and the Premier stated that the Government did not intend to appoint a Royal Commission or any Board of Enquiry to review the decision of the Supreme Court of Tasmania which had been upheld by the High Court of Australia. The Turnbull affair was specifically political, involving allegations that a Cabinet Minister, who had notoriously been in conflict with some of his colleagues over a period of three years, had offered or been offered a bribe during transactions for the transfer of a lottery licence. The Minister, Dr. R. J. D. Turnbull, was indicted on a charge of corruption in the Criminal Court at Hobart. The Hursey actions, brought by father and son against the Waterside Workers' Federation in Hobart and against individual waterside workers, involved the refusal to pay a political levy to the Australian Labor Party. The Hurseys sought damages, alleging that they had been prevented from obtaining employment as registered waterside workers by a series of mob actions on the waterfront. These three affairs roused widespread interest, throughout the mainland as well as in Tasmania. Until May Parliament was in recess, but in a short but dramatic session during May and June the House of Assembly provided the central stage for the Turnbull affair, while echoes of the Hursey affair penetrated both chambers of Parliament.

The Political Parties

Central to these issues was the Labor Party. It had held power continuously since 1934. The Premier, Mr. Robert Cosgrove, had occupied his position since 1939. He had developed almost a myth of invincibility. Yet around him his Government and his party appeared to be disintegrating. He had almost prevented the schism that rent the Federal Labor Party from spreading to Tasmania and had so far neutralized its effects, but he had shown himself singularly unable to control and discipline Dr. Turnbull, the Treasurer and Minister of Health, who was primarily responsible for the development of personal animosities in Cabinet and then in Caucus. Furthermore Mr. Cosgrove had found it increasingly difficult to manage the Annual Conference of the A.L.P. Opposition was concentrated in but not confined to the unions and revealed itself in a determination to take the control of endorsements out of the hands of the State executive. Motions to this effect had been carried at State A.L.P. Conferences in 1956 and 1957, but no action had been taken on the plea that machinery could not be devised to implement the rule. At the Annual Conference held at Devonport on and after 25 March 1958 it was resolved that "endorsement of candidates for election to any House of the Tasmanian and Federal Parliament shall be decided by ballot of Conference if in session, or if not, by a postal ballot of all credentialled delegates to the preceding Conference". The new method of endorsement has been used since the Conference to choose an A.L.P. candidate for the coming Senate elections.

With the obvious disintegration of the Labour Government, and the expected retirement of Mr. Cosgrove the Parliamentary Liberal Party sought to exploit the difficulties created by the Turnbull affair. In the parliamentary session the Opposition was more active than usual, though it may be doubted whether their tactics were really sound. The Liberal Leader, Mr. W. Jackson, wrote to the Premier on 28 March asking that Parliament be called together in view of the publicized fact that the Treasurer had been called upon by his Cabinet colleagues to resign. When Parliament assembled, the Opposition attacked immediately on the Address-in-Reply debate. Pressure was kept up throughout the session by the Opposition, which took the initiative even to the extent of introducing several bills. Undoubtedly the Liberals emerged with increased confidence, though it was widely rumoured that the spirit of faction, which has so often spoiled the chances of the party, was still too active. Better public relations were achieved by the Liberal Party's investigation into juvenile delinquency and by Mr. Jackson's steady reiteration of the need for a bold tourist plan.

The Democratic Labor Party was active and drew the public's attention to itself whenever possible. It was widely believed to be supporting the Hurseys but this Frank Hursey publicly

denied. The D.L.P. planned to fight both the coming Federal elections and the next State election.

Legislative Council Elections

Three seats in the Legislative Council became vacant as usual in May and elections took place. Three of the five Labour members (in a council of nineteen) were involved. The Leader of the Government in the Council, Mr. T. D'Alton, was returned unopposed in Gordon, Mrs. P. Benjamin held her Hobart seat, but Mrs. L. Grounds lost her Launceston seat to Mr. M. Fry. This was an unexpected setback for the A.L.P. which had steadily increased its membership in the Council since 1952. The belief was widely held that, had Parliament met and the Turnbull affair appeared in the press before the Council elections, Labour might well have lost the Hobart seat also.

The Parliamentary Session

Parliament which had adjourned on 28 November had been prorogued till 13 May. The recess was longer than usual. The Leader of the Opposition tried without avail to get the Premier to call Parliament together at an earlier date, but some authorities held the view that technically this was not possible. However, the real reason for delay was probably the Premier's desire to resolve the Turnbull trouble and to get the Legislative Council elections over before Parliament met. The Premier's tactics were in part successful, but he was unable to control either Dr. Turnbull or Mr. George Fitzpatrick, a Sydney business man, who made the allegations and counter-allegations in the bribery scandal.

Dr. Turnbull and Allegations of Bribery

The facts of this extraordinary affair were revealed to the public piecemeal during the debates in the House of Assembly in May and in the Magistrates' Court in June and in the Criminal Court in August. Some of the facts are by the very nature of the case controversial but this much seems to have been established. Mr. Fitzpatrick had interested himself for some time before November 1957 in the lottery licence which the owner, Mr. A. Drysdale, was wanting to sell and had been in touch with the Premier and the Under Treasurer, Mr. K. J. Binns. On 12 November Cabinet ruled that the licence should not be sold to an individual but only to a company. On that day the Treasurer, Dr. Turnbull, met Mr. Fitzpatrick for the first time and discussed the transfer of the lottery. Later in the day they met twice in Mr. Fitzpatrick's hotel room and these were the occasions when offers of bribery were allegedly made. Mr. Fitzpatrick reported to the Premier that night that Dr. Turnbull had asked for a consideration and on the Premier's advice he repeated the story next morning to Mr. Binns. When Mr. Binns raised the matter with Dr. Turnbull, the latter immediately accused Mr. Fitzpatrick of offering a bribe. Dr. Turnbull in turn reported the incident to the Solicitor-General, Mr. D. M. Chambers, and saw a private solicitor. But he did not take Mr. Chambers's advice and report it to the police, nor did he inform the Premier or the Attorney-General, Mr. R. F. Fagan. Fagan insisted on a full police investigation but not till 17 December did he get his way. A senior police officer interviewed Mr. Fitzpatrick in Sydney, who said no more than that he had made a statement to the Premier and had been assured that Dr. Turnbull would surrender his portfolio. On the facts thus disclosed the Solicitor-General recommended that there was not sufficient ground for laying a criminal charge against any person. It was then that Dr. Turnbull accused Mr. Fagan of "treachery", whereupon the Attorney-General, who was ill, feeling that he could no longer act "objectively", tendered his resignation. This precipitated a Cabinet crisis, for Mr. Fagan's colleagues insisted that Dr. Turnbull should be the one to resign. However Dr. Turnbull refused to resign, he talked freely to the press, tried in vain to raise the matter at the Annual Conference of the A.L.P. and called for a Royal Commission. He finally appealed to Caucus where, under strong pressure from Mr. D'Alton and Mrs. Benjamin, the differences between the Ministers were patched up. Dr. Turnbull made a public apology to Mr. Fagan, who withdrew his resignation.

At this point Parliament met and Mr. Jackson immediately moved to censure the Government. The Liberals defended Dr. Turnbull against his colleagues and Mr. Fagan in the debate

disclosed for the first time the events of the crisis. The censure motion was defeated. The Liberal Opposition then moved to suspend another licence held by Mr. Fitzpatrick in Tasmania, thereupon he sent a statement to the Attorney-General and the Leader of the Opposition charging Dr. Turnbull with having demanded a bribe. A second censure motion within a week was moved calling on the Treasurer to resign but ironically he was now defended by his colleagues and the motion was lost. Further evidence was then sent to the Solicitor-General by Mr. Fitzpatrick's lawyer, Mr. Witham, who claimed to have heard part of the conversation in the hotel bedroom. On the basis of this, and on the advice of independent counsel in Melbourne, the Solicitor-General recommended that Dr. Turnbull stand trial on a charge of corruption. Even then, before the indictment was filed, Dr. Turnbull succeeded in airing the matter in Parliament.

The charge was first heard before Mr. G. F. Sorell, P.M., who ruled that Dr. Turnbull should appear before the Criminal Court. The case was heard by Mr. Justice Crisp before a jury. On 22 August, as the jury could not agree on a verdict, Turnbull was remanded for a further trial.

The prestige of the Labour Government suffered as a result of this unfortunate affair and the strain affected the health of the Premier and the Deputy Premier, Mr. Fagan. Mr. Cosgrove underwent a surgical operation; he made a slow and painful recovery but his illness forced him to retire from political life. Mr. Fagan feeling "mentally exhausted" persisted with his resignation from Cabinet, and surrendered the leadership of the party on the very eve of Cosgrove's retirement.

The Legislative Programme

Vexed and torn the Government had little to show of legislative achievement during the short session. A bill authorizing expenditure out of the Loan Fund occupied both Houses; a bill authorizing the purchase by the Transport Commission of an important private bus service was denounced as "the socialization of transport", but was carried; a bill giving State Premiers a pension of £1,500 a year after six years in the office was also agreed to. The Opposition, through Mr. W. Hodgman, introduced three bills. The first authorized the Governor to call Parliament together at an earlier date than that to which it had been prorogued. A clause in the bill designed to allow the Governor to call Parliament on his own initiative was resisted by the Attorney-General and deleted. The second bill provided severe penalties for people who stop others from going to work. This echo of the Hursey dispute led to sharp controversy; the Premier strongly criticized the bill and it was defeated on a party division. A similar fate met the third bill designed to increase the membership of the Racing Commission from three to seven.

More important was the Government bill to increase the membership of the House of Assembly from thirty to 35 following a report of a Select Committee. The bill was supported by a Parliamentary Paper prepared by Mr. George Howatt, a former American Fulbright scholar, which showed statistically the advantages of seven-member over six-member constituencies. The bill passed the Lower House on the voices. It was never brought to the Legislative Council, possibly through the resistance in Caucus of Mr. D'Alton, who was known to be lukewarm about the proposed change.

The Hursey Dispute

Certain important issues involved in the dispute between the Hurseys and the Waterside Workers' Federation are still *sub judice* so that full comment may well be left to the next Political Chronicle. Certain facts may, however, be recorded. The trouble began in 1957 when Mr. Frank Hursey and his son Dennis persisted in their refusal to pay a ten shillings political levy struck by the local branch of the W.W.F. to support the A.L.P. at the time of the State election of October 1956. On 3 February 1958 Hobart watersiders declined to work with the Hurseys, allegedly not because the Hurseys refused to pay the political levy, but because they had not paid any union dues in 1957. The Hurseys have denied this allegation, so that the

facts are still a matter of dispute. For weeks between February and June during the apple export season, the waterfront repeatedly saw picket lines of watersiders preventing the Hurseys appearing to be rostered for work. The police who were constantly in attendance maintained order, on occasions with some difficulty as there were unruly incidents, but did not attempt to break the human barricade. At the close of the apple season an injunction was issued from the Supreme Court calling upon the W.W.F. and its members to refrain from impeding the Hurseys in their move to seek work. Watersiders then adopted other tactics, whereby those rostered refused to serve with the Hurseys. The Hursey case eventually came on in the Supreme Court before the Chief Justice, Sir Stanley Burbury, late in July. The Hurseys brought an action for damages against the W.W.F. and fourteen individual members while certain members of the Hobart branch brought a separate action against the Stevedoring Industry Authority and the Hurseys. By early September the hearing had already lasted 35 days and was unfinished.

W.A.T.

WESTERN AUSTRALIA

With no Legislative Assembly elections scheduled for earlier than 1959 and the State Parliament in recess until early August, the first half of 1958 seemed to offer both Government and Opposition parties reasonable opportunities to concentrate, in the one case, on administrative activity and, in the other, on reducing the Liberal-Country Party friction which had considerably weakened the effectiveness of occupants of Opposition benches during the second session of the twenty-second Parliament¹ and in the earlier part of 1957.²

Elections

Some electoral campaigning there nevertheless was in the early months of the year. The choice of the Minister for Lands, Mr. E. K. Hoar, as the new Agent-General for W.A. in London had caused a Legislative Assembly by-election in the south-west of the State. The campaign in the Warren electorate, with its enrolment of 5,076 voters at 18 December 1957, was opened by the Premier on 9 January. It was clear that the result of the by-election could not seriously affect the state of parties in the Assembly, where Labour held 28 seats against thirteen Liberal and eight Country Party members. Considerable interest was nevertheless taken in the campaign for a variety of reasons. No less than seven candidates were in the field with three Independents as well as the Democratic Labor Party challenging the representatives of the three parties already in the House. Speculation was also encouraged by the presence of many New Australians among the timber workers in the constituency. Half of the registered voters, it was estimated, had not hitherto voted for the Legislative Assembly, whether because of youth or because of change of residence. There was little recent experience to go upon, Mr. Hoar having won the district for Labour in 1943 but having been unopposed after 1948.

All parties entered into the fun and games of the contest. Senator G. Cole flew in from Tasmania to support the local D.L.P. candidate—fresh from his party's success in frustrating the N.S.W. Australian Labor Party's chances of winning the Wagga by-election. Pressmen following the candidates reported a full-scale revival of "old time vigorous election campaigns". When polling took place on 25 January, 4,682 votes were cast—92.24 per cent. of enrolled voters. The Labour candidate, Mr. J. N. Rowberry, a Manjimup traffic inspector, received 2,107 first preferences against 1,198, 455 and 327 cast for the Liberal, Country Party and D.L.P. candidates respectively. Mr. Rowberry was declared elected by an overall majority of 110 after the third redistribution of preference votes. The poor showing of the D.L.P. candidate occasioned some surprise despite the fact that the Labour movement in W.A. has been relatively free from the internal frictions noticeable in other States.

More significance was attached to the possible consequences of the Legislative Council elections of 10 May, in view of Labour's good showing in metropolitan electorates at preceding

¹See *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. III, No. 2, May 1958, p. 251.

²*ibid.*, Vol. III, No. 1, Nov. 1957, p. 114.

elections to this Chamber. Two more Labour victories would make Government and Opposition parties fifteen-all in the Council, voting for which was voluntary and based on a restricted franchise. Ten members stood for re-election and three were unopposed—the Country Party President of the Council, Mr. A. L. Loton, the member for the South-West Province, Mr. J. Murray, and the former Labour Premier and sometime Administrator of the Northern Territory, Mr. F. J. S. Wise, who now represents the Northern Province.

In the event, Labour's hopes were disappointed; the party remains with only thirteen members on the Council. There was, in fact, only one change in membership of the House, the new member, Mr. C. R. Abbey, winning the Central Province for the Liberal Party by 109 votes more than those cast for the sitting Country Party member, Mr. N. E. Baxter. Other sitting Labour members returned were Mr. W. R. Hall (North-East Province), Mr. G. Bennetts (South-East), Mr. Lavery (West). The sitting Liberal member for the Metropolitan Province, Dr. J. G. Hislop, who divides his time between Parliament House and his medical consulting rooms in St. George's Terrace a few hundred yards away, had an easy win over his Labour opponent with the slogan "Keep a Doctor in the House". In the Suburban electorate, two ex-R.A.A.F. candidates fought the election for the Liberal and Labor parties respectively. Victory went to the former representative, Mr. A. F. Griffith, by 9,056 votes to 6,686 for the Australian Labor Party candidate and a significant 1,227 cast for the State Secretary of the D.L.P., the only candidate for this party during the campaign.

Much interest attached to the contest in the Midland Province where the retiring member was Mr. C. H. Simpson, a former Liberal Minister for Transport, Railways and Mines in the McLarty-Watts Government, who had been the chief spokesman for the Liberal Party in the Council from 1955 to 1957. In March Mr. Simpson had announced his transfer to the Country Party after twelve years as a Liberal. He had supported the Country Party on the railway closure issue in the previous session and justified his transfer of party allegiance on the ground that his former party had not worked hard enough for Liberal-Country Party collaboration. This "defection" was taken badly by the Liberals who put up a cattle- and sheep-breeder from Geraldton as their candidate against the new recruit to the Country Party. This somewhat ironic gesture failed to influence the Midland electors against their sitting member.

Railways

The troublesome question of the W.A. Government Railways with their constantly recurring deficits continued to occupy public attention in varying forms. Early in January Cabinet decided to drop the remaining charges against the former Assistant Commissioner, Mr. C. W. Clarke, who had resigned in August 1957 and been charged with having participated in a benefit arising from a W.A.G.R. contract.³ He had appeared in court on four charges but the judge had ruled that there was no case to be answered and directed the jury to acquit him. The Crown secured the adjournment of two other charges pending an appeal to the State Full Court. When the latter upheld the trial judge the Government decided not to appeal to the High Court.

The future policy of the Railways and the responsibility for direction remained undetermined during the period under review. Parliament having in 1957 agreed to replace the three-commissioner system introduced some years previously by the McLarty-Watts Government, control had been exercised by Acting Commissioner Brodie following the retirement in December on grounds of ill health of the senior commissioner under the three-man scheme. Mr. Brodie being due to reach the retiring age in October 1958, the Executive Council on 8 June appointed in his stead Mr. Tom Marsland, who was then chief mechanical engineer, was himself due to retire in June 1959 and had in fact been unavailable because of ill health when Mr. Brodie was appointed in December of last year.

Though the main lines of future Railways policy thus still remained uncertain, a protracted argument was settled in the middle of January by the decision to build a new railway bridge at the port of Fremantle. This was a compromise between those who had urged up-river port

³*ibid.*, Vol. III, No. 2, p. 250.

expansion and those who wished to keep Fremantle's artificial but extensive harbour much as it is. The new decision provided for five more river berths after which, it seems, future port development will take place in Cockburn Sound, already being used increasingly for the purposes of the oil refinery at Kwinana.

With the eventual appointment of a permanent Commissioner of Railways more details will no doubt be given of the Government's plans for moving the Perth railway marshalling yards, goods sheds and East Perth locomotive depot, transferring the Central Railway Station to East Perth and lowering the tracks in the city area. Meanwhile it was announced that the last of Perth's trams would cease to run in mid-July.

Overseas Investment

A much publicized State trade mission left for London on 24 May, headed by the vigorous Deputy Premier, Mr. J. T. Tonkin. This mission was announced by the Premier as the first of a series of overseas visits by at least one Minister each year. The Tonkin trade mission, however, represented a determined effort to seek overseas capital investment. The mission included the President of the Chamber of Commerce, a representative and former President of the Chamber of Manufactures and the Under Secretary for Mines, who had accompanied his Minister to Canada and the United States in 1956. Its itinerary included Geneva, West Germany, Paris, the United Kingdom and a little over a week in the United States.

On the eve of the mission's departure from Perth its leader insisted that he and his colleagues were not going as "a prospecting party hoping for something to turn up" but with definite prospects in mind. Early reports of the mission after its arrival in London towards the end of June suggested some preliminary success in its search for a process for extracting gas from Collie coal. Other declared objectives were to induce an overseas company interested in manufacturing titanium oxide to establish a plant in W.A. and so provide a local market for ilmenite mined in the State; to negotiate for the establishment of a sulphuric acid plant and to encourage a tyre manufacturing company to set up in W.A., of which the Deputy Premier declared that he had "good prospects". In these and similar negotiations he was authorized to offer as inducements factory sites of thirty to forty acres at little cost with provision of essential services such as power (electricity rates had not been increased for five years), water and railways and reasonable help in establishing the new industry.

W.A. patriotism was duly stirred by declarations by some mission members before departure that they hoped to redress the situation whereby very little of the £110 million annually invested in Australia from overseas came to W.A.

Impending Legislation

The relatively late opening date for the third (1958) session of the State Parliament is explained in part by the alleged expectation of the Hawke Government that a short session may be relied on in view of the interest which all parties may have in the Federal election campaign anticipated for the closing weeks of the year. The Opposition's continued control of the Legislative Council is also calculated to limit the Government's ability to use its substantial majority in the Assembly for any strikingly partisan legislation.

Some controversy may nevertheless be expected on the Unfair Trading Act Amendment Bill which the Government is expected to introduce in the light of the report of a consultative committee. The Premier announced in May that copies of proposed amendments would be given to appropriate organizations before the amending legislation is finally drafted by Cabinet. Commercial interests have continued to criticize the existing legislation as hampering the Government's attempts to attract capital investment from overseas.

Other matters likely to arouse Opposition comment in the third session will include the regulations issued to limit the hours of petrol trading, steps to be taken to prevent a recurrence of the typhoid epidemic of April which followed a break in the sewerage pipes leading to the sea outside City Beach (which was closed to swimmers for some months), and reported delays in the construction of the Narrows bridge across the Swan River because of a nine-inch lateral movement of piles sunk. It is not yet clear whether an attempt will be made to reopen the

question of an Olympic Pool in King's Park as part of the preparations for holding the 1962 Empire Games in Perth.

One disputatious issue which is not likely to be revived in the third session is the vexed question of long service leave. This was settled at the end of March by an agreement covering all persons working under State industrial awards—a settlement arrived at by the parties in agreed acceptance in advance of a Court decision. The agreement is substantially identical with the national code for private industry which was worked out towards the end of 1957 by the A.C.T.U. and private employers' organizations.

When the third session does open on 7 August the Assembly will be without "the Father of the House" in the last six years, Mr. J. Sleeman, who at the age of 73 is retiring after 35 years' continuous representation of Fremantle, six years as Chairman of Committees, eight years as Speaker and a reputation for frank criticism of Governments from his own party as well as from the other side of the House. Other members returning to Parliament will have the satisfaction of knowing that operations began in March for the completion of parliamentary buildings within six years. Should the Government's expectation of a short session be not realized or the year end with more than the customary pressure of rushed legislation, members may console themselves with the thought that the fifty horsehair seats which have been used for the last thirty years have during the recess been replaced by a modern rubber type presumably more adapted for all-night sittings !

F.A.

Review Article

LAW AND EXPLANATION IN HISTORY

Collingwood's complaint that Anglo-Saxon philosophers ignore history, presuming that natural science is the paradigm of knowledge, no longer has its old force. "The nature of historical explanation", indeed, is a question of the hour. But Professor Dray¹—writing as an inheritor of that Idealist tradition to which Collingwood himself belonged—alleges that this reform is only skin-deep: even if philosophers now admit that the peculiarities of historical explanation are worthy of special study, they still try to fit historical and natural-science explanation into a single formal pattern. Dray hopes to show, on the contrary, that the pattern of historical explanation is unique, that historians offer explanations—and ought to do so—which cannot be formally described in the same terms as explanations in physical science.

The prevailing view, associated particularly with the names of Popper and Hempel, runs as follows: to explain why P is Q is to assert, or presume, a general law—say that "whatever is X is Q", from which, together with the fact that P is an X (the "initial conditions"), it follows that P is Q. In pure physical science, the centre of the scientist's concern is the general law. Even if Newton were inspired to construct his theory of motion by the sight of falling apples, there is no mention of apples in the *Principia*. Particular facts are important to the physical scientist as setting problems, or as helping him to decide between alternative hypotheses, but once the relevant laws have been discovered the facts fade into the background as mere illustrations and examples. In historical enquiry, on the other hand, laws are important only as ingredients in the explanation of particular events. Indeed, the laws implicit in historical explanations are usually so trivial that the historian does not realize that he is relying on their truth, and certainly does not bother explicitly to assert them: they are nonetheless vital to the cogency of his explanations. To sum the matter up, every explanation takes the form of showing that a fact is deducible from a general law; historians are mainly interested in the facts and physicists in the laws, but their explanations fit into exactly the same formal pattern.

In opposition to this analysis, Dray denies outright that general laws are implicit in the explanations proffered by historians. If they are implicit, he argues, we ought to be able, with a little trouble, to make them explicit. Yet the attempt to do so issues either in a "law" so vague as to be useless, or so loosely linked—as, say, a mere tendency statement—with its *explicandum* that it quite fails to show why events took the particular course they did, or so detailed and particularized that it is indistinguishable from the set of occurrences it is supposed to explain.

Suppose, for example, the historian sets out to explain why Louis XIV was unpopular. What law could he invoke? Entirely vacuous "laws" such as "any ruler who does things which most of his subjects dislike is unpopular" are obviously pointless; tendency statements like "rulers who attack religious orders tend to be unpopular" do not explain why *in this particular case* the ruler was unpopular. Indeed, nothing less than a detailed account of the situation in France and Louis's reaction to it can explain his unpopularity—and this will be a unique historical narrative, not a general law. The historian, Dray concludes, although he "weighs the factors" which operate in a situation, does not, in so doing, invoke the aid of general laws.

Dray's criticisms are clearly expressed and well worked out. They have certainly to be taken seriously, even if his own alternative analysis is so elusive—nothing could be more troublesome than the conception of "weighing factors"—that one scarcely knows how to discuss it. His criticism can be met, I think, but only if one is prepared to make certain amendments in the analysis he is rejecting, or, at least, to insist upon a special interpretation of that analysis.

¹W. Dray, *Law and Explanation in History*, London, Oxford University Press, 1957. Pp. 174. 39/3.

In the first place, it is distinctly misleading to assert that historical explanation presumes the truth of "laws". By a "law" we usually mean a proposition of extensive generality, of crucial importance within some area of scientific enquiry. In this sense of the word, the historian only occasionally makes use of laws. Most of the general statements upon which he relies do not form part of the content of any particular science. For "laws", then, one should read "general statements"—emphasising, however, that the generality must be of a strict kind.

Secondly, methodologists—perhaps out of a belief that every respectable form of enquiry can be assimilated to physics—often exaggerate the extent to which the historian sets out to explain. Explanation is the life-blood of physics, but even in other natural sciences its role is a limited one. The entomologist, for example, devotes most of his time to a study of the life-history of insects. He is not—or need not be—explaining when he describes the mating habits of ants. Equally, the historian is not—or need not be—explaining when he describes the difficulties encountered by Governor Phillip in setting up a colony in Sydney. Sometimes, no doubt, he will be explaining why, say, the colony was so slow in developing, and it is always possible to use his story, or part of it, as an ingredient in an explanation. But much of the time he is simply telling a story, describing in detail the most interesting stages in the development of Phillip's colony. He is responding to the request "Tell me how . . .", not "Explain to me why. . ."² Thus, if the historian feels that his enquiries only occasionally fit into the Hempel-Popper pattern, he is quite right: *for most of the time he is not explaining at all.*

Thirdly, the Popper-Hempel analysis might suggest that the course of history is deducible in principle from a single law or small set of laws. Popper himself is well aware that this is not the case—he writes in *The Poverty of Historicism* that "practically no sequence of, say, three or more causally connected concrete events proceeds according to any single law of nature" (p. 117)—but he has sometimes been interpreted in a contrary sense. All one can properly say is that the general direction of events is sometimes so deducible.

Suppose on a windless day in an empty paddock I toss a ball into the air. Then by applying simple physical principles, I can predict with considerable accuracy where the ball will fall; or, looking at the same phenomenon from a somewhat different standpoint, I can explain why it landed where it did. Once it lands, however, physical laws play only a subordinate part in determining its course. How it then moves may depend on what furrows a farmer once ploughed, or where a rabbit decided to build its home, or where a seed happened to land. The behaviour of the ball is still determined by physical laws, in the sense that if it hits a hollow at a certain speed and at a certain angle, and this hollow has such-and-such a resistance, then the path of the ball can be physically estimated. But in the problem of determining its course the general laws fade into the background; the detailed mapping of the field would be the really difficult task.

Similarly in history. Occasionally some quite general principle can be invoked to explain a crucial feature of the historical scene. "Governor Phillip found it impossible to grow enough food for the colony, because Sydney is surrounded by sandstone country." But to explain why Phillip took the steps he did in order to obtain additional food supplies, the historian has first to consider the general situation obtaining at the time, *e.g.*, communications with England, the availability of seed, the number of knowledgeable agriculturists in the colony. Once he has done this, it will ordinarily be quite apparent to the historian why events took the course they did; the general statements involved will be quite trivial ones—such statements as "You can't grow wheat without seed"; "in temperate climates seed won't produce wheat in mid-winter"; the detail is what is hard to determine. Yet, as in the case of the physical laws and the bouncing ball, the role of the general statements in the explanation is nonetheless crucial.

A fourth point Dray makes against the Popper-Hempel analysis of explanation is that explanation is not a purely logical notion and so cannot be described in wholly formal terms.

²I put the point thus, although in ordinary usage there are certainly cases where these requests would be taken to be identical in meaning: and cases, too, of "Tell me why . . ." and "Explain to me how . . ." No general theory of explanation, I should say, can remain entirely faithful to ordinary usage.

This, I think, is true and important; my only complaint is that Dray does not see quite what this criticism involves. Whether a deduction is or is not a satisfactory explanation depends upon what we already know, and what we want to know. Suppose someone asks "Why did Jones die?" and gets the answer, "Well, all men die". Now, if the questioner were a child, not yet acquainted with the fact of death, this might serve as an adequate explanation. However, in the circumstances in which this question "Why did Jones die?" is usually put to us, it would be quite frivolous to reply "All men die". We presume that our questioner wants to know why Jones died *at this particular time*; and the general statement that "all men die" will not, of course, serve to explain death at one time rather than another. Indeed, we should ordinarily interpret it rather as a refusal to explain—"Jones's death is of no particular interest"—than as an explanation. We should be more likely to reply: "He was run over by a car", or, perhaps (depending on the interests and knowledge of the questioner, who may already know that Jones was run over by a car): "He died from shock".

By mere inspection of the argument "Jones died because he is a man, and all men are mortal", we cannot tell, then, whether on a given occasion it will serve as a satisfactory explanation of Jones's death. Dray, however, is not content to conclude that an "explanation" is always, in this sense, relative; he writes, indeed, as if there were something describable as *the* explanation, which is ultimately intelligible, as distinct from being intelligible to this person or that.

He takes an example from the garage. Suppose the engine of my car seizes and I ask "Why?" Then the answer "it's due to a leak in the oil-reservoir" would be a typical explanation by reference to a "covering law". But, Dray argues, this answer does not really explain, except to those who are already acquainted with the mode of connexion between the oil-reservoir and the engine. Without that knowledge, even although I can be sure that a leak will be followed by a seizure, and can therefore predict a seizure when I experience a leak, I still do not know "the explanation" of the seizure; for the seizure to be explained

I need to be told that what makes the engine go is the movement of the piston in the cylinder; that if no oil arrives the piston will not move because the walls are dry; that the oil is normally brought to the cylinder by a certain pipe from the pump, and ultimately from the reservoir; that the leak, being on the underside of the reservoir, allowed the oil to run out, and that no oil therefore reached the cylinder in this case (p. 68).

Such a reference to a continuous series, he argues, constitutes *the* explanation of the car's seizure, whereas a mere reference to the leak in the oil-reservoir is "no explanation at all", except to those who can construct the series for themselves.

If this doctrine be accepted, it immediately follows that the historian gives *the* explanation of an event in a sense in which no economist or sociologist could, for the "continuous series" is the distinctive historical method of exposition. But there are, I should say, two closely connected difficulties in Dray's position; first, it is quite arbitrary to say that an explanation by reference to a general statement is "not an explanation at all", and, secondly, the "continuous series" never *is* continuous in the sense Dray contemplates. On the first point, no doubt I shall not be satisfied with the explanation "there is a leak in the oil-reservoir" unless I think of that reservoir as being in some way connected with the point where the seizure took place. But it is enough to be satisfied that such a connexion is possible; in order to understand the explanation, I do not have to know in detail what form the connexion takes. When the dentist tells me that I have a decayed tooth, I understand why I have been suffering from pains in my jaw; yet I certainly cannot construct a series of events leading from the decayed tooth to the sore jaw. Similarly, if Goodwin tells me in his *French Revolution* that "the labourer preferred the sickle to the scythe because . . . it made gleaning more profitable" (p. 23), this is surely an explanation, even if neither Goodwin nor I could explain what it is about the shape of the scythe which has the effect of making gleaning less profitable. If the explanation is defective, this will be because we cannot, in the situation as it has so far been described to us, see why the labourer would prefer the more to the less profitable, not because there are gaps in the detail.

The second point is that there are bound to be breaks in continuity. In the garage example Dray has presumed, for example, that we are not interested in knowing what happens inside the pump. The continuities described by even the most meticulous historians contain gaps compared with which the transition from oil-leak to engine seizure is a mere bagatelle. The story must be told in detail if the mechanisms involved are of a peculiarly mysterious nature, cutting across our natural expectations, but in any other case the mere fact that there are transitions left undescribed does not in the least worry us—and if it did the story could never be told. It is always possible to ask further questions. Told that the engine has seized because there is a leak in the reservoir, we can ask "Why does the engine seize when there is a leak?" But the original answer—"there is a leak"—was, all the same, a completely satisfactory reply to the original question "Why has the engine-seized?"

Oddly enough, Dray seems in a way to admit both these points—at least he grants that the degree of detail we demand will depend on what we already take to be familiar, and that it is always possible in principle to ask for more detail. But he does not accept what seem to be the inevitable consequences: that there is no such thing as *the* explanation, and that, in a particular instance and for a particular audience, a single general statement can be a completely adequate explanation.

This connects with Dray's fifth, and in many ways most interesting, line of criticism. The prevailing analysis of explanation, he argues, wrongly presumes that an explanation always mentions propositions from which the explicandum *necessarily* follows, whereas in fact the historian is normally content to show that certain events *could possibly* have taken place. He selects as his example (pp. 158-9) a listener to a radio description of a baseball match who is told that a ball is flying high in the air on a course which would take it twenty feet above the fence; then, at the next moment, that an outfielder has caught it. The listener is puzzled until it is explained to him that a platform stood on the edge of the field; the outfielder ran up the platform and caught the ball. The function of such an explanation, Dray argues, is to show, by a more detailed examination of the situation, how the outfielder *could* have caught the ball; the explanation does not mention principles from which it can be deduced that the ball *must* be caught.

No doubt, problems—scientific problems as well as historical problems—often arise in the way Dray has described; something seems to have happened that cuts right across our expectations. We believe, say, that X's are never Y's and then an X turns up which, on the face of it, is very clearly a Y. The historian has then to explain how the apparent Y-ness of X can be reconciled with our expectations.

Thus, in the present instance, the fact that the outfielder caught the ball seems to conflict with our belief that no outfielder is twenty feet high. In attempting to solve the problem set by this discrepancy in our experience, the difficult thing, certainly, is to discover the special circumstances (*e.g.* the existence of a platform) which make the situation a peculiar one. Nevertheless—and this is all Popper and Hempel need to argue—the explanation can be set out in the familiar logical pattern: "A professional outfielder on a platform can catch a high ball; this professional outfielder was on a platform; therefore he can catch the ball." The general statement is relatively trivial, the fact that the outfielder was on a platform may be extremely difficult to discover—but that is not the point. The form of the explanation is not affected by the relative degree of unfamiliarity of its major and minor premises.

The really serious question is whether a satisfactory explanation need refer to sufficient or only to ("important") necessary conditions. The baseballer might have dropped the catch; how, then, can his being on the platform serve as a sufficient explanation of his catching the ball? This is a large, difficult, now much-discussed philosophical problem. But if we keep it in mind that a request for an explanation always arises out of a specific gap in our knowledge, we can at least see the lines along which our solution might be developed. Thus, in the present instance, the central question is: "Granted that it is generally possible for professional outfielders to catch balls that come to them, how could the outfielder have caught this particular ball?" Then the answer "he was standing on a high platform" states a sufficient condition for what is puzzling us—how it is *possible* for him to catch the ball—even although it is not a

sufficient condition of ball-catching in general. Indeed, if we were asked why he *did* catch the ball, rather than drop it, we should not know what to say—or would give an answer which amounts to asserting “that’s no problem” (e.g. “Oh, but they generally do”).

One must admit, in fact, that we are often not in a position to mention conditions sufficient to produce a certain kind of effect. To revert to an earlier instance, somebody asks: “Why did Jones die?” and we answer “He contracted pneumonia”. Now, of course, not everybody dies who has pneumonia. If our explanation is accepted this is because it is presumed (perhaps through lack of interest) that the conditions under which pneumonia is sufficient to produce death were also present. If we do not believe this, we ask a further question. We might object “But I thought penicillin cleared up pneumonia” and receive the answer “Not if, like Jones, the patient is anaemic”; or perhaps the less satisfactory answer: “Not always; they don’t know why, but sometimes a case doesn’t respond to penicillin.” Then, at a certain level, Jones’s death is left unexplained; it presents a problem in medicine, and one could quite sensibly assert: “We don’t know why Jones died.” But the historian need not carry matters this far. For him it is enough if pneumonia can produce death and this is not one of those cases where it is known not to do so, *i.e.* if there is nothing, from his point of view, puzzling or mysterious about the death—something, say, which might suggest a deliberate lack of care by Jones’s attendants. The historian can think of Jones as suffering from an X-type pneumonia, or as having the X-sort of constitution in which pneumonia produces death, and be satisfied to leave matters at this level, without at all exploring the question—he would not, of course, be competent to do so—in what this X consists. But he must be confident all the same that pneumonia *was in this case sufficient*—otherwise he will go in search of some other possible cause of death.

Once again, Dray seems at times (e.g. pp. 103-4) to accept the point I am making, but not to see its effect on his view that the historian supplies us with answers to “how-possibly” rather than to “why-necessarily” questions. For it turns out that to answer a “how-possibly” question, unless with a mere guess, is to sketch in a “why-necessarily” explanation. Suppose, in the radio-broadcast example, we do not know that the baseballer ran up a tower, and we do not know, even, that there was a tower on the field. Then “he ran up a tower” might occur to us as a hypothesis; but it would be a satisfactory explanation only if we are convinced that, in the circumstances, there was no other way in which he could have caught the ball. (Of course, we would want to be shown that platforms sometimes stand on baseball fields, but even that would not do if, also, baseball fields sometimes contained helicopters.) No doubt it is only too often the case that the historian can produce nothing better than a set of conceivable explanations—“how-possibly” answers—with no real way of choosing between them, but this is certainly not a situation he finds satisfactory.³

One may become confused at this point, because, as I said, the historian is most of the time describing, not explaining. He tells us, say, that Phillip set out with eleven ships; he does not explain why there were eleven ships rather than ten or twelve, and he is under no obligation to do so. Now suppose somebody contests the historian’s account, arguing that there must have been more than eleven ships, because a thousand people could not have fitted into that number of ships. Then the historian might rebut that suggestion by pointing out that there are plenty of other recorded cases where passengers were fitted tightly into ships. He has still not explained why Phillip had eleven ships: his “showing-how-possibly” is simply a denial of a general statement used to construct, against his descriptive account, a “necessarily-not” argument. Just as describing is not explaining, so, equally, rebutting is not explaining. An explanation of course can be a rebuttal—the strongest rejection of “necessarily-not” is “necessarily-so”—but a rebuttal need not be explanation. “How could he possibly have died—I saw him only yesterday” can be answered by “you didn’t see him yesterday; you saw his twin brother” or by “people of his sort often die suddenly”. These are not explanations of his death, but merely a rejection of an alleged impossibility. But if we give the explanation:

³I have discussed this point in a little more detail in an article on “The Objectivity of History” which appeared in *Philosophy*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 125, Ap. 1958, pp. 97-111.

"He had a coronary occlusion", this—with the limitations suggested above—is an answer to the question "Why did he die?" as well as to "How could he possibly have died?"

It will by now be apparent that for all the interest and liveliness of Dray's book, he does not really overthrow the Popper-Hempel account of explanation, although he does help us to see at what point it needs to be worked out in greater detail or, even, amended. The kind of defect his argument contains can be further illustrated in his accounts of causal explanation and explanation by "principles of action". On causality, Dray is loose and confused. Thus, for example, he writes that "it cannot be denied (and *logically* cannot) that if, whenever I produce an x then a y follows, then x causes y " (p. 95). Consider, however, a psychiatrist who discovers that by administering a drug he can produce an improvement in the condition of his patients. Is he logically forced to conclude that the administration of the drug causes the improvement? Not at all. In fact, he uses a *placebo* as a control, and may discover that the improvement still takes place when the *placebo* is substituted for the drug. Then the psychiatrist concludes that whatever else—say, the look of interest on his face—is producing the improvement, the drug certainly is not, even although an improvement always follows the administration of the drug. Having discovered that the *placebo* is as effective as the drug, he will no doubt often try to devise situations in which the drug can be administered without producing the supposed effect. But this will be in order to obtain a clue as to what *does* produce the effect: not to show that the drug is, after all, the cause.

The examples Dray gives of causal relations—"dirt causes disease" (p. 70), "the cause of road accidents is speed" (p. 104)—are quite fantastically loose. To objections of this sort, Dray replies by anticipation: philosophers, he says, are "inventing" (p. 112) a special "stricter" sense of the word "cause" and trying to foist it upon historians as the ordinary use of the word. But one does not have to be a philosopher to see that "speed is the cause of accidents", for example, is a statement which belongs to that kingdom in which exaggeration reigns—propaganda. A historian is not a scientist, but he can surely be expected to use words like "cause" with somewhat more discrimination than a propagandist; if he is going to describe as the "cause" of x anything which is sometimes a factor in the production of it, then it is not only philosophers who will be misled.

The question how explanation by laws is related to explanation by reasons or "principles" is of such intricacy that one should perhaps be content merely to record the fact that Dray states that there is a distinct difference between the two modes of explanation, and that historical explanation is generally of the "*rationale*" form. One can see why he says what he does. Consider the two explanations: "He refused the Prime Ministership because he was a manic-depressive type, and they had approached him at the despressive stage of his cycle", and "He refused the Prime Ministership because he felt unequal to the strain". It could be quite natural to say that the first explanation deduced his refusal from a general statement about the behaviour of manic-depressives, whereas the second describes the "*rationale*" of his action, the "principle" to which he referred his conduct—"Never take on a job if you feel unequal to the strain". And there can be no doubt that historical explanations are generally of the second rather than the first type—although Dray allows, as not all historians do, that the historian is quite entitled to, and indeed should, make use of the "psychological" as distinct from the "rational" explanation when the essential information is available to him.

In that final remark, of course, lies the rub. For the historian has not usually the sort of competence necessary in order to analyse the behaviour of his subjects at any but the common-sense, non-technical, level. Yet the risk, certainly, is that historical writing will be superficial, offering us excuses and justifications rather than explanations. We all know how hollow-sounding are the explanations of our conduct we give to other people; how often our "reasons" for taking or not taking a course of action have a factitious air, as if they were constructed to satisfy our audience rather than as an explanation of our action; to how slight a degree, even to ourselves, they seem satisfactorily to account for our actions. The historian, of course, need not, and does not, take our excuses and justifications quite at their face-value; but he may be tempted, all the same, to make of our behaviour something much more a matter of principle than it actually is, just because this is the kind of "explanation" of our behaviour

which fits most easily into a polished and coherent narrative. (The "Namierisation" of history is, at a certain level, a protest against this tendency; and we can see what difficulties it creates for the historian.)

The more general point is that explanation by reference to a "principle of action" or "a good reason" is not, by itself, explanation at all. That such-and-such would have been "a good reason" for performing an action is not an explanation of our performing it. For a reason may be a "good reason"—in the sense of being a principle to which one *could* appeal in justification of one's action—without having in fact the slightest influence on us. To take a "reason" to be the actual explanation of anyone's conduct, when there is no direct evidence that this was the explanation, is to assert, at least, that he is the sort of person who is guided by this particular principle—and this, whatever it means in detail, amounts to asserting the general statement: "People of type X, in situation Y, act in such a way as to conserve the principle Z", *i.e.* it is an explanation by reference to a general statement. Only if the historian takes his task to be that of excusing and justifying rather than explaining can he be satisfied with an appeal to *good* reasons as distinct from *actual* reasons.

Canberra

JOHN PASSMORE

Book Reviews

AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER. By Julius Stone. Sydney, Maitland Publications Pty. Ltd., 1958. Pp. xiv + 226. 40/-.

There are many overworked words in this age of double-talk and double-think, but there is perhaps none that is quite so much abused as "aggression". The Americans are aggressors in Lebanon and the Syrians likewise, the British in Jordan, the Russians in Hungary and the Israelis in Sinai, the British in Yemen and the Yemenites in Aden. And the Communist Chinese are aggressors in Quemoy and the Americans in Formosa. In short the word serves at once as emotive slogan and a definition of conduct. By presupposing the issue as adjudged, and implying the automatic consequences of a conclusion, its user assumes an attitude of moral righteousness which these days gives him a tactical advantage in diplomatic practice.

It would be surprising, indeed, in the light of this, if there were unanimity on the use of the word in a legal and technical sense. A moment's reflection will serve to suggest a dozen possible legal criteria that might be adopted as indicia of aggression, and but a further comment is needed to show that most of them fail. Aggression as the equation of "unjust war" is exposed to all the difficulties involved in deciding the justice of political action. The Soviet proposal to brand as aggressor the state which takes the initial formal step of hostilities leaves the victim of Nasser-type intrigues and propaganda defenceless, to say nothing of the state which knows that nuclear attack is about to be launched and forestalls it. In terms of its own proposal the Soviet should allow that American forces invited by the legitimate Government into Lebanon are not aggressors, but they are nevertheless so branded. It is clear that formal characterization of complex international activity is doomed to failure not only because the facts refuse to be forced within the coercive boundaries of definition but also because it is frequently politically inexpedient to permit them to be.

All this is well brought out in Professor Stone's book. Whether, having said so much and having analysed in his usual penetrating way the attempts actually made by way of definition, Professor Stone had done all that is desirable is a question for debate. It could perhaps be said that to pursue the issue of linguistic and political difficulty as far as he chose to do was to flog a dead horse. On the other hand it is worth-while emphasising that attempts to characterize international behaviour in terms of definition do not serve the cause of peace enforcement but rather frustrate it by concentrating on formalities to the neglect of substance, and an exhaustive investigation of definition attempts highlights the point.

Whether it was necessary for the author to explore the analogies between international aggression, violence in internal law and the problem of due process is more doubtful. All are instances of legal endorsement of morally valuable criteria, but the analogy is not, perhaps, very illuminating even when employed only to demonstrate that in municipal law the vague and basic concepts may be susceptible of abstract and precise definition. It was, perhaps, sufficient to say that a judge of the criminality of international action is confronted with precisely the same task as the historian who has to formulate the causes of war. The task may be relatively straightforward as it was at Nuremberg, or it might be exceedingly difficult as it would have been had Franz Josef been tried supposing he survived the first war. On the form of the book only one comment need be made and that is to question the relevance of distracting references to Greek and Finnish mythology and etymology. There is, perhaps, the occasional reader not quite so widely read as we know Professor Stone is, who might not welcome having these allusions explained to him in footnotes.

It is obvious that Professor Stone feels deeply about the problem he discusses, as indeed do all sensitive men, and one joins in his plea for justice rather than words and perhaps shares his despair of its achievement. Aggression as a concept is useful only as a tool for quick

decision when implementing international enforcement measures, but one cannot avoid scepticism when reflecting on the possibility of its being used so objectively. Professor Stone instances the following possibility: "If, for example, Panama asserted claims with regard to the Panama Canal analogous to those asserted by Egypt with regard to Suez, and a great Soviet arms build-up and infiltration took place in neighbouring Central and South American countries, Washington would have to face a situation in the Assembly of the following nature. Security Council action would be barred by the Soviet veto. In the General Assembly the Afro-Asian and Soviet *bloc* votes alone could veto any redress. We leave aside as unlikely, though not wholly inconceivable, that if the Central and South American votes went along with Afro-Asian and Soviet *blocs*, the United States could be forthwith branded an aggressor if it took any measures of self-redress at all likely to succeed."

It has been suggested elsewhere that Professor Stone's book is in reality a case of special pleading for Israel. This is only true in the sense that he fails to examine the whole Israeli-Egyptian chronicle and record the Arab case. What he says about Egyptian action is only too true, and he might pardonably have demonstrated even more intense feelings of outrage at the Egyptian claim both to be at war and to be the victim of aggression, to claim belligerent rights and to refuse them to its enemy. If the author wished to avoid this charge of partiality he might well have devoted more space to laying out the whole sorry story of Israeli and Arab fears and then demonstrated how impossible it is to characterize the activities of the one side or the other as "aggression". The Arab will claim that Israel started it, the Israeli will claim the Arab is keeping it up. Each is equally in his own mind the victim. One feels some nostalgia for the Pax Britannica when there was someone to bang both their heads together in the interests of the common good.

Professor Stone comes to no conclusions and leaves the reader as frustrated as himself. Probably this is all he could do, and if he has offered little hope he has at least cleared the ground of a good deal of humbug and one only wishes that the nations would learn from his acute analysis of the possible and the impossible.

Adelaide

D. P. O'CONNELL

THE INDEPENDENTS IN THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR. By George Yule. Cambridge University Press and Melbourne University Press, 1958. Pp. 156 (incl. 71 pp. appendices and select bibliography). 30/- A.

"When we fully understand the connexion between religion and politics in the seventeenth century", writes Professor Yule in his introduction, "one of the major problems of the Civil War will have been solved." Dissatisfied with the purely sociological interpretations so long in fashion among historians of the "Puritan Revolution", he has explored that major problem at a key point, attempting to discover "the connexion between the Parliamentary Independent party and religious Independency". The result is an essay which must supplant the earlier work of Professor J. H. Hexter on the same problem; work which for twenty years has been a main plank in the platform from which almost every major sociological interpretation of the Civil War has been launched.

Hexter, having discovered that most members of the political Independent party were elders in Presbyterian churches, concluded that there was no real religious difference between the Presbyterian and Independent factions into which the Long Parliament split during the war. In that case, asks Yule, why did those factions bear the names of churches? In seeking an answer to that question he takes his stand on the proposition that "in the seventeenth century religion rather than politics or economics was the medium through which men—even irreligious men—"viewed the world".

Yule's method is to trace the history, composition and policies of the parliamentary Independent party and the history and theology of religious Independency; and to correlate his findings. Out of this process comes not only a better explanation of "the problem of the Presbyterian Independents" than Hexter offered, but an ingenious and illuminating discussion of the allegiance of members of the Long Parliament and their adherents.

The Independent party was not, in Yule's view, simply the political organ of a new merchant-class, as Maurice Dobb had argued, or of Professor Trevor-Roper's famous "declining gentry". It was, in fact, a heterogeneous party, politically, socially and religiously, which attracted at various times and in varying degrees the support of almost everyone who, for any reason, wished to see the Royalists decisively beaten and to gain a substantial measure of religious toleration. "These aims alone united the party. All other aims were sought by sections only of the group."

Independency, both in politics and religion, offered a "middle way" between extremes. "The Independent type of church organization preserved the social structure of the Church of England for the gentry in the sphere of local politics, in no way led to social anarchy nor endangered property, and yet abolished the not inconsiderable religious and social opposition of the anti-Puritan Bishops." Its adherents could not accept even the "lame erastian Presbytery" of the English Presbyterians, nor they Independency, because "the Independent leaders were genuinely afraid of religious intolerance and . . . the Presbyterians were genuinely apprehensive about the religious anarchy that might follow" the institution of a state church based on congregational autonomy.

Forced to stand for toleration against the pretensions of an established Presbyterian Church, the Independent party attracted the support of republicans and other political radicals and of the separatist sects. Like many another centre party it had often to defer to the wishes of its allies, though its leaders were mostly social conservatives convinced of the necessity of preserving a close connexion between church and state. Fundamental differences between the "classical", conservative wing of the party and its various radical adherents, notably in the army, help to account for the veering and hedging, the long hesitations and sudden decisions that mark the history of the party.

This heterogeneity of the Independent party creates the greatest difficulty for Professor Yule in analysing it. Where he is tracing the history and explaining the nature of religious Independency, as in Chapter I, he is admirably lucid, confident and convincing. When he analyses political Independency, however, one is often conscious of a tug-of-war between his desire to give due weight to religious motives in the party and his clear recognition that these were closely interwoven with political and economic motives. The trouble is that "classical" Independents tended to be much more conservative, religiously as well as socially and politically, than many "radical" Independents, many of whom were bitterly hostile both to the church policy and the political order advocated by their "classical" leaders.

Is it, perhaps, a mistake to treat the political Independents as a "party" throughout their history? The quotation from Clement Walker which concludes Professor Yule's essay contains a hint for those who would carry the work further: ". . . they who are Friends, and hold together in one Interest or Faction, are Opposites in another." In one of his valuable appendices Yule lists and analyses the parliamentary supporters of the Independent party. Here are included all who survived Pride's Purge, all who signed the King's death warrant, all who fled to the protection of Cromwell's army in 1647, and some few others. What a divided gang they make! Of those who survived Pride's Purge Yule says that they were "an oligarchy with no positive policy except that of self-interest". But they were certainly not united oligarchs. What had become of their Independency? Even before the purge, the party was deeply divided on issues at least as important as that of religious toleration; republicans against the rest; the minority touched by the democratic ideas of the Levellers against the many who feared those ideas; the special interest of the parliamentary wing of the party against the "interest of the Army". Yule treats the parliamentarians who fled to the army in 1647 as the most important Independents, since they were predominantly Independents in religion and committed themselves to the party at a time when it seemed to have poor prospects of success. Yet a glance at the Lords who fled at the same time discovers only one, Saye and Sele, who appears on Yule's list of Independents and the group was led by Manchester, commonly accounted a Presbyterian but probably a moderate episcopalian.¹ The history of the Independent party after 1648, once

¹I owe this observation to Dr. G. F. T. Jones, University of New England.

Charles and presbyterianism had ceased to be serious threats, was not one of unity in the principle of toleration, nor is it at all clear that the party in power disintegrated simply because of the moral decline involved in a sordid "struggle for place and power".

Some of the component parts of Professor Yule's heterogeneous Independent party seem to display a greater consistency and continuity in policy than the composite body, by its very nature, could ever display. Perhaps it would be more fruitful to treat the party as a series of alliances than as a single party. Hitherto such a treatment was likely to founder on the general ignorance of what Independency implied. Now that Professor Yule has mapped so much of the way and illuminated so much more of it, the attempt would be fruitful.

It is not often that a reviewer wishes a book longer than it is, but here is a case in which an essay of only 82 pages seems too small a vessel to accommodate the scholarship of its author and the intricacy of his argument. Again and again one wishes that Professor Yule's publishers had allowed him room in which to deploy his arguments and his evidence more fully.

The publishers must also bear the blame for some, though not all, of the needless blemishes on the work. Cryptic form and slipshod punctuation make some of the biographical notes in Appendix A obscure or ambiguous; it is mere want of punctuation, for example, that gives Henry Marten the credit for his father's public career. In Appendix A, besides some errors in the biographical notes, we find Lord Saye and Sele described (following Clarendon) as the only real Independent in the House of Lords, though on p. 28 and elsewhere Lords Brooke and Wharton are also described as Independents. The thesis that the army was very unpopular by 1659, though probably correct, is hardly well supported by a quotation (p. 76) from one of Monck's propaganda-sheets specifically designed to discredit the English wing of the army in the interests of the Scottish wing. The "minimum number of Republicans", fixed by Yule at the 34 who supported a Vote of No Addresses on 22 September 1647, is certainly too high (p. 77). In a much less ambiguous vote on the following day the republicans mustered only 23 voices in a slightly thinner House. Note 2 on p. 22 misquotes the title of an article by Sachse; the date of Elizabeth's suppression of the Presbyterian movement appears as 1592 on p. 6, 1593 on p. 31; the Hollis of p. 68 has become Holles on the following page; and the Savoy Conference, correctly dated 1658 on pp. 12 and 15, falls in 1657 on p. 23.

These are some merely irritating specks on the surface of a work which is an ornament to Australian historical scholarship and to the study of seventeenth-century British history. *The Independents in the English Civil War* will take an honourable place, and one much less modest than the author claims for it, alongside those other stimulating essays of Trevor-Roper and Tawney, Hexter and Hill.

Armidale

C. M. WILLIAMS

GEORGE III AND THE HISTORIANS. By Herbert Butterfield. London, Collins, 1957. Pp. 304. 21/- stg.

THE RISE OF THE PELHAMS. By John B. Owen. London, Methuen, 1957. Pp. x + 357. 30/- stg.

ENGLAND IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE CHATHAM ADMINISTRATION 1766-1768. By John Brooke. London, Macmillan, 1956. Pp. xiv + 400. 36/- stg. (56/6A.).

ENGLAND IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE END OF NORTH'S MINISTRY 1780-1782. By Ian R. Christie. London, Macmillan, 1958. Pp. xiii + 429. 40/- stg. (70/-A.).

Sir Lewis Namier made a revolution in eighteenth century studies with works which struck deep but which necessarily concentrated on a few years of English political history only. The method was even more revolutionary than the interpretations, and its influence is to be found in works on subjects far removed from the England of George III. What the master could not hope to complete, the followers have undertaken, and three of the books reviewed here are the products of what Professor Butterfield describes as "the most powerfully organized squadron in our historical world at the present time"—though the description has provoked a protest.

The Chatham Administration and *The End of North's Ministry* are the first instalments in a series (edited by Namier) which will cover the period 1754-84, and will include a rewritten version of Namier's own *England in the Age of the American Revolution*. Each volume will be "the author's own garden plot", but it is clear that both the method and the points of view can be traced to the influence of the editor. Dr. Owen's book is the contribution of an independent, though it is strongly influenced by the dominant school of thought, as other recent studies in eighteenth century politics have been also. Professor Butterfield, on the other hand, is an unrepentant and outspoken rebel against the new orthodoxy, and the first purpose of *George III and the Historians* is "to beat the drum for the awakening of criticism".

It is not the only purpose; the book is also a manifesto on historical method and an essay in the history of historiography. The three themes converge in the thesis that the Namier school is wrong about George III because it has wrong methodological preconceptions, including a disdain for the work of past historians. It may be doubted whether he altogether substantiates this thesis, or even presents it to best advantage. Work as massive as Sir Lewis Namier's demands criticism on a larger scale than is possible in a relatively brief volume, and the concentration on critical points, minor as well as major, occasionally conveys the impression of a merely factious opposition. Sir Lewis Namier and Mr. Sedgwick have shown that there are errors and misunderstandings in the book. All this is unfortunate, because a critical assessment of the Namier method is much to be desired, and Professor Butterfield's qualities and outlook as an historian are well suited to the task. Fortunately part at least of his case has been presented with more balance elsewhere.¹

George III and the Historians opens with a brief essay on The Historian and his Evidence, a lively defence of the critical faculty against the tyranny of "authorities", and an attack on the chimerical ideal of "definitive history"; but the link with what follows is tenuous. Book Two is a survey in six parts of historians' interpretations of George III, from the early sources through the rise and decline of the Whig interpretation. It includes a strong plea for such studies in the history of historiography as guides to progress in interpretation and as aids to a proper impartiality. The case is a good one, especially the stress on the preservation of genuine achievements in scholarship and on the stimulus to perceive the "strategic issues" in handling a period or a problem. Much less fortunate is the emphasis placed both here and in the criticism of the Namier school on the minor question of deciding what is really original in the work of recent writers.

The survey is limited to the development of views on one particular issue—the question of the King's intentions at his succession and their constitutional propriety. It is of course an important issue, and by concentrating on it Professor Butterfield is able to examine the views of a large number of historians in relatively few pages; but the procedure has disadvantages. Attention is diverted from the general attitudes of the historians concerned to relatively fine points of fact and interpretation, one surprising result being that there is much less difference between schools of thought than one would expect. Macaulay was surely more Whiggish in his general views on eighteenth century politics than he appears on this issue, and Croker more Tory. It is however an interesting examination of variations on an historical theme, and one which certainly explodes the view that historical writing before Sir Lewis Namier was dominated by a crude Whig myth in which George III conspired against the constitution and the liberties of Englishmen. Namier's own position in this controversy is not perhaps quite as clear as Professor Butterfield suggests, and the promised rewritten version of *England in the Age of the American Revolution* should help to clear the ground, though not perhaps to end the argument.

Butterfield's criticism of the Namier school is expounded in rather haphazard fashion in the seventeen brief chapters of Book Three; its kernel is the section entitled "The Occupational Disease of the Historian of Structure", where two related points are made. The historians of structure are said to neglect questions which historians always have regarded and still should regard as

¹For example in "George III and the Constitution", *History*, Vol. XLIII, No. 147, Feb. 1958.

interesting and important; secondly, to ignore the importance of ideas and ideals in history. "We are given a story which becomes silent or curiously neglectful as it touches the very things that governments and parliaments exist to do." We are told how Parliaments are elected, how ministries rise and fall, but little about the origins of policy, of ideas and attitudes. "Because the Whig historians took ideological pretensions too much at their face value, the modern school tend to drain the intellectual content out of the things that politicians do." Butterfield pleads for "narrative in depth"—accounts which combine narrative with structural analysis, revealing "the rational purposes and conscious intentions of human beings", within the framework of the "historical process, with its systems of necessity and ironies of circumstance".

There is a fundamental clash of attitudes here. Sir Lewis Namier habitually stresses "the deeper irrelevancies and incoherence of human actions", and is wary of explaining human actions in terms of ideological convictions. Circumstance is the basic determinant of history, not men's imperfect comprehension of it. In Mr. Brooke's words, "history is usually made by men who are ignorant of what they are about". For Professor Butterfield, however, history must reveal "ideas and rational purposes" or it becomes merely the play of contingencies, "a rope of sand", and the historian no longer has anything meaningful to interpret. History becomes "a tale told by an idiot".

It may be an exaggeration to describe this divergence of outlook as a clash between "humane" and "scientific" concepts of the role of the historian, but it is clearly a debate in which both sides have something important to say. Unfortunately for Professor Butterfield, eighteenth century English politics is not the most suitable ground on which to champion ideas and great purposes as the real stuff of history. The application of a narrowly conceived structural analysis to other places and periods is a much more vulnerable target. But he makes some specific criticisms. George III was in fact a conscious constitutional innovator, and the early years of his reign saw a real constitutional struggle and not a mere faction fight. The parties of the period were mental as well as material phenomena; and the much debated issue of corruption and the King's Friends cannot be evaded merely by calling placemen "civil servants". "We must not assume that if corruption and jobbery have been made historically understandable, the opposition to them is not also historically understandable." In destroying Whig fallacies the Namier school has turned them inside out, to the justification of the establishment and the discredit of the opposition.

In the exposition of these views Dr. Owen receives some mild criticism and Mr. Brooke a rebuke. (Mr. Christie's book has appeared since *George III and the Historians* was published.)

Dr. Owen's *Rise of the Pelhams* is an impressive book. It is based on detailed researches into the personal biographies of the 686 men who sat in the House of Commons between 1741 and 1747, but its erudition sits lightly in the text (though more heavily in the footnotes). The complicated parliamentary history of the confused period between the fall of Walpole and the consolidation in office of the Pelham brothers is told in great detail, but with a sure grasp of general constitutional issues and sound insight into personalities. The general framework of interpretation follows the Namier pattern. The position of Ministers between Closet and Parliament is shown to depend on two vital props—the willing support of the King on the one hand and control of the House of Commons on the other, control which corruption alone could never ensure because of the ultimately decisive role of the independent members. Although, as Dr. Owen stresses, this is a period "antecedent to the age of coherent group, still more party, organization", he does succeed in describing the politics of the period in terms of groups and not merely of individuals, though any simple two-party story has of course gone for ever. A handful of politicians, the Court and Treasury party, Tories, Opposition Whigs, the Prince of Wales's faction and a large group of independent members are the raw material of the story.

The Opposition could force the King to abandon Walpole, but it did not presume to impose a specific alternative on the royal will. How the Pelhams and the Old Corps of Whigs kept themselves in office and drew the teeth of the Opposition by detaching from it Pulteney, Carteret and the "New Whigs"; how they quarrelled with Carteret and eventually displaced

him with the help of "New Allies" from the opposition, in the so-called Broad-bottomed Administration; how they eventually forced the King to accept this situation—all this is carefully unravelled and becomes (if one is willing to immerse oneself in it) even a dramatic story. Dr. Owen maintains that the King himself and not the machinations of a Whig oligarchy were responsible for George II's unhappy position, but perhaps he under-estimates the finesse of the Pelhams in keeping to the narrow but crooked path. Carteret loses much of his reputation as a thwarted genius, and Newcastle his as an eccentric fool; Henry Pelham emerges as the real parliamentary manager of the family.

It is, of course, a story set almost entirely in the House of Commons and the Royal Closet. The Namier school does not seem interested in the House of Lords—perhaps with good reason. But there is surely some point in Butterfield's contention that even to understand politics in Parliament we need sometimes to go outside it, and not only at election times; and even occasionally to go outside the narrow political nation itself. The omission is not serious in Dr. Owen's period, though such an excursion might have helped to explain the persistence of the Tories as a group, and to explain too why the traditional opposition policies of Place Bills, repeal of the Septennial Act and so on retained their popularity. The so-called radicalism of London should also enter the picture. And, as Mr. Christie recognizes, Court versus Country is one of the most persistent political issues of the eighteenth century, and it is surely necessary to go outside Parliament to explain it.

This concentration on the House of Commons is much less defensible in the period after 1760, when political controversy "out of doors" raged so much more strongly. The pamphlet controversies of the decade may have been mainly the reflections of the struggle for office within Parliament, unscrupulous apologies rather than genuine statements of principle, but this is a case which must be proved, not assumed; and it cannot be proved merely by showing that Burke's is not an accurate description of constitutional realities. Mr. Brooke avoids the question by deliberately limiting his aim to the telling of the purely parliamentary story of the Chatham administration, a story he tells very well. The tale is a strange one—a Government formed round the foremost statesman of his generation, who promptly abdicated control but not office under the stress of an obscure illness; an opposition uniting briefly and splitting again when the administration absorbed the Bedford group, thus retaining office but forcing the resignation of its nominal but incapacitated head. Within its self-imposed limits the narrative is masterly, especially the chapter on the negotiations of 1767. Lack of material unfortunately prevents more than a brief analysis of the election of 1768.

Among Professor Butterfield's many criticisms of this book two may be mentioned. He accuses Mr. Brooke of failing to see the unique importance of the Chatham administration as an attempt to create a ministry without regard to party, and also of giving too little weight to questions of constitutional principle in his analysis of parties, especially in the case of the Rockingham Whigs.

The points are pressed rather too hard. Mr. Brooke frequently mentions Chatham's impatience of party considerations, and describes him as "the last English statesman to attempt to rule without the aid of party"—though he certainly exaggerates in claiming that all other administrations were as great a hotch-potch of conflicting elements as Chatham's. But the importance one attaches to this question depends on one's general assessment of parties at this time, and Mr. Brooke's essay on Party in the Age of Grafton and Chatham is an able statement of an extreme position in this particular debate. It is relatively easy to show that party groups existed only in the "flying squadron" of members between the placemen and the independents, that groups were of different kinds, and that as groups they had exceedingly soft edges. And it is easy to depict the Rockinghams as a group unique not in their devotion to constitutional principle but in their combination of aristocratic arrogance and popular cant. Perhaps it is too easy; a counter-attack may be expected.

Mr. Christie certainly gives more weight to principle and policy as determinants of party grouping in *The End of North's Ministry*, though he believes that this was a new development arising partly from the Reform Movement of 1779-80, but fundamentally from the American War. By 1780 it is no longer possible to ignore political movements "out of doors", or the

reality of differences of opinion over policy. Mr. Christie deals with them only as they impinge on Parliament, but tries to give them due weight—though there is room here for disagreement. Once again the political narrative is excellent. The crumbling of North's majority is carefully analysed, with due attention to divisions in the Cabinet, to the alienation of the independents, and to the "ratting" of supporters reluctant to remain in a sinking ship. The Reform Movement was strong, but it failed to dislodge even so weak a Government as North's, and it was only the defeat at Yorktown and the House of Commons' repudiation of the American war which made a new ministry inevitable.

There is much more than narrative in the book. A full-scale analysis of the election of 1780 and of the House of Commons which it produced provides both a confirmation and a development of Sir Lewis Namier's work on the 1760's. The basic pattern of the dominance of local and private interests is confirmed, but in both elections and party affiliations political convictions are more prominent factors. The great Rockingham confederation in opposition looms as the party of the future, with Mr. Fox to give it popular vigour; but the appearance of young Mr. Pitt on the side-lines reminds us that in the eighteenth century Kings could ultimately deny the "reversionary interest" of even the strongest opposition. Comic relief is provided by Mr. Gibbon, in assiduous attendance at Robinson's office in the hope of obtaining a safe Treasury seat in the election, being accidentally locked in the ante-chamber for the night when Robinson left by the back door.

Both Mr. Brooke and Mr. Christie can be accused of lack of sympathy to the opposition. There is a hint occasionally that they are willing to accept expressions of loyalty to the royal administration at their face value, while doubting the disinterestedness of statements opposing royal influence. As far as politicians "out" but wanting to get "in" are concerned scepticism is necessary, but the tradition of opposition to the whole system which linked royal rule to a dependent element in Parliament was much more respectable, even if it had little to offer as an alternative. Further study of the opposition is to be hoped for, and "the structure of politics" needs to be placed more fully in the structure of society as a whole.

Structural analysis is rapidly laying bare how England was governed in the eighteenth century; if it is not telling us much about what governments did it is partly because they did so little. Perhaps the great issues Professor Butterfield longs for did not exist, and we have to go to other places and periods for them. It is necessary to avoid a situation in which methods undoubtedly fruitful for the age of George III are too crudely applied to other men and other manners.

Professor Butterfield's drum-beating is therefore to be welcomed; unanimity in historical interpretation is as unattainable a goal as a truly Broad-bottomed Administration was in the eighteenth century—and it is much less desirable. These books are recommended to all interested in the analysis of political behaviour, even to those who find the air of the eighteenth century too rarefied for their comfort.

Melbourne

J. R. POYNTER

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE INDONESIAN-DUTCH NEGOTIATIONS AND THE HOGE VELUWE TALKS. By Idrus Nasir Djajadiningrat. Ithaca, New York: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1958, Monograph Series. Pp. x + 128, appendices, bibl. \$2.50.

Mr. Djajadiningrat's important and well-documented study is a most welcome addition to the excellent Monographs and Interim Reports brought out by the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project in the course of the past few years. The author—in former years an official in various Indonesian government agencies, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—has made an important contribution to our knowledge of the early stages of the protracted "too-little-too-late" drama of Dutch-Indonesian relations. This important period has so far received little scholarly attention, in spite of the fact that it was, as Mr. Djajadiningrat so well shows, in many ways crucial and also symptomatic for the course of later events. The drama is, after all, by no means concluded: Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) is its sorry last act.

The analysis falls into three parts, the internal political constellation in the Netherlands, the parallel study of Indonesian political configurations, and, third, the international setting, in particular the part played by the British who had been vested with military responsibility over the Indonesian islands on the eve of the Japanese surrender in August 1945. Of these three aspects of the problem, Mr. Djajadiningrat has given his greatest attention to the developments in the Netherlands. He has promised us for a later date a comprehensive account of contemporary Indonesian politics which are not fully dealt with in the present volume. Finally, while the third aspect has been briefly covered, the author's discussion of the international complications seems to add little of substance to Miss Woodman's fairly comprehensive account in *The Republic of Indonesia* (New York, 1955, Ch. 10). Organizationally, the three aspects have not always been kept separate, a stylistic defect which might well be removed in the more definitive study planned by the author.

Djajadiningrat's outstanding merit is that he has placed the Indonesian conflict within the context of Dutch domestic politics in the immediate post-war period. This is a significant achievement, for only too often are colonial policies dealt with *in vacuo*, as if they existed independently of the political forces in the metropolitan country. Djajadiningrat, who has made excellent use of Dutch parliamentary records, the summary records of the Hoge Veluwe talks and, above all, of personal information received from some of the leading *dramatis personae* on either side of the conference table, shows how Dutch politics, emerging from years of German occupation, inhibited a positive, or for that matter a realistic, approach to the Indonesian problem. Cut off from the Indies during the war, and experiencing significant changes in the domestic political climate, the public and the political leadership in the Netherlands were ill-prepared to cope with the vexing problems posited by the rapid evolution of Indonesian political developments during the Japanese occupation. If anything, a more or less traditional inertia regarding the colonies—often bewailed by pre-war commentators in the mother country—coupled with conservative intransigence virtually doomed all prospects for an imaginative settlement with the young Indonesian republic.

The Drees-Schermerhorn Government, largely appointed from among resistance leaders, was as yet lacking solid and organized party support. It faced a far from tractable provisional legislature whose party composition dated back to the 1937 elections, and which therefore gave more than ample opportunity for conservatives and diehards to obstruct the Cabinet's early and uncertain gropings for peace in the Indies. Men like Professor Logeman, the Minister of Colonies, and the Lt. Governor-General, Dr. van Mook, were thus fighting a difficult, and ultimately a losing, battle at home. Djajadiningrat highlights this situation when he shows that van Mook's draft proposal, submitted to the Republicans in March 1946, was disavowed by the Dutch Cabinet at the very outset of the Hoge Veluwe talks. Prime Minister Sjahrir's willingness to negotiate on the basis of van Mook's proposal was dissipated when the Netherlands Government submitted a draft protocol pruned of all traces of substantial compromise. The drama's first act thus ended before the Hoge Veluwe talks—the first ray of hope since the fall of 1945—had properly begun.

Let me end this brief appraisal with one major question. I am wondering whether in a definitive study of this period a fourth factor should not be added: the influence, direct or indirect, wielded by European and Eurasian groupings in Indonesia upon the lawmakers and leaders in the Netherlands. In the present monograph, Dr. van Mook appears as the only significant "link" between the colony and the mother country. Surely he cannot have worked in isolation, without experiencing the pressures of the army, navy, *entrepreneurs*, planters, and, last but by no means least, high-ranking officials, especially those of the *Binnenlandsch Bestuur* (Department of Interior Administration)? Information about the attitudes of, and pressures exerted by, these forces may be difficult to come by, but their inclusion would add a valuable dimension to Mr. Djajadiningrat's excellent study.

Rochester, N.Y.

HARRY J. BENDA

A HISTORY OF CANTERBURY, VOLUME I: TO 1854. General Editors James Hight and C. R. Straubel. Canterbury Centennial Association. Christchurch, Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd., 1957. Pp. 287. 22/6 N.Z.

A History of Canterbury was begun to mark the 140 New Zealand centennial, but was set aside during the war, and revived for the 1949 Canterbury centennial. Since then it has been expanded into three volumes with five separate authors. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the architecture of volume one is formless. It consists of three separate sections each with its separate author. Dr. Jobberns begins with an "introductory geographical appreciation", followed by Mr. Straubel on Maori and European to 1850, and Professor Webb on the Canterbury Association and its settlement. Dr. Jobberns is a distinguished Canterbury geographer, and historical geography at present is fashionable. Still, in this instance, I think the historians could have painted their own landscape more appropriately, and so reduced the number of separate authors and watertight compartments. Mr. Straubel's section compared to Professor Webb's is excessively long and detailed, taking up more than half the volume. Yet it deals only with the relatively few people who came to Canterbury before 1850, not with the main stream of settlement.

This lack of proportion is symptomatic of two very different kinds of history. Mr. Straubel is the thorough, painstaking collector and purveyor of detailed facts. Professor Webb is selective and imaginative. More careful planning and co-ordination might have ironed out some of the disparity between them. And it might also have placed the chapters on the purchase of the Canterbury block and the choice of the site for the Canterbury settlement where they belong, in the third not the second section.

There is little that is new in the contents of this volume except the assembling together of hitherto scattered material. Mr. Straubel's early chapters are largely a condensation of Roger Duff and J. W. Stack on the Maori, and J. C. Beaglehole and Robert McNab on the navigators and traders. Oddly enough, he makes no reference to the exhaustive researches on early New Zealand history undertaken by the Internal Affairs Department for its ill-fated historical atlas and now accessible at the Turnbull Library, so presumably he duplicated a lot of this spadework. His account of the French at Akaroa is based on official sources and breaks new ground for English readers. It shows how the Nanto-Bordelaise Company attempted to form not simply a whaling depot, but a settlement which it was intended to defend and expand into a colony to be "a counter to British expansion in the Pacific", and "the starting point of the acquisition for France of a much larger portion of the South Island".

Professor Webb is at his best in assessing the character and influence of individuals. His Godley, for example, is no hero-worshipped founding father. He is young and enthusiastic, an outstanding leader with a capacity to give and inspire friendship, mixed with a certain amount of unconscious arrogance and coldness, especially in his relations with his social inferiors. Professor Webb is also effective in dispelling the popular myth that Canterbury owes its class structure and its culture to its founders. Pastoralism not Wakefield planning gave Canterbury its landed gentry. Religion and education were financially starved before the emergence of settler self-government and a secular society. Added to this, is some shrewd comment on "the sufficient price theory". Probably it succeeded in confining early settlement; certainly it failed in providing adequate labour. And paradoxically, it remained to enable the labourer rather than the pastoralist to get land. Outside Canterbury, the limits of Professor Webb's researches become painfully evident. In his treatment of E. G. Wakefield and the theory of systematic colonization, and of Governor Grey and the development of self-government, for example, he has been unable to keep abreast with current research work. The former is largely "potted" Mills and Harrop; the latter suggests an undue willingness to accept the views of the Canterbury settlers and Grey himself at their face value.

The publication of this volume raises a question which concerns not only the history of Canterbury, but also the history of other New Zealand provinces. It is a question of the compatibility of provincial and centennial history. Since 1940 this question has come into the

limelight, because it has become a well-established New Zealand custom to celebrate the first hundred years of the main European settlements by the publication of provincial histories. Yet these settlements were not founded as provinces. Moreover the provinces were superimposed upon them for only a relatively short period. Where provincialism has lingered on after their abolition, it has become largely a historical disguise for a more localized sense of community, except in Ranfurly Shield football. Consequently the provincial historian in New Zealand faces the well-nigh impossible task of welding together a history that is partly local, partly provincial and partly general. Judging by *A History of Canterbury* the odds are against him. From volume one it is abundantly clear that Canterbury is neither geographically nor historically one unit, and volume three on modern social and economic development will no doubt serve to underline this. Hence I cannot escape the conviction that the way out for the Canterbury Association would have been to limit its centennial history either to the founding of the Canterbury settlement or to the provincial period. Then we might have had a more distinctively *Canterbury* history and a more valuable contribution to New Zealand historiography.

Wellington

MARY BOYD

AUSTRALIA'S COLONIAL CULTURE. By George Nadel. Melbourne, F. W. Cheshire, 1957. Pp. xiii + 304. 30/- A.

In the middle of the last depression, when I was a child, a bicycle was known as "a bitser"—bits of this and bits of that. Structurally, this book is "a bitser". Substantially it is composed of three monographs on related topics: books, magazines and the press in New South Wales; the rise and decline of mechanics' institutes in New South Wales, Tasmania and Victoria; and the war of ideas and sects over the shaping and support of education, again principally in New South Wales. Each covers somewhat more than the period from 1830 to 1860. The studies are linked organically by their common concern with popular education and by the appearance and reappearance in them of many of the same characters. John Dunmore Lang, Bourke and Gipps turn up in so many contexts, for example, that one finds oneself impelled to put the pieces together again by following up the index references seriatim.

At a more deliberate level Dr. Nadel harnesses his enquiries by reflecting in each study on the establishment and growth of Australia's culture and sense of nationality. After a carefully-turned, if orthodox essay on general trends in Australian history down to 1860, an account which may surprise by its independence from what is to follow, he prepares for his reflections by examining the immigrant's outlook, the fact and the intellectual consequences of transplantation. He then passes to his three instances of how and why the few proposed to change the attitudes of the many. As C. Hartley Grattan sagely sums up in his foreword: "Dr. Nadel has made a notable contribution to a variety of historical exercises which, it is to be hoped, will be frequently repeated in the future." If they are, Mr. Grattan foresees "a body of data which it will one day be reasonable to synthesize into a history of the Australian mind".

Even then such a history would be rather less than a history of Australia's culture, unless we are to accept either Dr. Nadel's definition of "culture in its modern sense, its artistic or aesthetic aspects", or the definition around which his work turns, culture as being "what people in the nineteenth century called 'the machinery of intellectual and moral improvement' ". T. S. Eliot in his *Notes towards the Definition of Culture* includes in culture the refinement of manners, the arts, learning and philosophy (of which only the latter two really occupy Dr. Nadel). Yet Eliot's grasp still falls short of that fruitful concept enunciated by the anthropologist, Tylor, in 1871: "Culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." One feels that Dr. Nadel's studies can be brought to aid the understanding of this wider complex, albeit they illustrate in the main how material self-improvement overwhelmed and incorporated the institutions created to advance "the social, the intellectual, and the moral condition of the people".

When one recalls that historians from Hancock and Fitzpatrick to Clark and Kiddle have all emphasised how knit together have been the Australian's life and labour, his history and attitudes, it seems odd that *Australia's Colonial Culture* should take a limited view of its

subject. Perhaps one explanation lies in Dr. Nadel's suspicion that "less for the purpose of generalizing than for validating the historicity of some political or social trend, first independence and then fellowship have been woven into historical perspectives. The latter, under the *gauche* but historically accurate designation of 'mateship', received more stress than the former from the 'nineties onwards, as poets and writers strengthened the identification of Australian nationalism with the values of the working classes." He fears, in short, that the characteristics of Australian culture at the end of the century have been artificially read back, for partisan purposes, into Australia's colonial culture.

Yet the impression that emerges from Dr. Nadel's own most entertaining preparatory section on "the mind of the immigrant" should quiet such fears. For what is notable is the similarity of the values in the two eras. And what is plain is their organic connection. On the evidence presented the immigrant's experiences of poverty, of the voyage, and of Australia's mixture of hardship and plenty were akin to the convict's, though written smaller, while the immigrant's conclusions appear to have been much the same. But Dr. Nadel's attentions are not focussed on what remained substantially the same—the general nature of the evolving culture. Instead, his interest is in a comparatively learned, articulate and exceptional group. His deepest concern is not to analyse the value structures of the unintellectual majority but to record the efforts made by the few who stood out against this majority and tried to redirect it.

Dr. Nadel's subjects are urban, and middle class in the English or Scots sense, liberal to be sure, but men of ideas who hoped to save their compatriots from "the skittle ground and the pot-house" and to ensure that "'civilization [would] add its soothing influence on habits acquired by mere pursuits of gain'". As parts of the culture at large the habits of gain, the skittle ground and the pot-house overcame the educators instead. At one point Dr. Nadel agrees that the effort to propagate a harmonious, classless and safe national consciousness was futile. But he does not show how that futility arose because the learned—knowing the relative ignorance of Australians—conceived of Australia as a cultural vacuum which was therefore without values whereas, in fact, its culture and character were already outlined and its values were in such lively operation as to reject the sectarians of moral betterment.

Indeed the most forceful impression left by this book is of Australian society bearing down and making over booksellers and libraries, schools of arts and schemes for sectarian education. Almost despite himself Dr. Nadel bears witness to the small importance of institutional libraries which emptied of texts and refilled with novels for the odd hours of unintellectual lives. He traces the failure of mechanics' institutes which attracted few mechanics and fell to engrossing clerks in phrenology. Most striking of all is the account of the many plans for religious teaching which were converted—despite and because of their differences—into the fact of a lay, state-centralized, equalitarian preparation for a useful though secular life.

Australia's Colonial Culture will be recognized as something of an Australian equivalent, for its more limited period, of Vernon Parrington's *Main Currents in American Thought*. It differs radically, of course, because of the meagreness of Australian intellectual and philosophic discourse. Fortunately Dr. Nadel has the delight of a Van Wyck Brooks in the quirks and careers of those who used to be referred to as "thinkers". He enjoys condensing systems of ideas and following their metamorphoses from Britain to Australia. And he has a quick eye for the quotable. Anyone who has worked in the field will appreciate Dr. Nadel's pertinacity. The general accounts and reminiscences of nineteenth century Australian life and conditions are disproportionately numerous. They have been drawn on with intelligence for the background chapters. But Dr. Nadel chose rare and elusive quarry in pursuing the formal lecture, the article of ideas and the systematic exposition. They have been hunted out with diligence. If students of his work are occasionally stopped by an aside—"Prussia and Scotland, the countries most directly affected by the Reformation, . . ."—or diverted by the high gloss of his style, they will undoubtedly be delighted to find here material for much retouching of the picture of Australia's colonial culture and be pleased to recognize at last, or to see for the first time, a whole row of new faces down in the centre-right foreground.

BROADCASTING IN AUSTRALIA. By Ian K. Mackay. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1957. Pp. 216. 25/- A.

The information on mass media in Australia is so scanty that any serious study of even one of the media is bound to be welcome. On broadcasting there has been none of the books and articles available for a study of the B.B.C. and written by people associated with it.

Mr. Mackay has been active in the New Zealand commercial and national broadcasting service, and is now production manager of the Macquarie Network. His book is not very profound, but it is competently written and brings together a good deal of scattered information. He begins with a sketch, rather too brief, of the history of the system, and then deals with the National Service, commercial and network radio, listener research, and the various non-governmental and governmental bodies involved in broadcasting. A few pages on the impact of television round up his story—these could well have been left out, being much too general and scrappy.

The chapter on the A.B.C. is markedly different in tone from the rest of the book. It reads rather like a combination of an essay by a final year honours student, who'll get his second in due course, with a brief prepared by someone in the A.B.C. All the standard points are made competently, but Mr. Mackay here is much too anxious not to offend anyone, and the result is that the long chapter lacks life. Moreover, it never really succeeds in reconciling the theme of the growing "independence" of the A.B.C. with the story of increasing governmental financial control over it. At times, it seems as if the author might be flying a kite on behalf of Sir Richard Boyer, as when he suggests that in recent years the A.B.C. possibly "suffered more from parliamentary ignorance than interference, and I believe the Commission might welcome, say, a triennial parliamentary investigation. . . ."

Where Mr. Mackay uses his personal experience, and lets himself go a little, as in the chapter on Listener Research, he is much more interesting. Pretty clearly, though very politely, he suggests that radio has been sold a pup and should concentrate on getting measurements of station audiences, rather than particular programme ratings. He agrees with Lazarsfeld that surveys should try and probe listener dissatisfaction. It might well be the case that an entirely different programme, fully exploited, could secure as high a rating as the standard fare does.

The author naturally puts commercial radio in the most favourable light, but he gives the facts which make possible a somewhat different appraisal. It is clear enough that competition between stations is declining, and that the enterprising stations are few and far between. If there is timidity on the part of the A.B.C., the same would hold true of most commercial stations.

Rather than try and summarize his story, or comment on it, I would like to concentrate on a few generalizations which seem to be implied in this book.

First, it seems that whatever broadcasting system a country adopts, there is little evidence of widespread popular dissatisfaction with it. The presence of an educated élite, as in Britain, may increase serious interest in radio, but that interest is bound to be that of a small minority. Most listeners simply accept what they are given "as they do the milkman's visit every morning". Few people in Australia would have even a rough idea of the difference between the status of the A.B.C. and that of a government department, even fewer would even have heard about the Broadcasting Control Board. If these hunches are true—and Gallup Polls, which the author might have used, tend to confirm them—a great deal of talk about radio is beside the point. Mr. Mackay, like most writers on the subject, attaches considerable importance to "choice", to listeners getting what they want, and to their having alternatives available to them. One of the main advantages of the dual system for him is that it allegedly offers a wider choice between types of programmes. But, quite apart from whether in fact the programmes of the A.B.C. are so very different from those of the commercial stations—and the author does not use any analysis to show this—it would surely be important to approach radio listening as a habit, rather than as an act of conscious choice. A discussion in those terms might put an end to the implied picture of the rational listener and might tell us much more about the actual audience.

Second, the study of broadcasting can throw some interesting light on the causes of, or the reasons for, government regulation. Mr. Mackay repeatedly claims radio should have the same type of freedom as the press, but he never really investigates why "Freedom of Radio" has nowhere become as important a slogan as "Freedom of the Press". He does show that Australian governments intervened most reluctantly. Private interests, as yet not organized or "self-regulated", were unable to extend the physical range of radio to country areas. It would be interesting to speculate whether, had networks which to some extent pool resources, already existed in the 'twenties and 'thirties, they could have acted as a counter to government intervention.

Thirdly, Mr. Mackay's book shows very clearly that in one field at least it would be false to speak of increasing government intervention. Very broadly speaking, the story runs the other way. A period in which, at least on paper, the government takes on considerable powers is followed by a gradual whittling down of those powers. Whatever the reasons for this may be, it is a suggestive development. Possibly one reason may be that the A.B.C. has become so respectable, or, if you prefer, "responsible", that it is most unlikely to want to assert its formal independence. Perhaps the government realizes better than many sociological writers that, as far as commercial radio is concerned, there is a fair amount of hot air in the idea of it being of great social importance. Maybe radio has neither the capacity nor the willingness to rock the boat and has, in general, a conservative effect. Another possible reason for gradually relaxed controls might be that the interests affected have gradually managed to organize and have established their right to be "consulted". Reading the pages which tell the story of the role of the Australian Federation of Commercial Broadcasting Stations, of the Associations of the Advertisers or Advertising Agencies, and of their relation to the Broadcasting Control Board, one cannot help but wonder just what that board does "control".

The general picture we are given here is that of a system where fundamentally by now everything is for the best. After initial frictions and fears, the A.B.C., the Control Board, the commercial stations, the press, and the listeners all live in almost perfect harmony. Our dual system "does not hand over broadcasting to the opportunist who would measure the medium in terms of profit, nor to the intellectual snob who would force his concept of culture down protesting gullets". Each partner checks and balances the other. What minor blemishes remain can gradually be removed by self-control.

That may well be the picture of a declining social force in a society in which there are no longer serious social conflicts. It may be so. However one may view such a perspective, it is not true to suggest that the A.B.C. balances and checks the commercials and *vice versa*. It might be much nearer the mark to argue that both are gradually moving towards a common denominator, and that the A.B.C. is being increasingly forced to adopt the standards of the commercial stations. It is hardly correct to state that the A.B.C. is "unhampered by the need to woo popularity by the count of heads". If that were true it would indeed be the only example of a genuinely elitist institution in Australia. Even in a country with a quite different class structure, such as England, the B.B.C. has, since the inception of commercial T.V., been forced to chase its audience in the same field, and its T.V. programmes have changed accordingly, whether one considers that change an improvement or a deterioration.

Sydney

HENRY MAYER

Book Notes

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY. Special Number, July-September 1958—The Passing of Colonialism.

In accordance with its current policy of devoting whole issues to special topics, the *Quarterly* in this number contains an editorial article on "The Splendours and Miseries of Colonialism", and separate papers by various authors on "Colonialism and the USSR", on recent developments in India and Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, Ghana and East Africa, and on "Aid to Underdeveloped Countries".

POLITICIANS. By J. D. B. Miller. An Inaugural Lecture. Leicester University Press, 1958. Pp. 19.

Delivered on his inauguration as Professor of Politics in the University of Leicester, this lecture is typical of Professor Miller's refreshingly sensible approach to topics which have either been neglected by academic political scientists in the past, or been bedevilled by conventional clichés and popular catch-cries. After distinguishing the democratic politician from the charismatic leader, the courtier, and the revolutionary conspirator, it discusses the role of the politician, warns against superficial distinctions between the "politician" and the "statesman", and chides, while it attempts to explain, the popular habit of underrating "the indispensable functions which the politician performs in a free political system".

THE GOVERNMENT OF VICTORIA. An Analysis of the Machinery of State. By the Department of Political Science, University of Melbourne. Melbourne University Press, 1958. Pp. 72. 12/6.

This useful handbook was compiled on the basis of questionnaires and follow-up enquiries to all Victorian State departments and statutory corporations, under the direction of a staff study group set up in 1953. It describes the distribution of functions among agencies of government in that State, analyses the administrative structure, from the Cabinet downwards, and summarizes the work of the different departments and the ways in which it is co-ordinated. It also classifies the various types of administrative agencies, lists the public corporations and other statutory bodies, and indicates in tabular form their constitution and modes of appointment, and their varying degrees of autonomy and dependence in policy, finance and staffing. The survey views the administrative system at a point in time, and does not attempt any historical analysis.

CHECKLIST OF ROYAL COMMISSIONS, SELECT COMMITTEES OF PARLIAMENT AND BOARDS OF INQUIRY. By D. H. Borchardt. Part I: Commonwealth of Australia, 1900-1950. Studies in Australian Bibliography, No. 7 (General Editor, Walter W. Stone). Cremorne, N.S.W., 1958. Pp. 113. 15/-.

The Librarian of the University of Tasmania has done a useful service in compiling this guide to the contents and bibliographic details of the reports of Royal Commissions, Select Committees of Parliament and Boards of Inquiry. It includes a synopsis of each report and a summary of recommendations made. There is an excellent index by subjects and names of members.

THE HISTORY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND. Being a reissue of Book I of *Local Government in England*, by Josef Redlich and Francis W. Hirst. Edited with Introduction and Epilogue by Bryan Keith-Lucas. London, Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1958. Pp. xv + 261. 30/- stg.

The only previous edition of Redlich and Hirst, in 1903, consisted of what has become the standard general history of English local government, followed by an account of the law and practice of local government as it then was. The present edition reprints the historical part, with the addition of some new footnotes and a final chapter, chronicling the main events and developments in local government since the book was first published. Mr. Keith-Lucas, now a Fellow of Nuffield College and Senior Lecturer in Local Government in the University of Oxford, had long experience as a local government officer and also as a city and parish councillor.

